MAY v. BURNSWORTH et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM MAY, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-1386
)
v. 	)
) 	Judge Marilyn J. Horan
OFFICER DONALD BURNSWORTH, 	) 	Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge
OFFICER ANDREW HIGINBOTHAM, 	)
LAUREL R. HARRY, 	)
SUPERINTENDENT TINA WALKER, 	)
LIEUTENANT SEAN DAILEY, 	)
SERGEANT MATTHEW FARNAM, 	)
OFFICER DAKOTA MCWILLIAMS, 	)
OFFICER NOAH WILSON and 	)
OFFICER JULIAN TATUM, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff William May, who is proceeding pro se, is in the custody of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and housed at SCI Fayette. For the reasons that follow, it is
respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss with prejudice the official capacity claims
asserted against all Defendants, as well as the claims asserted against Superintendent Tina Walker
and Secretary Laurel R. Harry in their individual capacities.
II. 	REPORT
A. 	Relevant Procedural Background
May filed the original complaint in October 2024. He named as defendants Lt. Dailey and
Corrections Officers (“CO”) Burnsworth and Higinbothham, each of whom worked at SCI Fayette
on August 22, 2024, the date of the events in question in this lawsuit. May alleged in the original
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complaint (ECF 6) that on that date, these three individuals assaulted him, and he asserted claims
against them of excessive force and civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Lt. Dailey and COs Burnsworth and Higinbothham filed their answer to the original
complaint. (ECF 27.) The Court then issued a case management order that, among other things,
set forth the schedule for discovery. (ECF 28.)
After the close of discovery, May moved to amend the complaint to add as defendants
Sgt. Matthew Farnam, CO Dakota McWilliams, CO Noah Wilson, CO Julian Tatum, SCI Fayette
Superintendent Tina Walker, and DOC Secretary Laurel R. Harry and to assert against one or more
of them (as well as the three original defendants) claims of excessive force and civil conspiracy
based on the alleged August 22, 2024 incident. In support of his motion, May explained that when
he filed the original complaint he knew that more officers were involved in the incident, but that
he was unable initially to identify them because of the severity of the injuries he sustained. May
stated that he did not learn the names of the other officers involved in the incident until after he
received in discovery the “extraordinary occurrence reports for Sgt. Farnam, and Correctional
Officers McWilliams, Wilson and Tatum.” (ECF 38 at 1.)
Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s motion, suggesting that amendment would prejudice them
because it would require returning to the pleading stage and require the filing of a motion to
dismiss. (ECF 41.) Thereafter, the Court granted May leave to amend and directed the Clerk’s
Office to file the Amended Complaint. However, it advised the parties that Defendants were not
required to respond to the Amended Complaint until the Court reviewed it under the applicable
screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and issued any appropriate
orders. (ECF 42; see also ECF 45.)
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The case was later temporarily stayed for reasons related to the ransomware attack on the
Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office (attorneys with that office represent Defendants). (ECF
54.) The stay has now been lifted. (ECF 56.)
B. 	Allegations of the Amended Complaint
May 	alleges 	in 	the 	Amended 	Complaint 	that 	between 	12:30 	and 	1:30 	p.m. 	on
August 22, 2024, Lt. Dailey, Sgt. Farnam and COs Burnsworth, Higinbotham, McWilliams,
Wilson and Tatum, each of whom was assigned to the Special Management Unit (“SMU”) at SCI
Fayette, approached May’s cell to conduct a strip search. (ECF 44 ¶¶ 13, 19-20.) During this
incident, May alleges, he sustained serious injuries when the officers, at the direction of Lt. Dailey,
brutally assaulted him. (Id. ¶¶ 30-35) May claims that these Defendants’ actions violated the
DOC’s “use of force” policy, which is set forth at DC-ADM 201. (Id. ¶¶ 14-19.)
May brings civil conspiracy and/or excessive force claims under § 1983 against Lt. Dailey,
Sgt. Farnam and COs Burnsworth, Higinbotham, McWilliams, Wilson and Tatum (labeled “Count
One” and “Count Two,” respectively, in the Amended Complaint). (Id. ¶¶ 42-45.) He also brings
excessive force claims under § 1983 against Supt. Walker and Sec. Harry premised on the
allegation that they failed to protect him because they “failed to train, improperly trained, and
failed to put a procedure in place to ensure training was being applied” (labeled “Count Three” in
the Amended Complaint). (Id. ¶¶ 46).
C. 	Standard of Review
Under the PLRA, courts shall screen complaints where, as is the case here, the plaintiff has
been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). It requires the
Court to dismiss a complaint or certain claims contained in it if, among other things, the complaint
or claim at issue fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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The legal standard for dismissing a complaint under the PLRA for failure to state a claim
is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). In deciding
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.
2008)). While “accept[ing] all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true,” the court “may
disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-11. The plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Though ‘detailed factual allegations’ are not required, a
complaint must do more than simply provide ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action.’” Davis v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, the plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to
show that her claim has substantive plausibility.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10
(2014).
Because May is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be
held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules a court should construe all
allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant.
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D. 	Discussion
Section 1983 “provides a cause of action against state actors who violate an individual’s
rights under federal law.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 380 (2012). Section 1983 does not create
substantive rights but “provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in
the Constitution or federal laws.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). “To state
a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
A plaintiff must plead a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of his
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). That is
because, as stated in the text of § 1983 itself, only a person who “subjects, or causes to be
subjected” another person to a civil rights violation can be held liable under § 1983. Thus, each
defendant is liable only for his or her own conduct. See, e.g., id.; see also Parkell v. Danberg, 833
F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.
2014) (rev’d sub. nom. on other grounds 575 U.S. 822 (2015)); C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.,
430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To impose liability on the individual defendants, Plaintiffs
must show that each one individually participated in the alleged constitutional violation or
approved of it.”) (citing C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
1. 	Claims Asserted Against Each Defendant in His or Her Official Capacity
The Amended Complaint asserts claims against each Defendant in his or her official and
individual capacities. The official capacity claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
A § 1983 claim asserted against an individual in his or her “official capacity” is
synonymous with a claim against the entity that employs the individual (here, the DOC). Kentucky
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v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits…‘generally represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). Thus, “an
official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”
Id.
The Eleventh Amendment proscribes actions in the federal courts against states, their
agencies and state officials acting within their official capacities. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-67;
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Betts v. New Castle Dev. Ctr.,
621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010) (“official capacity suits generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against the state.”) (citing Lombardo v. PA. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d
190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008)). The DOC and the facilities that comprise the DOC are agencies or arms
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and, as such, both they and their employees who are sued
in their official capacities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity unless an exception to
such immunity applies. See, e.g., Lavia v. Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d
Cir. 2000).
“Such immunity…may be lost in one of two ways: (1) if the Commonwealth waived its
immunity; or (2) if Congress abrogated the States’ immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of its
power.” Id. Neither exception applies to May’s § 1983 claims. The Commonwealth has not waived
its immunity, see, e.g., id. (citing Pa. Const. Art. I, § 11 and 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b)), and
Congress did not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity when it enacted § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 339-46 (1979). Thus, all
§ 1983 claims asserted against Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
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Although claims against state officers in their official capacity for prospective relief are
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, this exception, first set forth in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), is “narrow,” in that it “applies only to prospective relief, [and] does not permit
judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past.” Puerto Rico
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (emphasis added)
(citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985)); see also Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013). The purpose of this
exception ensures that state officials cannot employ the Eleventh Amendment to avoid compliance
with federal law. Id. Thus, in determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an
Eleventh Amendment bar to suit in this case, the Court must determine whether May has alleged
in the Amended Complaint an ongoing violation of federal law and whether he seeks injunctive
relief from a defendant who can stop the violation. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535
U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (“In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh
Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the]
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.”) (alteration in original)
Although May claims an entitlement to injunctive relief in the Amended Complaint, no
official capacity claim asserted against any Defendant1 falls within the narrow Ex parte Young
doctrine. That is because all of May’s claims (Counts One, Two and Three) are premised on the
1 Presumably, May is seeking injunctive relief from Sec. Harry and/or Supt. Walker because they
are the only Defendants in the position to provide him with such relief. In the Amended Complaint,
May alleges that Sec. Harry “is legally responsible for the overall operation of the Department and
each institution under its jurisdiction, including SCI Fayette.” (ECF 44 ¶ 4.) He alleges that
Supt. Walker “is legally responsible for the operation of SCI Fayette and for the welfare of all the
inmates in that prison.” (Id. ¶ 5.)
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alleged incident of excessive force that occurred on August 22, 2024, not on an ongoing
constitutional violation.2
Based on the above, the Court should dismiss with prejudice the claims asserted against
each Defendant in his or her official capacity.
