Myers v. Warden of FPC-Schuylkill

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RONNIE LEE MYERS,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN FCI-SCHUYLKILL,
Respondent.
No. 4:25-CV-02258
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
FEBRUARY 19, 2026
Ronnie Lee Myers, an inmate confined at the Federal Correctional
Institution, Schuylkill (FCI Schuylkill) in Minersville, Pennsylvania, filed the
instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He
attempts to challenge his 2021 convictions or sentence and asks the Court to order
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to find him eligible to earn time credits under
the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA). 1 The Court will dismiss in part and deny in part
Myers’ Section 2241 petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Myers is currently serving a 100-month aggregate sentence imposed by the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland after pleading guilty to
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance,
1 	Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
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18 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) and 846, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).2 His current projected release
date is January 12, 2028.3
Myers’ Section 2241 petition appears to raise two claims: (1) a challenge to
his underlying convictions or sentence; and (2) an argument that his Section 924(c)
offense “is not a crime of violence,” so he should be eligible to earn and receive
FSA credits. 4 The Court is without jurisdiction to consider his first claim, and his
second claim is facially meritless. The Court will therefore dismiss in part and
deny in part Myers’ Section 2241 petition without requiring a response from the
government.5
II. 	D ISCUSSION
As noted above, Myers appears to assert two claims in his habeas petition.
The Court does not have jurisdiction to consider his Section 2241 challenge to his
underlying convictions or sentence. Additionally, his claim regarding FSA
eligibility is without merit. The Court will discuss each claim in turn.
2 	See Doc. 1 at 1; United States v. Myers, No. 8:19-cr-00029-PX, Doc. 256 (D. Md. June 21,
2021).
3 	See FED. BUREAU OF P RISONS I NMATE LOCATOR, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (searching
BOP Register Number “24009-016”) (last visited Feb. 12, 2026).
4 	See Doc. 1 at 9. Most of Myers’ petition consists of prior judicial opinions. See id. at 1-8.
5 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4 (“If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition
and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 1(b) (permitting
district court, in its discretion, to apply Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to Section 2241
habeas petitions).
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A. 	No Jurisdiction for Challenge to Conviction or Sentence
Generally, the presumptive method for bringing a collateral challenge to the
validity of a federal conviction or sentence is a motion to vacate pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255.6 Only in the exceedingly rare circumstance where a Section 2255
motion is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the inmate’s] detention”
can a federal prisoner proceed under Section 2241 instead of Section 2255.7
For many years, the law in the Third Circuit (and the majority of other
circuits) was that this “saving clause” in Section 2255(e) applied when an
intervening change in controlling, substantive law renders the petitioner’s prior
conduct noncriminal.8 In other words, for more than two decades, the Third
Circuit held that Section 2255(e) permitted a federal prisoner to resort to a Section
2241 petition when he “had no earlier opportunity to challenge” a conviction for a
crime “that an intervening change in substantive law may negate.” 9
In June 2023, however, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
Jones v. Hendrix, abrogating—among other circuit court decisions—In re
Dorsainvil and effecting a profound change in habeas practice with respect to
6 	See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
7 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (sometimes referred to as the “safety valve” or “saving clause”); In re
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated by Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465
(2023).
8 	See Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2017) (collecting cases),
abrogation recognized by Voneida v. Johnson, 88 F.4th 233 (3d Cir. 2023).
9 	Id. at 180 (quoting Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251).
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Section 2241 petitions.10 The Jones Court explicitly held that “§ 2255(e)’s saving
clause does not permit a prisoner asserting an intervening change in statutory
interpretation to circumvent AEDPA’s restrictions on second or successive § 2255
motions by filing a § 2241 petition.”11
Rather, Section 2255(e)’s saving clause is reserved for exceedingly rare
situations where it is “impossible or impracticable to seek relief in the sentencing
court,” such as when the sentencing court dissolves or when the prisoner is unable
to be present at a necessary hearing. 12 The saving clause also “preserves recourse
to § 2241 . . . for challenges to detention other than collateral attacks on a
sentence.” 13 In all other circumstances, a convicted prisoner’s only avenue for
filing a second or successive Section 2255 motion attacking his sentence is
expressly codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h): “newly discovered evidence,” 14 or “a
new rule of constitutional law.” 15 16
To the extent Myers is attempting to challenge his underlying convictions or
sentence in the instant Section 2241 petition, he cannot do so. Myers has already
filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in
10 	See Jones, 599 U.S. at 477.
11 	Id. at 471.
12 	See id. at 474-75, 478.
13 	Id. at 478; see also id. at 475-76.
14 	28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1).
