SWANSON v. DR. DON CHAPMAN, DDS, PLLC et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RACHEL SWANSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DR. DON CHAPMAN, DDS, PLLC, and
DONALD C. CHAPMAN,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 24-1622
Judge Nora Barry Fischer
ECF No. 36
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In this action, Plaintiff, Rachel Swanson, alleges that Defendants, Dr. Donald C. Chapman
and his dental practice company, Dr. Don Chapman, DDS, PLLC, terminated her employment
because she opposed unlawful practice(s) of sexual harassment - a retaliatory termination in
violation of (a) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Stat. § 955(e); and the West Virginia Human Rights Act,
W. Va. Code § 16B-17-9(7)(C). 1 (Docket No. 19, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint).
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and the parties’
responsive briefings, concise statements of material fact, and supportive exhibits. (Docket Nos.
36-48). Defendants’ motion rests solely on Dr. Chapman’s averment that Plaintiff does not (and
1 The individual Defendant is a Pennsylvania resident, and his professional limited liability company has a principal
place of business in West Virginia. (Docket No. 19 at ¶¶ 5-6). Plaintiff worked for Defendants from her home and in
the dental practice’s Pennsylvania and West Virginia office locations. Defendants operated four (4) dental offices at
that time. (Docket No. 41 at 2 n. 1).
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cannot) “meet the initial factor” of her prima facie claim, which requires that she prove she
engaged in protected activity by “opposing” unlawful conduct. (Docket No. 36 at 2; Docket No.
38; Docket No. 46).2 Defendants’ motion having been fully briefed, and the Court having afforded
it full consideration and concurred in Plaintiff’s objections to it as unfounded, said motion will be
denied for the reasons and by the Order set forth below.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Factual History
The full relevant factual history of this litigation is presented in Plaintiff’s responsive
pleadings. (Docket Nos. 41-44). See also n. 6, infra. In sum, these claims arise from Plaintiff’s
employment and her expressly communicated complaints and objections to (1) other female
employees’ subjection to sexual harassment and (2) the timing and nature of Defendants’ response
“(or lack thereof)” to those employees’ complaints, reported directly to him, of sexual harassment
by Dr. John Powe (“Powe”), a periodontist employed/retained by Defendants beginning in early
2023. (Docket No. 41 at 1; see generally, Docket Nos. 41-44).3
More specifically, Plaintiff was employed as Defendants’ Chief Operating Officer from
July 2020 through February 2024, and in that position generally handled “human resources”
(“HR”) issues, including complaints of sexual harassment, in the absence of an HR department or
2 As Plaintiff observes, Defendants fail to provide authority as required by this Court’s Practices and Procedures, and
more generally. (Docket No. 41 at 2). Apart from its statement of the standard of review, the legal analysis of
Defendants’ Brief in Support is presented in two paragraphs with citation to one (1) case in support of the elements of
a Title VII retaliation claim and no cases in support of Defendants’ extraordinary assertion that Plaintiff did not
“oppose” an unlawful practice because she “simply . . . voiced her personal opinion about” Defendants’ handling of
the investigation in a “very direct” manner. (Docket No. 38 at 4). Defendant’s Brief in Reply adds one (1) additional
case, inapposite to the principle for which it is cited. (Docket No. 46 at 2-3). See Section IV, infra.
3 Powe’s alleged sexual harassment included both verbal advances and inappropriate physical contact. (Id.).
Defendants’ pre-hiring background check of Powe indicated he had been acquitted of a criminal charge of, Dr.
Chapman believes, inappropriate physical conduct (kissing a patient). (Docket No. 45-1 (Defendant’s Deposition) at
26-27).
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other designated employee. (Docket No. 19 at ¶¶ 11-12, 19).4 In May 2023, a female employee
whom she supervised reported that Powe had made an unwelcome/inappropriate sexual remark;
Plaintiff reported it to Dr. Chapman, who appeared to dismiss it. (Docket No. 41 at 4). See also
Docket No. 42 at ¶¶ 10-11, 14-17).
