Edwards v. The United States Department of Education

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN RE: 	) 	Bankruptcy No. 24-21192-JAD
)
SHANNON M. EDWARDS, 	) 	Chapter 7
)
Debtor. 	)
X
)
SHANNON M. EDWARDS, 	) 	Adversary No. 24-02082-JAD
)
Plaintiff/Debtor, 	) 	ECF No. 30
)
-v- 	)
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 	)
OF EDUCATION, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
X
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment (the
“Motion”) filed by Defendant, the United States Department of Education (the
“Department”). The Department seeks judgment as a matter of law on the
complaint filed by Plaintiff/Debtor Shannon M. Edwards (“Edwards”), which
asks 	the 	Court 	to 	determine 	that 	her 	federal 	student-loan 	obligations 	are
dischargeable 	under 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	523(a)(8). 	See 	Complaint 	to 	Determine
Dischargeability 	of 	Student 	Loan 	Pursuant 	to 	11 	U.S.C. 	§523(a)(8) 	(the
“Complaint”), ECF No. 1.
The Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and
1409. A proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a particular debt is a
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core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I), and the Court has authority to
enter final judgment.
Section 	523(a)(8) 	generally 	excepts 	qualifying 	educational 	debt 	from
discharge unless repayment would impose an “undue hardship” on the debtor
and the debtor’s dependents. In this Circuit, “undue hardship” is governed by
the three-part test announced in Brunner v. New York State Higher Education
Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987), and adopted in Pennsylvania
Higher Education Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 304-
06 	(3d 	Cir. 	1995). 	Edwards 	ultimately 	bears 	the 	burden 	of 	proving 	each
element by a preponderance of the evidence, and failure to prove any one
element defeats discharge. See In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 306; Brightful v. Pa.
Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Brightful), 267 F.3d 324, 327-28 (3d Cir.
2001).
That ultimate burden, however, is not the question presently before the
Court. Summary judgment is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,
made 	applicable 	to 	adversary 	proceedings 	by 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Bankruptcy
Procedure 7056. The Department must show that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Where, as here, the nonmovant (i.e. Edwards) will bear the
burden 	of 	proof 	at 	trial, 	the 	movant 	may 	discharge 	its 	initial 	burden 	by
identifying an absence of evidence sufficient to support an essential element of
the nonmovant’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986).
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The burden then falls on the nonmovant to identify particular record materials
demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
In deciding whether that showing has been made, the Court must view
the evidence and draw reasonable inferences in Edwards’ favor. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). The Court may not weigh
competing evidence or resolve credibility disputes. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
At the same time, Rule 56 does not require the Court to construct a party’s
case for her: the parties must identify the record materials on which they rely,
although the Court may consider other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1), 	(3). 	The 	question 	is 	therefore 	narrow 	but 	consequential: 	has 	the
Department 	shown 	that, 	even 	crediting 	Edwards’ 	evidence 	and 	drawing
reasonable inferences in her favor, no reasonable factfinder could find for
Edwards on at least one indispensable element of Brunner/Faish?
I. SUMMARY OF DECISION
The answer is no. The Department has developed a substantial record
and identified serious weaknesses in Edwards’ case. Those weaknesses may
ultimately prevent her from carrying the demanding burden imposed by section
523(a)(8), 	particularly 	under 	the 	second 	and 	third 	Brunner 	prongs. 	But
weakness of proof is not the same as the absence of a genuine factual dispute,
and 	skepticism 	is 	not 	a 	substitute 	for 	trial 	where 	resolution 	depends 	on
credibility and competing reasonable inferences.
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Several features of the record are central. As of April 20, 2026, Edwards
owed 	$763,261.56 	in 	federal 	student-loan 	debt, 	including 	$650,446.32 	in
principal and $112,815.24 in accrued interest. Declaration of Erin K. Hughes
(“Hughes Declaration”) ¶ 10 & Attach. 4, ECF No. 32-6 at ECF pgs. 7, 61-62.1
See United States’ Concise Statement of Material Facts (“Concise Statement of
Material Facts” or “CSMF”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 32; Response to United States’ Concise
Statement of Material Facts (“Response to Concise Statement of Material Facts”
or “Response to CSMF”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 35. 2 The Complaint, relying on an
account statement attached thereto as Exhibit A, alleges a scheduled monthly
payment of $7,642.34, while Edwards’ summary-judgment brief later refers to
a 	total 	student-loan 	projected 	payment—inclusive 	of 	a 	$1,100 	monthly
payment on “an additional private loan”—of approximately $8,600. Complaint
¶¶ 	11 	& 	20; 	Plaintiff’s 	Response 	in 	Opposition 	to 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for
Summary Judgment and Brief in Support Thereof (“Opposition”) 4-5, ECF No.