15 	Id. § 2255(h)(2).
16 	Jones, 599 U.S. at 477-80.
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the sentencing court.17 The sentencing court subsequently directed Myers to
supplement his Section 2255 motion using specific, prepared forms such that he
could properly state the facts underlying his Section 2255 claims and explain why
he believes he is entitled to post-conviction relief.18 It does not appear that Myers
has responded to this September 29, 2025 order yet,19 and thus his Section 2255
motion remains pending at this time. As such, there is no jurisdiction in this Court
for Myers to challenge his convictions or sentence in a Section 2241 petition
through Section 2255(e)’s saving clause, as he does not meet the extremely narrow
circumstances where the saving clause could apply.
B. 	Merits of FSA Claim
Myers’ second claim appears to be that he should be eligible to earn FSA
credits because his Section 924(c) conviction is not “a crime of violence.” 20 This
argument is facially meritless.
Section 3632(d)(4)(D) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides an
extensive list of offenses that render a prisoner “ineligible to receive [FSA] time
credits” if the prisoner “is serving a sentence for a conviction” for any of the
17 	See Myers, No. 8:19-cr-00029-PX, Doc. 348 (D. Md. Sept. 8, 2025).
18 	See id., Doc. 349 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2025).
19 	On the District of Maryland’s docket, it appears that this September 29, 2025 order was
returned to the court for reasons unknown. See id., Doc. 350 (D. Md. Oct. 14, 2025). Yet the
mailing address for Myers used by the District of Maryland appears to be accurate. 	See id.
The docket annotation does not state whether the supplemental Section 2255 packet was
remailed to Myers after being returned to the district court.
20 	Doc. 1 at 9.
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enumerated offenses. 21 One such disqualifying offense is “Section 924(c), relating
to unlawful possession or use of a firearm during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime.” 22 Thus, under the plain language of the FSA,
Myers’ Section 924(c) conviction and sentence render him ineligible to receive
FSA time credits. This conclusion is bolstered by the relevant regulations, which
plainly state that “[i]f the inmate is serving a term of imprisonment for an offense
specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D), the inmate is not eligible to earn FSA Time
Credits.” 23
It may be possible—under exceedingly liberal construction—that Myers is
contending that because his Section 924(c) sentence is ordered to run consecutive
to his sentence for the other non-disqualifying controlled substance offenses, he is
not yet “serving” that 924(c) sentence and therefore is eligible to earn FSA time
credits. In other words, Myers may be arguing that his sentences for different
offenses should be treated in a bifurcated manner for FSA eligibility purposes.
If Myers is indeed attempting to invoke this argument, it has been
consistently rejected by courts within and beyond this district.24 It also runs
21 	See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D).
22 	Id. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii).
23 	28 C.F.R. § 523.41(d)(2).
24 	See, e.g., Teed v. Warden, Low Sec. Corr. Inst., Allenwood, No. 1:22-CV-1568, 2022 WL
17252584, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2022) (Conner, J.); Dunston v. Spaulding, No. 4:20-CV-
01961, 2021 WL 2588791, at *2, 4 (M.D. Pa. June 24, 2021) (Brann, J.) (finding petitioner
ineligible for FSA time credits when one of his three convictions was under Section 924(c));
Keeling v. LeMaster, No. 0:22-cv-00096, 2022 WL 17407966, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 2, 2022);
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counter to the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), which mandates that
“[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently
shall be treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of
imprisonment.” Thus, because Myers is in fact serving his Section 924(c) sentence
as part of his “single, aggregate term of imprisonment,” he is statutorily ineligible
to receive FSA time credits and this second portion of his Section 2241 petition
must be denied.
III. 	C ONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss in part and deny in part
Myers’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. An
appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
Sok v. Eischen, No. 22-cv-458, 2022 WL 17156797, at *6 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2022), adopting
report & recommendation, 2022 WL 17128929 (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 2022).
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