USA v. Guzman-Matias et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN RAFAEL GRANADOS-ORTIZ,
Defendant.
CRIMINAL NO. 16-454 (ADC) (HRV)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is defendant Kevin Rafael Granados-Ortiz’s (hereinafter
“Granados-Ortiz” 	or 	“Defendant”) 	“Motion 	for 	Compassionate 	Release 	and 	for
Reduction of Sentence under Title 18 USC [sic] § 3582(c)(1)(a)” which was filed, pro se,
on June 23, 2025. (Docket No. 1790). The motion was subsequently supplemented by
appointed counsel on October 31, 2025. (Docket No. 1855). The United States opposes.
(Docket Nos. 1825, 1883). The matter has been referred to me by the presiding District
Judge for report and recommendation. (Docket No. 1829). For the reasons set forth
below, I recommend that Defendant’s motion for reduction of sentence be DENIED.
I. 	B ACKGROUND
On July 19, 2016, the Grand Jury returned an Indictment against Defendant
charging 	him 	and others 	in 	five 	counts 	with 	drug-trafficking offenses 	including
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances within 1,000 feet of
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a protected location and substantive drug-distribution offenses in aiding and abetting
modality, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846, and 860 as well as 18 U.S.C. § 2.
(Docket No. 3). To face these charges, Defendant was brought to the federal system on
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued on July 21, 2016. (Docket No. 7). In due
course, 	Granados-Ortiz 	pleaded 	guilty 	pursuant 	to 	a 	plea 	agreement 	with 	the
Government. (Docket Nos. 448, 451). He was sentenced on April 3, 2018, to 121 months
of imprisonment and an eight-year term of supervised release. (Docket Nos. 1091, 1092).
The judgment is silent as to whether this sentence is to run concurrently or consecutively
to a state sentence he was serving at the time. (Docket No. 1092).
At the time of his sentencing hearing in this case, Defendant was serving a 273-
year sentence imposed on November 2, 2016, by the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance,
Mayaguez part. (See Second Amended Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (“PSR”),
Docket No. 1049 at 13). Such a sentence, however, was later vacated by the Puerto Rico
Court of Appeals via judgment issued on October 31, 2019. (See Docket No. 1855 at 1,
n.1). On remand, Granados-Ortiz entered into a plea agreement and the state court
sentenced him to a significantly lower total term of imprisonment. The state judge
ordered the sentence to run concurrently with the already imposed federal sentence as
to some of the charges. (Docket No. 1855-1). Defendant continues under the custody of
the Puerto Rico Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and has not begun to
serve his federal sentence. (See Docket No. 1885). It should be noted that the Defendant’s
sentence at the state level was for offenses that are unrelated to the federal charges.
On June 23, 2025, Defendant filed his pro se motion for sentence reduction under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) seeking an order from this court to “correct the current state of
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the consecutive sentence” and to remove the detainer that is currently impeding
Defendant to obtain release on parole. (Docket No. 1790 at 9-10). He argued that
extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for granting such relief because he is serving
an unusually long sentence. The United States filed a response in opposition on
September 4, 2025. (Docket No. 1825) to which Granados-Ortiz replied. (Docket No.
1836). Subsequently, the motion was referred to me for report and recommendation.
(Docket No. 	1829). I appointed the Federal Public Defender (“FPD”) to represent
Granados-Ortiz and ordered that the compassionate release motion be supplemented.
(Docket No. 1830). On October 31, 2025, Defendant filed, this time through counsel, a
“Supplemental Memorandum of Law” requesting that the court “order that his federal
sentence run[] concurrently with his state sentence . . . .” (Docket No. 1855). The
Government responded to the supplemental memorandum and again opposed the relief
requested. (Docket No. 1883).
II. 	A PPLICABLE L AW AND DISCUSSION
Granados-Ortiz requests that this court order his federal sentence to run
concurrently to his state sentences. He invokes 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and advances
the contention that sentencing errors may constitute a basis for compassionate release.
He also argues that he should be exempted from exhausting administrative remedies
because he is not currently in federal custody.