34. Neither figure is an admitted fact in the parties’ Concise Statement of
Material Facts and response thereto, and the Court does not rely on either as
establishing the present conventional payment. What is undisputed is the size
of the debt and the availability of an income-driven plan requiring a current
1 The Hughes Declaration is attached to the United States’ Concise Statement of Material Facts (ECF No.
32) as Exhibit E.
2 Citing the Hughes Declaration, the Department states in its Concise Statement of Material Facts that the
portion of the total $763,261.56 outstanding as of April 20, 2026 attributable to interest is “$11,815.24.”
CSMF ¶ 5. This appears to be a typographical error as the Hughes Declaration identifies the outstanding
interest as “$112,815.24.” Hughes Declaration, Attach. 4 (ECF No. 32-6 at ECF pg. 62). Simple
arithmetic supports the latter figure as $763,261.56 - $650,446.32 (principal) equals $112,815.24.
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payment of approximately $0.00. See CSMF ¶¶ 14 & 15; Response to CSMF ¶¶
14 & 15.
That $0.00 option is relevant, but the Department has identified no
controlling authority making enrollment in a repayment plan mandatory or
treating eligibility for such a plan as dispositive under section 523(a)(8). Nor is
a $0.00 payment economically equivalent to reducing the debt: it pays no
principal 	and, 	if 	the 	debt 	remains 	nondischargeable, 	postpetition 	interest
remains a personal liability. See Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 360-
63 (1964); Leeper v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 49 F.3d 98, 101-03
(3d 	Cir. 	1995). 	The 	Court 	therefore 	reserves 	judgment 	on 	the 	ultimate
significance of Edwards’ decision not to enroll.
On the present record, factual disputes remain concerning Edwards’
actual 	minimal 	standard 	of 	living 	needs, 	the 	extent 	to 	which 	her 	current
expenses can reasonably be reduced, the effect of the non-APA-accredited 3
doctoral program on her earning capacity and employment opportunities, the
realistic relationship between her future earnings and a debt exceeding three-
quarters of a million dollars, and the good faith reflected by her payment
history and financial choices. Those issues are sufficiently intertwined with
testimony and credibility that they should be resolved at trial. The Motion will
therefore be denied.
3 American Psychological Association (the “APA”).
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II. UNDISPUTED FACTS AND AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT
The parties have narrowed the factual field considerably through the
Department’s Concise Statement of Material Facts and Edwards’ response.
Edwards 	admits 	most 	of 	the 	Department’s 	numbered 	statements, 	while
disputing principally the inferences the Department draws from those facts.
See Response to CSMF.
Edwards earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology and Criminal
Justice 	from 	California 	University 	of 	Pennsylvania 	in 	2006. 	CSMF 	¶ 	7;
Response 	to 	CSMF 	¶ 	7. 	She 	later 	earned 	a 	master’s 	degree 	in 	forensic
psychology and a doctorate in clinical forensic psychology from the Chicago
School of Professional Psychology. CSMF ¶ 8; Response to CSMF ¶ 8. In her
deposition 	(the 	“Edwards 	Deposition”), 4 Edwards 	testified 	that 	the 	doctoral
program was not accredited by the APA and that the lack of APA accreditation
restricts 	certain 	government 	and 	out-of-state 	employment 	opportunities,
although 	she 	is 	licensed 	to 	practice 	psychology 	in 	Pennsylvania. 	Edwards
Deposition 22:8-24:2; Response to CSMF ¶ 8.
Edwards 	has 	operated 	Edwards 	& 	Associates, 	her 	private 	forensic-
psychology 	practice, 	since 	approximately 	December 	2015. 	CSMF 	¶ 	16;
Response to CSMF ¶ 16. She remains capable of working and identifies no
physical or medical condition that impairs her ability to do so. CSMF ¶ 28;
Response to CSMF ¶ 28. The Department also points to Edwards’ testimony
that she does not presently want to give up her private practice. CSMF ¶ 20;
4 The Edwards Deposition is attached to the Concise Statement of Material Facts as Exhibit A, ECF No.
32-2.
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Edwards 	Deposition 	40:4-5. 	Edwards 	responds 	that 	she 	sees 	no 	better
alternative and attributes some limitation in available opportunities to the non-
APA-accredited doctorate. Response to CSMF ¶ 20.
