Sadiqq v. St. Clair, Inc. et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ABRAHAM L. SADIQQ,
Plaintiff,
v.
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant.
Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC)
OPINION AND ORDER
I. 	Introduction
Pending before the Court is defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company’s (“Liberty
Mutual”) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF
No. 26. Liberty Mutual argues that any claim plaintiff Abraham L. Sadiqq (“plaintiff”) may have
against it as the insurer of the now dismissed co-defendant ESJ Towers, Inc. (“ESJ”) was time-
barred at the time it sought to include it as a named party. Specifically, that plaintiff had to bring
his claim against it within one year of having learned of its identity, and that it did not do so.
Plaintiff agrees with the legal principle that it had one year from learning of Liberty
Mutual’s name to include it in the complaint, but disagrees with its application. Plaintiff argues,
among other things, that the amendment to include Liberty Mutual relates back to the filing of
the original complaint, that ESJ’s filing for bankruptcy tolled the statute of limitation against
Liberty Mutual, and that any lack of diligence on his part is excused by equitable considerations.
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 1 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 2
After reviewing the applicable law on statute of limitations and relations back of
amendments, for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss.
II. 	Procedural and Factual Background
On August 26, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging damages suffered while staying
at the “Máre St. Clair Hotel” in Isla Verde, Puerto Rico, on August 28, 2019—a little less than a
year before filing. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff initially brough suit against St. Clair, Inc., St. Clair
Collection (China) LLC, and Pitts St. Clair, LLC (together, “St. Clair defendants”), as the owners
or administrators of the hotel. Id., at ¶¶ 3-5. In this initial complaint, plaintiff included the St.
Clair defendants’ insurance companies as unknown codefendants. Id., at ¶ 6.1
On January 5, 2021, ESJ appeared in the case and moved to dismiss the complaint
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process. ECF No. 7. Among other
arguments, ESJ claimed that the summonses were “directed to an incorrect name” (i.e., the St.
Clair defendants) and that “the correct name of the appearing party is ESJ Towers, Inc.” Id., at
1 Paragraph 6 of the original complaint reads:
Co-Defendants, INSURANCE COMPANY A and INSURANCE COMPANY B, by information and
belief, are business entities organized under the laws of and with principal place of business in a
state other than New York, whose real names are presently unknown, and that have issued
insurance policy or policies in favor of ST. CLAIR INC. AND/OR ST. CLAIR COLLECTION
(CHINA), LLC; AND/OR PITTS ST CLAIR, LLC, and/or any other Defendant herein included, that
cover all or part of the negligence, risks, damages, occurrences and/or events alleged in this
Complaint. These companies are directly liable to Plaintiff for the damages claimed in this suit. The
real name of these co-defendants is unknown at this time and will be substituted pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedures once the real names is made known to Plaintiff.
ECF No. 1 at ¶ 6.
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 2 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 3
¶¶ 2-3. On January 8, 2021, plaintiff filed its response and requested leave to amend the
complaint. ECF No. 8. The Court granted plaintiff’s request, ECF No. 9, and plaintiff proceeded
to file a first amended complaint including ESJ as a defendant on March 15, 2021. ECF No. 10.2
After being served, ESJ answered the amended complaint on May 25, 2021. ECF No. 13. The
parties then submitted an initial scheduling memorandum on July 19, 2021, where they certified
having exchanged initial disclosures in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. See ECF No. 15 at 12.3
This included ESJ’s certification that it had produced the “Declaration Page of the Policy,” in
compliance with its obligation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) to allow for inspection or
copying of any applicable insurance agreement. Id.
The parties presumably engaged in discovery as set out therein. However, ESJ filed for
bankruptcy almost a year later on June 10, 2022, triggering the application of the automatic stay.
See ECF No. 16; 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). Notwithstanding, on July 26, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion
for leave to amend the complaint again to substitute the unknown insurance companies for
Liberty Mutual, stating that he learned of its identity “as discovery progressed.” ECF No. 17 at
¶¶ 2, 5. Plaintiff also affirmed that the automatic stay did not extend to ESJ’s insurer and that
2 Paragraph 7 of the first amended complaint mirrored paragraph 6 of the original complaint except that it now
included “ESJ Towers, Inc.” along with the St. Clair defendants as beneficiaries of the insurance policy or policies.
