VOGT v. WETZEL et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 2:17-cv-01407-AJS-MPK Document169 _ Filed 11/10/25 Page 1 of 20

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STEVEN VOGT,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 17-1407

District Judge Arthur J. Schwab
Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

Vv.

JOHN WETZEL, Secretary of the Department
of Corrections (Official & Individual
Capacity),

Re: ECF Nos. 145, 150, and 156

4444444444

Defendant

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

1. RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended that the Court grant in part the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed on behalf of John Wetzel (“Wetzel”), ECF No. 145, and grant in part the Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by Steven Vogt (“Vogt’’), ECF No. 150. It is further recommended
that the Court deny as moot “Plaintiff's Motion for Determining Materiality of Facts for the
Purpose of Inclusion in Court Ordered Joint Concise Statement of Material Facts, and Sanctions
Against Defendant if Appropriate,” ECF No. 156.
1. REPORT

A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Vogt brings claims against Wetzel for the violation of his constitutional right to due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the alleged violation of his First Amendment right to access

to the courts. His claims arose when prison officials rejected his incoming mail without notifying

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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him of the rejection. His rejected mail included a typewritten letter allegedly sent by Arthur
McClearn (“McClearn”).
McClearn and Vogt were part of a group who were convicted of various crimes related to
the murder of Francis Landry. McClearn pleaded guilty to third-degree murder. Vogt went to trial,
and along with evidence that placed him with McClearn and Landry on the evening of the murder,
McClearn’s trial testimony linked him to Landry’s death.1 The jury convicted Vogt of first-degree
murder. As a result, Vogt is serving a sentence of life without parole.
The letter rejected by prison officials is dated October 23, 2016, entirely typewritten with
a typewritten signature, and was mailed to Vogt in a handwritten envelope without a return
address.2 ECF No. 158 at 8; ECF No. 161-4 at 2. In the letter purportedly sent by McClearn, he
recants his trial testimony and asserts that at the time of Landry’s murder, Vogt was “passed out
in the car” and had nothing to do with the crime. ECF No. 158 at 8. Pursuant to the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections’ (“DOC”) mail policy in effect at the time, prison officials rejected the
letter for delivery because it lacked a return address but did not notify Vogt of the rejection.
Several months later, Vogt learned that a friend’s letter was missing and not returned to
her. Id. at 1. “[S]he admitted that she may have sent it without a return address….” Id. Vogt sent
requests to “post offices and the mail recovery center” to locate and retrieve his friend’s letter. On
May 17, 2017, he received an envelope that contained three pieces of mail, including the McClearn
letter. Each letter was stamped refused “due to want of a return address.” Id.
Based on the contents of the McClearn letter, Vogt initiated his fifth petition for relief under
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9541 et seq. See ECF
1 See Vogt v. Coleman, No. 08-530, 2023 WL 5228804 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2023).
2 The Court of Common Pleas for Butler County observed that the original envelope was not produced for inspection.
ECF No. 148-3 at 20.
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No. 148-3 at 14; ECF No. 163 ¶ 22. In his petition, Vogt contended that the letter is newly
discovered and admissible evidence of his actual innocence. Commonwealth v. Vogt, No. 1010
WDA 2017, 2018 WL 1516372, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2018); see also ECF No. 148-3 at
16.
Ultimately, Vogt filed a counseled amended petition for PCRA relief that was denied by
the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County. No. CP-10-0030816-1990 (Sept. 29, 2021), slip op.;
see also ECF No. 148-3 at 16. The trial court determined that direct and circumstantial evidence
introduced at a hearing on the merits, including contradictory testimony by McClearn’s cousin
related to McClearn’s letter-writing habits, was insufficient to establish that the typewritten letter
was authentic. Therefore, the letter was inadmissible to prove Vogt’s actual innocence. Id. The
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief. Commonwealth v. Vogt,
299 A.3d 936 (Table), 2023 WL 3736814 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 31, 2023).
Vogt followed the state court’s denial of PCRA relief with a Motion for Relief from
Judgment in this Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Vogt v. Coleman, No.
08-530 (W.D. Pa. June 12, 2023) (ECF No. 98). The Court conducted a detailed review of Vogt’s
