USA v. MORGAN-GRAHAM

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	)
)
v. 	) 	Criminal No. 23-215
)
MIQUANN MORGAN-GRAHAM 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court are the following additional pretrial motions filed by pro se
Defendant Miquann Morgan-Graham: Motion for a Franks Hearing Followed by Suppression
Hearing; Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment;1 Motion to Suppress Evidence From Cell
Phone Search Warrant Defects; and Motion to Suppress All Evidence Related to this Federal
Prosecution, all of which are opposed by the Government. (Docket Nos. 190, 191, 193, 194, 199,
202, 207, 213). After careful consideration of the parties’ respective positions, the Court finds that
all of Defendant’s arguments in support of a Franks hearing, suppression of evidence, and
dismissal of the Superseding Indictment lack merit, thus his Motions will be denied in their
entirety.
I. 	Background
Defendant is charged in a four-count Superseding Indictment with the following:
possession with intent to distribute a quantity of fentanyl, a quantity of a mixture and substance
containing detectable amounts of fentanyl and fluorofentanyl, and a quantity of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) (Count One); carrying a firearm, which was
also a machinegun, during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
1 	Although this Motion is entitled “Motion to Dismiss Counts Four and Two of the Superseding Indictment,”
Defendant specified that he wished to amend/correct the heading to just “Motion to Dismiss.” (Docket No. 191 at 3,
n.2).
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 1 of 22

2
924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Count Two); possession of a machinegun, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(o)(1) (Count Three); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Four). (Docket No. 56).
Defendant, proceeding pro se, previously filed numerous pretrial motions, which were
adjudicated by the Court. (See Docket Nos. 149, 152-155). Following resolution of Defendant’s
pretrial motions, the Court scheduled jury selection and trial to commence on February 9, 2026.
(Docket No. 165). 	Attorney Ryan Smith, who is Defendant’s standby counsel, joined by
Defendant, subsequently moved to continue jury selection and trial, which the Court granted.
(Docket Nos. 167, 173). 	Jury selection was then rescheduled on May 20, 2026, and trial was
rescheduled to begin on May 26, 2026. (Docket No. 173).
After jury selection and trial were rescheduled, however, Defendant moved to file
additional pretrial motions, which the Court initially denied without prejudice because it was
unclear what type of motions he sought to file. 	(Docket Nos. 177, 178). 	Defendant moved to
reconsider his request, the Court convened a status conference to address the matter, and ultimately
permitted him to file the four additional pretrial motions which he identified at the status
conference, with the specific directive that no other additional pretrial motions were permitted.
(Docket Nos. 179, 186, 187). After Defendant filed the four additional Pretrial Motions which are
presently 	before 	the 	Court, 	the Government 	responded, 	Defendant 	filed 	a Reply 	and 	a
Supplemental Reply in support of his Motions, (Docket Nos. 202, 207), and the Government filed
a Sur-reply. (Docket No. 213). Defendant’s Pretrial Motions are now ripe for disposition.
II. 	Motion for a Franks Hearing Followed by Suppression Hearing (Docket No. 190)
Defendant contends that the Affidavit in Support of the Criminal Complaint and Arrest
Warrant in this case contain “blatant deficiencies” because it omits certain information concerning
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 2 of 22

3
his alleged lack of knowledge of his fugitive status and circumstances surrounding the shooting
death of his girlfriend, which he claims was material to the probable cause determination. (Docket
No. 190 at 1, 4-7). As a result, Defendant maintains that both a Franks hearing and a suppression
hearing are warranted. Defendant is incorrect.
Initially, Defendant is not entitled to the relief he seeks because the operative charging
document in this case is the Superseding Indictment, not the Criminal Complaint that Defendant
claims was issued based upon a deficient Affidavit. To be clear, on September 21, 2023, Defendant
was accused in a Criminal Complaint of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 	(Docket Nos. 4, 4-1). 	The grand jury subsequently returned an
Indictment on October 4, 2023, charging Defendant with violating § 922(g)(1), (Docket No. 16),
and later returned a Superseding Indictment on May 7, 2024, charging him with violating 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), 18 U.S.C. §
922(o)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Docket No. 56). Therefore, Defendant’s contention that
the Criminal Complaint is somehow deficient is negated by the fact that he subsequently was
indicted by a federal grand jury. See United States v. Vaughn, 492 F. Supp. 3d 336, 343 (D.N.J.
2020) (illustrating that a felony indictment supersedes a criminal complaint and becomes the
operative charging document) (citing United States v. Dorsey, 462 F.2d 361, 363 n.2 (3d Cir.
1972)) (“[T]he grand jury supersedes the complaint procedure by returning an indictment.”);
United States v. Parker, No. CIV.A. 03-6926, 2006 WL 759689, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2006)
(“Even if the complaint [was] insufficient, however, the indictment superseded and thus cured any
deficiencies in the complaint.”) (citing Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 220 (1965)).
Nonetheless, given Defendant’s pro se status, the Court will liberally construe his argument
to the extent he claims that suppression is warranted because the Affidavit omitted facts material
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 3 of 22

