Robinson v. Montgomery County et al

4:25-cv-02217Pamd23 dic 2025

Testo completo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL J. ROBINSON, 	: Civil No. 4:25-CV-2217
:
Plaintiff, 	:
: (Judge Neary)
v. 	:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This case comes before us for a screening review of the plaintiff’s
pro se civil complaint. 1 	The plaintiff, Michael Robinson, brings this
action against Montgomery County, Columbia County, and Shamokin
City. 	From what we can discern from the complaint, Robinson appears
to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and state tort law against these
defendants. 	However, Robinson’s complaint is largely unintelligible, in
1 Doc. 1.
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2
that it fails to describe how any of the defendants allegedly violated his
constitutional rights or committed racketeering activity. 2
Along with this complaint, Robinson filed a motion for leave to
proceed
in forma pauperis. 3 We will grant the motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis for screening purposes only but after consideration, we
will recommend that the complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of
Pro Se Complaints – Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review
	pro se
complaints 	brought 	by 	plaintiffs 	given 	leave 	to 	proceed
	in 	forma
pauperis. 4 	We review such complaints to determine whether there are
frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. 5 This statutory preliminary screening
mirrors 	review 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil
2 Robinson attached multiple documents to his complaint that appear to
relate to his appeal before the Third Circuit.
See Doc. 1, Ex. 1. 	We are
compelled to note that the documents do not illuminate his claim.
3 Doc. 2.
4
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
5
Id.
Case 4:25-cv-02217-KMN Document 5 Filed 12/23/25 Page 2 of 9
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Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 6
With 	respect 	to 	this 	legal 	benchmark, 	under 	federal 	pleading
standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement
of 	the 	claim 	showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.” 7 	In
determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this
pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true, 8 and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the
non-movant.” 9 	However, 	a 	court 	is 	not 	required 	to 	accept 	legal
conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” 10
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter
Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
8
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
9
Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d
Cir. 1994).
10
Id.;
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice”).
Case 4:25-cv-02217-KMN Document 5 Filed 12/23/25 Page 3 of 9
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part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim
should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
. Second, a District
Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a
“plausible claim for relief.”
	Id. at 1950. In other words, a
complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement
to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with
its facts.
See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme
Court instructed in
Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, 	the 	complaint 	has 	alleged—but 	it 	has 	not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ”
Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. 11
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on
the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public
record. 12 	A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]
that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.”13 	Additionally,
if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically
attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the
11
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009).
12
Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
13
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192,
1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
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5
court may consider such document in its determination. 14 	However, the
court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion
to dismiss. 15
Finally, when reviewing a
pro se complaint, we are reminded that
such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial
justice.’” 16 	We must apply the relevant law even if the
pro se plaintiff
does not mention it by name. 17
B. This Complaint Should be Dismissed.
After review, we conclude that the complaint should be dismissed
for failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 	8 	dictates 	that 	a 	complaint 	must 	contain 	“a 	short 	and 	plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”18 It
is well established that “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
14
See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.
2002).
15
Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
16
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(f)).
17
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Higgins v.
Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’”19 	A 	complaint 	must 	contain 	“more 	than 	unadorned, 	the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 	accusation[s].” 20 	Rather, 	it 	must
include factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level[.]”21
Here, Robinson’s complaint fails to meet these federal pleading
standards. 	The 	allegations 	set 	forth 	by 	Robinson 	are 	confusing,
disjointed, and vague, thereby rendering his complaint incomprehensible
to the Court. 	In addition, Robinson’s complaint does not identify or
describe any wrongdoing by the defendants or when and where such
wrongdoing is alleged to have occurred. 22 	Rather, his complaint only
broadly asserts what appears to be an alleged violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process, claiming the defendants failed to
protect him by “letting 	a know[n] mentally-broken person stay free and
19
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citations omitted).
20
Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
21
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
22 This is especially concerning when one of the defendants listed in
Robinson’s complaint is Montgomery County, which is located in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
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7
harm helpers.” 23 	He further asserts “intentional infliction of emotional
[distress] [] by keeping Travis Gower insane and dangerous.” 24 	As to the
RICO claim, the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations pertaining
to an alleged pattern of racketeering activity. This is simply not enough
to comply with Rule 8’s basic requirement that the complaint contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” 25
While the Court is mindful of the well-established principle that the
plaintiff's
pro se pleading, “however inartfully pleaded,” shall be held to
“less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” 26
the Court is equally mindful that his
pro se status does not excuse his
23 	Doc. 1 at 2. The Court further notes that “failure to protect an
individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation
of the Due Process Clause.”
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).
24
	Id. 	Robinson appears to bring claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. However,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 only “provides a remedy for the violation of a federal
constitutional or statutory right.”
See Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist.,
422 	F.3d 	141, 	146 	(3d 	Cir. 	2005) 	(citation 	omitted). 	Accordingly,
Robinson’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed with prejudice.
25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
26
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
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8
failure 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure. 27
Accordingly, because the plaintiff's complaint does not provide fair notice
of his claims or the grounds upon which his claims rest, we conclude that
this complaint violates Rule 8.28
However, while we have concluded the Robinson’s complaint does
not state a claim at this time, recognizing that Robinson is a
pro se
litigant, we recommend that the court allow him an opportunity to amend
his complaint to endeavor to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. 29
III. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED
that the plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to
27
See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (providing that
procedural rules in civil litigation should not “be interpreted so as to
excuse 	mistakes 	by 	those 	who 	proceed 	without 	counsel” 	(footnote
omitted)).
28
See Glover v. F.D.I.C., 698 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that
“Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint be presented with clarity sufficient
to avoid requiring a district court or opposing party to forever sift through
its pages in search of the nature of the plaintiff's claim” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
29
See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247,
253 (3d Cir. 2007);
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
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9
the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report,
provided that the plaintiff acts within 20 days of any dismissal order.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule
72.3:
Any 	party 	may 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge's 	proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written 	objections 	which 	shall 	specifically 	identify 	the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions 	of 	the 	report 	or 	specified 	proposed 	findings 	or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may 	also 	receive 	further 	evidence, 	recall 	witnesses 	or
recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Submitted this 23rd day of December 2025.
s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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