ECF No. 10 at ¶ 7.
3 Plaintiff continued to include other named defendants, St. Clair, Inc., St. Clair Collection (China) LLC, and Pitts
St. Clair, LLC, as parties throughout this case despite having listed ESJ as the only defendant in the Initial
Scheduling Memorandum. ECF No. 15 at 1. That is, until prompted by the Court to clarify the situation. See ECF
No. 30.
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 3 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 4
the case could proceed solely as to Liberty Mutual. Id., at ¶ 8. On August 24, 2022, the Court
stayed the case but allowed plaintiff to file its amended complaint. ECF Nos. 18, 19.
On December 9, 2022, more than 100 days after obtaining leave, plaintiff filed a second
amended complaint naming Liberty Mutual as a defendant. ECF No. 22. On January 18, 2023,
plaintiff moved for entry of default. ECF No. 24. ESJ’s counsel, acting on behalf of Liberty
Mutual, filed an opposition on the very next day, stating that the motion for default was “the
first notice that Liberty Mutual was served with summons” and that he would verify with
Liberty Mutual “whether they had received notice from said agency.” ECF No. 25.4 He requested
twenty days to file an answer or otherwise plead. Id. On February 2, 2023, Liberty Mutual filed
a motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff had failed to toll the one-year statute of limitations
period against it. ECF No. 26. Plaintiff did not file any opposition within the fourteen-day
response period afforded by Local Civil Rule 7(b). On June 13, 2023, the Court held in abeyance
the motion to dismiss due to the automatic stay and stated that it would afford plaintiff an
opportunity to respond once the stay was lifted. ECF No. 27.
After three years had passed with no movement whatsoever from either side, the Court
ordered the parties to inform of the status of ESJ’s bankruptcy proceedings. ECF No. 28. The
parties complied on September 19, 2025, and stated that the Bankruptcy Court had approved a
reorganization plan for ESJ and insinuated that plaintiff’s claim had been dismissed or
4 Liberty Mutual was served via the Office of the Insurance Commissioner of Puerto Rico, presumably pursuant to
P.R. Laws Ann. t. 26, § 327.
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 4 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 5
discharged. ECF No. 29 at ¶¶ 2-4. The parties stated that “the only matter pending before this
court would be its ruling regarding Liberty Mutual’s motion to dismiss . . . .” Id., at ¶ 4.
Accordingly, the Court then issued an Order on September 22, 2025, where it stated that it
construed the joint filing as a notice of voluntary dismissal of the claims against ESJ and ordering
their dismissal. ECF No. 30. The Court, after reviewing the record, further remarked that the St.
Clair defendants still appeared as named defendants in plaintiffs’ first and second amended
complaints, and ordered plaintiff to clarify whether it would also voluntarily dismiss his claims
against these entities. Id. Plaintiff complied on October 3, 2025, confirming his intent to dismiss
those claims, and the Court promptly ordered their dismissal. ECF Nos. 31, 32. Partial Judgment
was entered on October 12, 2025. ECF No. 33. Plaintiff was further ordered to file his opposition
to the motion to dismiss by no later than October 24, 2025. ECF No. 32. Plaintiff duly complied
and filed his opposition to the motion on said date. ECF No. 34.
III. 	Legal Standard
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in a complaint “must
contain more than a rote recital of the elements of a cause of action . . . [and they] must contain
sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Rodríguez-Reyes v.
Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation modified). To perform this plausibility
inquiry, the Court must “separate factual allegations from conclusory ones and then evaluate
whether the factual allegations support a ‘reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 5 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 6
the misconduct alleged.’” Conformis, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 58 F.4th 517, 528 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In
addition to the well-pleaded allegations in a complaint, the Court may consider, without
converting the motion into one for summary judgment, “documents the authenticity of which
are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs'
claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint.” Flores v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B.,
886 F.3d 160, 167 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)). “In short,
an adequate complaint must provide fair notice to the defendants and state a facially plausible
