PARRISH v. DOE et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DONTAE PARRISH,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALLEGHENY COUNTY HOUSING
AUTHORITY and TIMOTHY
BALLOU,
Defendants.
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2:26-CV-38
MEMORANDUM ORDER
J. Nicholas Ranjan, United States District Judge
Before the Court is Defendants’ Allegheny County Housing Authority and
Timothy Ballou’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Dontae Parrish’s Third Amended
Complaint (ECF 32). 	Upon careful consideration, the Court grants Defendants’
motion for the reasons stated here.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
According to the Third Amended Complaint, Mr. Parrish resided at Truman
Towers in Duquesne. 	ECF 31, ¶ 7. 	Mr. Parrish filed complaints with Allegheny
County Housing Authority and the police about safety concerns, arguments with
another resident, and habitability concerns. Id. ¶¶ 8–11. Then, on January 7, 2026,
and unrelated to any of Mr. Parrish’s prior complaints, Defendant Timothy Ballou,
an ACHA police officer, responded to a complaint made by another resident against
Mr. Parrish. Id. ¶ 12. While Officer Ballou was at Truman Towers, Mr. Parrish tried
to make his own complaint about that same incident. 	Id. ¶ 13. 	Officer Ballou
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allegedly refused to accept Mr. Parrish’s complaint, accepted the allegations against
Mr. Parrish, accused him of being a troublemaker, and issued summary citations to
Mr. Parrish. Id. ¶¶ 14–17, 23.
But elsewhere on the docket, Mr. Parrish has shown the Court a slightly
different story. 	When he filed his First Amended Complaint, Mr. Parrish attached
the citations that Officer Ballou issued. 	See ECF 10-1, at 14–15. 	These citations
state that Officer Ballou came to Truman Towers because the property manager
called 911 on Mr. Parrish. 	Id. at 15. 	According to these citations, Mr. Parrish was
screaming outside his neighbor’s apartment and the manager’s office at 1:00 a.m.
Officer 	Ballou 	then 	issued 	Mr. 	Parrish 	citations 	for 	disorderly 	conduct 	and
harassment.1 See id. at 14–15.
Mr. Parrish now brings five claims against Defendants: (1) First Amendment
Retaliation; (2) Violation of Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process; (3) Lack
of Probable Cause/Reckless Disregard for the Truth; (4) Malicious Initiation of
Prosecution; and (5) a Monell claim.2
1 The Court considers these citations in deciding Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Courts may take judicial notice of documents “integral to or explicitly relied upon in
the complaint” because there is no concern of lack of notice to the plaintiff. 	See
Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting in re Burlington Coat
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)). Although Mr. Parrish chose
not to attach these citations to his operative complaint, the TAC still references the
citations, their accuracy is not in question, and it’s clear that there is no notice
concern here.
2 The TAC doesn’t specify which claims are against which Defendants. 	The Court
presumes Counts 1 through 4 are against Officer Ballou and Count 5 is against
ACHA.
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DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified). 	“A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Any reasonable inferences should be considered in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See Lula v. Network Appliance, 255 F. App’x 610, 611 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing
Rocks v. City of Phila., 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989)).
I. 	Mr. Parrish doesn’t state a First Amendment retaliation claim.
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) there was retaliatory action
sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional
rights, and (3) there was a causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct
and the retaliatory action. 	Conard v. Pa. State Police, 902 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir.
2018). Additionally, when a retaliation claim is based on prosecution, a plaintiff must
plead lack of probable cause. Ferris v. Borough of Baldwin, 247 F. Supp. 3d 671, 676
(W.D. Pa. 2017) (Hornak, J.).
Defendants argue that Mr. Parrish’s claim fails on causation and probable
cause. The Court agrees.
First, Mr. Parrish insufficiently pleads causation. 	At the pleading stage, a
plaintiff must plead facts suggesting that his “constitutionally protected conduct was
a substantial or motivating factor” for the retaliatory conduct. Conard, 902 F.3d at
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184 (quoting Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016)). This can be done,
for example, by pleading a suggestive timing between the protected conduct and the
retaliation, or a pattern of antagonism. Id.
Mr. Parrish pleads no such facts. 	The theory seems to be that Officer Ballou
refused to listen to Mr. Parrish and issued the citations because of Mr. Parrish’s prior
complaints to the police and ACHA. 	But the TAC only alleges that he made these
complaints “[p]rior to January 7, 2026.” 	ECF 31, ¶ 8. 	The Court cannot infer
suggestive timing based on that. Nor does the TAC allege a pattern of retaliation—
or any other facts—from which causation could be inferred.
Second, Mr. Parrish fails to plead any facts establishing a lack of probable
cause. 	Rather, the citations themselves show the opposite. 	Officer Ballou came to
Truman Towers responding to a 911 call that Mr. Parrish was screaming at a
neighbor and the property manager at 1:00 a.m. 	This is sufficient to establish
probable cause, particularly given that the TAC doesn’t call into question the 911
call’s reliability. See McNeil v. City of Easton, 694 F. Supp. 2d 375, 388–89 (E.D. Pa.
2010) 	(noting 	that “numerous 	courts 	have 	noted the 	reliability of 	anonymous
emergency calls” and that 911 calls reporting an emergency are entitled to a high
degree of reliability). Once Officer Ballou arrived at the scene, “[he] was not required
to undertake an exhaustive investigation in order to validate probable cause that, in
his mind, already existed.” Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 790 n.8
(3d Cir. 2000).
