USA v. Cruz-Jimenez

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
v.
JOAQUIN CRUZ-JIMENEZ,
Defendant.
Crim. No. 23-047 (ADC)
OPINION AND ORDER
I. 	Introduction
Before the Court are defendant Joaquín Cruz-Jiménez’s (“defendant”) objections to
United States Magistrate Judge’s (“Magistrate Judge”) Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) at
ECF No. 125.
For the following reasons, defendant’s objections at ECF No. 137 are OVERRULED.
Accordingly, the R&R at ECF No. 125 is ADOPTED.
II. 	Procedural background
On February 2, 2023, defendant was charged in a single-count indictment with being a
prohibited person in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). ECF No. 3. 	He later moved to suppress evidence and statements. ECF Nos. 26, 39.
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More specifically, defendant requests suppression of a firearm and ammunition found in his
motor vehicle during a search conducted pursuant to a state-court-warrant. ECF No. 39. He also
moves to suppress statements he gave during a custodial interrogation after his arrest. ECF No.
26. The government opposed both motions. ECF Nos. 31, 43.
The Court referred the motions to suppress to U.S. Magistrate Judge Giselle López-Soler
for a hearing and a R&R. ECF No. 50. The Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary hearing on
February 13 and 14, 2024. ECF Nos. 87-88. During the hearing, the government called Puerto
Rico Police Bureau (“PRPB”) agent Leady Martínez-Cortés (“Martínez-Cortés and/or Officer
Martínez-Cortés”) and Task Force Officer, Ricardo Costales-González (“Costales-González
and/or TFO Costales-González”). Defendant did not take the stand. The parties filed post-
hearing briefs. ECF Nos. 121-122.
The Magistrate issued her R&R recommending that the Court deny both motions to
suppress. ECF No. 125. Defendant filed timely objections to the R&R. ECF No. 137.
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III. 	Factual background1
Defendant was arrested by the PRPB on August 27, 2022 on charges that are not before
this Court. The arrest relates to a stabbing incident in a commercial establishment in San Juan,
Puerto Rico. A vehicle associated with defendant was impounded and sealed by the PRPB at the
scene. Two days later, a Puerto Rico municipal judge issued a search warrant for a 2022,
Charcoal Gray, Toyota Tundra. ECF No. 47-1. The search warrant authorized the search for “a
knife of approximately 3” to 4” inches in length and blood samples or any other evidence found
herein (sic)”. Id., at 6. The search warrant was executed on September 7, 2022. ECF No. 125 at 2.
The PRPB conducted the search of the vehicle in the presence of defendant. Id. A loaded
firearm and ammunition was the first thing “discovered” by the PRPB agents during the search.
ECF No. 125 at 2. It was found under a rubber mat in the floor of the driver’s seat. Id. The PRPB
also found a knife in the vehicle. Id.; ECF No. 99 at 44.
1 After a careful review of the docket, the Court deems that the facts distilled by the Magistrate Judge from the
evidentiary hearing accurately reflect the testimony and evidence presented for suppression purposes. Moreover,
the R&R’s findings of facts are not contested by the defendant. See ECF No. 137. The Court was only able to find
one challenge to the credibility of one witness. Even then, it was a single line in defendant’s objections perfunctorily
claiming that a government witness’ answer to the question of whether or not he knew defendant had an attorney
in a state court criminal proceeding could not be “credib[le]”. ECF No. 137 at 9. However, this challenge is
undeveloped. United States v. Zaninno, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). Moreover, the Magistrate Judge properly
addressed and disposed of that issue. Indeed, the Magistrate Judge noted that “[t]here is no basis for this
conclusion[,]” the “right to counsel is offense specific. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175. It attaches once the prosecution has
commenced.” ECF No. 15 at 11. In any event, this Court adds, the fact that the witness knew about pending state
court proceedings does not necessarily imply that he knew for a fact that defendant had retained or had appointed
counsel in such proceedings. Furthermore, he clarified that his answer was that he did not know “who” represented
the defendant in the state proceedings as opposed to the fact that defendant had legal counsel in those proceedings.
ECF No. 99 at 103 (“Q: You knew, [defendant] was represented by an attorney at that time, correct? A: Well, I don’t
know the process at the State level. Q: You knew there was a state case pending, correct? A: Correct. Q: You knew
he wasn’t representing himself, correct? A: Well that information, who’s representing him, I don’t know that. “).