4
to the finding of probable cause for issuance of the Criminal Complaint and arrest warrant which
in turn tainted the entire federal prosecution. Here again, Defendant is incorrect.
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), the Supreme Court articulated the
rule governing situations involving allegedly misleading search warrant affidavits, holding that a
defendant has the right to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the truthfulness of statements made
in an affidavit establishing probable cause if certain requirements are met.2 To obtain a hearing,
Franks requires a defendant to make a substantial preliminary showing that the affidavit contained
a false statement, which was made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the
truth, and which is necessary to the finding of probable cause. 	Id. at 155–56, 171. 	In order to
make this showing, the defendant cannot rest on conclusory allegations or a “mere desire to cross-
examine.” 	Id. at 171. 	Rather, he must specifically identify the alleged false statements or
omissions in the affidavit3 and present an offer of proof contradicting the affidavit, including
materials such as affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses, or provide a
satisfactory explanation of their absence. Id.; see also United States v. Desu, 23 F.4 th 224, 234 (3d
Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 383 n. 8 (3d Cir. 2006)).
2 	While Franks dealt with search warrants, later cases have applied its reasoning to arrest warrants. See, e.g.,
United States v. Carter, 756 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Harrison, 400 F. Supp. 2d 780, 785 (E.D.
Pa. 2005).
3 	Statements or assertions contained in an affidavit of probable cause are “made with reckless disregard when
‘viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had
obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.’ ” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir.
2000) (quoting United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1995)). Omissions from an affidavit are made
with reckless disregard for the truth if an affiant withholds facts that any reasonable person would know that a judge
would want to know. Id. at 788. A district court “may properly infer that an affiant acted with reckless disregard for
the truth where his affidavit contains an averment that was without sufficient basis at the time he drafted it.” United
States v. Brown, 631 F.3d 638, 649 (3d Cir. 2011). However, when attempting to demonstrate that the affiant included
a false statement in a warrant affidavit or omitted material from it, it is insufficient to prove that he acted with
negligence or made an innocent mistake. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171; Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 383.
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 4 of 22

5
“[The] preliminary showing [that a defendant must make] is no light burden and puts the
defendant to task by requiring some offer of proof that materially false statements were recklessly
or intentionally made.” 	United States v. Romeu, 433 F. Supp. 3d 631, 645 (M.D. Pa. 2020)
(quoting United States v. Darby, No. 1:14-CR-00123, 2015 WL 13344905, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug.
19, 2015)). To reiterate, “[t]o make the initial showing, a defendant must allege with specificity
what was false in the affidavit, must provide proof, must allege that the affiant had a culpable state
of mind, and must allege that the remaining information from the affidavit is insufficient to support
a finding of probable cause.” 	United States v. Yokshan, 431 F. App’x 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72).
If the requirements of the substantial preliminary showing “are met, and if, when material
that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains
sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is
required.” 	Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72. 	However, if the remaining content is insufficient, the
defendant is entitled to a hearing.4 Id. at 172.
In light of the prevailing legal standard, Defendant is not entitled to a Franks hearing
because he has not made the requisite substantial preliminary showing. See Franks, 438 U.S. at
171. Defendant failed to make the threshold showing for two reasons: (1) he failed to make an
offer of proof showing that Task Force Officer Christian Sciulli, who authored the Affidavit,
misstated or omitted information from the Affidavit knowingly and intentionally or with reckless
4 	If a Franks hearing is held, and the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the false
statements or omissions were made knowingly and intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth, and with
the affidavit’s false material set aside, the remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, then the warrant
must be voided, and the fruits of the search must be excluded from the trial. Franks, 438 U.S. at 156; see also United
States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1993).
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 5 of 22