In its most recent opposition, the United States does not press the argument that
Defendant failed to exhaust administrative remedies. It had previously done so when
responding to Defendant’s pro se motion. (Docket No. 1825). The government, however,
opposes the relief requested by the Defendant. It first notes that the Defendant has not
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started serving his federal sentence because he has not yet been received in federal
custody as per 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). Second, the government posits that the presiding
District Judge was presented with a request that the federal sentence be ordered to run
concurrently with the state sentences and denied it, choosing instead to issue a judgment
that was silent on the matter, causing the sentence to default to consecutive under the
relevant statutes. For those reasons, the government argues that the Court’s decision
should not be considered a sentencing error nor a basis to grant a sentence reduction.
A. 	Legal Framework
1. 	Compassionate Release – 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)
The so-called compassionate release statute allows a court acting on a defendant-
filed motion “after the defendant has exhausted all administrative rights to appeal” and
as long as such reduction is consistent “with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission”—to
reduce [a] term of imprisonment (and… impose a term of
probation or supervised release with or without conditions
that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term
of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in
section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds
that—
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction; . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). This statute is one of the very few exceptions to the rule that
once imposed, a term of imprisonment shall not be modified. United States v. Saccoccia,
10 F.4th 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2021).
To grant a compassionate release motion, the court must find that a defendant
has established three things: (1) that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a
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sentence reduction; (2) that the reduction is consistent with the applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; and (3) that relief is appropriate under
the circumstances of the case after considering the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
See United States v. Duluc-Mendez, 156 F.4th 55, 60 (1st Cir. 2025). Whether the reasons
advanced by the defendant are extraordinary and compelling is “guided by the plain
meaning of those terms.” United States v. Canales-Ramos, 19 F.4th 561, 566 (1st Cir.
2021). “The plain meaning of ‘extraordinary’ suggests that a qualifying reason must be
a reason that is beyond the mine-run either in fact or in degree . . . . By the same token,
the plain meaning of ‘compelling’ suggests that a qualifying reason must be a reason that
is both powerful and convincing.” Id. (citations omitted).
Prior to November 1, 2023, and because the Sentencing Commission had not
issued any policy statements applicable to prisoner-initiated compassionate release
motions, the First Circuit held that district courts had discretion to “consider any
complex of circumstances raised by a defendant, as forming an extraordinary and
compelling reason warranting relief.” United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14,28 (1st Cir.
2022). Subsequently, in United States v. Trenkler, 47 F.4th 42, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2022), it
was clarified that the holding in Ruvalcaba meant that district courts “may conduct a
holistic review to determine whether the individualized circumstances [of the defendant],
taken in the aggregate, present an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason to grant
compassionate release,” including alleged sentencing errors. The “any complex of
circumstances” approach, is shaped, however, by the arguments advanced by the
defendant, such as when the defendant presents separate arguments in support of his
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request rather than multiple arguments in favor of the sentence reduction. United States
v. Gonzalez, 68 F.4th 699, 706 (1st Cir. 2023).
It must be noted that the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement regarding
defendant-filed motions for sentence reductions is now in effect. See U.S.G.G. § 1B1.13
(Nov. 1, 2023). Consequently, the court “must take heed of” the policy statement as noted
in United States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1, 18 n.22 (1st Cir. 2023), and consider
its scope in deciding what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason. United
States v. Quiros-Morales, 83 F.4th 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2023).
The 	Commission 	has 	identified 	six 	circumstances 	that 	individually 	or 	in
combination may provide extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction in
sentence. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). These are: certain medical circumstances such as a
terminal illness or inability to receive medical care while incarcerated, id., § 1B1.13(b)(1);
the defendant’s age, id. § 1B1.13(b)(2); the defendant’s family circumstances, id. §
1B1.13(b)(3); the defendant having been the victim of sexual or physical abuse by or at
the direction of a correctional officer, id. § 1B1.13(b)(4); a catch-all provision of any other
reason or combination of reasons similar in gravity to those described in (1) through (4),
id. § 1B.13(b)(5); and if the defendant received an unusually long sentence, id. §
1B1.13(b)(6).