In late August 2023, an employee informed Plaintiff that Powe sexually harassed her a few
days prior and had unwanted/inappropriate physical contact with another employee at a practice
office earlier that month. Both women then told Plaintiff that they had informed Dr. Chapman of
the incidents within a day of their occurrence, he “directed both of them not to tell Plaintiff what
occurred”, and although he said he would handle it, they felt nothing was being done. With the
employees on the call, Plaintiff confronted Dr. Chapman regarding these complaints; Dr. Chapman
indicated that he did not want her to know because he had anticipated she would be quite upset
and unreservedly express it (“freak[ ] out”). (Docket No. 41 at 5; Docket No. 42 at ¶¶ 18-38).5
In that and subsequent conversations, Plaintiff emphatically communicated to Dr.
Chapman that she was distressed that: the practice had failed its employees; what Powe did was
“not ok”; Dr. Chapman had kept knowledge of the alleged sexual harassment and inappropriate
touching from her; and (in her strong opinion) Defendants were failing to appropriately address
the very serious matter of Dr. Powe’s misconduct - including by failing to (1) promptly obtain
legal/professional/HR guidance regarding what investigation/action(s) to take as to Powe (e.g.,
4 In addition, the record reflects that at a meeting of Defendants’ approximately 32 employees in May 2023, Dr.
Chapman directed that employee questions/concerns (other than those regarding marketing or finance, which were
handled by the two managing employees in those departments/positions) should be communicated to Plaintiff.
(Docket No. 45-1 at 8-9, 16-17, 69). The Court notes that no particular employment position/responsibility is required
for protection from retaliatory termination under Title VII. Nor do Defendants cite any law supporting their apparent
belief that an objecting employee must be specially situated as to the unlawful conduct complained of (e.g., a victim
or eyewitness) to be protected from retaliation for complaining in opposition to it. See Section IV, infra.
5 See also Docket No. 45-1 at 43-44, 46) (Dr. Chapman’s recounting that when Plaintiff called him she was “mad”
and “pretty upset”; he deduced she was calling about the employees’ complaints against Powe and responded: “this is
why I didn’t want you to know”).
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perhaps disciplining Powe and/or suspending his employment, and (2) institute practice procedure
changes sufficient to protect employees (and perhaps patients) from sexual harassment. (Docket
No. 42 at ¶¶ 34-48; see also Docket No. 19 at ¶¶ 32-37). When requested by Dr. Chapman, Powe
refused to do sexual harassment training and, after additional incident(s) of sexual
harassment/misconduct, his employment was ultimately terminated on October 12, 2023. (Docket
No. 42 at ¶ 49-51; Docket No. 45-1 at 51-56).
Dr. Chapman’s working relationship with Plaintiff became strained throughout the interval
of tension over Powe, during which her “pushing” frustrated and annoyed him, as he acknowledges
in his deposition testimony. (Docket No. 42 at ¶ 53, citing testimony exhibits). And it continued
to deteriorate as Dr. Chapman felt he could no longer trust Plaintiff, accused and reprimanded
Plaintiff for alleged wrongs, reduced her work, and excluded her from meetings. (Docket No. 19
at ¶¶ 38-47; cf. Docket No. 42 at ¶ 54). Plaintiff was terminated approximately four (4) months
later, on February 6, 2024, on the allegedly pretextual grounds of the elimination of her position
due to financial difficulties. (Docket No. 19 at ¶¶ 48-55).
In response to Plaintiff’s March 4, 2024 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) Charge of discriminatory termination (prepared by his counsel and which he reviewed),
Dr. Chapman indicated that once Plaintiff became aware of the sexual harassment complaints, she
“openly and at times disrespectfully and unprofessionally challenged [him] about the situation and
how it was being handled and made [ill-informed] accusations about [Defendant’s] response to the
complaints”. (Docket No. 42 at ¶ 39).
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff has properly exhausted her administrative remedies, and timely filed her initial
Complaint on November 24, 2024 and Amended Complaint on March 6, 2025. (Docket Nos. 1,
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17 and 19). Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on September 12, 2025, with
the Brief in Support following the next day. (Docket Nos. 36 and 38). Said motion was thereafter
fully briefed as set forth above. Plaintiff’s subsequently filed Motion for Sanctions (Docket No.