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II. 	Mr. Parrish doesn’t state a procedural due-process claim.
Mr. Parrish’s procedural due-process claim is based on Officer Ballou refusing
to “accept [Mr. Parrish]’s complaint” when he arrived at Truman Towers. 	ECF 31,
¶ 39. But “the requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation
of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and
property.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Mr. Parrish
pleads no such interest, so his claim fails.
There 	is 	no 	support 	for 	Mr. 	Parrish’s 	proposition 	that 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment protects an interest in having the police accept and investigate every
spontaneous complaint. The Court declines to extend the due process clause so far.
Further, Mr. Parrish does not allege that the state-court proceedings following
his citations were at all deficient. So, if those proceedings are the basis of his claim,
the claim fails for that reason too.
III. 	Mr. Parrish doesn’t state a claim for lack of probable cause under any
theory.
“Prosecution without probable cause is not, in and of itself, a constitutional
tort.” Brockington v. City of Phila., 354 F. Supp. 2d 563, 568 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (quoting
Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1998)). 	But under any applicable
theory, Mr. Parrish’s claim would fail because he does not plausibly allege a lack of
probable cause.
IV. 	Mr. Parrish doesn’t state a malicious-prosecution claim.
A malicious-prosecution claim can “be based on a constitutional provision other
than the Fourth Amendment, including the procedural component of the Due Process
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Clause, so long as it [is] not based on substantive due process.” Merkle, 211 F.3d at
792. But to state a claim under any theory, a plaintiff must establish an underlying
constitutional violation. 	See Olasz v. Welsh, 301 F. App’x 142, 144 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“Thus, our caselaw clearly establishes that the analysis of a malicious prosecution
claim 	arising 	under 	§ 	1983 	must 	begin 	with 	a 	determination 	of 	whether 	a
constitutional violation exists.”).
Mr. Parrish’s malicious-prosecution claim fails because he doesn’t plead any
underlying 	constitutional 	violation. 	There 	is 	no 	viable 	First 	Amendment 	or
procedural due-process claim. And, to the extent that Mr. Parrish brings this claim
based on a Fourth Amendment violation, the TAC doesn’t include any facts indicating
a “seizure,” as required for this claim to proceed under the Fourth Amendment.
Brockington, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 568.
V. 	Mr. Parrish doesn’t state a
Mo nell claim.
Mr. Parrish alleges that ACHA both had a policy violating his constitutional
rights and failed to train Officer Ballou. 	But to state a Section 1983 claim under
either theory, Mr. Parrish must establish a constitutional violation in the first place.
He has not, and so his Monell claim fails.
Even assuming he had established a constitutional violation, Mr. Parrish’s
Monell claim would still be deficient. 	Mr. Parrish pleads “no facts to support the
existence of any policy, custom, [] practice,” or deficient training. 	Phillips v.
Northampton Cnty., 687 F. App’x 129, 132 (3d Cir. 2017). 	The TAC nakedly asserts
that ACHA “failed to adequately train and supervise” its officers and “maintained
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customs, practices, or policies that permitted constitutional violations to occur.” ECF
31, ¶¶ 59–60. That doesn’t suffice. Phillips, 687 F. App’x at 132.
VI. 	Mr. Parrish’s claims must be dismissed with prejudice.
Because Mr. Parrish doesn’t plausibly allege a constitutional violation or lack
of probable cause, his claims fail. The Court must next consider whether Mr. Parrish
should be granted an opportunity to amend. He should not.
Courts should generally permit a curative amendment unless an amendment
would be inequitable or futile. 	Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108
(3d Cir. 2002). While the Court is mindful that Mr. Parrish is pro se, dismissal with
prejudice is nonetheless warranted.
Although Mr. Parrish asks for leave to amend, he doesn’t explain how he would
cure his claims’ issues even given the chance. 	ECF 35, at 11. 	Nor could he; the
deficiencies in Mr. Parrish’s claims are legal in nature. 	No matter which facts Mr.
Parrish adds or omits, he cannot plausibly plead that Officer Ballou lacked probable
cause or that his actions violated any of Mr. Parrish’s constitutional rights. 	So,
amendment would be futile.
Additionally, 	Mr. 	Parrish 	has 	already 	taken 	advantage 	of 	multiple
opportunities to amend. And, rather than add more facts, Mr. Parrish chose to strip
his claims down and omit critical details already known to him. 	Compare ECF 10
with ECF 31. For example, Mr. Parrish knew that he was involved in the “complaint
involving another resident” that brought Officer Ballou to Truman Towers. ECF 31,
¶ 12; ECF 10, at 1. Yet he omitted this detail from the TAC. Nothing suggests that
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Mr. Parrish will state a plausible claim supported by facts if given leave to amend. It
would be inequitable to give him another shot to rejigger the facts.
For these reasons, and despite Mr. Parrish’s pro se status, granting leave to
amend here would be inequitable and futile, so the Court declines to do so.
***
For these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss
(ECF 32) is GRANTED, and Mr. Parrish’s third amended complaint (ECF 31) is
DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court shall mark this case as CLOSED.
DATED this 9th day of October, 2026
BY THE COURT:
/s/ J. Nicholas Ranjan
United States District Judge
cc:
Dontae Parrish
741 1/2 Proctor Way
Pittsburgh, PA 15210
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