COLLADO REYES v. PETERS et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ISRAEL COLLADO-REYES, 	:
Petitioner 	:
v. 	: Case No. 3:25-cv-299-KAP
MICHAEL UNDERWOOD, WARDEN, 	:
F.C.I. LORETTO, et al., 	:
Respondents 	:
Report and Recommendation
Recommendation
This is the second petition by petitioner Collado-Reyes, an inmate at F.C.I. Loretto,
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 2241. ECF no. 4. I automatically issued
a Rule and Order when the petition was filed, see ECF no. 5, but now that I have been able
to screen the petition as contemplated by 28 U.S.C.§ 2243 and compare it to the previous
petition, I recommend that this petition be denied without need of a response.
Report
Petitioner’s petition is an abuse of the writ because he is already before the Court
with a petition raising the same issue that the current petition raises: whether under the
First Step Act petitioner is eligible to have Earned Time Credits applied to his time in pre-
release custody or on supervised release. See Collado-Reyes v. Peters, Case No. 3:25-cv-
5-SLH-KAP, report and recommendation pending at ECF No. 14 (W.D.Pa. May 29,
2025). In his September 10, 2025 correspondence filed with the current petition, ECF no.
4 at 11, petitioner asserts that he has filed this petition “now that the administrative
remedies have run their course.” That conveys two mistakes: petitioner’s exhibits do not
show 	that 	he 	has 	exhausted 	his 	administrative 	remedies, 	and 	my 	pending
recommendation in the first case is not based on any lack of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. 	Petitioner’s 	use 	of 	administrative 	remedies 	is 	not 	relevant 	to 	my
recommendation here.
As I have previously reported, Collado-Reyes was convicted on his plea of guilty in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in United States v. Collado-Reyes, Case No. 2:19-cr-
321-MSG (E.D.Pa. November 10, 2021). His subsequent appeal was dismissed based on
an appellate waiver. Judge Goldberg sentenced Collado-Reyes to concurrent terms of 108
months imprisonment followed by a 5-year term of supervised release on four counts:
conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute controlled substances
in violation of 21 U.S.C.§ 846 (Count 1); distribution of a quantity of heroin and fentanyl
in violation of 21 U.S.C.§§ 841(a)(1) and 841 (b)(1)(C) (Count 2); possession with intent
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to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.§§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(B)(i) (Count 5); and possession with intent to distribute 1000 grams or more of
heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(i) (Count 6). With credit for
time served and assuming no loss of Good Conduct time, the Bureau of Prisons projected
Collado-Reyes’ release date for January 7, 2027.
In his first petition, petitioner made two claims: 1) that his offense of conviction
did not disqualify him from having ETCs applied to his time in pre-release custody or
supervised release; and 2) he had no final order of removal that would disqualify him
either. After considering the Response in the first petition, especially Exhibit 2 ( a final
administrative order of removal dated September 25, 2023) and Exhibit 3 (Judge
Goldberg’s Judgment and Commitment order), I found that petitioner was right about
the terms of his sentence and wrong about his order of removal.
Petitioner now returns with another of the form petitions generated at Loretto,
repeating his previous argument that he is not subject to a final order of removal.
Under the First Step Act, inmates who are nationals of other countries and who
have a final order of removal are also not eligible to have ETCs applied. 18 U.S.C.§ 3632
(d)(4)(E). Petitioner repeats his argument that he is not subject to a final order of removal
because, according to petitioner (that is, according to the scribe from whom petitioner
and other petitioners obtain their legal materials) the only valid order of removal is one
made by an immigration judge after notice and hearing, and petitioner has never seen an
immigration judge. This argument is one that I have rejected many times because the
premise that there is only one path to a final order of removal is wrong, and other judges
of this court have agreed. See Said v. Underwood, 2025 WL 90145 at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 14,
2025)(Hornak, C.J.); Montano v. Underwood, 2025 WL 2782449 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30,
2025)(Fischer, J.), adopting report and recommendation at 2025 WL 2783793, (W.D.
Pa. 	Feb. 	12, 	2025). 	See 	also 	Orellana v. 	Garland, 	117 	F.4th 	679, 	682 (5th 	Cir.
2024)(discussing procedure for issuance of final administrative removal orders under 8
U.S.C. § 1228(b) without a hearing before an Immigration Judge). Exhibit 2 to the
Response in the pending matter appears to be what it was asserted to be: a final
administrative removal order signed September 25, 2023. It is presumptively valid for the
reasons explained by Judges Hornak and Fischer in the above cited cases.
Petitioner casts no doubt on the validity of the removal order, and the only new
thing that petitioner offers is a red herring: he attaches as Exhibit 9 to his petition a Notice
of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative Removal Order, dated August 7, 2023. This does
not refute the authenticity of the final administrative order of removal dated September
25, 2023 attached as Exhibit 2 to the Response in the first petition. If anything, it supports
the authenticity of the final order. See Orellana v. Garland, supra, 117 F.4th at 682:
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Administrative removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) authorizes DHS to order
removal of some noncitizens without a hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”).
This includes those noncitizens who are convicted of aggravated felonies, who “shall
be conclusively presumed to be deportable from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1228(c). The first step of an administrative removal proceeding is service
to the noncitizen of the Notice of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative
Removal Order (“NOI”). 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2).
(my emphasis). The petition should be summarily denied, and it makes no difference
whether it is dismissed as an abuse of the writ or on the merits.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days to file written
objections to this Report and Recommendation. In the absence of timely and specific
objections any appeal would be severely hampered or entirely defaulted. See EEOC v. City
of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir.2017)(describing standard of appellate review
when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).
DATE: December 3, 2025
Keith A. Pesto,
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice by ECF to counsel and by U.S. Mail to:
Israel Collado-Reyes, Reg. No. 76302-054
F.C.I. Loretto
P.O. Box 1000
Cresson, PA 16630
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