McClearn-related claims and his prior post-conviction litigation and denied the request for relief.
Vogt v. Coleman, No. 08-530, 2023 WL 5228804 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2023). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied Vogt’s request for a certificate of appealability.3
3 The Third Circuit concluded there was no basis to grant the requested relief.
To obtain a COA, Vogt must make both “(1) a credible showing that the district court's procedural
ruling was incorrect; and (2) a substantial showing that the underlying habeas petition alleges a
deprivation of constitutional rights.” Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 340 (3d Cir. 1999). Vogt again
fails to make either showing. The District Court's denial of Vogt’s motion was decidedly proper,
particularly given the result of the state court's evidentiary hearing. Additionally, Vogt’s habeas
petition contained no arguably meritorious claims, for substantially the reasons explained by the
District Court in its thorough opinion. See also C.A. No. 21-3201, Doc. 10-1 (3d Cir. July 5, 2022)
(order). Accordingly, the COA request is denied.
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Along with his post-conviction relief litigation, Vogt filed the instant action against
Secretary of Corrections Wetzel on November 6, 2017. Vogt contends the prison’s rejection of
McClearn’s letter without notice violated his right to procedural due process and his right to access
to the courts. He asserts that the constitutional violations resulted in his continued incarceration
because rejection of his mail without notice deprived him of an opportunity to authenticate the
McClearn letter to present evidence of his actual innocence. ECF No. 3.
This Court dismissed Vogt’s complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that Vogt alleged sufficient facts
to support a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim based on the prison’s rejection
of mail without notice. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 186 (3d Cir. 2021). The Third Circuit reasoned
that under applicable precedent, prisoners retain a liberty interest in the freedom to correspond by
mail. Therefore, prisons must provide procedural safeguards when they withhold delivery of mail.
“Notice and a reasonable chance to challenge the original official’s decision satisfy due process.”
Id. The Third Circuit remanded the case to this Court for consideration of his two remaining
claims: (1) Vogt’s due process claim for the violation of his liberty interest in communicating by
mail and (2) a potential access to courts claim 	that it ordered stayed pending resolution of his
PCRA and related post-conviction litigation.
After remand, Vogt filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking the entry of judgment
and damages for the violation of his due process rights only. ECF No. 76. Wetzel responded that
he “does not dispute that the rejection of [Vogt’s] mail without notice was in violation of the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.” ECF No. 101 at 3. The Court
found that “as to liability only, that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact, and [Vogt]
Vogt v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, No. 23-2714, 2023 WL 10407422, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 11, 2023).
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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 4. The Court also determined that Vogt failed to
establish the absence of genuine issues of material fact related to his entitlement to damages. Thus,
damages would need to be resolved at trial. Id. The Court stayed this action pending resolution of
his PCRA litigation, and any related federal habeas litigation. Id.
The stay of this matter was lifted on January 23, 2024. ECF No. 104. The parties
participated in an unsuccessful judicial mediation on September 17, 2024, and this action was
referred to the assigned District Judge for purposes of trial. ECF Nos. 126, 127. Vogt voluntarily
dismissed his claims against John/Jane Doe mailroom staff and moved to withdraw his access to
courts claim to proceed to trial on damages on his due process claim. ECF Nos. 128, 129. The
Court granted Vogt’s motion as to the John/Jane Doe Defendant(s) and dismissed them from this
action. ECF No. 131.
As to damages, Wetzel responded that Vogt’s motion should be denied because Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), bars recovery of compensatory or punitive damages “as a
matter of fact and/or law.” ECF No. 136 at 3. Vogt filed a Motion for Judicial Notice that a trial
of a similar claim in the United States Eastern District of California resulted in an award of
compensatory damages. ECF No. 137 (citing Penton v. Johnson, No. 2:11-cv-518, 2024 WL
3398341 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 12, 2024)). Vogt also argued that Wetzel’s Heck bar argument is wrong
because the constitutional violations at issue did not arise from his underlying criminal
proceedings, and because he has sustained “actual damages.” ECF No. 137.