6
disregard for the truth; and (2) even if the information that Defendant claims was omitted is
inserted, the Affidavit still would contain sufficient content to support a finding of probable cause.
To begin, Defendant fails the first prong of Franks because he has not presented an offer
of proof consisting of affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses to contradict
the Affidavit and showing that Task Force Officer Sciulli knowingly and intentionally made false
statements or omitted information from the Affidavit or that he acted with reckless disregard for
the truth, nor has he explained the absence of these materials. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171; Desu,
23 F.4 th at 234; Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 383, n. 8; United States v. Rodriguez-Colon, 827 F. App’x 188,
190 (3d Cir. 2020) (affirming denial of motion to suppress evidence claiming that affidavit in
support of search warrant contained material omissions where the defendant’s challenge did not
contain an offer of proof); United States v. Rivera, 524 F. App’x 821, 826 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Even
if the information provided by the informants was unreliable, [defendant] has offered no evidence
that the detective who provided the affidavit either knew that the information was not true or
recklessly disregarded its falsity.”). 	At most, Defendant has made speculative and conclusory
allegations with respect to the alleged omissions which are insufficient to meet his burden for a
hearing under Franks. See Desu, 23 F.4th at 234 (explaining that a defendant cannot “rest on mere
conclusory allegations . . . but rather must present an offer of proof contradicting the affidavit,
including materials such as sworn affidavits or otherwise reliable statements from witnesses”)
(quoting Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 383, n.8).
Putting aside Defendant’s failure to tender the requisite offer of proof, even if his claimed
omissions regarding his alleged lack of knowledge of his fugitive status and circumstances
surrounding the shooting death of his girlfriend are inserted into the Affidavit, probable cause for
issuance of the Criminal Complaint and arrest warrant would not be negated. See United States v.
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 6 of 22

7
McKnight, 568 F. App’x 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2014) (“In a Franks proceeding, the court assesses
materiality by removing allegedly false statements, inserting omissions, and determining whether
probable cause nonetheless remains.”) (citing Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 383-84). 	Quite simply,
Defendant’s alleged omitted facts are both unsupported and irrelevant to the charge of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon as alleged in the Criminal Complaint. Accordingly, given that
the Affidavit established probable cause even if Defendant’s alleged omissions are inserted, he is
not entitled to a Franks hearing regarding the validity of the Criminal Complaint and the arrest
warrant.
III. 	Motion to Dismiss Superseding Indictment (Docket No. 191)
Defendant next argues that the Superseding Indictment should be dismissed because: (1)
the § 922(g)(1) charge violates his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and
equal protection; (2) the §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c) charges are the result of discrimination and/or
selective prosecution; and (3) the Superseding Indictment, which was filed eight months after his
arrest, is the result of prosecutorial vindictiveness. 	(Docket Nos. 191 at 3; 202 at 1-4). 	These
claims are baseless and provide no reason to dismiss the Superseding Indictment.
The Executive Branch is vested with the exclusive authority to prosecute cases. 	See
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974). In our criminal justice system, “so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute,
the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion.” 	Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
“Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses,
‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional
violation’ so long as ‘the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 7 of 22

8
as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456
(1962)). Defendant does not claim that his prosecution was motivated by any of these improper
considerations. Rather, Defendant complains that “each and every felon and/or person convicted
of a crime punishable by more than a year, found in possession of a Glock firearm while in
Pennsylvania, [should] be similarly prosecuted in federal court. 	Just as the Defendant here
currently is.” (Docket No. 191 at 5). Defendant alleges that he was somehow “treated differently
from others who were similarly situated,” (Docket No. 202 at 3), yet there is nothing in the record
to support that allegation. Notably, Defendant does not claim that his prosecution is based on an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. 	Therefore, to the
extent that Defendant claims that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and
equal protection were somehow violated, any such claim fails.
Turning to Defendant’s contention that some or all of the charges against him are the result
of selective prosecution, such a claim is “an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought
the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution” and is founded on principles of equal
protection. 	United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463, 465 (1996). To demonstrate selective
prosecution, a defendant must show that the federal prosecutorial policy was “motivated by a
discriminatory purpose” and had a “discriminatory effect.” Id. at 465; see also United States v.
Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1989) (“A decision to prosecute is selective and violates the
right to equal protection when it is made on a discriminatory basis with an improper motive.”). To
establish a claim of selective prosecution, a defendant must (1) “provide evidence that persons
similarly situated have not been prosecuted” and (2) “show that the decision to prosecute was made
on the basis of an unjustifiable standard, such as race, religion, or some other arbitrary factor, or
that the prosecution was intended to prevent his exercise of a fundamental right.” 	Id. 	“The
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 8 of 22

