USA v. Lopez-Pino et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Fabian López-Pino, et al.,
Defendant.
Crim. No. 23-353 (GMM)
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are five motions in limine filed by the
United States of America (the “United States”): United States’s
Motion in Limine (Docket No. 1617); Motion in Limine to Admit State
Court Convictions as Self-Authenticating Documents (Docket No.
1618); Motion in Limine Regarding Co-Conspirator Statements
(Docket No. 1619); The United States of America’s Motion in Limine
to Allow Officers to Offer Lay Opinion Testimony (Docket No. 1620);
and Motion in Limine Regarding Authenticity of Evidence (Docket
No. 1621) (collectively, the “Motions in Limine”). For the reasons
set forth below, the United States’ Motions in Limine are GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 20, 2025, a grand jury returned a seven-count
Indictment against forty-two (42) defendants. (Docket No. 3).
Count One charges conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
and distribution of controlled substances – heroin, fentanyl,
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cocaine, crack, marijuana, Tramadol, and Clonazepam - within 1,000
feet of the Enrique Zorrilla Public Housing Project, Villa
Evangelina Public Housing Project, Vivamery Public Housing
Project, Los Murales Public Housing Project, and other areas, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, and 860. (Id. at 4-13). Count
Two charges possession and distribution of heroin, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841 and 860 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Id. at 13-15). Count
Three charges possession and distribution of cocaine base (i.e.,
crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 860, and 18 U.S.C. §
2. (Id. at 15-17). Count Four charges possession and distribution
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 860, and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. (Id. at 17-19). Count Five charges possession and distribution
of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 860, and 18
U.S.C. § 2. (Id. at 19-20). Count Six charges possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (Id. at 20-21). Count Seven charges
possession of a machinegun in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (B)(ii) and 18
U.S.C. § 2. (Id. at 22-23).
Trial as to the first group of defendants — Fabian López-Pino
(1) (“Defendant López-Pino”), Michael Angelo Reyes-Vázquez (2)
(“Defendant Reyes-Vázquez”), Joshua Siragusa-Romero (3)
(“Defendant Siragusa-Romero”), and Daniel Morla-Reyes (9)
(“Defendant Morla-Reyes”) (collectively, “Defendants”) — is
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scheduled to commence on March 31, 2026, before the undersigned.
Defendant López-Pino is charged in Counts One through Six;
Defendant Reyes-Vázquez is charged in Counts One through Seven;
Defendant Siragusa-Romero is charged in Counts One through Six;
and Defendant Morla-Reyes is charged in Counts One through Six.
On February 20, 2026, the United States filed the Motions in
Limine in this case. (Docket Nos. 1617-21). As of March 6, 2026,
two defendants have responded. Defendant López-Pino filed his
Response to Motion in Limine, at docket no. 1617; Response to
Motion in Limine, at docket no. 161[8]; and Response to Motion in
Limine Regarding Co-Conspirator Statements, at docket no. 1619.
(Docket Nos. 1639, 1641, 1644). Subsequently, Defendant López-Pino
also filed a Response to Motion in Limine Regarding Authenticity
of Evidence, at docket no. 1621, (Docket No. 1662), and Response
to Motion in Limine to Allow Officers to Offer Lay Opinion
Testimony, at docket no. 1620. (Docket No. 1666). These responses
object generally to the asserted breadth and lack of specificity
in the Government’s requests.
Defendant Morla-Reyes filed a Motion to Join Codefendant’s
Motions at DE 1633, 1639, 1641, 1644, 1662 and 1666 on March 6,
2026, joining Defendant López-Pino’s requests. (Docket No. 1670).
Defendant Reyes-Vázquez also filed a Motion for Joinder of Co-
Defendant Lopez-Pino’s Motions at DKTS. 1639, 1641, 1644 and 1633.
(Docket No. 1671). Defendant Siragusa-Romero filed a Motion for
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Joinder of Codefendant Lopez Pino Objections to Government in
Limine Motions. (Docket No. 1672). All requests for joinder were
granted by the Court on March 8, 2026. (Docket Nos. 1673-1675).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal district judges enjoy broad discretion in respect to
the ordering and presentation of proof and the handling of
evidentiary questions.” United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154,
163 (1st Cir. 1994); see Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), (c). A motion in
limine permits a court to rule in advance of trial on the
admissibility of anticipated evidence to avoid interruption or
delay during the proceedings. See United States v. Grullon, 996
F.3d 21, 28 n.8 (1st Cir. 2021).