49) remains pending completion of responsive filing later this month.
III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party,6 the “materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the
motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” show “that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a) & (c)(1)(A). Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to
adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party’s case, and
for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence which demonstrates
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact; that is, the movant must show that the evidence of
record is insufficient to carry the non-movant’s burden of proof. Id. Once that burden has been
met, the nonmoving party must set forth “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial” or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and judgment will be
entered as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)) (emphasis added by Matsushita Court).
6 See e.g., Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that the court must interpret the facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor).
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An issue is genuine only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty-Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); id.
at 250 (“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment
may be granted.”). See also McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).7
IV. DISCUSSION
Title VII outlaws retaliation for opposing discrimination:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees . . . because [she] has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because [she] has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). See also PHRA, 43 Pa. Stat. § 955(e), and WVHRA § 16B-17-9(7)(C).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must tender
evidence that: “(1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse
employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between her participation in
the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461
F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006), quoting Nelson v. Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995).8
Defendants remarkably posit, without support, that Plaintiff’s “pushing [Dr. Chapman] to
move faster with the investigation . . . is not opposing discrimination in the workplace but instead
voicing a personal opinion” about Defendants’ handling of the complaints. (Docket No. 38 at 2).
Defendants’ later assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, the alleged sexual harassment is the
7 In summary, the inquiry under a Rule 56 motion is whether the evidence of record (a) presents a genuine dispute
over material facts requiring submission of the matter to a jury for resolution or (b) is so one-sided that the movant
must prevail as a matter of law.
8 As Plaintiff observes, Defendants’ motion does not contest the evidentiary sufficiency of other elements of her prima
facie claims.
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“issue”, and not the “backdrop”, in this litigation,9 and Plaintiff’s complaints regarding Powe’s
sexual harassment of other of Defendants’ female employees and her admonitions/insistence it be
promptly addressed were a quintessential example of an employee opposing an unlawful
employment practice.10 (Cf. Docket No. 46 at 1).
As Plaintiff observes, “[e]ven a cursory review of relevant precedent from the Supreme
Court, the Third Circuit, and other sources makes clear” that Defendants’ motion should be denied.
(Docket No. 41 at 2) (quoting Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276) (the term “oppose” under Title VII
carries its ordinary meaning of “‘[t]o resist or antagonize . . .; to contend against; to confront; . . .
.”);11 id. (quoting Moore, 461 F.3d at 342) (noting, where white employees complained that
supervisor was treating black employees less favorably, that “‘[o]pposition’ to discrimination can
take the form of ‘informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, including making
complaints to management’”).12 Cf id. at 9 (quoting Moore, supra) (observing that Title VII’s
protection is not limited to those opposing “their own mistreatment or [that] of their own . . .
protected class”); id. (quoting Moore, supra) (“Protected opposition includes actions such as:
9 (Docket No. 46 at 1).
10 (Docket No. 48 at 9-10) (“Complaining about an employer’s response to a sexual harassment complaint is just as
protected as the complaint of sexual harassment itself. . . . [B]ecause, in cases involving coworker harassment, an
employer has a duty to take “reasonable steps to discover and rectify acts of sexual harassment by its employees.”)
(citing Doe v. Manor Coll., 479 F. Supp. 3d 151, 170 (E.D. Pa. 2020); Huston v. P&G Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d
100, 108 (3d Cir. 2009)).
11 See also Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276 ("When an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer
has engaged in a form of employment discrimination, that communication virtually always constitutes the employee's
opposition to the activity."); id. (concluding that employee’s “ostensibly disapproving account of sexually obnoxious
behavior . . . would certainly qualify in the minds of reasonable jurors as ‘resistant’ or ‘antagonistic’ to [it]”)).