legal claim.” Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
IV. 	Discussion
A. 	The parties’ positions.
Liberty Mutual urges the Court to apply Puerto Rico’s one-year statute of limitations to
the filing of the second amended complaint and deem it untimely. It argues that plaintiff had
knowledge of Liberty Mutual’s role as insurer to ESJ since July 15, 2021, when ESJ, as part of its
initial disclosures, produced the “Declarations” page of its policy with Liberty Mutual
identifying the latter as its insurance carrier. ECF No. 26 at 2; see also ECF No. 26-1. Plaintiff did
not move to amend the complaint until more than a year later, on July 26, 2022, ECF No. 17, and
did not file his second amended complaint until December 9, 2022. ECF No. 22. According to
Liberty Mutual, plaintiff’s claims against it are time-barred as a result.
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 6 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 7
Plaintiff does not meaningfully dispute Liberty Mutual’s timeline of events, but also does
not concede the argument. He argues that ESJ’s bankruptcy filing on June 10, 2022, tolled the
statute of limitations against Liberty Mutual—but offers no support for this proposition. ECF
No. 34 at 6 ¶¶ 15-16. He further maintains (although with the barest of attempts at developing
the argument) that the second amended complaint adding Liberty Mutual relates back to the
filing of the original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) because Liberty Mutual had
constructive notice of his claim against ESJ and because they arise from the same accident, facts,
and insured premises as his claims against ESJ. Id., at 6-7 ¶¶ 17-20. Finally, plaintiff appeals to
equity and equitable tolling to negate the application of the statute of limitations and lays the
blame for any lack of diligence on “procedural circumstances outside of his control—
specifically, ESJ’s bankruptcy and Liberty [Mutual’s] delayed identification.” Id., at 7 ¶¶ 20-23.
The Court will address each argument in turn.
B. 	Puerto Rico’s statute of limitations, tolling thereof, and doctrine of solidary
liability.
Because this Court is “sitting in diversity[, it applies] state substantive law and federal
procedural law.” Suero-Algarín v. CMT Hospital Hima San Pablo Caguas, 957 F.3d 30, 39 (1st Cir.
2020) (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 58 (1938)). In diversity cases, the Court “. . . look[s] to the pronouncements of a
state’s highest court in order to discern the contours of that state’s law.” Hosp. San Antonio, Inc.
v. Oquendo-Lorenzo, 47 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting González Figueroa v. J.C. Penney Puerto
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 7 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 8
Rico, Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 318 (1st Cir. 2009)). Puerto Rico is treated as a state for diversity purposes.
Quality Cleaning Products R.C., Inc. v. SCA Tissue North America, LLC, 794 F.3d 200, 204 (1st Cir.
2015). Thus, “Puerto Rico law supplies the substantive rules of decision.” Rodríguez v. Encompass
Health Rehab. Hosp. of San Juan, Inc., 126 F.4th 773, 779 (1st Cir. 2025). If available, “an on-point
decision of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court normally will control.” González Figueroa v. J.C.
Penney Puerto Rico, Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 318 (1st Cir. 2009). If not, then the Court must ascertain
what rule Puerto Rico courts would most likely apply. See Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d
1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1996); Quality Cleaning Products R.C., Inc., 794 F.3d at 206.
For purposes of Erie, Puerto Rico’s statute of limitations is considered substantive law.
Alejandro-Ortiz v. PREPA, 756 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 2014). Accordingly, a one-year statute of
limitations applies and runs from the date the injured party knows both that he or she has
suffered harm and the identity of those responsible. See Calderón-Amézquita v. Rivera-Cruz, 158
F.4th 54 (1st Cir. 2025).5 Further, “[w]hen the damage is caused by two or more persons, ‘all joint
tortfeasors are liable to the plaintiff for the damage sustained by the latter.’” González Villegas v.