The 	financial 	record 	is 	less 	tidy. 	Edwards 	reported 	current 	monthly
household gross income of $3,734.00 in her Attestation, 5 while Schedule I
reflected monthly income of $5,561.21. CSMF ¶ 17; Response to CSMF ¶ 17.
Her 2022 federal tax return reflected adjusted gross income of $44,808, while
her 2024 return reflected total income of $8,254 and adjusted gross income of
$1,931. CSMF ¶ 18; Response to CSMF ¶ 18. Edwards explains that her self-
employment income varies depending upon patient volume and collection of
patient accounts. Response to CSMF ¶ 17.
Edwards’ expense figures also vary over time. Her bankruptcy schedules
listed 	rent 	of 	$2,405.00; 	discovery 	responses 	listed 	$2,795.59; 	and 	at
deposition she testified that her then-current rent was $2,750.00, inclusive of
amounts charged with the rent. CSMF ¶ 21; Response to CSMF ¶ 21; Edwards
Deposition 7:2-8:8. She testified that she had moved from a more expensive
Lawrenceville 	apartment 	in 	2019 	(which 	was 	$2,500 	at 	that 	time), 	to 	her
current location which was then $1,950, but that the rent at her current
location had since increased. Edwards Deposition 30:9-31:1. She explained
that, after several moves associated with a contentious divorce, she hoped to
remain in the apartment until her daughter graduated. Id. Edwards’ daughter
5 “Attestation of Shannon Edwards in Support of Request for Stipulation Conceding Dischargeability of
Student Loans[,]” attached as Exhibit C (ECF No. 32-4) to the Concise Statement of Material Facts.
Hereinafter, the “Attestation”.
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attends Oakland Catholic High School. Edwards testified that annual tuition
and related charges are approximately $17,900, of which she pays roughly one-
quarter under the parents’ arrangement, along with some additional school and
activity expenses. Id. at 24:3-30:8.
The 	Department 	challenges 	other 	spending 	as 	well. 	Its 	Concise
Statement 	of 	Material 	Facts 	identifies 	April 	2025 	business-account
transactions including $1,100 for Hamilton tickets for Edwards’ daughter’s
birthday, 	$315 	for 	salon 	and 	spa 	appointments, 	and 	more 	than 	$780 	in
UberEATS charges. CSMF ¶ 22. Edwards admits the cited transactions but
denies that isolated transactions fairly represent her overall spending habits.
Response to CSMF ¶ 22. She likewise admits testifying that reducing rent was
not 	an 	option 	“at 	this 	point” 	and 	that 	she 	was 	not 	attempting 	to 	reduce
expenses for her daughter, but she states that she would consider moving if a
better alternative became available. CSMF ¶ 23; Response to CSMF ¶ 23.
The federal student-loan balance dwarfs the other figures in the record.
As of April 20, 2026, Edwards owed $763,261.56, consisting of $650,446.32 in
principal 	and 	$112,815.24 	in 	accrued 	interest. 	As 	discussed 	above, 	the
Department’s 	Concise 	Statement 	of 	Material 	Facts 	states 	the 	interest
component as $11,815.24, but the Hughes Declaration and the arithmetic
establish that the intended figure is $112,815.24.
Edwards’ federal loans are eligible for income-based repayment (“IBR”).
CSMF 	¶ 	12; 	Response 	to 	CSMF 	¶ 	12. 	Before 	this 	adversary 	proceeding,
Edwards participated in the SAVE plan, under which her required federal
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payment was $0.00. CSMF ¶ 14; Response to CSMF ¶ 14. Based upon the
2024 tax return and a family size of two, the Department calculates that an
available IBR plan would likewise require a current payment of approximately
$0.00. CSMF ¶ 15; Response to CSMF ¶ 15. Edwards does not dispute the
calculation; she disputes what follows from it. She states that she has not
pursued IBR due to this litigation, further noting that IBR would not discharge
the debt and interest would continue to accrue. Response to CSMF ¶ 13.
Edwards’ direct payments on her federal loans have been minimal: the
Department’s records reflect $183.73 received as of January 9, 2026. CSMF ¶
26; Response to CSMF ¶ 26. Her treatment of private educational debt is
markedly different. Edwards currently pays approximately $1,100 per month
on private student loans, has repaid approximately $150,000 on those loans,
and 	owes 	approximately 	$70,000. 	CSMF 	¶ 	24; 	Response 	to 	CSMF 	¶ 	24;
Edwards Deposition 19:14-20:9. She testified that she continues making those
payments even though she believes she may presently be excused from doing
so on account of her bankruptcy because she does not want the burden shifted
to her cosigners. Edwards Deposition 20:10-21:7.