9
defendant bears the burden of proof, and must establish each of these elements with ‘clear
evidence’ sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity that attaches to decisions to
prosecute.” United States v. Taylor, 686 F.3d 182, 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Armstrong, 517
U.S. at 464).
Defendant has failed to sustain his burden to establish that he has been selectively
prosecuted. Defendant simply alleges, without any supporting evidence, that he was the victim of
selective prosecution. Nothing in the record substantiates Defendant’s bald assertion or suggests
that he was prosecuted on the basis of an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or some
other arbitrary factor, or to prevent him from exercising a fundamental right.
Defendant’s claim of vindicative prosecution likewise fails. According to Defendant, the
Government obtained the Superseding Indictment eight months after he was arrested and initially
indicted because he supposedly declined to cooperate and/or provide any information he may have
concerning the Race Street Crip gang. (Docket Nos. 191 at 8-9; 202 at 5-6).
“Prosecutorial vindictiveness may be found when the government penalizes a defendant
for invoking legally protected rights.” United States v. Reynolds, 374 F. App’x 356, 361 (3d Cir.
2010) (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982)). 	However, “there is no
prosecutorial vindictiveness where the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute is based upon the usual
determinative factors.” United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1986). A defendant
bears the burden of proving prosecutorial vindictiveness, and he may meet his burden by either (1)
using evidence of the prosecutor’s retaliatory motive to prove actual vindictiveness, or (2) showing
facts sufficient to give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d
1212, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993). Courts will apply a presumption of vindictiveness only where there
exists a “realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.” Id. 	“The inquiry here is not whether there is a
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 9 of 22

10
possibility that the defendant might be deterred from exercising a legal right, but whether the
situation presents a reasonable likelihood of a danger that the State might be retaliating against the
accused for lawfully exercising a right.” 	United States v. Esposito, 968 F.2d 300, 303 (3d Cir.
1992).
Defendant fails to show either actual vindictiveness or that a presumption of vindictiveness
applies here. 	As to actual vindictiveness, Defendant does not allege that Government counsel
harbored any actual animus towards him, let alone provide support for a finding that the decision
to obtain the Superseding Indictment against him was motivated by any personal vindictiveness
by Government counsel.
Next, as to any presumption of vindictiveness, it is notable that the Supreme Court has cast
doubt on the applicability of the presumption in the pretrial context:
There 	is 	good 	reason 	to 	be 	cautious 	before 	adopting 	an 	inflexible
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting. In the
course of preparing a case for trial, the prosecutor may uncover additional
information that suggests a basis for further prosecution or he simply may
come to realize that information possessed by the State has a broader
significance. At this stage of the proceedings, the prosecutor’s assessment
of the proper extent of prosecution may not have crystallized.
See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381; see also United States v. Sellers, 501 F. App’x 194, 197 (3d Cir.
2012) (noting that a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness does not generally apply to pre-
trial prosecutorial conduct).
Notwithstanding the limited applicability of prosecutorial vindictiveness in this case given
its current pretrial posture, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to allege any facts which
support a presumption of vindictiveness, other than his assertion that additional charges were
brought in the Superseding Indictment supposedly because he declined to cooperate. 	However,
the mere fact that the Government filed a Superseding Indictment adding more charges does not
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 10 of 22

11
trigger a presumption of vindictiveness by the Government in prosecuting him on the additional
charges. See, e.g., Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382-83 (“[T]he mere fact that a defendant refuses to plead
guilty and forces the government to prove its case is insufficient to warrant a presumption that
subsequent changes in the charging decision are unjustified.”); Reynolds, 374 F. App’x at 361
(holding that the Government’s filing of a superseding indictment which added more serious
terrorism related charges to the original possession of destructive device charges set forth in
indictment was insufficient to give rise to presumption of vindictiveness by the Government);
United States v. Dufresne, 58 F. App’x 890, 895-96 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that the Government’s
alleged decision to indict defendant because he had refused to cooperate in drug investigation was
not a vindictive prosecution); United States v. Braddy, No. 03-CR-14-104, 2016 WL 3633536, at
*7 (M.D. Pa. July 7, 2016) (finding that the Government’s decision to charge defendants with
additional drug related charges in the superseding indictment, after both had rejected plea
agreements, did not constitute actual vindictiveness, nor did it trigger a presumption of
vindictiveness); United States v. Baskerville, Crim. No. 03-836 JAP, 2007 WL 150439, at *3
(D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2007) (“[D]ue process does not prohibit a prosecutor from bringing additional
charges against a defendant who refused to plead guilty to an offense with which he was originally
charged or who refused to cooperate with authorities.”). Defendant otherwise fails to identify any
right that he was lawfully exercising that prompted the Government to retaliate. See Esposito, 968
F.2d at 303. 	Under these circumstances, the Government’s decision to pursue a Superseding
Indictment 	was 	not 	presumptively 	vindictive. 	Accordingly, 	even 	if 	a 	presumption 	of
vindictiveness can be invoked in the pretrial context, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that such
a presumption applies here.
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 11 of 22