Doctors' Ctr. Hosp., No. CV 21-1592 (GMM), 2025 WL 949471, at *7 (D.P.R. Mar. 28, 2025) (quoting
Szendry v. Hospicare, Inc., 158 P.R. Dec. 648, 654, P.R. Offic. Trans. (P.R. 2003)). However, when
5 The current version of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, Act No. 55 of June 1, 2020, codified as 31 L.P.R.A. § 5311 et seq.,
entered into force on November 28, 2020, repealing the previous 1930 Code. See Rivera-Rosario v. LSREF2 Island
Holdings, Ltd., Inc., 79 F.4th 1, 5 n. 1 (1st Cir. 2023). However, because the alleged tort occurred on August 28, 2019
(ECF No. 22 at ¶ 11), the 1930 Code applies. See Article 1815, Puerto Rico Civil Code (2020), 31 L.P.R.A. § 11720
(providing that, in the context of tort claims, liability will be determined by the law in effect at the moment the act
or omission that gives rise to said liability occurred).
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 8 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 9
two or more tortfeasors are jointly liable to the same claimant, the claimant must toll the statute
of limitations against each tortfeasor individually. See Tonge v. Doctor’s Center Hospital, 531 F.
Supp. 3d 491, 510-12 (D.P.R. 2021) (citing Fraguada Bonilla v. Hosp. Aux. Mutuo, 186 P.R. Dec. 365
(P.R. 2012)). That is because the relationship between two joint tortfeasors is in solidum or, in
other words, one of imperfect—not perfect—solidarity. Fraguada Bonilla, 186 P.R. Dec. at 378,
389.6
Despite the parties’ almost exclusive focus on plaintiff’s compliance or non-compliance
with the statute of limitations and the date plaintiff discovered Liberty Mutual’s name, they fail
to acknowledge that Liberty Mutual is not a co-tortfeasor in this case. Its only liability for any
damage plaintiff may have suffered stems from its agreement to insure ESJ, but it otherwise has
no relationship to the plaintiff or to the alleged tort.7 Plaintiff alleges that Liberty Mutual is
“directly liable to Plaintiff for the damages claimed in this suit.” ECF No. 22 at ¶ 7. The only
way that can be so, as per the factual allegations in the amended complaint, see id., at ¶¶ 11-17,
is through the Puerto Rico Insurance Code’s direct-action statute, P.R. Laws Ann. t. 26 § 2003(1).8
6 A certified English language translation of Fraguada Bonilla is available on file with the First Circuit librarian.
7 This is a reasonable inference taken from plaintiff’s allegation that Liberty Mutual “had issued the insurance policy
or policies in favor of ESJ TOWERS, INC. . . . that cover all or part of the negligence, risks, damages, occurrences
and /or events alleged in this Complaint.” ECF No. 7 at ¶ 7. What cannot be inferred from this allegation is an
explicit agreement between ESJ and Liberty Mutual to be jointly and severally liable to plaintiff.
8 The Court is aware that plaintiff claims in his complaint that “[p]ursuant to the laws of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, as joint tortfeasors, Defendants together with their insurance carriers must be held jointly and severally
liable for all the damages alleged in this Complaint.” ECF No. 22 at ¶ 19. However, this is a legal conclusion that
the Court need not credit at the motion to dismiss stage. See Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12. And, as discussed
below, it is ostensibly incorrect.
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 9 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 10
That statute allows an aggrieved party to directly sue the tortfeasor, its insurer, or both. Id. It
does not convert the insurer into a co-tortfeasor.
A recent Puerto Rico Supreme Court case strongly suggests that there is no joint and
several liability relationship between a tortfeasor and its insurer, and that a plaintiff must also
sue the insurer in order to toll the statute of limitations against it. In Menéndez Lebrón v. Rodríguez
Casiano, 203 P.R. Dec. 885 (P.R. 2020), a total of five justices of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court,
in two separate concurring opinions, recognized that there is no legal solidarity (i.e., joint and
several liability) between a tortfeasor and its insurer.9 Consequently, a person who sues only the
tortfeasor does not toll the statute of limitations against the insurer for purposes of the direct-
action statute. See 203 P.R. Dec. at 894-95 (Rodríguez-Rodríguez, J., concurring, and joined by
three other justices), 921-22 (Estrella-Martínez, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also
Tonge, 531 F. Supp. 3d at 510-12 (explaining import of the Menendez Lebrón plurality).