These facts frame the dispute. The Department views Edwards as an
educated, healthy, employable professional who has paid almost nothing on
her federal loans, has not minimized all expenses, and can presently obtain an
IBR 	payment 	of 	$0.00. 	Edwards 	emphasizes 	fluctuating 	income, 	asserted
employment limitations associated with a non-APA-accredited doctorate, her
substantial repayment of private educational debt, and a federal balance that a
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$0.00 payment would not reduce. Civil Rule 56 asks whether the competing
inferences arising from that record can be resolved as a matter of law.
III. STANDARD FOR DISCHARGE OF STUDENT-
LOAN DEBT UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)
Section 	523(a)(8) 	excepts 	qualifying 	educational 	debt 	from 	discharge
“unless excepting such debt from discharge . . . would impose an undue
hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
As discussed in In re Faish, the Third Circuit adopted Brunner and as such
requires the debtor to prove: (1) that, based on current income and expenses,
she 	cannot 	maintain 	a 	minimal 	standard 	of 	living 	for 	herself 	and 	her
dependents 	if 	forced 	to 	repay 	the 	loans; 	(2) 	that 	additional 	circumstances
indicate this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the
repayment period; and (3) that she has made good-faith efforts to repay. In re
Faish, 72 F.3d at 304-05 (quoting Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396).
The test is conjunctive. “All three elements must be satisfied individually
before a discharge can be granted.” In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 306. Edwards bears
the burden of proof on each element by a preponderance of the evidence. In re
Brightful, 267 F.3d at 327. In re Faish also instructs that equitable concerns or
other factors outside the Brunner framework may not substitute for proof of
the three elements. 72 F.3d at 306. Those principles govern the merits; at
summary 	judgment, 	the 	question 	is 	whether 	the 	record 	would 	permit 	a
reasonable factfinder to find for Edwards on each indispensable element.
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A. First Prong: Minimal Standard of Living
The first prong asks whether Edwards can maintain, “based on current
income 	and 	expenses, 	a 	‘minimal’ 	standard 	of 	living” 	for 	herself 	and 	her
dependent if required to repay the loans. In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 305 (quoting
Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396). The standard requires more than “tight finances”
and 	is 	not 	satisfied 	where 	reasonable 	“short-term, 	belt 	tightening” 	would
permit repayment, but it does not require poverty. Flickinger-Luther v. ECMC
(In re Flickinger-Luther), 462 B.R. 157, 161 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2012)(citations
omitted). The inquiry is individualized and turns on whether the debtor can
meet basic needs while repaying the student-loan obligation.
The Department’s principal argument is straightforward, but it ultimately
rests upon a concept of attribution. Because Edwards apparently could elect
an 	income-driven 	repayment 	program 	under 	which 	her 	presently 	required
monthly payment would be $0.00, the Department asks the Court effectively to
attribute that $0.00 payment to Edwards for purposes of the first Brunner
prong. From that premise, the Department reasons that repayment necessarily
can impose no present hardship: a debtor cannot be unable to maintain a
minimal 	standard 	of 	living 	because 	of 	a 	payment 	that, 	if 	she 	elected 	the
available program, would presently be $0. That argument has surface appeal,
but it is too categorical for summary judgment. In Reagan v. Educational
Credit Management Corp. (In re Reagan), Chief Judge Taddonio of this Court
rejected 	the 	proposition 	that 	a 	$0.00 	income-based 	payment 	necessarily
defeats the first Brunner prong. 587 B.R. 296, 301-03 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2018).
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The 	inquiry 	remains 	whether, 	considering 	Edwards’ 	current 	financial
circumstances, she can make the required student-loan payment and maintain
a minimal standard of living. Id. at 303.
There is also a practical distinction between a payment set at zero and
repayment of the debt. A $0.00 payment reduces neither principal nor accrued
interest. If the debt remains nondischargeable, postpetition interest may accrue
and remain collectible from the debtor personally. Bruning, 376 U.S. at 360-
63; Leeper, 49 F.3d at 101-03. Thus, eligibility for a $0.00 plan may alleviate
immediate cash-flow pressure, but it does not by itself answer the first-prong
inquiry.