2. 	Claims 	Asserted 	Against 	Sec. 	Harry 	and 	Supt. 	Walker 	in 	Their
Individual Capacities
As previously noted, Count Three of the Amended Complaint is an excessive force claim
against Supt. Walker and Sec. Harry premised on the allegation that they did not protect May from
the events of August 22, 2024 because they “failed to train, improperly trained, and failed to put a
procedure in place to ensure training was being applied[.]” (ECF 44 ¶¶ 46).
Also as previously noted, § 1983 requires that a plaintiff plead a defendant’s personal
involvement in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. The
Court of Appeals has explained that liability may attach to a supervisor-defendant such as
Sec. Harry and Supt. Walker for constitutional harms incurred by an inmate if the supervisor:
(1) directed a subordinate to take the action in question; (2) had “knowledge of and acquiesced”
in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct, meaning the supervisor knew that his or her
subordinate was violating the plaintiff’s rights but failed to stop the subordinate from doing so; or
(3) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice
or custom which directly caused the violation. See, e.g., A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv.
2 Moreover, the injunctive relief requested in Amended Complaint (an order that directs that May
be removed from the SMU, transferred, and that also ensures that he will not face “any future
negative incidents” or retaliation (ECF 44 ¶¶ 47-48), runs afoul of the PLRA’s limitation on
prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions. That limitation, codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), provides that “[t]he court shall not grant or approve any prospective
relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct
the violation of the Federal right.”
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Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208. “Failure
to” claims—failure to train, discipline or supervise—are generally considered a subcategory of
policy or practice liability. Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316-19.
Importantly, “it is not enough for a plaintiff to argue that the constitutionally cognizable
injury would not have occurred if the superior had done more than he or she did.” Sample v. Diecks,
885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989). Rather, the plaintiff must point to specific facts showing “a
close causal relationship between the ‘identified deficiency’ and the ‘ultimate injury.’” Id.
Additionally, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily
necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011).
Here, May fails to plead sufficient facts to state a “failure to” protect or train excessive
force claim against either Sec. Harry or Supt. Walker. He alleges in the Amended Complaint that
the DOC has a policy regarding the use of force and that the officers involved in the
August 22, 2024, incident intentionally and maliciously violated that policy. (ECF 44 ¶¶ 14-17.)
He has not, however, asserted any facts that plausibly causally link the officers’ actions to any
failure to train on the part of either Sec. Harry or Supt. Walker. May cannot assert a claim against
Sec. Harry or Supt. Walker based on conclusory statements that they failed to train or supervise
employees at SCI Fayette.
Similarly, although May states at Count Three that Sec. Harry and Supt. Walker knew or
should have known about the alleged “widespread use of excessive force” at SCI Fayette and other
DOC facilities (ECF 44 ¶ 46), he asserts no facts in the Amended Complaint that support that
allegation. Moreover, such broad and conclusory allegations that attempt to impute either
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Sec. Harry’s or Supt. Walker’s personal involvement in the August 22, 2024 incident warrant no
presumption of truth.
Based on the above, May has failed to plausibly allege that the officers’ misconduct on
August 22, 2024 was the result of any failure to train on the part of either Sec. Harry or Supt.
Walker. Therefore, the Court should dismiss the individual-capacity claims asserted against those
two defendants.
When dismissing a § 1983 claim, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to replead it
in an amended complaint unless doing so would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp.
v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). Under the circumstances
here—in which (1) May filed the Amended Complaint after having the benefit of discovery and
(2) there is no basis to surmise that he will be able to state a plausible “failure to” protect or train
claim against either Sec. Harry or Supt. Walker—it is recommended that the dismissal of the
individual-capacity claims asserted against them be with prejudice.
III. 	CONCLUSION
It is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss with prejudice: (1) the official-
capacity claims asserted against each Defendant; and (2) the individual-capacity claims asserted
against Sec. Harry and Supt. Walker, who should then be terminated as defendants in this action.
The excessive force and conspiracy claims asserted against Lt. Dailey, Sgt. Farnam and COs
Burnsworth, Higinbotham, McWilliams, Wilson and Tatum remain in this action, and the Court
will issue an appropriate scheduling order after the resolution of this Report and Recommendation.
Under the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of
the Local Civil Rules, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file
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objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal.
Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).
Date: December 11, 2025 	/s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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