12
IV. 	Motion to Suppress Evidence From Cell Phone Search Warrant Defects (Docket No. 193)
Defendant moves to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his three cell phones
pursuant to federal search warrants because he claims that the warrants violate the particularity
requirement rendering them overbroad. 	(Docket No. 193 at 2). 	Defendant also argues that
suppression is justified because the search warrant return sheets were not filled out, contrary to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(f), thus he is prejudiced because he does not know the date,
time, or seized inventory and may unknowingly waive his right to challenge the same. (Id. at 5-
6). Suppression is not warranted on either basis.
First, Defendant’s particularity argument essentially contends that law enforcement was
improperly permitted to search his three cell phones without limitation rendering the warrants
overbroad. (Docket No. 202 at 7-8). Defendant is incorrect.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits general warrants. 	See United States v. Perez, 712 F.
App’x 136, 138 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). “An overly broad warrant describe[s] in both
specific and inclusive generic terms what is to be seized, but it authorizes the seizure of items as
to which there is no probable cause.” United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred
Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-Seven Cents ($92,422.57), 307 F.3d 137, 149 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). To guard against the issuance of general warrants, courts
require “particularity,” which “prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing
another.” Perez, 712 F. App’x at 138 (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)).
Particularity has three components: “First, a warrant must identify the specific offense for which
the police have established probable cause. Second, a warrant must describe the place to be
searched. Third, the warrant must specify the items to be seized by their relation to designated
crimes.” Id. at 138-39 (citation omitted).
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 12 of 22

13
“[C]ourts generally recognize that search warrants may authorize broad searches of
electronic data on cellphones and computers, without violating the particularity requirement.”
United States v. Reese, No. 19-257, 2021 WL 4429429, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2021). Broad
searches of electronic devices are permissible “because criminals can—and often do—hide,
mislabel, or manipulate files to conceal criminal activity, [and] a broad, expansive search of the
hard drive may be required.” 	United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 237 (3d Cir. 2011). 	The
nature of a cell phone “necessarily provides a potential criminal actor with a nearly limitless variety
of means and methods to further their criminal activity, to broadcast their success in criminal
activity, and to conceal evidence of their criminal activity[.]” United States v. Carter, No. 20-104,
2024 WL 510344, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2024). Because of the vast potential for cell phones to
store evidence, a warrant to search a cell phone is sufficiently particularized so long as “it specified
the item to be searched and the crime for which police were seeking evidence.” United States v.
Bridges, No. 21-1679, 2022 WL 4244276, at *4 (3d Cir. Sept. 15, 2022).
Here, the warrants to search Defendant’s cell phones satisfy the three particularity
components. First, Special Agent Wilner, who completed the Affidavit in support of the warrants,
specified the offenses under investigation – that is, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c) and 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 	(Docket Nos. 199-2, ¶ 9; 199-3 at 3; 199-4 at 3; 199-5 at 3). Second, the
Affidavit described the place to be searched by specifically identifying the three cell phones to be
examined. (Docket No. 199-2, ¶ 6). Notably, the Affidavit stated that Defendant was in possession
of three cell phones when he was searched incident to arrest, at which time a Glock pistol equipped
with a loaded magazine and a Glock conversion device, along with suspected narcotics, also were
recovered from him. (Id., ¶¶ 16, 18, 19, 20). Finally, in light of that information, the Affidavit
identified the items to be seized by their relation to the alleged crimes. (Docket Nos. 199-2, ¶¶ 24-
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 13 of 22

14
27; 199-3 at 3; 199-4 at 3; 199-5 at 3). Because the warrants do not lack particularity, they are not
overbroad, and therefore suppression is unwarranted.
However, even if the Court were to find that the warrants were overbroad, suppression still
would not be appropriate because it was reasonable for law enforcement to rely on the warrants to
search Defendant’s three cell phones pursuant to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
The law applicable to the good faith exception is summarized as follows:
The Supreme Court has held that evidence derived from a warrant not
supported by probable cause is still admissible when obtained by officers
acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate judge. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
“[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule - to deter police misconduct - would
not be furthered by suppressing evidence obtained during a search ‘when an
officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from
a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.’ ” United States v. Tracey,
597 F.3d 140, 150 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 919–20).
The question is “whether a reasonably well trained officer would have
known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.”
Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. Indeed, “[t]he mere existence of a warrant typically
suffices to prove that an officer conducted a search in good faith and
justifies application of the good faith exception.” United States v. Hodge,
246 F.3d 301, 307-308 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized that the
good faith exception does not apply in four limited circumstances:
1) where the magistrate judge issued the warrant in reliance on a
deliberately or recklessly false affidavit;
2) 	where the magistrate judge abandoned his or her judicial role
and failed to perform his or her neutral and detached function;
3) where the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia
of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable; or
4) where the warrant was so facially deficient that it failed to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized.
Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151 (citations omitted). 	These limited exceptions
“involve conduct that is ‘deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent.’ ” 	Id.
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 14 of 22