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On February 9, 2023, defendant was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ECF
No. 3. An arrest warrant and a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum followed. ECF Nos. 5, 8. On
February 23, 2023, Costales-González and FBI Agent Shaun Borland (“Agent Borland”) took
defendant from state custody to the FBI offices for processing and interview before taking him
to the Court for initial appearance and arraignment. ECF No. 125 at 2.
At the outset of the interview and without there being any questions from the agents,
defendant asked the agents to remove his shackles and stated in English that “I’m not new in
this and you know it.”2 ECF No. 92 at 1. He went on to say, “…if I made a mistake, like I said, I
put my hands up and I, I accept my responsibility about everything… But you gotta (sic)
investigate everything, because it's easy to say: ‘No he got a gun.’ You just say one thing. What
about the rest of the history?” Id. The agents then posed introductory questions asking
defendant if he graduated from school. At the same time, the agents handed to defendant the
form titled Federal Bureau of Investigations Advise of Rights. ECF No. 125 at 3. The following
exchange between the agents and defendant ensued:
[Defendant] Oh, this is about my rights?
[Agent Borland] Sí
[Defendant] I know my rights.
[Agent Borland] Okey. But… you…
[Defendant] What you want me, to sign up?
[Agent Borland] Yeah.
[Defendant] I don’t want to sign… sign up anything.
[Agent Borland] Okey.
2 Defendant switched from English to Spanish a couple of times during his interview.
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[Defendant] I just want to tell for (sic) why. Because I don’t have representation here
about… you know?
[Agent Borland] But it says your rights about that.
Id., at 4-5. Defendant then read a list of Miranda rights from the form and without any question
from the agents, defendant and the agents had the following conversation:
[Defendant] I don't want to... I don't want to answer questions.
[Agent Borland] Okey.
[Defendant] I just…
[Agent Borland] That’s alright
[Defendant] I just want to tell you that you have to investigate properly
[Agent Borland] And that’s our job…
ECF No. 92 at 5-6. Without any question from the agents, defendant started to give his side of
the events that apparently led to the search and seizure of the firearm. This first monologue
lasted for approximately two and a half minutes. Among other things, defendant spoke about a
firearm and a “kidnapping” in a commercial establishment. Id. The agents then identified
themselves, asked whether defendant reported the kidnapping, and informed that they were
only working on the investigation concerning the firearm. ECF No. 125 at 3. Defendant
continued speaking to the agents for approximately five minutes, without any questions from
the agents. Id. Costales-González then asked about the vehicle, the arrest, the place in which the
arrest took place, circumstances and events leading up to the arrest, the seizure and search of
his vehicle and other PRPB proceedings after the search. Id. Defendant answered all these
questions without hesitation even though he knew the interview was being recorded. Id.
Defendant did not ask for an attorney, to stop the interview or otherwise manifested discomfort
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or anything that could be interpreted as indicative of coercion or as an invocation of the right to
have an attorney or to remain silent. Instead, defendant seemed eager to talk to the agents.
IV. 	Standard of review
The District Court may refer pending criminal motions to a Magistrate Judge for entry of
a report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(1). An adversely
affected party may file written objections to the report and recommendation within fourteen
days after served with the same. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
A party is entitled to a de novo review of “those portions of the report . . . to which specific
objection is made.” Sylva v. Culebra Dive Shop, 389 F.Supp. 2d 189, 191-92 (D.P.R. 2005) (citing
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980)). “Absent objection by [the adversely affected party],
[a] district court ha[s] a right to assume that [the affected party] agrees to the magistrate’s
recommendation.” M. v. Falmouth Sch. Dep't, 847 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing Templeman v.
Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 247 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1985)). Thus, “a
party’s failure to assert a specific objection to a report and recommendation irretrievably waives
any right to review by the district court and the court of appeals.” Santiago v. Canon U.S.A., Inc.,
138 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998).
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V. 	Discussion
A. The search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition
a. 	The Report and Recommendation
In his motion to suppress at ECF No. 39 defendant moved to suppress evidence of the
firearm and ammunition because the scope of the search conducted by the PRPB agents
allegedly exceeded the limits of the search warrant, which in defendant’s view, was limited to
evidence connected to the stabbing incident (a knife of approximately 3” to 4” in length and
blood samples). Id., at 2. The Magistrate Judge, however, considered a wider range of arguments
for suppression. For example, the Magistrate Judge scrutinized the search warrant to evaluate
if it was constitutionally overbroad. ECF No. 125 at 4. She also addressed elements of the
automobile search exception or inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. Ultimately, the Magistrate
Judge determined that the search was reasonable and constitutionally valid under any of the
arguments presented by the parties.