The longer-term consequences of the particular income-driven alternative
available 	to 	Edwards 	also 	are 	not 	adequately 	developed 	in 	the 	present
summary-judgment record. Income-based repayment can extend for as long as
twenty-five years before the Secretary repays or cancels the remaining balance
of principal and interest, with a twenty-year period applicable to certain newer
borrowers. 	See 	20 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1098e(b)(7), 	(e)(2); 	see 	also 	34 	C.F.R. 	§
685.209(k)(1)-(2). During that period, the treatment of unpaid interest can
materially affect the balance. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(2)-(4). The Department
has not developed a record showing what Edwards’ balance reasonably would
be over the applicable repayment period, how interest would be treated under
the particular plan available to her, or what amount ultimately might remain
for cancellation.
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Nor does the present record address the potential tax consequences of
eventual loan forgiveness. As current federal tax law stands, cancellation of
indebtedness generally constitutes gross income unless an exclusion applies.
26 U.S.C. §§ 61(a)(11), 108. The broad temporary exclusion that applied to
certain student-loan discharges through December 31, 2025, no longer applies
to post-2025 income-driven forgiveness. Whether Edwards ultimately would
recognize taxable income would depend upon the law and her circumstances at
the time, including any applicable exclusion such as insolvency. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 108(a)(1)(B), (a)(3). And if forgiveness were to produce an income-tax liability,
the 	dischargeability 	of 	that 	tax 	liability 	in 	a 	later 	bankruptcy 	could 	itself
depend upon, among other things, the timing and circumstances of the later
case. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(8), 523(a)(1).
The difficulty with the Department’s attribution argument is that it treats
the availability of the $0.00 payment as though Edwards had already elected it
and 	assumes 	that 	her 	decision 	not 	to 	do 	so 	has 	no 	legitimate 	economic
explanation. The present record does not permit either assumption. Edwards
offers countervailing reasons for declining the program, including that a $0.00
required payment does not actually repay the debt and that interest may
continue to accrue on an already extraordinary balance. See Response to CSMF
¶ 13. Moreover, as discussed above and on the record at the hearing on the
Motion, it is not lost on this Court that indebtedness ultimately forgiven after
an extended repayment period may carry consequences of its own. See Audio
Recording of July 7, 2026 Hr’g at 11:43:52-11:45:26. The Court does not
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determine at summary judgment that Edwards’ explanations are sufficient,
economically sound, or ultimately credible. Nor does the Court hold that the
availability 	of 	a 	$0.00 	income-driven 	payment 	is 	irrelevant. 	It 	is 	plainly
relevant. 	But 	relevance 	is 	different 	from 	attribution. 	The 	sufficiency 	and
credibility 	of 	Edwards’ 	explanations, 	and 	the 	weight 	properly 	given 	to 	the
available $0.00 payment, are matters for trial rather than summary judgment.
Accordingly, on the present record, the Court finds it inappropriate to
attribute to Edwards a hypothetical $0.00 monthly payment that she has not
elected and then use that attributed payment to conclude, as a matter of law,
that she cannot satisfy the first Brunner prong. The Department remains free
at trial to demonstrate that the available income-driven program provides a
realistic repayment alternative, that Edwards lacked a reasonable basis for
declining it, and that the $0.00 payment should therefore carry substantial or
even decisive weight in the undue-hardship analysis. Edwards likewise bears
the burden of proving why the availability of that program does not defeat her
claim. Those competing positions require factual determinations on a more
complete record.
Edwards’ own presentation, however, is far from ideal. Because she bears
the ultimate burden, she will need to present a coherent and credible account
of her actual income and the expenses reasonably necessary to maintain a
minimal standard of living. As this Court explained in Lepre v. Department of
Education 	(In 	re 	Lepre), 	a 	court 	need 	not 	accept 	scheduled 	income 	and
expenses at face value and must have a sufficiently accurate financial picture
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to conduct the first-prong analysis. 466 B.R. 727, 732-34 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
2012), aff’d, 530 F. App’x 121, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2013). Edwards’ varying income
and rent figures, the presence of another adult in the household, 6 private-
school 	expenses, 	and 	the 	discretionary 	transactions 	identified 	by 	the
Department all warrant examination at trial.
The Court does not hold on this paper record that Edwards’ present rent
or her contribution to private-school tuition is reasonable or necessary to a
minimal standard of living. Nor does it hold the opposite. Edwards testified that
she previously moved to reduce rent, that the rent later increased, and that she
now seeks residential stability for her daughter; she also testified concerning
the amount she contributes toward her daughter’s school expenses. Whether
those explanations are credible, and whether those expenses reasonably can be
reduced 	without 	falling 	below 	a 	minimal 	standard 	of 	living, 	are 	factual
questions. Edwards will bear the burden at trial of explaining why the expenses
she 	asks 	the 	Court 	to 	recognize 	are 	consistent 	with 	Brunner’s 	minimal
standard.