Upon review, the Court denied without prejudice Vogt’s motion to withdraw his access to
courts claim because “it is unclear … whether Plaintiff’s request to withdraw his First Amendment
Access to Court claim is contingent on this Court granting Plaintiff’s request to proceed to
mediation or trial on damages as to his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.” ECF No. 138
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at 3. As to damages, rather than resolve the issue at the close of Vogt’s case based on evidence
adduced at trial, the Court entered an order that “permits the parties to file cross motions for
summary judgment as to any claim in [Vogt’s] Complaint and [Vogt’s] entitlement to nominal,
compensatory, and punitive damages relating thereto.” Id. at 4. The Court then referred this case
back to the undersigned to consider the parties’ anticipated motions for summary judgment. ECF
No. 149.
Vogt filed his Motion for Summary Judgment, supporting brief, appendix and exhibits, and
his Response in Opposition to Wetzel’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 141-143,150,
158-162. Wetzel filed his Motion for Summary Judgment and related documents. ECF Nos. 145-
148. Wetzel also responded to Vogt’s Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting documents.
ECF Nos. 153-155.
Vogt separately challenges the substance of Wetzel’s responses to his Concise Statement
of Facts and filed a “Motion for Determining Materiality of Facts for the Purpose of Inclusion in
Court Ordered Joint Concise Statement of Material Facts, and Sanctions Against Defendant if
Appropriate.” ECF No. 156. The Court did not order a response to this motion.
The Motions for Summary Judgment and Vogt’s motion for miscellaneous relief are ripe
for consideration.
B. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is properly entered “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see
also Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Under this standard, “the mere existence
of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). “[A] fact is ‘material’ where ‘its
existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive
law.’” Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). “A
dispute is ‘genuine’ if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Clews v.
Cnty. of Schuylkill, 12 F.4th 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that the evidence fails to support
one or more essential elements of the non-moving party’s claim, while the non-movant must
establish the existence of each element for which it bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322-23; see also Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir.
2004). The parties must support their positions by “citing to particular parts of materials in the
record, 	including 	depositions, 	documents, 	electronically 	stored 	information, 	affidavits 	or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “[W]hen the moving party
has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted).
In making this assessment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of the
non-moving party. See Matreale v. New Jersey Dep’t of Mil. & Veterans Affs., 487 F.3d 150, 152
(3d Cir. 2007); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2001). If
the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
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essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof
at trial,” Rule 56 requires the entry of summary judgment because such a failure “necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche
Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).
The parties have each filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The standard is “more
stringent” for a plaintiff or the party that otherwise bears the burden of proof at trial to obtain
summary judgment. Nat’l State Bank v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d
Cir. 1992).
When the moving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, it must
point to evidence in the record that supports its version of all material
facts and demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material
fact …. 	If the moving party does not meet this standard, the court
must deny the motion for summary judgment …. If the moving party
does meet this standard, the non-moving party can counter with
evidence showing there is a genuine issue of material fact.
EFMC Int’l, Inc. v. Leep, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-1289, 2006 WL 8448817, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 19,
2006) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, to warrant summary judgment a plaintiff “must come
forward with ‘credible evidence’ that would entitle the party to a ‘directed verdict if not
controverted at trial.’” DeLeon v. Shaw, No. 1:21-CV-289, 2023 WL 8456133, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 6, 2023) (quoting In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 237 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the pleadings must be held to “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, at the summary judgment stage, a court need not credit mere
