RIVERA v. HARRY et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:24-cv-00313-SPB-RAL Document 41 Filed 12/08/25 Page1of8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIE

ANGEL RIVERA,
Plaintiff 1:24-CV-00313-SPB

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States District Judge

vs.

LAUREL HARRY, SECRETARY OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; TABB BICKLE,
EXECUTIVE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
INSTITUTIONS; TAMMY FERGUSON,
EXECUTIVE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF

RICHARD A. LANZILLO
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

INSTITUTIONS; ROBERT MARSH, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
REGIONAL DEPUTY SECRETARY;

CYNTHIA WRIGHT, REGIONAL CHIEF

LICENSED PSYCHOLOGIST MANAGER; RE: ECF NO. 10

BRUCE SIMONS, LICENSED
PSYCHOLOGIST MANAGER; R. IRWIN,
SUPERINTENDENT; E. MONGELLUZZO,
DSFM; M. BLICHA, DSCS/DSFM; I.
GUSTAFSON, CCPM/DSCS; AND MAJOR

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J. ALEXANDER,
Defendants
I, Recommendation

For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 10] be DENIED.
Il. | Report
A. Background
Plaintiff Angel Rivera (“Rivera”) is an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at its State Correctional Institute at Phoenix (“SCI-Phoenix”).
Consistent with the claims of his Complaint, Rivera’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction asserts

that he has been wrongfully placed on the DOC’s Restrictive Release List (“RRL”) without due

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 1:24-cv-00313-SPB-RAL Document 41 Filed 12/08/25 Page 2of8

process in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and that, as a result of such placement,
he has been housed in SCI-Phoenix’s Intensive Management Unit (“IMU”) where he endures
conditions of confinement that violate his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. These conditions allegedly include indefinite solitary confinement with little
opportunity for social interaction and physical exercise, denial of adequate physical and mental
health care and treatment, and denial of participation in prison programs and vocational training.
Rivera alleges that he has endured these conditions of confinement for more than thirteen months
and that they have aggravated his post-traumatic stress disorder and caused him severe mental
distress. See ECF No. 9, generally. Defendants have filed a response to Rivera’s motion (ECF
No. 24) and an opposition brief (ECF No. 26).

On November 25, 2025, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Rivera’s motion
during which it received testimony from Rivera and argument by him and counsel for the DOC
Defendants.

B. Findings of Fact

Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing and the affidavits and other documents of
record, the Court makes the following findings of fact:

1. On May 5, 2023, Rivera was approved for RRL placement by the DOC’s Executive
Deputy Secretary for Institutional Operations (“EDSI’) based on his having received multiple
misconduct charges that included assaults on staff and assaults on other inmates.

2. Rivera’s placement followed an incident on February 16, 2023, where he
manipulated the locks of his Behavioral Management Unit (“BMU”) cell and assaulted the Unit
Manager. This incident prompted Rivera’s removal from the BMU and his transfer to SCI-Phoenix

and placement in the IMU.

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3. | The RRL is a list of inmates who may only be released from Administrative
Custody upon prior approval of the EDSI. An inmate may be placed on the RRL “when he/she
poses a threat to the secure operation of the facility and where a transfer to another facility or
jurisdiction would not alleviate the security concern.” DC-ADM 802, § 1C.1. |

4. - The criteria for placing an inmate on the RRL include a history of assaults against
staff or other inmates. Jd. at § 1C.2. The EDSI must approve the designation of the inmate to the
RRL. /d. at § 1C.6.

5. Both RRL and non-RRL inmates have their custody status periodically reviewed
by the prison Program Review Committee (“PRC”). In the case of RRL inmate, the inmate’s status
is subject to annual review, where the assigned counselor initiates the DC-46, Vote Sheet and
ensures that the Inmate Cumulative Adjustment Record (“ICAR”) is complete, the EDSI makes
the final decision regarding the inmate’s status on the RRL. Jd. at § 2D.10. In all other respects,
RRL inmates are treated the same as non-RRL inmates who have been designated for
administrative custody status. See Booze v. Wetzel, 2015 WL 5173937, at *5 (M.D. Pa. 2015)
(summarizing RRL placement).

6. Rivera’s placement on the RRL is subject to annual review. Rivera also receives
PRC review every 90 days.

7. Rivera testified that such reviews are not consistently performed or meaningful, but
he did not dispute that they occur.

8. Rivera is currently assigned to the IMU program, which is a six-phase program
with progressive incentives designed to assist inmates in achieving sufficient coping skills,
behavioral control, and emotional regulation to ultimately return to the prison general population.

ECF No. 26-3 at 4-5, Phase 6 of the IMU program is the most restrictive. Id.

