BECHDEL v. THE PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:25-cv-00256-NBF-KAP Document6 Filed 11/17/25 Pagelof5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAMUEL R. BECHDEL,
Petitioner, :
v. : Case No. 3:25-cv-256-KAP
PENNSYLVANIA PAROLE BOARD (formerly :
the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and :
Parole), et al.,
Respondents

Report and Recommendation
Recommendation

Petitioner Bechdel’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be denied without
a certificate of appealability. The Clerk shall draw a District Judge to preside over this
matter and shall add counsel for the Pennsylvania Parole Board to the docket for notice
purposes only, with no duty to respond.

Report

Because I cannot always screen petitions before service I ordered service in this
matter, but I submit this Report and Recommendation now because dismissal before
response is appropriate. Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
(Habeas Rule 4), a district court has the power and the duty to examine habeas petitions
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 2254 before service, to screen out meritless applications and
eliminate the burden on respondents of assembling an unnecessary answer. See Kiser v.
Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir.1999), quoting Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas
Rule 4. See also 28 U.S.C.§ 2243. One issue that can be raised sua sponte where the record
is clear is a petitioner's failure to exhaust state law remedies. Magouirk v. Phillips, 144

F.3d 348, 357 (5th Cir. 1998).

Petitioner Bechdel is an inmate at S.C.I. Houtzdale serving a 21/2 -5 year sentence
imposed in Blair County in 2022 after he entered a negotiated guilty plea to aggravated
assault. Bechdel was denied parole in May 2024 after he served his minimum sentence
and was denied parole a second time in May 2025. Petitioner filed a habeas petition dated
August 8, 2025 challenging the denial of parole to him by the Pennsylvania Parole Board;
he asks in the alternative for a writ directing a de novo parole hearing by the Parole Board
or a writ releasing him on parole. ECF no. 1, Brief at ECF no. 3.

Bechdel, in Exhibits A-I, attaches to his petition the Board’s decisions, his version
of his offense conduct, and his certificates for programs completed by Bechdel. The Parole
Board denied petitioner parole on May 16, 2025, giving petitioner notice in a Notice of

' |

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 3:25-cv-00256-NBF-KAP Document6 Filed 11/17/25 Page2of5

Board Decision at Petition Exhibit B. In it, the Parole Board gave six reasons for its 2025
denial: Bechdel’s unsatisfactory supervision history, his risk to the community, his
minimization of the nature of his offense, his lack of acceptance of responsibility, his lack
of remorse, and his criminal history. Petitioner’s next review by the Parole Board is in
May 2026.

Petitioner argues that differences in the language used in Petition Exhibit A, the
Parole Board’s 2024 decision, and in Petition Exhibit B prove that his latest denial of
parole was arbitrary and capricious. The 2024 denial cited a need to complete programs
but the 2025 denial did not, probably because Bechdel completed several programs before
the 2025 decision. Bechdel cites Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233 (3d Cir.1980) for the
proposition that this difference in reasons invalidates the decision. In Block v. Potter, 631
F.2d at 240, the Court of Appeals held that the Virgin Islands could not deny parole “on
the basis of factors that are divorced from the policy and purpose of parole,” giving as
examples “race, religion, political beliefs, or another impermissible factor.” What Bechdel
asserts as the “impermissible factor” in his denial is simply different panels of the Parole
Board giving different reasons at different times. That Bechdel believes he is rehabilitated
but the Parole Board did not find his completion of programs to warrant parole suggests
nothing impermissible.

Bechdel also claims that the Board violated due process because it was motivated
by “retaliation [for] exercising constitutional rights” (he does not explain his basis for
using either term and so fails to clear the threshold of showing he engaged in some
constitutionally protected conduct) and was “hyperfocused” on two domestic violence
crimes in petitioner’s criminal history because his proposed release plan calls for him to
live with his fiancée. He argues that this focus is improper because his current offense,
although for aggravated assault, is not a domestic violence offense.

Petitions for habeas corpus, whether governed by the general provisions of 28
U.S.C.§ 2241(c)(3) or the specific provisions of 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(a) as amended by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214, April 24, 1996 for petitions challenging custody under state court sentences,
allow a writ of habeas corpus only where the petitioner "is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Additionally, AEDPA codifies the
longstanding limit on the federal power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to cases where
there has been an exhaustion of remedies in the state courts. See Castille v. Peoples, 489
U.S. 346, 349 (1989). Exhaustion requires the petitioner to first present to the state courts
the same legal arguments addressing the same factual context that the petitioner presents
to the federal court. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29-33 (2004); Duncan v. Henry,
513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995) (per curiam). Under 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(b)(1)(A) and (2), a federal
court can deny a writ of habeas corpus sought on an unexhausted claim that a petitioner’s

2

Case 3:25-cv-00256-NBF-KAP Document6 Filed 11/17/25 Page3of5

custody is unlawful, but it cannot grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has
exhausted the remedies available for such claims in state court or has shown that
exhaustion is excused because there is an absence of available state corrective process, or
because circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of
the applicant. 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(b)(1)(B).

Bechdel admits (and it is plain from the proximity of the decision date and filing
date) that he did not attempt to exhaust any state court remedies. As have many previous
petitioners who were denied parole by the Parole Board, petitioner cites DeFoy v.
McCullough, 393 F.3d 439 (3d Cir.2005) for the proposition that he need not exhaust any
claim in the state courts.