Specifically, the Magistrate Judge held that even if the portion of the search warrant that
allowed for the search of “any other evidence” was constitutionally overbroad, the rest of the
search warrant (which defendant did not properly challenge)3 was valid and lawful. She
3 Indeed, defendant did not challenge probable cause as to or the specificity of the search warrant alluding to “the
knife and blood samples.”. ECF No. 125 at 5.
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concluded that under United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 677, 682 (1st Cir. 1992), “the remaining
part of the warrant which is not offensive to the particularity requirement may stand.” Id., at 5.
The defense argued that since the knife was in the center console cupholders, it should
have been seen and seized first. Accordingly, the search must have stopped at such point.
The Magistrate Judge then moved to the question of “whether the seizure of the firearm
and ammunitions during the search of the knife and blood samples was valid”. She noted that
the answer to that question lied in the order in which the seized items were found. Id.4 Based on
the consistent testimony heard from both law enforcement officers5, the Magistrate Judge
determined the sequence in which the search was conducted and sequence in which items were
seized. A four-step approach was used by the agents. At step one (1) the driver’s side of the
vehicle was searched first and as such, the firearm was seized first. Id., at 5-66. Moreover, the
Magistrate Judge savvily underscored that the “even assuming that the knife was seen by the
agents prior to the discovery of the firearm and ammunition… the agents were expressly
authorized to keep on with the search of the vehicle for blood samples. Accordingly, there was
no reason (logical or in the text of the warrant) to limit the search for blood samples to those that
may have been found in the knife.” Id., at 5. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge found that the
4 The parties agreed with the framing of the issue. ECF No. 125 at 5.
5 Said testimonies also coincided with the defendant’s statement during the custodial interview of February 23,
2023. ECF No. 125 at 7.
6 The Magistrate Judge determined that the phrase within the warrant authorizing the seizure “of any other
evidence herein” infringed the particularity requirement.
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search was constitutionally reasonable even though they seized evidence that was not listed in
the warrant.
But the Magistrate Judge went even further and concluded that, assuming the seizure of
the firearm and ammunition were “impermissible under the warrant,” an exception would still
render the seizure constitutionally valid. Id., at 7. To wit, the inevitable discovery doctrine
“would apply” because the vehicle was impounded and subjected to forfeiture and inventory
procedures. Id., at 7.
b. 	Defendant’s objections
Defendant did not object to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that suppression be
denied because the search and seizure were reasonable under the terms of the valid portions of
the search warrant. ECF No. 137 at 7-8. Indeed, defendant did not challenge any of the findings
of fact or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge on the central issue: whether the search and
seizure of the firearm and ammunition were valid under the search warrant. See ECF No. 137.
Instead, defendant devoted all his discussion to “exceptions” under which the search and
seizure would have been lawful even if the search pursuant to the warrant was not.
Thus, after a careful review of the complete record, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate
Judge’s unopposed recommendation to deny defendant’s motion to suppress at ECF No. 39
because the search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition under the terms of the search
warrant turned lawful under the inevitable discovery exception. “Absent objection by [the
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adversely affected party], [a] district court ha[s] a right to assume that [the affected party] agrees
to the magistrate’s recommendation.” M. v. Falmouth Sch. Dep't, 847 F.3d at 25.
Moreover, defendant’s objections to the R&R’s alternative grounds for denial of his
motion to suppress are also unavailing. In essence, defendant argues that “the government did
not present any evidence or testimony to justify either [the automobile [] or inventory]
exceptions.” ECF No. 137 at 7. However, defendant did not challenge any factual finding related
to this issue. He simply contends that there was no evidence to show that “when the [vehicle]
was seized there was probable cause to believe there would be evidence in the vehicle.” Id.
However, the existence of a state issued valid search warrant for the search of the vehicle is
undisputed.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the record pristinely shows that “[d]efendant was
arrested after leaving the scene of a murder and entering his vehicle…The vehicle was forfeited
and kept in the PRPB station from the day of Defendant’s arrest until (at least) the day when the
search warrant was executed.” ECF No. 125 at 7. Moreover, under Puerto Rico law, property
used during the commission of a felony must be forfeited. PR Laws Ann. Tit. 34 §§ 1724f, 1724g.