The parties both rely on Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Pérez & Cia., De Puerto Rico, Inc.,
142 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998) in their arguments. There, the First Circuit held that “insured
defendants and their insurance companies are solidarily liable for the acts of the insured.” 142
F.3d at 7. However, in reaching that conclusion, the First Circuit relied principally on two cases:
Arroyo v. Hosp. La Concepción, 130 P.R. Dec. 596 (P.R. 1992), a case that was explicitly overturned
in 2012 by Fraguada-Bonilla, and Barrientos v. Gobierno de la Capital, 97 P.R. Dec. 552 (P.R. 1969), a
9 A certified English language translation of Menéndez Lebrón is available on file with the First Circuit librarian.
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 10 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 11
case that the Menéndez Lebrón plurality considered overturned by later precedent. See Menéndez
Lebrón, 203 P.R. Dec. at 900-07 (Rodríguez-Rodríguez, J., surveying interpretative case law on
the Puerto Rico Insurance Code from 1946 to 2017 and concluding that Barrientos must be
reconsidered), 920-22 (Estrella-Martínez, J., citing Durán Cepeda v. Morales Lebrón, 112 P.R. Dec.
623 (P.R. 1982) and Gen. Accid. Ins. Co. P.R. v. Ramos, 148 P.R. Dec. 523 (P.R. 1999) as overruling
Barrientos). Nonetheless, courts in Puerto Rico and the First Circuit have continued to rely on
Tokyo Marine’s holding to classify the insured-insurer relationship as one of “perfect solidarity.”
See Calderón-Amézquita, 158 F.4th at 80 n. 21; Hamdallah v. CPC Carolina, LLC, 91 F.4t h 1, 26-27
(1st Cir. 2024); Rivera-Carrasquillo v. Centro Ecuestre Madrigal, Inc., Civ. No. 12-1862 (JAF), 2016
WL 1642627, *6 (D.P.R. Apr. 25, 2016). Perfect solidarity between a tortfeasor and its insurer
cannot be presumed and only exists if the insurance agreement establishes such relationship.
Menéndez-Lebrón, 203 P.R. Dec. at 909 (Rodríguez-Rodríguez, J.), 918 (Estrella-Martínez, J.). The
overturning of Arroyo and Barrientos, coupled with the plurality opinions in Menéndez-Lebrón
and the cases cited therein, considerably weaken the First Circuit’s Erie prediction (made almost
28 years ago) on what the Puerto Rico Supreme Court would say about the relationship between
a tortfeasor and its insurer and the interruption of the statute of limitations.10
Applying the Menéndez Lebrón plurality’s rationale here, the Court would hold that
plaintiff failed to file his direct-action claim against Liberty Mutual within one year of knowing
10 Justice Rodriguez-Rodriguez’s opinion explicitly signaled out Tokyo Marine as one of the federal court decisions
whose reliance on Barrientos it sought to clarify. Menéndez Lebrón, 203 P.R. Dec. at 906 n.6.
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 11 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 12
its identity. In his opposition, plaintiff makes oblique reference to “learning” of Liberty Mutual’s
role in “July 2021,” referring not to the disclosure of the policy’s declarations page on July 15
but to the submission of the joint initial scheduling memorandum on July 19. ECF No. 34 at 5 ¶
14. But even under that narrative, plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint still came only on
July 26, 2022, more than a year after the date in which he purportedly learned of Liberty
Mutual’s status as ESJ’s insurance carrier. That is clearly beyond the statute of limitations.
C. 	Whether plaintiff’s amendment nonetheless relates back to the filing of the
complaint.
The only serious—albeit skeletal—argument in plaintiff’s opposition is that Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(c)(1)(C) allows the amendment including Liberty Mutual to relate back to the filing of the
original complaint. The Court will take and address the argument at face value.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) allows for the relations back of an amendment to the date of the filing
of the original pleading if it meets one of three requirements:
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation
back;
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in the original
pleading; or
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom
a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period
provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be
brought in by amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in
defending on the merits; and
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 12 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 13
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). Here, taking plaintiff’s barely developed argument at face value, the
Court will apply the federal rule contained in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) as proposed by plaintiff.