12 In further response to Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff merely expressed an “opinion” and desire to interfere,
Plaintiff notes that a Title VII retaliation plaintiff need have only a reasonable and good faith belief of a violation to
have engaged in protected activity. (Docket No. 41 at 3-4) (citing Moore, 461 F. 3d at 341; Kengerski v. Harper, 6
F.4th 531, 537 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding that employee engages in protected activity when she holds an objectively
reasonable belief of a hostile work environment)). And that “[t]here is little . . . difference between the “reasonable
belief” standard for protected activity set forth in cases like Kengerski and Moore and [Plaintiff]’s ‘opinion’ that her
employer was falling short of its legal obligations under Title VII. . . . In short, [Plaintiff]’s opinion was an
oppositional one.” (Docket No. 41 at 8-9). The Court concurs.
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complaining or threatening to complain about alleged discrimination against oneself or others. . .
.”). Here, as clearly detailed in Plaintiff’s responsive filings, the record evidences material fact
questions - supported in the deposition testimony of Plaintiff, Dr. Chapman, and other affected
employees – regarding Plaintiff’s confrontations with Dr. Chapman, opposition to Powe’s sexual
harassment of other of Defendants’ female employees and objections to Defendants’ delayed
resolution. See e.g., Docket No. 48 at 2-4 (bullet-pointing material fact questions as well as
undisputed supportive facts).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not “engage in protected activity” because she “never
alleges she was a victim”, or a witness, or an invited participant in the investigation. (Docket No.
38, Docket No. 46 at 1-2).13 That contention is meritless; Defendants cite no authority to the
contrary. Rather, Defendants’ reliance on Qing Qin, v. Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th 458 (3d Cir. 2024)
(Docket No. 46 at 2-3) is misguided. The case, in reinforcing the proposition that “an employee is
protected from retaliation when the employer perceives [him/her] to have engaged in protected
activity”, simply does not stand, as Defendants would have it, for the proposition that Title VII’s
protection extends only to victims and witnesses. Compare Docket No. 46 at 3 with Docket No.
48 at 5 (citing EEOC-CVG2016-1, Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues,
Protected Activity: Examples of Opposition § II(A)(2)(e)); Docket No. 41 at 9); id. (“Qing Qin
does not hold that Title VII only protects those who complain about discrimination against
themselves; it just happened to be a case where the employee was complaining about
discrimination against himself.”).
13 See also Docket No. 46 at 2 (“She did not raise a concern about her being victimized but instead used the opportunity
to try and tell the owner how to run his business better and that she wanted to get involved. Dr. Chapman explained
he was handling it and she should not be involved. It was a simple straightforward request but it was ignored.”).
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Finally, Defendants’ assertion that the written response to the investigation of Plaintiff’s
EEOC Charge14 is inadmissible hearsay is also made without citation to supportive caselaw and is
similarly meritless. (Docket No. 38 at 2, 4). The Court concurs with Plaintiff’s succinct and
correctly supported rejection of that fundamental mischaracterization/misunderstanding of the law.
(Docket No. 41 at 6-7); id. at 6 (“A statement made by an opposing party, its agent, or a person
authorized to make a statement on the subject, is not hearsay.” (citing Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(C)&(D)).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has more than sufficiently evidenced that she
opposed an unlawful employment practice, i.e., Defendant’s failure to redress Powe’s sexual
harassment of female employees in a reasonably timely and/or meaningful way. In other words, a
jury could reasonably find that she “engaged in protected activity”, as required to maintain her
claims for unlawful retaliation under Title VII and parallel Pennsylvania and West Virginia laws.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on grounds that she has and could not will therefore
be denied.
An appropriate Order follows below.
14 See Section II(A), supra.
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ORDER
AND NOW, this 12th day of November, 2025, for the reasons aforesaid,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket
No. 36) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file her Pretrial Statement by December
1, 2025 and Defendants shall file their Pretrial Statement by December 15, 2025.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for the parties shall meet and confer and file
a Joint Status Report by December 22, 2025 advising (a) if they agree to refer this matter back to
ADR or to a judicial settlement conference, and (b) as to both counsel’s availability for trial; and
FINALLY, the Court will convene a video status conference with counsel on January 12,
2026 at 10:00 a.m. Dial-in information will be forwarded prior to the proceeding.
s/Nora Barry Fischer
Nora Barry Fischer
Senior U.S. District Judge
cc/ecf: All counsel of record
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