The record nevertheless contains evidence from which a factfinder could
find the first prong satisfied. Edwards reported current monthly household
gross 	income 	of 	$3,734.00 	in 	her 	Attestation, 	while 	Schedule 	I 	reflected
$5,561.21 per month; her 2024 return reflected total income of $8,254 and
adjusted gross income of $1,931. CSMF ¶¶ 17-18; Response to CSMF ¶¶ 17-
6 In her deposition, Edwards testified that in addition to herself and her daughter, Edwards’ partner, Ron
Horne, resides with her. See Edwards Deposition 5:9-14. See also CSMF ¶ 6; Response to CSMF ¶ 6.
Edwards’ testified that while Mr. Horne does not directly contribute to rent, he contributes to utility and
grocery costs. Edwards Deposition 7:22-8:8.
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18. Her Attestation further states that, after the expenses reported there, she
had 	no 	remaining 	monthly 	income. 	Attestation 	¶ 	16. 	The 	Department
vigorously challenges the reasonableness of several expenses, and Edwards’
figures are not entirely consistent. But those are precisely the disputes that
prevent the Court from concluding, as a matter of law, that reasonable belt-
tightening necessarily would leave sufficient funds for repayment.
Edwards therefore survives summary judgment on the first prong, but
only in the Rule 56 sense. She must still prove a reliable minimal-living budget
and 	justify 	the 	expenses 	the 	Department 	challenges. 	Viewing 	the 	present
record in her favor, however, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that she
cannot maintain a minimal standard of living while repaying the federal loans,
and In re Reagan persuasively rejects treating a $0.00 income-driven payment
as 	an 	automatic 	answer. 	Summary 	judgment 	is 	unwarranted 	on 	the 	first
prong.
B. Second Prong: Additional Circumstances
and Persistent Inability to Repay
The second prong requires proof that “additional circumstances exist
indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of
the repayment period[.]” In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 305 (quoting Brunner, 831
F.2d at 396). It is a demanding requirement. In re Brightful explains that
present 	financial 	distress 	is 	not 	enough; 	the 	debtor 	must 	show 	“a 	total
incapacity . . . in the future to pay [her] debts for reasons not within [her]
control,” and that discharge should rest on a “certainty of hopelessness,” not
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merely a present inability to pay. 267 F.3d at 328 (citations omitted)(alteration
in the original).
The Department has forceful facts on this prong. As discussed above,
Edwards 	is 	educated, 	licensed 	in 	Pennsylvania, 	has 	operated 	a 	forensic-
psychology practice for roughly a decade, remains employed, and identifies no
disabling physical or medical condition. Those facts may ultimately make the
“certainty of hopelessness” standard difficult for her to satisfy. The Court does
not minimize that difficulty.
But the Department’s showing does not eliminate every genuine factual
issue. Edwards testified from personal knowledge that her doctoral program
was not APA accredited and that this has excluded her from VA positions, most
government positions, and practice in several states. Edwards Deposition 22:8-
24:2. 	She 	also 	testified 	concerning 	her 	employment 	efforts, 	including 	an
application 	for 	a 	teen-outreach 	director 	position 	for 	which 	she 	was 	not
interviewed because, according to what she was told, the salary was too low for
her. CSMF ¶ 19; Response to CSMF ¶ 19; Edwards Deposition 39:22-40:2. The
weight ultimately due that testimony, the extent of the employment limitations,
and whether Edwards has adequately pursued realistic alternatives are matters
the 	Court 	can 	assess 	more 	reliably 	after 	hearing 	her 	testimony 	and 	any
contrary proof.
Future earning capacity, however, cannot be examined in isolation from
the 	obligation 	to 	be 	repaid. 	The 	second 	prong 	asks 	whether 	the 	debtor’s
inability to repay is likely to persist. A finding that Edwards can continue to
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earn income does not itself establish that she can realistically repay a federal
student-loan 	balance 	of 	$763,261.56. 	The 	amount 	of 	the 	debt 	is 	not 	an
extraneous 	equitable 	consideration; 	it 	defines 	the 	obligation 	against 	which
future repayment capacity must be measured.
