Tindol v. Sage

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES TINDOL,
Petitioner,
v.
JESSICA SAGE,
Respondent.
No. 4:26-CV-01429
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
OCTOBER 13, 2026
Petitioner James Tindol, an inmate confined at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (FCI Lewisburg), filed the instant petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He asks the Court to
order the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to find him eligible to earn time credits
pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) 1 and to apply those credits to his
sentence. Because Tindol is statutorily ineligible to receive FSA time credits, the
Court must deny his petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In March 2020, Tindol was charged by criminal information with
distribution of fentanyl (a schedule II controlled substance) “and the death of A.V.
resulted from the use of such substance,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
1 	Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
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(b)(1)(C).2 Tindol entered into a written plea agreement, agreeing to plead guilty
to the single-count information charging a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(C) where death resulted, which agreement expressly noted that the statutory
mandatory minimum for this offense was 20 years’ incarceration.3 Tindol then
pled guilty to this same offense on June 2, 2021. 4 In March 2022, he was
sentenced to a term of 120 months’ imprisonment.5
In his Section 2241 petition, Tindol alleges that he was originally
determined to be eligible to earn and receive FSA credits.6 However, that
determination was changed when he was transferred to “SPC” Lewisburg, where
he was informed that his offense of conviction was disqualifying for FSA credit
purposes under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D).7 Thus, his current projected release
date, according to BOP officials and via application of good-conduct time, is
November 18, 2030.8
Tindol avers that he exhausted administrative remedies and thereafter filed
the instant Section 2241 petition.9 He contends that although he may have been
charged with an FSA-disqualifying offense, he was not convicted of or sentenced
2 	United States v. Tindol, No. 3:20-cr-00083, Doc. 1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2020) (Mariani, J.).
3 	See id., Doc. 3 at 1-2.
4 	See id., Doc. 12 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2021).
5 	See id., Doc. 30 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2022).
6 	See Doc. 1 ¶ 13.
7 	Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
8 	Doc. 7-3 at 1, 2.
9 	See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6-10.
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for a disqualifying offense and therefore is eligible to earn and receive FSA credits.
He asks the Court to order the BOP to find him eligible for FSA credits and to
apply the credits he believes he has earned. Tindol’s Section 2241 petition is fully
briefed and ripe for disposition.
II. 	D ISCUSSION
Tindol’s argument goes like this: under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(lviii),
Congress expressly removed from FSA eligibility only those drug manufacturing
or distribution offenses “for which death or serious bodily injury resulted from the
use of such substance.” 10 He then contends that—although he was charged with
such a disqualifying offense—because distribution of fentanyl that results in death
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) carries a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment of 20 years (or 240 months), and he was sentenced to only 10 years’
(or 120 months’) imprisonment, he was not convicted of or sentenced for an FSA-
disqualifying offense.11 Tindol is incorrect.
Section 3632(d)(4)(D) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides an
extensive list of offenses that render a prisoner “ineligible to receive [FSA] time
credits” if the prisoner “is serving a sentence for a conviction” for any of the
enumerated offenses. 12 One such disqualifying offense is “Section 401(a) of the
10 	18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(lviii).
11 	See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 20-23, 31-34, 37-41.
12 	See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D).
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Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. [§] 841), relating to manufacturing or
distributing a controlled substance in the case of a conviction for an offense
described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of subsection (b)(1) of that section for
which death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of such substance.” 13
There is no question that Tindol was charged with and pled guilty to an
FSA-disqualifying offense. As noted above, his criminal information charged
distribution of fentanyl (a schedule II controlled substance) “and the death of A.V.
resulted from the use of such substance,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(C), and he pled guilty to the offense charged in the information.
Tindol’s argument centers on the sentence he received. He claims that he
could not have been convicted of and sentenced under the “death-or-serious-
bodily-injury-resulted” enhancement of Section (b)(1)(C) because he was
sentenced to only 120 months’ imprisonment, not the 240-month mandatory
minimum implicated by the enhancement.
This sentencing discrepancy, however, is easily resolved. In Tindol’s
criminal case, the government moved for a downward departure, 14 and the Court
granted that motion and reduced Tindol’s sentence accordingly. 15 The downward
departure did not alter the offense of conviction or the fact that Tindol was
13 	Id. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(lviii).
14 	See Tindol, No. 3:20-cr-00083, Doc. 21 (M.D. Pa.).
15 	See id., Doc. 31.
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convicted and sentenced for that specific offense. Indeed, Tindol’s judgment of
sentence plainly states that he pled guilty to Count 1 of the information and was
“adjudicated guilty” of “Distribution of Fentanyl Resulting in Death,” 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). 16
Because Tindol is in fact serving a sentence (albeit, a reduced one) for an
offense that Congress has deemed categorically ineligible for receipt of FSA
credits under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D), he is statutorily barred from receiving
FSA time credits. Consequently, his Section 2241 petition must be denied.
III. 	C ONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Tindol’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
16 	Id., Doc. 30 at 1.
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