Rulings on motions in limine are provisional and may be
revisited as the evidence develops at trial. See United States v.
Benedetti, 433 F.3d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 2005). On appeal, such
rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See White v. N.H.
Dep’t of Corr., 221 F.3d 254, 262 (1st Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION AND APPLICABLE LAW
A. Motion to preclude Defendants from eliciting self-serving,
exculpatory statements
The United States first moves the Court to preclude the
Defendants from “introducing any evidence, making any statement,
or asking any questions that include or could be reasonably
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expected to elicit the defendant’s purportedly exculpatory
hearsay” while the jury is present. (Docket No. 1617 at 1).
Federal Rules of Evidence 801 and 802 prohibit hearsay. See
Fed. R. Evid. 801-02. Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court
statement that is offered as “evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2).
Although Rule 801(d)(2) establishes that opposing party statements
are not hearsay, this exemption “exclude[s] the introduction of
self-serving statements by the party making them.” United States
v. Palow, 777 F.2d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 1985); see Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2).
The Government bases its request on Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2) but does not specify exactly which self-serving
statements have been produced by Defendants and are allegedly
inadmissible. To the extent that the United States requests that
Defendants comply with the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Motion
in Limine at Docket No. 1617 is GRANTED. Defendants are precluded
from introducing or eliciting self-serving, exculpatory hearsay
statements that violate the rules against hearsay, subject to the
Court’s consideration of any specific evidentiary issues that may
arise during trial.
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B. Motion to allow the United States to introduce Defendants’
prior convictions as self-authenticating documents
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 902, the United States
requests the Court to allow the introduction of “self-
authenticating documents, specifically, records of convictions”
from the Puerto Rico state court. (Docket No. 1618 at 1).
Certain categories of evidence are self-authenticating and do
not require extrinsic evidence, such as witness testimony, to
support a finding that the evidence is what the proponent claims
it to be. See Fed. R. Evid. 901-02. One such category is certified
copies of public records. Fed. R. Evid. 902(4). Rule 902(4)
provides that these records are self-authenticating if the copy is
certified as correct by “the custodian or another person authorized
to make the certification” or “a certificate” by the appropriate
Government authorities. Id. Thus, certified copies of the Puerto
Rico state court records of conviction meet these criteria, as
they are sealed and properly certified by the custodian of records
of the court where the convictions were entered. Thus, the Motion
in Limine at Docket No. 1618 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART
as to the certified documents showing Defendants’ prior
convictions. Notwithstanding, the Government is bound by the
Federal Rules of Evidence to the purpose of admitting these
documents.
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C. Motion to allow the United States to present coconspirator
statements
The United States requests that the Court allow the Government
to present evidence of coconspirator statements pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and United States v.
Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977). (Docket No. 1619). The
United States anticipates that the cooperating witnesses, who
allegedly participated in the conspiracy, will testify as to
statements made to them by Defendants. (Id. at 2).
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) exempts from the general ban against
hearsay statements that were made by a defendant to a coconspirator
“during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(E). Given that coconspirator statements are not hearsay
under this rule, they “may be considered for the truth of the
matter asserted” when presented by the Government. United States
v. Ramos-Baez, 86 F.4th 28, 71 (1st Cir. 2023).
A coconspirator statement may be admitted as non-hearsay if
it satisfies the requirements in Petrozziello. Under Petrozziello,
the party seeking admission of “a coconspirator statement must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the declarant
and the defendant were members of the same conspiracy at the time
that the statement was made and that the statement was made ‘in
furtherance’ of the conspiracy.” Ramos-Báez, 86 F.4th at 72.
However, this determination can only be made “if there is
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corroboration in the form of extrinsic evidence beyond the
statement itself of the declarant’s involvement in the
conspiracy.” Id. In making this preliminary determination, the
Court may consider hearsay, including the challenged statement
itself. United States v. Mitchell, 596 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2010).
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the
Motion in Limine at Docket No. 1619. The Court will conditionally
admit coconspirator statements subject to the United States
establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the requirements
of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and Petrozziello.