allegations or assertions unsupported by evidence. See Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402,
407 (3d Cir. 2000). “[A] pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under Rule 56 to point to
competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant’s motion for summary
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judgment.” Dawson v. Cook, 238 F. Supp. 3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted); see also
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
C. 	DISCUSSION
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court considers Vogt’s entitlement to nominal,
compensatory, and punitive damages for the alleged violation of his First Amendment access to
courts rights and the violation of his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights.
In his Complaint, Vogt requests:
[m]onetary compensation ($250,000 on State Court Claims; Maximum arguable
amount on Federal Claims, not less than $24,000,00.00) for damages and injuries
associated with being deprived of personal property without due process while it
had its worth, and for being deprived of the opportunity and ability to investigate a
matter of grave legal importance so that timely and effective appeal could be taken
to vindicate myself in court and in public opinion, which caused and will continue
to cause mental anguish, loss of opportunity to potentially end my being subjected
to indignities, humiliations, and restrictions of prison life, and loss of all of the
opportunities which would have followed, with no other legal recourse.
ECF No. 3 at 5. He also seeks punitive damages and “any other compensation or relief deemed
appropriate.” Id.
Separating the wheat from the chaff, Vogt seeks compensatory damages for two types of
injury: (1) mental anguish and (2) the loss of the “value” of the McClearn letter for an opportunity
to end his ongoing incarceration. But as follows, Vogt is precluded by statute and precedent from
recovering nominal or compensatory damages for his access to courts claim, compensatory
damages for due process claim, and damages for a due process property loss claim. Vogt’s claim
for punitive damages also fails for lack of evidence of Wetzel’s intentional disregard of the rights
of prisoners to notice of the rejection of incoming mail.
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1. 	PLRA and Compensatory Damages for Emotional Distress
Compensatory damages for civil rights claims are ordinarily available for an “actual injury”
suffered because of the violation of a constitutional right. Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250
(3d Cir. 2000). In most cases, damages “‘may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other
monetary harms, but also such injuries as impairment of reputation …, personal humiliation, and
mental anguish and suffering.’” Id. (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,
307 (1986)). But here, under the circumstances alleged in the Complaint, Wetzel argues that the
Prison 	Litigation 	Reform 	Act 	(“PLRA”), 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1997e(e), 	bars 	Vogt’s 	claim 	for
compensatory damages for emotional harm. ECF No. 146 at 6-7.
The PLRA prohibits a civil action for the recovery of damages for mental or emotional
injury absent allegations of physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“[n]o Federal civil action may
be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the
commission of a sexual act.”); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 314 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001); Mitchell v.
Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 533 (3d Cir. 2003); Allah, 226 F.3d at 251. Because Vogt is a prisoner, the
PLRA is clear that absent physical injury, he may not recover compensatory damages for alleged
mental anguish. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
Vogt neither alleges nor presents evidence that he sustained a physical injury. Thus, he
appears to concede that he cannot recover for emotional harm. ECF No. 159 at 5 (Vogt’s “actual
injuries” are the loss or “irreplaceable photographs, a letter, the evidentiary value and use of the
recantation letter [and] his ability to litigate a claim of arguable merit …. These injuries are not of
an emotional or mental nature.”). Accordingly, in the absence of allegations or evidence of
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physical harm, it is recommended that the Court grant Wetzel’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on Vogt’s claim for compensatory damages for mental or emotional harm.
2. 	Access to Courts Claim
Through the First Amendment, the United States Constitution guarantees prisoners a “right
of access to the courts.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996) (emphasis omitted). A prisoner
making an access to courts claim must show that an alleged denial of access caused actual injury.
Id. at 352-53. In addition, a prisoner must show he has no other “‘remedy that may be awarded as
recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the present denial-of-access suit.” Coulston v.
Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, 651 F. App’x 139,142 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). Actual injury requires a showing that a prisoner lost a
“nonfrivolous” and “arguable” claim because of the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 353.
Vogt moves for summary judgment in his favor as to his First Amendment access to courts
claim. He asserts that the prison’s failure to provide notice that McClearn’s letter was rejected
caused him to lose an opportunity to authenticate the letter. As a result, Vogt claims that he lost
the opportunity to prove his actual innocence, and he has since languished in prison. ECF No. 141
at 11-13.
Wetzel disputes Vogt’s entitlement to summary judgment and contends that as a matter of
law, Vogt cannot show he “lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying
claim.” ECF No. 146 at 15 (quoting Harmer v. Wetzel, No. 22-1852, 2024 WL 3237536, at *4
(W.D. Pa. May 7, 2024)). Wetzel also argues that as to damages, Vogt’s claim is barred by Heck.
ECF No. 153 at 14 n.4, ECF No. 146 at 9. Thus, Wetzel argues that summary judgment should be
entered in his favor and against Vogt.
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As an initial matter, Vogt cannot show that he lost an opportunity to present a nonfrivolous
claim of actual innocence based on McClearn’s recantation or that no other remedy is available.
As reflected in the underlying criminal action, parallel with this action, Vogt pursued counseled
PCRA proceedings in state court and a pro se motion for relief from judgment in his federal habeas
litigation. In both, Vogt raised McClearn’s alleged recantation as a basis to set aside his conviction.
State and federal courts considered Vogt’s claims of actual innocence based on the McClearn
letter. The issued opinions reflect that each court gave substantial consideration to Vogt’s claims
as to the circumstances and effect of the letter’s belated discovery, circumstantial evidence about
the authenticity of the letter, and the credibility of McClearn’s alleged recantation. The recantation
was weighed with evidence at Vogt’s underlying criminal trial that supported the jury’s verdict
and against past claims of newly discovered evidence in Vogt’s post-conviction litigation to
determine whether relief was appropriate.4 See Vogt v. Coleman, 2023 WL 5228804, at *2, 3, 5-
11, 13-19; Commw. v. Vogt, 2023 WL 3736814. Thus, despite the belated receipt of the McClearn
letter and McClearn’s untimely passing, remedies were available to Vogt to prove his actual
innocence based on the contents of the letter and the circumstances surrounding rejection of the
letter for want of a return address.
Further, as argued by Wetzel, Heck bars Vogt’s Section 1983 claim for damages for any
alleged denial of his access to courts rights as a matter of law.
Vogt asserts he is entitled to substantial compensatory damages because the DOC mail
policy promulgated by Wetzel caused him to “not merely lose time due to the Defendant’s violative
4 See Commw. v. Vogt, 2023 WL 3736814, at *7-19. On appeal, the Superior Court noted that in 1998 and again in
2004 Vogt pursued PCRA relief based on alleged recantations in the form of letters purportedly written by co-
defendant Cowfer. However, on the date scheduled for the 1998 hearing regarding the contents of the letter, Vogt
“voluntarily withdrew his petition. The lower court specifically noted that Cowfer had been transported to the Butler
County Prison and was available for the hearing.” Id. at *5.
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acts – he lost evidence which had the potential to prove his innocence in a murder case for which
he is serving a mandatory life sentence.” ECF No. 159 at 5. Faced with this alleged loss, Vogt
seeks compensation for his continued imprisonment, including lost wages he asserts he would have
earned.
[I]n 	order 	to 	recover 	damages 	for 	allegedly 	unconstitutional 	conviction 	or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus,
when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if
successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal
judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the
absence of some other bar to the suit.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. This bar applies regardless of the relief sought if success would
necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-
81 (2005). Thus, Heck bars a suit for compensatory or nominal damages if the “injury” alleged is
continued imprisonment. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (compensable injury “does not encompass the
‘injury’ of being convicted and imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned”) (emphasis
in original)); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644 (1997) (any claim for money damages for
alleged due process violation that implies the invalidity of punishment is not cognizable under
Section 1983).
Based on Heck, a Section 1983 access to courts claim that prison officials destroyed a