The policy statement also requires the court to make a finding that “the defendant
is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18
U.S.C. § 3142(g).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2). Factors to be considered in the dangerousness
determination include the nature and circumstances of the offense, the weight of the
evidence, the history and characteristics of the person, and the nature and seriousness
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that the release of the person would pose to any person or the community. 18 U.S.C. §
3142(g).
2. Multiple Terms of Imprisonment – Concurrent versus Consecutive
Pursuant to section 3584(a), “[i]f multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on
a defendant at the same time, or if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant
who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run
concurrently or consecutively . . . . Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different
times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.”
18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Thus, when a judgment is silent as to whether a sentence is to run
concurrently or consecutively to another sentence, the “default” rule is that they must
run consecutively. See United States v. Diaz-Valentin, No. 14-cr-284 (RAM), 2022 WL
2441192, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117821, at *6 (D.P.R. July 5, 2022). Sentencing judges
have discretion in selecting whether a sentence they impose will run concurrently or
consecutively with other sentences, even with anticipated but not-yet-imposed state
sentences. Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 236 (2012).
Moreover, a federal prison sentence “commences on the date the defendant is
received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence
service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.”
18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). “While the BOP has authority to determine when a sentence begins
to run, its exercise of that authority is bound by the doctrine of primary custody [or
primary jurisdiction] . . . and by . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a).” Pope v. Perdue, 889 F.3d 410,
415 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1922)). The
sovereign which first arrests a defendant has primary jurisdiction over him. Stephens v.
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Sabol, 539 F. Supp. 2d 489, 493 (D. Mass. 2008). Said sovereign retains jurisdiction over
a defendant until it takes a specific act that relinquishes it such as bail release, dismissal
of the charges, parole, or expiration of the sentence. Jimenez v. Warden, 147 F. Supp. 2d
24, 28 (D. Mass. 2001) (citations omitted). A transfer on writ is not one of the acts that
relinquishes primary jurisdiction. See United States v. Casas, 425 F.3d 23, 67 (1st Cir.
2005) (“[A] state that sends a prisoner in state custody to federal authorities pursuant to
a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum retains jurisdiction over the prisoner because
the prisoner is merely ‘on loan’ to the federal authorities.”).
B. 	Analysis
1. 	The Government has waived any exhaustion of administrative
remedies defense.
Before discussing the merits of Granados-Ortiz’s arguments, a threshold matter
must be addressed. Prior to entertaining a defendant-filed motion for compassionate
release, the court must be satisfied that the defendant fully exhausted administrative
remedies, or that thirty (30) days elapsed without the director of the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) having brought such a motion on the defendant’s behalf despite a request to the
warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see
also United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2022). This exhaustion
requirement, however, is not a jurisdictional bar. Rather, it is a nonjurisdictional claim-
processing rule. United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th at 53 (“In our judgment . . .
[the] exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional limitation….”). As such, the
government can waive it “either expressly or by failing to raise it as a defense.” United
States v. Newton, No. 17-cr-0073-JAW, 2023 WL 8529442; 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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218588 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 2023) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Trinidad-
Jorge, No. Criminal No. 16-282 (ADC)(HRV), 2024 WL 1621069, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72078 at *3, n.2 (D.P.R. Apr. 15, 2024) (same); United states v. Waite, No. 2:18-cr-
00113-GZS, 2022 WL 2966505, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133073, at *4 (D. Me. July 27,
2022) (exhaustion is mandatory unless waived or conceded by the Government).
Here, 	the 	Defendant 	argues 	that 	the 	court 	should 	waive 	the 	exhaustion
requirement because he is not in federal custody “where he can pursue his administrative
remedies.” (Docket No. 1855 at 8). The government, for its part, has withdrawn the
previously asserted exhaustion defense. (Docket No. 1883 at 2) (“While the Government
previously emphasized the need to exhaust administrative remedies under 18 §
3582(c)(1)(A), due to Defendant’s current placement in state custody and the practical
unavailability of the [BOP] procedures, the United States submits the exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not ripe for consideration since the Defendant has not begun
his federal sentence.”). Accordingly, I find that the government has expressly waived the
exhaustion of remedies defense and I proceed to the merits of the motion for sentence
reduction.
2. Defendant 	has 	failed 	to 	show 	that 	extraordinary 	and
compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction.