Edwards’ historical income has fluctuated materially. CSMF ¶¶ 17-18;
Response to CSMF ¶¶ 17-18. The Department may prove at trial that she has
materially greater earning capacity than those historical figures suggest, that
the 	accreditation 	issue 	is 	overstated, 	or 	that 	any 	inability 	to 	repay 	is
substantially 	self-imposed. 	But 	those 	are 	propositions 	to 	be 	proved, 	not
inferences the Court may draw against Edwards at the summary judgment
stage.
The available $0.00 IBR option does not change the procedural result.
Income-driven repayment may bear on future repayment prospects, but the
Department 	has 	identified 	no 	controlling 	Supreme 	Court 	or 	Third 	Circuit
authority holding that a debtor must enroll in such a plan before invoking
section 523(a)(8), much less that eligibility for a $0.00 payment conclusively
defeats the second prong. The Court therefore reserves judgment on the legal
and evidentiary weight of Edwards’ decision not to enroll. That question is
better addressed on a complete trial record concerning the plan’s terms and
consequences.
In re Brightful’s “certainty of hopelessness” requirement is demanding,
but 	hopelessness 	need 	not 	necessarily 	take 	the 	form 	of 	disability,
unemployment, or some other obvious personal incapacity. Depending upon
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the evidence, it may instead be structural—arising from an enduring disparity
between the debtor’s reasonably attainable earning capacity and the magnitude
of the educational debt that must be repaid. The Court neither suggests that a
large student-loan balance, standing alone, establishes undue hardship, nor
does it treat the amount of the debt as an extraneous equitable consideration
prohibited by In re Faish. Rather, the amount of the obligation is necessarily
part of the repayment inquiry: whether a debtor’s inability to repay is likely to
persist cannot be evaluated in the abstract, without considering the debt that
must be repaid.
That distinction may prove important here. Edwards does not contend
that 	she 	is 	incapable 	of 	working. 	To 	the 	contrary, 	she 	is 	educated,
professionally 	licensed, 	presently 	employed, 	and 	identifies 	no 	physical 	or
medical condition preventing her from working. Those facts weigh heavily in
the 	Department’s 	favor. 	But 	they 	do 	not 	necessarily 	answer 	the 	question
presented by the second prong. Edwards owes more than $763,000 in federal
student-loan debt. Her theory is that, notwithstanding continued employment
and reasonable efforts to maximize her earnings, the disparity between what
she can realistically earn over the relevant repayment period and what she
owes is so substantial and enduring that her inability to repay is structurally
hopeless within the meaning of In re Brightful. Whether the evidence ultimately
proves that proposition remains to be determined.
That 	determination 	requires 	a 	factual 	record. 	Edwards 	may 	testify
concerning 	her 	education, 	employment 	history, 	professional 	opportunities,
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actual earnings, efforts to increase those earnings, and, to the extent permitted
by the Federal Rules of Evidence, her anticipated professional prospects. To the
extent timely disclosed and otherwise admissible under the Court’s discovery
orders, expert testimony may bear upon her reasonably attainable earning
capacity, the practical consequences of her non-APA-accredited doctorate, and
whether any realistic professional trajectory would permit repayment of an
obligation 	of 	this 	magnitude. 	The 	Department 	likewise 	may 	offer 	contrary
evidence, including any properly disclosed expert testimony, demonstrating
that 	Edwards 	possesses 	materially 	greater 	earning 	capacity 	or 	repayment
prospects than she claims. The Court cannot resolve those competing factual
propositions 	on 	summary 	judgment. 	Summary 	judgment 	is 	therefore
unwarranted on the second prong.
C. Third Prong: Good-Faith Efforts to Repay
The third prong requires Edwards to prove a good-faith effort to repay. In
re Faish, 72 F.3d at 305; Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. Relevant considerations
include 	the 	debtor’s 	payment 	history, 	efforts 	to 	obtain 	and 	maintain
employment, efforts to maximize income and minimize expenses, and use of
available repayment or restructuring options. See In re Flickinger-Luther, 462
B.R. at 163-64. The inquiry is guided by the principle that undue hardship
should not result from a default the debtor willfully or negligently caused; the
condition 	instead 	must 	arise 	from 	factors 	beyond 	the 	debtor’s 	reasonable
control. In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 305 (discussing the good-faith inquiry).
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The Department again has substantial evidence. Edwards has paid only
$183.73 directly on federal loans now exceeding $763,000. She is not presently
enrolled in the available IBR program. The Department also points to expenses
it contends could have been reduced and to Edwards’ testimony that she does
not want to abandon her private practice. Those facts are plainly relevant and
may weigh heavily at trial.