declaration setting forth a third-party’s alleged confession to a plaintiff’s underlying crime was not
cognizable absent successful invalidation of the plaintiff’s underlying conviction. Coulston, 651
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F. App’x at 141-43. An access to courts claim also was dismissed under Heck where the plaintiff
alleged that a prison property room officer lost a memory card containing exculpatory evidence
that ostensibly would prove the plaintiff’s innocence because the underlying conviction was not
yet declared invalid or called into question by a writ of habeas. Abouloh v. Lehigh Cnty. Prison,
No. 25-3377, 2025 WL 2654904, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2025).
As in Coulson and Abouloh, Vogt contends that but for Wetzel’s conduct, a collateral
attack on his conviction would have succeeded, and he would have been released from prison. On
that basis, he claims interference with his access to courts and seeks substantial compensatory
damages for his continued imprisonment. ECF No. 141 at 14-15; ECF No. 142-10 (estimated pay
for telecommunications repair and maintenance work). But any damages award, including nominal
damages, based on this theory of recovery necessarily implies the invalidity of his ongoing
incarceration and is not yet cognizable under Heck.5 Thus, it is recommended that the Court deny
Vogt’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to his First Amendment access to courts claim and grant
Wetzel’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
3. 	Heck v. Humphrey: Due Process Claim
Vogt argues that his claim for compensatory damages for the violation of his due process
rights is not barred by Heck because the due process violation at issue “has nothing to due with
Plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.” ECF No. 141 at 10. That may be true, but his claim for
5 In Edwards, the plaintiff alleged that his due process rights were violated in disciplinary proceedings when prison
officials concealed exculpatory witness statements that resulted in the loss of “good-time credit” previously earned
toward release. Id., 520 U.S. at 643. The plaintiff agued Heck did not bar his claim because he sought damages for the
use of procedures that deprived him of good-time credits without due process, not for the resulting loss of credits. Id.
at 645. The Supreme Court rejected the distinction because the plaintiff’s claim for damages attributable to an
unconstitutional procedure would necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued confinement. Id., 520 U.S. at 648.
Here, Vogt’s access to courts claim rests on a similar faulty distinction; Vogt asserts that he seeks damages for harm
to legal arguments that but for Wetzel’s conduct would have resulted in an end his incarceration. As framed by him,
an award of damages in his favor for interference with his legal claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction and sentence. And, as in Edwards, any such award is barred by Heck until the underlying conviction is
invalidated or called in question.
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compensatory damages is predicated on the result – his continued incarceration – and thus calls
into question his continued incarceration. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 648; see also Nicastro v.
Rtichey, No. 3:15-cv-182, 2025 WL 964451 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2025) (insofar as an award of
damages for lost wages for the time prisoner believes he should have been out of prison would
necessitate a finding that plaintiff should have been released earlier, his claim is barred by Heck).
In an analogous case, Heck barred a prisoner-plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim for
compensatory damages arising from the defendants’ loss or destruction of hard drive and zip disc
that allegedly prevented plaintiff from proving his evidence. Miller v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 588 F. App’x 96, 97 (3d Cir. 2014). Like Vogt, the plaintiff argued that Heck did
not bar his claim because he was “not questioning the validity of his conviction, but rather
questioning the Appellees’ destruction of exculpatory evidence.” Id. This characterization “[did]
not distinguish him from the complainant in Heck, who argued that two prosecutors and an
investigator knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence that could have proven his innocence. The
Supreme Court held that such an argument necessarily implied the invalidity of his conviction, and
that principle clearly applies to [the plaintiff’s] complaint.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Vogt counters that like the plaintiff in Penton v. Johnson, 2024 WL 3398341, he is entitled
to recover damages for the violation of his due process rights because his claim is not a direct
attack on his conviction. ECF No. 159 at 6-7. In Penton, the plaintiff alleged that prison officials
violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to forward his mail and by failing
to notify him that his mail was withheld for nearly a year while he was housed in a different facility.