After forfeiture, an inventory of the vehicle would have been prepared by law enforcement and
the weapon and ammunition found regardless of the existence of the search warrant. PR Laws
Ann. Tit. 34 §§ 1724h and ECF No. 125 at 8.
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As to the inventory search exception, defendant only claims that “there was no evidence
or testimony that an inventory search occurred.” ECF No. 137 at 8. But defendant overlooks the
fact that the record contains:
convincing[] testi[mony] that, when preparing to perform the search,
[PRPB] divided the search of the vehicle into four parts… seals on each of
the four doors of the vehicle [placed on the night of defendant arrest] were
intact and opened as each step of the search took place… The driver’s side
was searched first… The search moved towards the passenger’s side behind
the driver’s seat… Then the search of the passenger’s side in the front of the
vehicle… Afterwards, they searched the area behind the front passenger’s
side… And this is consistent with the order in which Martínez-Cortés took
the photographs of the items that were seized.
ECF No. 125 at 7-8. Defendant’s arguments and objections are unconvincing and overruled,
respectively.
B. Defendant’s statements to law enforcement
a. 	The Report and Recommendation
Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation of denying defendant’s
request to suppress statement. In doing so, defendant argues that:
a) 	“At the start of his interrogation by Federal agents, Mr. Cruz unambiguously invoked
his right to counsel; he explained that he knew his rights and expressed that he was not
going to sign any document because he didn’t have legal representative there”.
Accordingly, law enforcement agents were required to immediately stop interrogation.
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Crim. No. 23-047 (ADC) 	Page 12
b) Agents knew that defendant was under state criminal charges and should not have
conducted an interrogation knowing he was represented by counsel at state level.
c) 	Agents posed questions to defendant in spite of his assertions that he was not to sign
a waiver of rights, without representation being present.
Based on the findings of fact previously discussed, mainly those related to the initial
stages of defendant’s interview, the admonishment of Miranda’s rights and the recorded
evidence of the interview, the Magistrate Judge determined that “[g]iven [d]efendant’s evident
willingness to continue to speak (immediately after stating that he would not sign any
documents) throughout the interview, Defendant’s refusal to sign the waiver form without
counsel present was not a clear invocation of right to counsel.” ECF No. 125 at 9-10. After
alluding to the approximately 7 minutes during which defendant voluntarily and without
questions posed, spoke to the agents, the Magistrate Judge considered that, a reasonable law
enforcement officer “would not have understood” defendant’s refusal to sign a document as a
request for assistance of counsel. Id. She also rejected defendant’s creative argument that having
an attorney in state court proceedings must be interpreted as an automatic invocation of his
right to counsel that law enforcement is to respect in every other custodial interview. Id., at 11
(citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 n.16 (1985)). Even if defendant’s refusal to sign
amounted to an invocation, or even if the fact that he had legal counsel in other proceedings
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Crim. No. 23-047 (ADC) 	Page 13
carried an automatic invocation effect with it, the Magistrate Judge concluded that defendant
“nonetheless waived this right.” Id., at 12. The Magistrate Judge reasoned:
[a]fter reading the Miranda form, [d]efendant immediately spoke for
approximately 2:30 minutes without any questions by the agents… After
the agents identified themselves, asked whether [d]efendant reported his
kidnapping, and informed that they were only working on the federal
investigation concerning the gun, [d]efendant carried on with statements
for approximately 5:00 minutes again without any questions posed by the
agents… 	Defendant’s unprobed 	statements were 	related 	to 	both 	the
incident which led to his arrest by the PRPB and the federal investigation.
Any invocation of right to counsel was waived.
Id., at 12. Likewise, while citing to Connecticut v. Barret, 479 U.S. 523 (1987), the Magistrate Judge
found that defendant refusal to sign a document (the Waiver form) in the absence of counsel
was a limited request for counsel (limited to written responses.) Since defendant expressed his
willingness to talk to the agents and did so for over 7 minutes, he had waived his right to remain
silent. ECF No. 125 at 10-13.7
b. 	Defendant’s objections
Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations arguing the exact same
thing that he generally argued in his motion to suppress statements and that he argued before
the Magistrate Judge. To wit, that defendant’s refusal to sign a document “because he didn’t
have legal representation here” constitutes an “unambiguous” invocation of right to counsel.