For an amendment to relate back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C), it must first comply
with subparagraph (B) of the Rule. Here, the amendment does not intend to bring a novel cause
of action disconnected from the conduct or occurrence set out in the original complaint. Plaintiff
seeks to hold Liberty Mutual liable for the damages ESJ caused him. As explained above,
plaintiff’s claim against Liberty Mutual is a direct action against both the tortfeasor and insured
allowed by the Puerto Rico Insurance Code. There is no additional conduct, transaction or
occurrence attempted to be set out. The amendment thus complies with the first requirement.
Second, the amendment must “change[] the party or the naming of the party against a
claim is asserted . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C). Here, the amendment intends to change a
defendant’s initially unknown name. Liberty Mutual is substituted in for the party originally
described as “Insurance Company A and Insurance Company B”. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 6; ECF No. 10
at ¶ 7. Accordingly, the amendment complies with this requirement.
Third, the Court must examine whether, within ninety days of the filing of the original
complaint (Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)), Liberty Mutual had “such notice of the action that it will not be
prejudiced in defending on the merits” and “knew or should have known that the action would
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 13 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 14
have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i)-(ii).
To illustrate how to apply this two-pronged test, one need not go too far: Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(i)-(ii) seems to apply perfectly to the first amended complaint. As recounted above,
plaintiff originally included the St. Clair defendants in the complaint, not ESJ. After plaintiff
effectuated service on what it thought were the correct parties, ESJ voluntarily appeared and
maintained that summons had been served on the incorrect party. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff admitted
the mistake and sought leave to amend. ECF No. 7 at ¶¶ 2-3. Thus, ESJ had, within the ninety-
day period provided for by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), both notice of the claim against it and
knowledge that, but for the mistake, the action would have been brought against it, complying
with Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i)-(ii).11
As to Liberty Mutual and the second amended complaint, the facts are markedly
different. The original complaint was filed on August 26, 2020. It is not evident anywhere on the
record that Liberty Mutual received notice of this complaint before the ninety-day term elapsed
on November 24, 2020.12 Likewise, even considering March 15, 2021—the date of filing of the
11 The Court is compelled to note that this is a generous reading of the record. Plaintiff continued to maintain the
St. Clair defendants as parties to this litigation despite having learned of ESJ. See ECF No. 30. ESJ’s inclusion could
have very well been interpreted as an amendment to add an additional defendant rather than to substitute an
incorrectly named one, conclusion which could have had repercussions on whether the first amended complaint
related back to the filing of the original complaint. Because that issue was neither raised then nor briefed now, the
Court only highlights it for purposes of completeness.
12 Although plaintiff sent an extrajudicial claim letter (a tolling method accepted by Puerto Rico law) the day before
filing his original complaint requesting insurance coverage information, ECF No. 8-1, the same was directed to the
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 14 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 15
first amended complaint—as an alternative starting point, the record is likewise barren. There
is no indication that Liberty Mutual was on notice of the claim against it before the ninety-day
period elapsed on June 14, 2021.
Plaintiff’s only retort is to point to the fact that ESJ’s lawyer is the same as Liberty
Mutual’s. That is far from persuasive support. While there is a scenario in which ESJ promptly
notified Liberty Mutual of the claim against it either after being served with the original
complaint or the first amended complaint, there is nothing in the record that supports this idea.
It is as likely as not that counsel for Liberty Mutual was retained by it once it had notice of the
filing of the second amended complaint.
Finally, the Court notes that the amendment to add Liberty Mutual came over a year after
plaintiff knew of the existence of the insurance policy, after all the discovery and filing deadlines
in the parties’ initial scheduling memorandum had elapsed, and after ESJ, the sole tortfeasor,
had filed for bankruptcy. At that point, it is not unreasonable to consider that including Liberty
Mutual in the case would prejudice its ability to defend itself. Plaintiff offers no reason to
conclude otherwise.
St. Clair defendants (later understood to be meant for ESJ), does not ask for the identity of the then-unknown
insurer, and evinces no intent to toll the direct-action claim against it. There is no indication on record that this letter
was ever notified to Liberty Mutual within ninety days of the filing of the original complaint.