There 	is 	no 	dispute 	that 	the 	federal 	sentence 	of 	Granados-Ortiz has 	not
commenced to be served because, as explained above in the discussion of the primary
jurisdiction rules, he has not been received in federal custody. As things stand (with a
detainer in place), he would only begin to serve the federal sentence once his custody is
transferred to the BOP once he is finished serving his state sentence. (Docket Nos. 1855-
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2 and 1885). But here, the Defendant is not requesting a reduction of his sentence as such.
Properly construed, Granados-Ortiz is requesting that an amended judgment be entered
ordering that his federal sentence run concurrently to his state sentence. Presumably,
said relief, if granted, would prospectively allow some portion of the state sentence he is
currently serving to be credited to his federal sentence once custody is transferred to the
BOP. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (allowing credit for a prior sentence to be given for a term
of imprisonment “that has not been credited against another sentence.”).
It is questionable at best that such relief is even allowed under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A)(i) 	(a 	district 	court 	may 	“reduce 	[a] 	term 	of 	imprisonment” 	if
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”); see also United
States v. McKay, No. 23-14085, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 24990, at *5 (11th Cir. Sept. 26,
2025) (affirming denial of motion to modify judgment to order concurrence where the
request for modification did not “fall within any of the narrow categories under which a
district court may modify an already-imposed sentence.”). In this case, Defendant
invokes the compassionate release statute but does not request that his sentence be
“reduced.” He only seeks a modification of the judgment stating that the federal sentence
is to run concurrently with the state sentences. The Defendant has not cited any authority
for the proposition that such relief can be granted pursuant to the compassionate release
statute as opposed to a traditional habeas petition. And caselaw is actually to the contrary.
See United States v. Sonier, No. 13-CR-00059, 2025 WL 31111511, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
219415, at *4 (W.D. La. Nov. 6, 2025) (compassionate release is not the appropriate
vehicle to seek a retroactive declaration of concurrence); see also United States v.
Childress, No. 19-cr-36, 2025 WL 2600048, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177763, at *5-6 (W.D.
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Va. Sept. 8, 2025); United States v. Trujillo, No. 13-709-TUC-CKJ, 2025 WL 1884272,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129061, at *8 (D. Ariz. July 8, 2025); United States v. Love, No.
18-CR-178-MOC-SC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157515, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 27, 2020).
Be that as it may, I agree with the government that even if the request was
cognizable in compassionate release proceedings, the discretionary refusal of the District
Judge to run her sentence concurrently with the state sentences is not a sentencing error
amounting to extraordinary and compelling reasons. The issue was a matter of discretion
at the time of sentencing, and it remains a matter of discretion today as acknowledged
by the Defendant. (Docket No. 1855 at 2) (“Mr. Granado-Ortiz [sic] respectfully requests
that this Honorable Court exercise its discretion and order that his federal sentence runs
concurrently with his state sentence . . . .”). The transcript of the sentencing hearing
shows that the Defendant asked the District Judge to order the federal sentence to run
concurrently with the state sentences. Yet, the District Judge chose to remain silent on
the matter by declining to state in the judgment how both terms of imprisonment would
run. More to the point, the following exchange took place at the sentencing hearing
between defense counsel and the District Judge:
And having said that, if the Court may consider it, we will also,
despite the fact that the only conviction that stands, which is
the three points that have been added, is unrelated to the
conspiracy, we would request in any case that any sentence
run concurrently to what he’s serving already at the state level,
which he would prefer to serve first by the way if it stands.
THE COURT: Well, I think that right now, if the appeal were
to be dismissed and the state conviction to stand, my sentence
would be inconsequential, technically, looking at it, 273 years.
MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes.
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THE COURT: I would think that consecutiveness would - -
MR. HERNANDEZ: Correct.
THE COURT: -- make a difference –
MR. HERNANDEZ: That’s why I argued for it, because
he requested from me –
THE COURT: -- and if the appeal is dismissed and he goes for
a new 	trial, 	for 	me 	the 	issue 	of 	whether 	to 	impose 	it
concurrently or not as well is meaningless because the state
judge will be coming after my sentence. That would be for him
to decide and rule upon.