ECF No. 137 at 8-9. Like he did before the Magistrate Judge, he places too much stock on the fact
7 Defendant did not specifically challenge any recommendation as to his right to remain silent.
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that he had legal counsel in the state court case and blames law enforcement for not actively
trying to clarify the extent of his refusal to sign a form without counsel. Id.
Defendant raises no new arguments or legal authority in support of the arguments
already addressed by the Magistrate Judge. After a careful review of the record, the Court finds
that defendant’s arguments are unconvincing and overrules his objections, at ECF No. 137.
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. This protection includes the right to
be warned about the right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel at a custodial
interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 394 U.S. 436 (1966) (“Miranda”). Waiver of Miranda rights
prompts 	an 	“inquiry 	into 	whether 	a Miranda waiver 	was 	voluntarily, 	knowingly 	and
intelligently made.” United States v. Donald, 84 F. 4th 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Miranda, 384
U.S. at 444).
Such waiver has “two distinct dimensions.” Morán v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
First, it must be voluntary, “in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id., at 421. Second, “the waiver must have been
made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. These questions must be answered after
examining the totality of the circumstances. Id.; see, generally, United States v. Carpentino, 948 F.3d
10, 26 (1st Cir. 2020).
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It is beyond dispute that a request for counsel “must be clear and unambiguous.” United
States v. Oquendo-Rivas, 750 F.3d 12, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2014)(citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.
452 (1994)). In other words, the request “must be such that a reasonable police officer in the
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Id., at 19. “[I]f a
suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal… our precedents do
not require the cessation of questioning.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. A request “that a reasonable
officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be
invoking the right to counsel” does not meet the bar. Id. (emphasis in the original).
The Court cannot find that defendant’s refusal to sign a Form because counsel was not
present constitutes an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. Accordingly, under this
case’s circumstances the suppression of statements is not warranted. See United States. v.
Oquendo-Rivas, 750 F.3d at 19 (finding defendant’s statement “‘I do not understand this, my
lawyer speaks’” insufficient); see also United States v. Carpentino, 948 F.3d at 24-25 (holding that
“I kinda need a phone call to my lawyer, too. I need to let somebody know that I’m here” is
ambiguous and not an unequivocal request for attorney assistance during custodial interview);
Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 525 (1987); U.S. v. Ortiz-Ortiz, No. CR 21-192 (RAM), 2024
WL 621305, at *4 (D.P.R. Feb. 14, 2024) (citing United States v. Lugo Guerrero, 524 F.3d 5, 11 (1st
Cir. 2008) and noting that the Court of Appeals there determined the defendant had not invoked
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right to counsel when he refused to sign waiver of rights portion of form but not discussing the
same).
In any event, defendant waived his rights to counsel and to remain silent by voluntarily
speaking to the agents. See United States v. Thongsophaporn, 503 F.3d 51, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2007).
Based on the unchallenged facts of this case, as discussed above, a reasonable law enforcement
agent could not have construed this statement as an invocation under the totality of the
circumstances under which such statement was made. Indeed, defendant was not only the
interviewee, but he was also the interviewer and the moderator of the interrogation. He decided
what to do (demanding that the agents take off his handcuffs since he arrived at the
interrogation room), and then decided he would not sign the forms provided to him by the
agents. More importantly, he decided he would talk even though he knew he had a right not to
speak and a right to have counsel present. He also decided the topics and scope of the
conversation with the agents. Only after he had spent several minutes talking out of his own
volition and uninterrupted by a single question from the agents, he finally allowed one of the
two agents to ask questions regarding the story he had narrated.
There is absolutely no ground in this case to draw a conclusion different from the one
reached by the Magistrate Judge on defendant’s rights to remain silent and to have counsel
present. More importantly, defendant raises no argument or legal authority in support of his
undeveloped objections.
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VI. 	Conclusion
After a careful review of the record and for the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS
the R&R, ECF No. 125; OVERRULES defendant’s objections at ECF No. 137; and, thus, DENIES
defendants’ motions to suppress at ECF Nos. 26, 39.
SO ORDERED.
At San Juan, Puerto Rico, on this 13th day of March of 2025.
S/AIDA M. DELGADO-COLÓN
United States District Judge
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