As a result, the plaintiff alleged he did not receive notice of his father’s grave illness before his
death, and he was unable to timely file an appeal from the district’s court’s decision to deny his
habeas petition. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California declined to
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reverse a jury award of compensatory damages. Id. at *1. But the damages award in that case was
limited to psychological harm. The district court previously concluded (and the plaintiff conceded)
that under Heck, the plaintiff could not recover damages for allegedly wrongful continued
incarceration. See Penton v. Johnson, No. 2:11-cv-0518, 2019 WL 6618051, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
5, 2019) (“Here, the undersigned adopts Judge Brennan's careful reasoning in finding that Heck
does not bar plaintiff’s access to the courts claim, but simply prevents plaintiff from seeking
damages for wrongful incarceration if his conviction or sentence is not invalidated.”); report and
recommendation adopted, Penton v. Johnson, No. 2:11-cv-00518, 2020 WL 1862346, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Apr. 14, 2020) (“Plaintiff already conceded he is not pursuing wrongful incarceration
damages in this action unless he is successful on his federal habeas petition that is currently on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit.”). Instead, compensatory damages awarded by the jury were based on
expert testimony related to “the psychological effects of Plaintiff’s inability to receive mail as well
as the loss of his legal remedies and inability to communicate with his father.” Penton v. Johnson,
2024 WL 3398341, at *9. As discussed above, however, in the Third Circuit, damages for
psychological harm absent physical injury are barred under the PLRA, see supra p. 10, and
damages for continued incarceration are barred by Heck absent a prior judicial determination that
an underlying conviction is invalid. Thus, the Court is not persuaded that Penton provides a basis
for the recovery of compensatory damages. See ECF No. 141 at 14.
Beyond a property loss claim separately addressed below and damages for his continued
incarceration, Vogt provides no other measure for relief for compensatory damages for Wetzel’s
admitted violation of Vogt’s due process rights. To that end, a violation of rights by itself, without
a cognizable measure of damages, cannot support a compensatory damage award. Memphis, 477
U.S. at 309.
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Vogt is not left without a remedy. “Common-law courts traditionally have vindicated
deprivations of certain ‘absolute’ rights … through the award of a nominal sum of money.” Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (“Because the right to procedural due process is “absolute” in
the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions, and because
of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed, we believe that
the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of
actual injury.”) (internal citations omitted)). As a matter of law, “nominal damages may not exceed
one dollar.” U.S. ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 830 (3d Cir. 1976). Therefore, it is
recommended that the Court grant Wetzel’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to compensatory
damages only. It is further recommended that the Court grant Vogt’s Motion for Summary
Judgment as to his due process claim and enter judgment in his favor and against Wetzel in the
amount of $1.00 as nominal damages.
4. 	Due Process: Property Loss Claim
Wetzel also moves for summary judgment on Vogt’s property loss claim. In his briefing
on the pending motions for summary judgment, Vogt seeks compensatory damages for the alleged
loss of correspondence from a friend residing in Australia that contained personal photos. ECF No.
141 at 9; ECF No. 159 at 10-11. But, based on the parties’ concessions that “have narrowed the
case,” the Third Circuit observed that it need not address whether Vogt has a property interest at
stake.6 Thus, Vogt waived any property loss claim for the purported value of the Australian letter
and enclosed photos.
If the Court otherwise considers Vogt’s newly asserted property loss claim, he fails to
demonstrate that state tort remedies are inadequate such that a due process claim for property loss
6 Vogt’s Complaint does not present a property loss claim based on the loss of any correspondence other than the
McClearn letter. ECF No. 3.
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may be sustained. Shakur v. Coelho, 421 F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (the
Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act provides an adequate remedy for a willful deprivation of property);
McNeil v. Grim, 736 F. App’x 33, 35 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 	8522(b)(3)) 	(“[E]ven 	if 	McNeil 	claimed 	that 	the 	prison 	grievance 	procedures 	were
constitutionally inadequate, Pennsylvania’s state tort law would provide an additional adequate