Habeas petitioners’ continued citation to DeFoy v. McCullough for the proposition
that there is no exhaustion requirement in challenges to parole denial is something I have
been addressing for a decade. See e.g. Pendleton v. Pennsylvania Parole Board, Case No.
3:25-cv-99-KAP (W.D.Pa.July 14, 2025). See also Hinton v. Armel, No. 2:22-cv-1494,
2025 WL 295773, at *5-6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2025)(Dodge, M.J.), certificate of
appealability denied, No. 25-1345 (3d Cir. May 19, 2025).

Although the Court of Appeals has not formally overruled DeFoy v. McCullough
see Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2012) , that case does not accurately
describe the current state of Pennsylvania’s remedies for the denial of parole. See Bradley
v. Wingard, No. 3:15-cv-235-KRG-KAP, 2017 WL 11476608, at *1-2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12,
2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 10150909 (W.D.Pa. Sept. 5, 2018),
certificate of appealability denied, No. 18-3196 (3d Cir. March 8, 2019); Spada v.
Johnson, No. 1:21-cv-158-SPB-KAP, 2021 WL 3572824, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 24, 2021),
report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 3563374 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2021);
Armstrong v. Tice, No. 3:22-cv-76-NBF-KAP (W.D. Pa. September 26, 2025) adopting in
the alternative report and recommendation at ECF no. 3; Graves v. Henry, No. 3:23-cv-
258-NBF-KAP (W.D. Pa.), report and recommendation at ECF no. 3 (December 8, 2023),
case dismissed as moot after reassignment at ECF no. 7 (January 7, 2025). The
Commonwealth Court considers petitions for mandamus that present constitutional
challenges to the denial of parole. See Short v. Barkley, No. 438 M.D. 2016, 2017 WL
1337557, at *2 (Pa.Cmwlth. Apr. 12, 2017)(considering but rejecting as insufficient a
constitutional claim by Short that he was denied parole on the basis of his race and mental
illness.) See also Toland v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 263 A.3d 1220,
1233 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2021)(“[U]nder our precedent, both ex post facto claims and due
process challenges may be raised in a mandamus action.”), adhered to in Toland v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 311 A.3d 649 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2024).

Bechdel makes no effort to explain why a mandamus action in the Commonwealth

Court is unavailable to him. The Court should therefore not reach the merits of the
3

Case 3:25-cv-00256-NBF-KAP Document6 Filed 11/17/25 Page4of5

petition. If it nevertheless does so, it should summarily deny the petition on the merits
without need of a response. Rule 2(c) of the Rules governing Habeas Corpus Cases under
Section 2254 in the United States District Courts, 42 U.S.C.8, also made applicable to
Habeas Corpus Cases under Section 2241 by Rule 1(b), requires petitioner Bechdel to set
forth all the claims he intends to present and the facts that support those claims. See
Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005) (quoting with approval the Advisory Committee's
Note on Habeas Corpus Rule 4, that “[N]otice pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is
expected to state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). A habeas petition does not launch a federal court into its own
parole investigation and hearing. Even before federal parole was abolished that was a
power federal courts could not exercise in federal parole cases.

The discretionary aspects of a decision by the Parole Board cannot be reviewed in
a Pennsylvania court, see Coady v. Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. 2001), because the
Parole Board’s grant of parole is a matter of discretion and not of right. 61 Pa.C.S.§
6137(a). The denial of parole cannot be for reasons that are forbidden by the Constitution,
but the number of reasons forbidden by the Constitution is small and their nature well-
defined. See Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 784 (3d Cir.2010)(a parole applicant’s
refusal to admit guilt for the crimes he was convicted of is a permissible factor to consider
in decision to parole), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 950 (2011). The “complete discretion” that
the Parole Board possesses over the parole decision does not make a challenge to that
discretion a constitutional challenge. Richardson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole, 423 F.3d 282, 285 (3d Cir.2005), citing Coady v. Vaughn, supra.

The Court should dismiss the petition without prejudice as unexhausted, and if it
does not want to do that it should summarily deny the petition on the merits under Rule
4. The reasons for the denial of parole given by the Parole Board do not violate the rule of
Block v. Potter that a parole denial cannot be based on impermissible factors. Bechdel
offers no evidence that the reasons given by the Parole Board were not the reasons used
by the Parole Board. Bechdel’s personal opinion that he deserves to be paroled is not
evidence of error by the Parole Board, constitutional or otherwise. _

The petition simply asks this court to re-weigh the same evidence considered by
the Parole Board and come to a result favorable to Bechdel. AEDPA prohibits habeas relief
on claims adjudicated on the merits in state courts unless the adjudication of the claim
was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law as
determined by holdings of the Supreme Court, see 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(d)(1). AEDPA also
places stringent limits on evidentiary hearings in federal habeas proceedings. See Shinn
y. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 371 (2022). Launching federal courts into de novo appellate
review of panels of the Parole Board without AEDPA’s constraints is not just bad
constitutional law: it is beyond the institutional competence of federal judges to consider

4

Case 3:25-cv-00256-NBF-KAP Document6 Filed 11/17/25 Page5of5

challenges to the thousands of parole decisions made every year in Pennsylvania simply
because an inmate cites Block v. Potter and DeFoy v. McCullough. |

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1), the parties are advised that they have fourteen
days to file written objections to my recommendation. Failure to file timely and specific
objections may result in any appeal being severely hampered or entirely defaulted. See
EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of
appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for
plain error).

DATE: November 17, 2025

Keith A. Pesto,
United States Magistrate Judge

Notice by ECF to counsel and by U.S. Mail to:

Samuel R. Bechdel QP-1742
S.C.I. Houtzdale

P.O. Box 1000

209 Institution Drive
Houtzdale, PA 16698-1000