15
(quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009)).
United States v. Gardenhire, Crim. No. 15-87, 2017 WL 1105733, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24,
2017).
Defendant argues that the good faith exception is inapplicable because the Affidavit in
support of the warrants to search the three cell phones failed to particularize the things to be seized.
(Docket No. 202 at 8). 	However, as just discussed, the warrants do not lack particularity.
Additionally, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Magistrate Judge issued the warrants
in reliance on a deliberately or recklessly false Affidavit, or that she abandoned her judicial role
and failed to act in a neutral and detached manner. Finally, the Affidavit in support of the warrants
was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause that it was entirely unreasonable for law
enforcement to rely on it in searching Defendant’s cell phones.5 The record in this case simply
does not support a finding that one of the four limited circumstances which permit the avoidance
of the good faith exception apply here. See Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151. Consequently, suppression
is not warranted.
Defendant next claims that the evidence should be suppressed because the search warrant
return sheets for the cell phones were not filled out, contrary to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41(f), thus he is prejudiced because he does not know the date, time, or seized inventory and may
unknowingly waive his right to challenge the same. (Docket No. 193 at 5-6). The Court is not
5 	Defendant complains that there was no probable cause to conclude that the cell phones contained evidence
of drug trafficking because there were never any controlled buys. (Docket No. 193 at 3). Contrary to Defendant’s
position, there is no requirement that controlled buys must have occurred in order for probable cause to exist.
Defendant also incorrectly contends that there was insufficient information to conclude that evidence of violating 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(c) would be found in the cell phones. (Id. at 2-3). Defendant’s contention is belied by the
fact that the Affidavit details that a Glock pistol equipped with a loaded magazine and a Glock conversion device,
along with controlled substances, were recovered when he was searched incident to arrest. (Docket No. 199-2, ¶¶ 16,
18, 19). Therefore, there was a fair probability that Defendant’s cell phones would contain evidence of his firearm
possession in relation to drug trafficking. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 15 of 22

16
persuaded by this claim.
Rule 41 requires the officer who executes the warrant to promptly return it to the magistrate
judge designated on the warrant. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(1)(D). “The procedural requirements
of Rule 41(d) are essentially ministerial in nature.”6 United States v. Hall, 505 F.2d 961, 963 (3d
Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). In Hall, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that not every
violation 	of 	the 	procedures 	in 	Rule 	41 	“however 	insignificant 	and 	however 	lacking 	in
consequences, should give rise to the remedy of suppression.” Id. at 964. Rather, a district court
should grant a motion to suppress based on a Rule 41 violation only when the defendant
demonstrates prejudice, “that is, prejudice in the sense that it offends concepts of fundamental
fairness or due process.” Id.
In this case, law enforcement’s failure to strictly comply with Rule 41 does not justify the
remedy of suppression. Nothing in the record suggests that the warrant return was not filled out
due to bad faith on the Government’s part. Further, Defendant has made no showing of prejudice.
While Defendant claims that he is prejudiced because he does not know the date, time, or seized
inventory and may unknowingly waive his right to challenge the same, (Docket No. 193 at 6), the
Government represents that the information which would have been included on the search warrant
returns was provide to Defendant through discovery. (See Docket No. 199 at 20) (specifying the
information that has been provided via discovery). In sum, suppression is not warranted based on
law enforcement’s ministerial violation of Rule 41(f). See United States v. Brown, Crim. No. 15-
182, 2017 WL 3593883, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2017) (finding that law enforcement’s failure
to strictly comply with Rule 41 and the magistrate judge’s order did not justify suppression of
6 	When Hall was decided in 1974, Rule 41(d) addressed the requirement of promptly making a return of the
search warrant. See Hall, 505 F.2d at 961 n.1. At present, that requirement is contained in Rule 41(f). See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 41(f)(1)(D) (stating that “[t]he officer executing the warrant must promptly return it ... to the magistrate judge
designated on the warrant”).
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 16 of 22