D. Motion to allow the United States to offer lay opinion
testimony by law enforcement officers
The United States moves the Court to allow law enforcement
officers to offer lay opinion testimony based on their training
and experience regarding: “(1) firearm and ammunition, including
identifying machineguns, caliber of ammunition and the use of
extended magazines; (2) items retrieved from a phone via extraction
and Instagram accounts; (3) use of drug packaging paraphernalia;
(4) drug ledgers; and (5) other items within their training and
experience.” (Docket No. 1620 at 1).
Rule 701 sets the rules for the admissibility of opinion
testimony by lay witnesses. See Fed. R. Evid. 701. To that end,
Rule 701 requires that an opinion by a lay witness be “(a)
rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to
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clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a
fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of [the rule on testimony
by expert witnesses].” Id.
“When a law enforcement officer provides interpretive
testimony as lay opinion, the government must erect a foundation
to ensure that the opinion fulfills the requirements of Rule 701.”
United States v. Rodriguez, 115 F.4th 24, 43 (1st Cir. 2024). As
such, the district court must assess whether the “law enforcement
officer is equipped by knowledge, experience, and training to break
criminal codes such that his testimony can help to inform the
factfinder’s understanding” of the communications at issue. Id.
(quoting United States v. Dunston, 851 F.3d 91, 97 (1st Cir. 2017))
(citation modified).
The “line between expert testimony under Rule 702 and lay
opinion testimony under Rule 701 is, in practice, ‘not [an] easy
[one] to draw.’” United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 50 (1st
Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the First Circuit has
“previously upheld the admission of similar lay opinion testimony
about drug distribution practices based on law enforcement
experience.” United States v. Agramonte-Quezada, 30 F.4th 1, 20–
21 (1st Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). In this regard, the Court
has stated: “we have long held that government witnesses with
experience in drug investigations may explain the drug trade and
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translate coded language for juries, either through lay or, if
qualified, expert testimony.” United States v. Rosado-Pérez, 605
F.3d 48, 56 (1st Cir. 2010). “Indeed, time and again we have stated
that Rule 701 lets in testimony based on the lay expertise a
witness personally acquires through experience, often on the job.”
United States v. Belanger, 890 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2018)
(citation modified); see also United States v. Habibi, 783 F.3d 1,
5 (1st Cir. 2015) (concluding it was not an abuse of discretion to
permit an agent to offer lay testimony when the testimony was based
on the agent’s “experience as a federal law enforcement officer”).
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the
Motion in Limine at Docket No. 1620 and will conditionally allow
the lay testimony of law enforcement officers only in compliance
with the strictures highlighted above.
E. Motion to allow the United States to present as evidence
information obtained from the extraction of cell phones,
social media, and other electronic sources
The United States requests the Court to allow the presentation
of evidence obtained from the extraction of cell phones, Instagram
accounts, and other electronic sources. (Docket No. 1621).
Rule 901(a) provides that “[t]o satisfy the requirement of
authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent
must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).
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Rule 901(b) offers many examples of evidence that satisfies the
standard of proof for establishing authenticity, including
testimony of a witness with knowledge, circumstantial evidence,
and evidence describing a process or system that shows that it
produces an accurate result. Id. The standards and examples
provided by Rule 901(a) and (b) are — by design — flexible enough
to adapt to all forms of evidence - including electronic evidence.
Accordingly, the Court will conditionally GRANT IN PART AND
DENY IN PART the Motion in Limine, at Docket No. 1621, as to the
cellphone extracted data subject to the Government’s compliance
with Rule 901 and other applicable evidentiary rules that require
establishing the proper foundation for admissibility. The
Government shall sufficiently show that the phone in question
belonged to the applicable Defendant and that the extraction report
and accompanying exhibits were derived from the contents of that
Defendant’s phone through a reliable process or system. As to
evidence extracted from Instagram accounts, social media, or other
electronic sources, the Government shall also establish the
evidence’s authenticity and establish the proper grounds for its
admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES
IN PART the Motions in Limine at Docket Nos. 1617 through 1621 as
delineated herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 9, 2026.
/s/Gina R. Méndez-Miró
GINA R. MÉNDEZ-MIRÓ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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