They are not, however, the entire record. Edwards previously participated
in SAVE, under which her required federal payment was $0.00. Her Attestation
also describes efforts to obtain consolidation and her experience with income-
driven repayment and forbearance. Attestation ¶¶ 22-26. Most significantly, the
undisputed record shows that Edwards has repaid approximately $150,000 on
private educational loans, continues to pay approximately $1,100 per month,
and 	owes 	approximately 	$70,000 	on 	those 	loans. 	She 	testified 	that 	she
continues those payments in part because she does not want the burden
shifted to cosigners. A factfinder could reasonably view that history as evidence
that the paucity of federal payments does not, standing alone, establish an
unwillingness to honor educational debt.
Nor will the Court hold on summary judgment that declining a $0.00 IBR
payment necessarily demonstrates bad faith. In re Flickinger-Luther holds that
participation in repayment programs may be a persuasive factor in the good-
faith analysis, but failure to use such a program is not dispositive. 462 B.R. at
163-64. Here, the proposed current payment is $0.00, and such a payment
would not reduce principal; if the debt remains nondischargeable, postpetition
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interest remains collectible from Edwards personally. Bruning, 376 U.S. at
360-63; Leeper, 49 F.3d at 101-03. The Court therefore reserves judgment on
what Edwards’ refusal to enroll says about good faith.
The same caution applies to the Department’s expense evidence. The
Hamilton tickets, salon and spa charges, food-delivery expenses, housing costs,
and 	private-school 	contributions 	are 	relevant 	to 	whether 	Edwards 	has
minimized expenses. Edwards disputes the inference that isolated transactions
represent her ordinary spending and offers explanations for her housing and
child-related 	expenses. 	Good 	faith 	depends 	not 	simply 	on 	whether 	an
expenditure occurred, but on the debtor’s overall pattern of conduct and the
reasons 	for 	her 	financial 	choices. 	Those 	matters 	are 	appropriately 	tested
through testimony and cross-examination.
Edwards has not established good faith merely by surviving the Motion.
At trial she must account for the very small amount paid on the federal debt,
explain her repayment choices, establish reasonable efforts to maximize income
and minimize expenses, and persuade the Court that her circumstances were
not willfully or negligently created. But the present record permits competing
reasonable inferences. Resolving them would require weighing evidence and
assessing credibility, so summary judgment is unwarranted on the third prong.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 	Court’s 	ruling 	is 	procedural, 	not 	predictive. 	Edwards 	faces 	a
formidable burden under section 523(a)(8), Brunner, In re Faish, and In re
Brightful. The Department has identified evidence that may ultimately defeat
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one or more elements of her claim: Edwards is educated, licensed, employed,
and free of any identified disabling medical or physical condition; she has made
only nominal direct payments on her federal loans; and aspects of her spending
and employment choices warrant close scrutiny. Edwards will bear the burden
of persuasion on all of those matters at trial.
The 	record 	also 	contains 	evidence 	that 	cannot 	be 	resolved 	against
Edwards without factfinding. Her federal debt exceeds $763,000. Her reported
income is modest by comparison and has fluctuated materially. She contends,
based 	on 	her 	own 	professional 	experience, 	that 	the 	non-APA-accredited
doctorate 	limits 	employment 	opportunities. 	She 	has 	repaid 	approximately
$150,000 of private educational debt while continuing to work in her field. And
the available income-driven option presently requires approximately $0.00—a
circumstance relevant to current cash flow, but not one that itself reduces
principal.
The Court therefore does not decide today whether Edwards’ rent is
reasonable, whether private-school expenses are necessary, whether she has
maximized her earning capacity, whether her accreditation-related limitations
will persist, whether she should enroll in an income-driven plan, or whether
her 	overall 	conduct 	satisfies 	good 	faith. 	Those 	are 	trial 	questions 	on 	this
record. Civil Rule 56 asks only whether a genuine dispute exists for trial, and
genuine disputes remain as to each Brunner/Faish prong.
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Accordingly, 	the 	Department 	has 	not 	demonstrated 	entitlement 	to
judgment as a matter of law. The Motion will be denied. An appropriate Order
follows.
Dated: September 16, 2026 	______________________________
The Honorable Jeffery A. Deller
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Case Administrator to Mail to:
All parties of record in adversary proceeding
26 	__________	___________________________
Th 	H 	bl 	J ff 	A 	D ll
FILED
CLERK
U.S. BANKRUPTCY
COURT - :'3$
9/16/26 4:04 pm
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