17
evidence, where there was no evidence of bad faith by the Government or prejudice to the
defendant).
V. 	Motion to Suppress All Evidence Related to this Federal Prosecution (Docket No. 194)
Defendant contends that certain defects related to a state arrest warrant mandate
suppression of all evidence in this case as fruit of the poisonous tree. 	To that end, Defendant
asserts that (1) the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania failed to apprehend him using due diligence
in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600, (2) the affidavit in support of the
state arrest warrant misrepresented facts material to the finding of probable cause for issuance of
the warrant, and (3) the affiant on the affidavit in support of state arrest warrant had an adverse
credibility finding against him which resulted in his testimony being stricken in a court proceeding.
(Docket No. 194 at 2). 	Defendant argues that the foregoing “technical violations of the state
amount to multiple constitutional deprivations of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process as well as his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial,” which warrant suppression of all
evidence in this case or dismissal of the Superseding Indictment. 	(Id. at 1, 2, 8). 	Defendant is
incorrect that the alleged state violations mandate any such relief in the instant federal criminal
case.
Initially, the Court notes that no evidentiary hearing is required on the foregoing issues
raised by Defendant because whether he was subjected to an unlawful arrest is a legal question for
the Court to resolve as there is no dispute that he had an active arrest warrant, he was arrested
pursuant to the warrant, and a loaded, stolen 9mm Glock pistol equipped with a Glock conversion
device and narcotics were discovered when he was searched incident to arrest. See United States
v. Waller, No. 2:24-CR-90, 2025 WL 3165662, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (finding no
evidentiary hearing was necessary under such circumstances).
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 17 of 22

18
Before addressing Defendant’s specific claims, the Court first notes that he is charged in
federal court with federal firearm and controlled substance offenses, thus federal law applies. See
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960) (“In determining whether there has been an
unreasonable search and seizure by state officers, a federal court must make an independent
inquiry, whether or not there has been such an inquiry by a state court, and irrespective of how any
such inquiry may have turned out. The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what one state
court may have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may have colorably suppressed.”);
United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 363 (3d Cir. 1984) (“It is a general rule that federal district
courts will decide evidence questions in federal criminal cases on the basis of federal, rather than
state, law.”). Therefore, “evidence obtained in accordance with federal law is admissible in federal
court—even though it was obtained by state officers in violation of state law.” Id. at 363-64.
Defendant first contends that the state arrest warrant was executed in violation of
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600. 	(Docket No. 194 at 4-6). 	Even if that was so,
where an arrest meets federal constitutional standards, it is irrelevant if it was made in violation of
state law. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (“But the arrest rules that the officers
violated were those of state law alone, and as we have just concluded, it is not the province of the
Fourth Amendment to enforce state law. That Amendment does not require the exclusion of
evidence obtained from a constitutionally permissible arrest.”); United States v. Laville, 480 F.3d
187, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We write to correct that misunderstanding by making clear that state or
local law does not dictate the reasonableness of an arrest for purposes of a Fourth Amendment
probable cause analysis—a violation of state or local law is not, in other words, a per se violation
of the Fourth Amendment.”). 	Defendant only alleges that his arrest violated a Pennsylvania
procedural rule. 	He does not claim that the arrest was unreasonable for purposes of the Fourth
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 18 of 22

19
Amendment or that it was otherwise contrary to federal constitutional standards. 	Accordingly,
Defendant’s argument concerning violation of a Pennsylvania procedural rule provides no basis to
suppress the evidence that was seized incident to his arrest.
Defendant’s next argument - that suppression is warranted because the state arrest warrant
was issued pursuant to an affidavit that mispresented or omitted facts material to the finding of
probable cause, (Docket Nos. 194 at 3-4; 202 at 9-15), fares no better. According to Defendant,
Detective Gino Macioce, who was the affiant on the state affidavit, made a “blatant incorrect
identification[]” of him as the suspect “seen entering the vehicle in question.” (Docket No. 194 at
3). Defendant further alleges that the state affidavit misrepresented that he was connected to the
vehicle, which supposedly was owned by his mother. (Id. at 4).
Given Defendant’s contention that the state affidavit misrepresents and omits information
which undermines the probable cause finding, the Court construes Defendant’s argument as a
request for a Franks hearing. However, Defendant is not entitled to a Franks hearing because he
has not made the requisite substantial preliminary showing. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
To that end, Defendant fails the first prong of Franks because he has not presented an offer
of proof consisting of affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses to contradict
the state affidavit and showing that Detective Macioce knowingly and intentionally made false
statements or omitted information from the affidavit or that he acted with reckless disregard for
the truth, nor has he explained the absence of these materials. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171; Desu,
23 F.4 th at 234; Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 383, n. 8; Rodriguez-Colon, 827 F. App’x at 190 (affirming
denial of motion to suppress evidence claiming that affidavit in support of search warrant
contained material omissions where the defendant’s challenge did not contain an offer of proof);
Rivera, 524 F. App’x at 826 (“Even if the information provided by the informants was unreliable,
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 19 of 22