(Transcript Sentencing Hearing, Docket No. 1164, at 17).
Despite intervening events in state court (a new sentence being imposed after the
original conviction and sentences were vacated on appeal), nothing in the record
suggests that the District Judge erroneously believed herself without discretion to run
the federal sentence concurrently with the state sentences. Further, no argument has
been advanced that said intervening events changed the primary jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Courts have rejected the notion, albeit in different
contexts, 	that 	the 	effects 	of 	the 	primary 	jurisdiction 	doctrine 	can 	amount 	to
extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cook, No. 20-1974, 2022 WL 2447897, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 18507 (3d
Cir. Jul. 6, 2022); United States v. Isbell, No. 21-3019, 2022 WL 1800759, 2022 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15212 (7th Cir. Jun. 2, 2022); United States v. Bean, No. 18-CR-0017-DCLC-CRW,
2024 WL 2870077, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100955 (E.D. Tenn. Jun. 6, 2024); 	United
States v. Gordon, No. CR 19-46-BLG-SWS, 2024 WL 2749649, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
95590 (D. Mont. May 29, 2024).
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3. Alternatively, Defendant has failed to establish that the section
3553(a) factors support the relief requested or that he is not
danger to the community.
The record contains no information regarding Defendant’s rehabilitation efforts
while in prison, such as programing or good behavior, that the Court could consider in
assessing if relief was warranted and to what extent under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). I note that
rehabilitation efforts alone fall short of being extraordinary or compelling reasons to
warrant compassionate release. See United States v. Chavez, 534 F. Supp. 3d 176, 178 (D.
Mass. 2021). Indeed, the policy statement of the Sentencing Commission specifically
prohibits considering rehabilitation, by itself, in the extraordinary and compelling
calculus. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d); see also United States v. Malpica-Garcia, Criminal
No. 04-217 (ADC)(HRV), 2024 WL 1172769, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51793 at *7 (D.P.R.
Mar. 19, 2024). But “rehabilitation of the defendant while serving the sentence [can] be
considered in combination with other circumstances in determining whether and to what
extent a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is warranted.” U.S.S.G. §
1B1.13(d); see also Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 487 (2022).
I find that even if extraordinary and compelling reasons had been independently
established, a reduction of Granados-Ortiz’s sentence would be inconsistent with the §
3553(a) factors. He was a member of a drug trafficking organization with a supervisory
role. In fact, at sentencing, he was assigned a three-level adjustment for role as a
“manager or supervisor” of an “extensive” conspiracy despite a stipulation in his plea
agreement that he should only receive a two-level enhancement. This determination was
subsequently upheld on appeal. (Docket No. 1322). He also admitted that he possessed
and 	carried 	firearms 	in 	furtherance 	of 	the 	drug-distribution 	offense. 	Thus, 	the
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seriousness of the offense, the need to provide just punishment, the need to protect the
public, and the need to promote respect for the law weigh heavily against any
modification of his sentence that potentially opens the door to early release. See United
States v. Martinez, No. 2:18-cr-00089-JAW, 2023 WL 3305674, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79444 at *29 (D. Me. May 8, 2023). These factors, together with the fact that he accepted
responsibility for his participation in a violent crime in state court, likewise foreclose a
finding that Defendant’s release will not pose a danger to the safety of others in the
community. (See Judgments, Docket No. 1855-1) (Defendant pled guilty to two counts
manslaughter reclassified down from first degree murder, and related firearm offenses).
III. 	C ONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, I recommend that the motion for a sentence reduction at
Docket No. 1790 as supplemented in Docket No. 1855 be DENIED.
This report and recommendation is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and
Rule 72(d) of the Local Rules of this Court. Any objections to the same must be specific
and must be filed with the Clerk of Court within 14 days. Failure to file timely and
specific objections is a waiver of the right to appellate review. See Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Davet v. Maccorone, 973 F.2d 22, 30–31 (1st Cir. 1992); Paterson-
Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1988); Borden v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1987).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 10th day of February, 2026.
S/Héctor L. Ramos-Vega
HÉCTOR L. RAMOS-VEGA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:16-cr-00454-ADC Document 1889 Filed 02/10/26 Page 14 of 14