remedy.”). Thus, from the day Vogt learned his friend’s letter was missing, he was free to pursue
available statue law remedies for any wrongful deprivation of his property. Mbewe v. Delbalso,
No. 23-2054, 2024 WL 510500, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 9, 2024). His failure to do so does not render
the claim actionable through this litigation.
5. 	Punitive Damages
The parties dispute Vogt’s entitlement to punitive damages with both seeking summary
judgment as to this claim. ECF No. 141 at 15-16; ECF 146 at 10-12. The availability of punitive
damages for the violation of constitutional rights was most recently explained in Butler v. Little,
No. 1:22-CV-00289, 2025 WL 327424 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2025).
The availability of punitive damages has a different focus and requires a different
analysis. Unlike compensatory or nominal damages, “[t]he purpose of punitive
damages is to punish the defendant for his willful or malicious conduct and to deter
others from similar behavior.” Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477
U.S. 299, 306 n. 9 (1986). “Punitive damages may also be awarded based solely on
a constitutional violation, provided the proper showing is made.” Allah v. Al-
Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (citing Alexander v.
Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 430 (3d Cir. 2000)). That showing requires evidence to support
a finding that the defendant’s action was “motivated by evil motive or intent, or
when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of
others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Our Court of Appeals has
explained that the term “reckless indifference” refers to the defendant’s knowledge
that he “may be acting in violation of federal law.” Riga, 208 F.3d at 431 (citing
Kolstad v. American Dental Assn, 527 U.S. 526, 537 (1999)); see also Miller v.
Apartments & Homes, 646 F.2d 101, 111 (3d Cir. 1981) (instructing that punitive
damages are appropriate where the defendant acts with reckless disregard to
whether he is violating a federally protected right or where he consciously and
deliberately disregards consequences of his actions)). Therefore, where the record
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supports a finding that a defendant knew that his actions may violate a federally
protected right, the issue of punitive damages should go to the jury. However,
because the term “reckless” focuses on the defendant's state of mind, more than the
violation alone must be shown. Whittaker v. Fayette Cnty., 65 Fed. Appx. 387, 393
(3d Cir. 2003). For example, “the mere existence of a civil rights violation is not a
guarantee of eligibility for punitive damages because a defendant might not be
aware of the federal law he violated....” Id. (citing Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536–537).
Id., at *3. To the extent such damages are not barred by Heck, Vogt presents no evidence of ill-
motive or intent to establish that Wetzel’s conduct in 2015 when he promulgated the challenged
mail policy was consciously reckless or malicious. Thus, Vogt has not established that he is entitled
to an award of punitive damages. It is recommended that the Court grant Wetzel’s Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Vogt’s claim for punitive damages.
D. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant the Motion
for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Wetzel, ECF No. 145, as to all claims save Vogt’s due
process claim for nominal damages. It is further recommended that the Court grant Vogt’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 150, as to his procedural due process claim related to the
rejection of his mail and enter an award of for nominal damages in Vogt’s favor in the amount of
one dollar. It is recommended that the Court deny Vogt’s Motion for Summary Judgment in all
other 	respects, 	including 	any 	procedural 	due 	process 	property 	loss 	claim. 	Finally, 	it 	is
recommended that the Court deny “Plaintiff’s Motion for Determining Materiality of Facts for the
Purpose of Inclusion in Court Ordered Joint Concise Statement of Material Facts, and Sanctions
Against Defendant if Appropriate,” ECF No. 156.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule
72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections within fourteen days, or seventeen days
for unregistered ECF Users. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States
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Case 2:17-cv-01407-AJS-MPK Document169_ Filed 11/10/25 Page 20 of 20

District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file

objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir.

2011). Any party opposing objections may respond to the objections within 14 days thereafter in

accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.

Dated: November 10 , 2025 Respectfully submitted,

cc: The Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge

AJl counsel of record via CM/ECF

Steven Vogt
BN-3436

SCI Fayette

48 Overlook Drive
LaBelle, PA 15450

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