20
[defendant] has offered no evidence that the detective who provided the affidavit either knew that
the information was not true or recklessly disregarded its falsity.”). At most, Defendant has made
speculative allegations with respect to the alleged misrepresentations and omissions which are
insufficient to meet his burden for a hearing under Franks. See Desu, 23 F.4th at 234 (explaining
that a defendant cannot “rest on mere conclusory allegations . . . but rather must present an offer
of proof contradicting the affidavit, including materials such as sworn affidavits or otherwise
reliable statements from witnesses”) (quoting Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 383, n.8). 	Despite the absence
of an offer of proof, even if the information that Defendant claims is a misstatement or omission
is excised or inserted, the state affidavit still would contain sufficient content to support a finding
of probable cause. See McKnight, 568 F. App’x at 182 (“In a Franks proceeding, the court assesses
materiality by removing allegedly false statements, inserting omissions, and determining whether
probable cause nonetheless remains.”) (citing Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 383-84). Accordingly, Defendant
is not entitled to a Franks hearing regarding the validity of the state arrest warrant.
Defendant next claims that Detective Macioce, who was the affiant on the state affidavit in
support of the arrest warrant, has “been found to be uncredible and stricken from testimony by a
state court.” (Docket No. 194 at 2). Defendant provides no support whatsoever for his assertion
that Detective Macioce had an adverse credibility finding against him. Even if the opposite were
true, it would not invalidate the state arrest warrant which was supported by probable cause at the
time it was issued.
Defendant’s 	fourth 	contention 	that 	the 	foregoing 	alleged 	technical 	violations 	of
Pennsylvania procedure amount to multiple violations of his constitutional rights, (Docket No. 194
at 2), does not entitle him to the relief he seeks. 	To reiterate, “[a] technical violation of a state
procedural rule does not automatically rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation requiring
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 20 of 22

21
suppression of the evidence seized.” United States v. Brookins, 413 F. App’x 509, 512 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing Moore, 553 U.S. at 173). Rather, a defendant “must demonstrate that the technical
violations amounted to a constitutional deprivation; mere conclusory allegations are insufficient.”
Id. at 513 (citing United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1071 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1996)). While Defendant
acknowledges that these principles control, he nonetheless maintains that he “has made a
substantial showing of prejudice and constitutional deprivations” to warrant relief. (Docket No.
194 at 7). Contrary to Defendant’s position, the Court finds that he has not established prejudice
that rises to the level of a constitutional deprivation warranting suppression of the evidence in this
federal case. Nothing suggests that the alleged technical violations of Pennsylvania procedure
somehow undermined the state court judge’s probable cause finding and the issuance of the arrest
warrant. Accordingly, suppression of all evidence related to this federal prosecution, as Defendant
requests, is unjustified.
Finally, even if the Court were to conclude that technical violations of Pennsylvania
procedure in obtaining the state arrest warrant somehow undermined its validity, it was reasonable
for the police to rely on the warrant to apprehend Defendant pursuant to the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule. As already discussed, the state arrest warrant was not issued in reliance
on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit. 	See Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151. 	Further, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that the state judge abandoned his judicial role and failed to act in
a neutral and detached manner. See id. Likewise, any claim that the state arrest warrant was so
facially deficient that it was not particularized is unsupported by the record. See id. Finally, the
state warrant affidavit is not so lacking in indicia of probable cause that it was entirely
unreasonable for the police to rely on it in arresting Defendant. See id. In the Court’s estimation,
under the totality of the circumstances, the information contained in the state affidavit established
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 21 of 22

22
probable cause for issuance of the arrest warrant. 	In sum, even if the state arrest warrant was
deemed insufficient, the good faith exception would apply to the police’s reliance on it to arrest
Defendant. Accordingly, suppression is not warranted.
VI. 	Conclusion
For the reasons discussed, Defendant is not entitled to a Franks hearing, there is no basis
to suppress any evidence in this case, and there is no basis to dismiss the Superseding Indictment.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Pretrial Motions, (Docket Nos. 190, 191, 193, 194), are DENIED in
their entirety.
An appropriate Order follows.
s/ W. Scott Hardy
W. Scott Hardy
Date: October 9, 2026 	United States District Judge
cc/ecf: All counsel of record
Miquann Morgan-Graham (via U.S. mail)
Inmate No. 78841-510
Butler County Prison
202 S. Washington Street
Butler, PA 16001
Case 2:23-cr-00215-WSH Document 214 Filed 10/09/26 Page 22 of 22