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 15 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 16
Accordingly, the amendment does not relate back and the claim against Liberty Mutual
is time-barred.13
D. 	Plaintiff’s bankruptcy and equity-based arguments.
Finally, plaintiff’s contention that ESJ’s bankruptcy filing tolled the statute of limitations
stumbles right out of the gate. First, plaintiff was always of the opinion that the case could
proceed against the insurer irrespective of the automatic stay. In its motion requesting leave to
file the second amended complaint, plaintiff specifically argued that the automatic stay did not
apply to Liberty Mutual. ECF No. 17 at ¶¶ 8-9. Later, after filing the second amended complaint,
plaintiff filed a motion for entry of default against Liberty Mutual, arguing that it had a duty to
answer the complaint notwithstanding the automatic stay. ECF No. 24. At no point did plaintiff
provide any legal authority to support its newfound position that ESJ’s bankruptcy filing had
any effect on its claim against Liberty Mutual. He does not do so now, either. Plaintiff only cites
Rivera-Gómez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631 (1st Cir. 1988), but that case has no bearing on the effects
of the automatic stay on the running of the statute of limitation against a tortfeasors’ insurer.
13 The Court’s analysis is undertaken under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) because that is the only authority cited by
plaintiff in his opposition. See ECF No. 34 at ¶¶ 20, 24(C). However, were the Court to apply the Puerto Rico
relations back rule under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(A), it would apply Rule 15.4 of the Puerto Rico Rules of Civil
Procedure, P.R. Laws Ann. t. 32 App. V. This rule specifically allows for the inclusion in a complaint of defendants
under fictitious names to toll the statute of limitations period as of the date of filing. P.R. R. Civ. P. 15.4, P.R. Laws
Ann. t. 32 App. V R. 15.4; see In re Aprobacion Rs. Proc. Civ., 176 D.P.R. 673, 76 P.R. Offic. Trans. 38 (Sept. 4, 2009)
(containing English language translation of rule). Importantly, it applies only when the name of the defendant (not
its existence) is unknown at the time of filing and allows a plaintiff to later amend the complaint “forthwith” (con
toda prontitud) “upon discovery of the [defendant’s] true name.” Id. Under this standard, the Court would find that
plaintiff did not act with the required diligence in moving to amend the complaint given his unjustified failure to
take any action towards doing so for more than a year after learning that Liberty Mutual was the unknown
insurance company—and only after ESJ filed for bankruptcy.
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 16 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 17
Rather, it deals with the equitable tolling of a civil rights claim due to a defendant’s fraudulent
concealment of pertinent information. Id., at 634-635. Apart from an inapposite holding,
however, the case does provide a useful observation, perfectly suitable here: “Judges are not
expected to be mindreaders. Consequently, a litigant has an obligation ‘to spell out its
arguments squarely and distinctly,’ or else forever hold its peace.” Id., at 635 (quoting Paterson–
Leitch Co. v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 990 (1st Cir. 1988)); see also
United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory
manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”).
The Court accordingly rejects plaintiff’s undeveloped bankruptcy argument.
As to plaintiff’s broader equitable tolling argument, which perfunctorily claims that
Liberty Mutual’s identification was “delayed,” that too fails. There is no indication of any
untoward act to conceal the identity of Liberty Mutual. ESJ produced the insurance policy’s
declarations page as part of its Rule 26 initial disclosures. Plaintiff apparently sat on this
information for more than a year and failed to include Liberty Mutual in its complaint until after
the year elapsed. The Court cannot see how this justifies equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations.
V. 	Conclusion
Plaintiff failed to diligently and properly assert its claims against Liberty Mutual despite
having all the necessary elements to include it as a named defendant in the complaint. Plaintiff
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 17 of 18

Civil No. 20-1445 (ADC) 	Page 18
waited until after ESJ’s filing for bankruptcy to attempt to safeguard its ability to sue Liberty
Mutual directly. Accordingly, because it did so past the statute of limitation, because tolling is
inapplicable, and because the amendment does not relate back to the filing of either the original
or first amended complaint, the Court GRANTS Liberty Mutual’s motion to dismiss. ECF No.
26. The case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk of Court shall enter Judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
At San Juan, Puerto Rico, on this 30th day of January, 2026.
S/AIDA M. DELGADO-COLÓN
United States District Judge
Case 3:20-cv-01445-ADC Document 35 Filed 01/30/26 Page 18 of 18