Case 1:24-cv-00313-SPB-RAL Document 41 Filed 12/08/25 Page4of8

9. Rivera had previously progressed to Phase 3 of the IMU program, but, on May 12,
2025, he received a misconduct for fighting, which resulted in his being regressed back to Phase
4. He was recently reviewed and approved for return to Phase 3.

10. Phase 3 of the IMU program requires a minimum of nine months for an inmate to
show an overall positive adjustment before being eligible for Phase 2.

11. At Phase 3, Rivera has access to exercise, phone calls, video visits, individual
counseling, out-of-cell meals, and access to a tablet/kiosk. ECF No. 26-1 16. He also has access
to psychological services and was recently seen by a Psychological Services Specialist.

12. Psychological Services Specialists make rounds on Rivera’s housing block Monday
through Saturday. Jd. at 7 18.

13. Rivera may request to meet with a medical or mental health service provider at any
time. Jd. at | 19.

14. On October 2, 2025, Rivera was seen by psychology and expressed his desire to
resume his previously prescribed medication for PTSD. Rivera was then informed by the Licensed
Psychologist Manager that he would be scheduled to Psychiatric Review Team to discuss resuming
medications. Jd. at § 20.

15. Rivera was seen by a Psychological Services Specialist on November 24, 2025.

16. | Now that Rivera has advanced to Phase 3 of the IMU program, he is permitted to
leave his cell unrestrained for three hours each day—two hours in the yard and an additional hour
in the day room or for meals or to shower.

17. Rivera is not presently confined under conditions that can be considered solitary

confinement.

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18. There is no imminent threat or probability that he will be placed in solitary
confinement.

C. Conclusions of Law

1. The Court considers four factors in assessing a motion for a preliminary injunction.
They are: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2)
whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of relief; (3) whether granting preliminary
relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the
preliminary relief will be in the public interest. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks,
121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Black
Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1996) (in banc)).

2. The first two factors of these four factors are the “most critical.” Reilly v. City of
Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2017), as amended (June 26, 2017) (quoting Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). Only if the movant satisfies these “gateway factors” will “a
court then considers the remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion if all four
factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.” Jd.

3. The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the
rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined based on a complete record
and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980).
Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in
limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve
Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank’s GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General

Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)).

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4, The facts must clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will
result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3
(3d Cir. 1990).

5. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a “clear showing of irreparable
injury.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226 (it is not enough
to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable
injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with
money damages). Absent a showing of immediate, irreparable injury, the court should deny
preliminary injunctive relief. Id.

6. In the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with
great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and
intractable problems of prison administration.’” Goff. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)).

7. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a
correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators are to be accorded wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve
internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).

8. Although prolonged periods of solitary confinement can violate the Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution, Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 231 (3d Cir. 2017), mere
placement on the RRL does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Harris v. Little, 2025 WL 720089,

at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2025). See also Wayne v. Wetzel, 2024 WL 3696467 at *5-8 (E.D. Pa.

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Aug. 7, 2024) (finding that the conditions outlined in the various phases of the IMU did not amount
to cruel and unusual punishment).

9. To demonstrate a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show that he
has been deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Griffin v. Vaughn, 112
F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997).

10. Mere placement in administrative custody, on the Restricted Release List, does not
violate the Eighth Amendment. See Milhouse v. Arbasak, 2009 WL 1119488, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Apr.27, 2009) (finding that mere placement in a special housing unit does not violate the Eighth
Amendment).

11. _ Rivera has been subjected to highly restricted conditions of confinement, but there
is no evidence that he has been denied the minimal measure of life’s necessities.

12. Rivera’s conditions of confinement do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.

13. Rivera has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable
harm to support a preliminary injunction based on his Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim. |

14. Likewise, Rivera has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or
irreparable harm to support a preliminary injunction based on his Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim.

15. His current conditions of confinement are not sufficiently severe to raise a liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Mudric y. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 469 F.3d 94,

98 (3d Cir. 2006).

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16. Placement on the RRL alone does not implicate a constitutionally protected due
process right. See Bracey v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 686 Fed. Appx. 130, 136 (3d Cir. 2017) (per
curiam); Huertas v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 533 Fed. Appx. 64, 67 n.6 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam);
Bowen v. Ryan, 248 Fed. 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2007).

17. In addition, periodic reviews of his status on the RRL and in the IMU program,
including his recent advancement from Phase 4 to Phase 3 of the IMU program, support that Rivera
is receiving due process review regarding each.

UI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Rivera’s Motion for Preliminary

Injunction (ECF No. 10) be DENIED.
IV. Notice

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the parties may seek
review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within
fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the
objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See
Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.
2007).

DATED this 8th day of December 2025.

—_ LALL

RICHARD A. LANZILLO ~~ .
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE