Major v. Brittain et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AARON MAJOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
K. BRITTAIN, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 4:25-CV-02156
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
FEBRUARY 24, 2026
Plaintiff Aaron Major filed the instant pro se Section 19831 action, alleging
constitutional violations by officials at the State Correctional Institution, Frackville
(SCI Frackville) regarding his conditions of confinement. The Court will dismiss
Major’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim
for relief but will grant him leave to amend.
I. 	STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se
prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees. 2 One
basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim
1 	42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional
wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves
as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.
v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002).
2 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
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upon which relief may be granted[.]” 3 This language closely tracks Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to
screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as
they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).4
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire
“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to
offer evidence to support the claims.” 5 The court must accept as true the factual
allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.6 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of
the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,
matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to
a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these
documents.7
When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a
three-step inquiry.8 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]
3 	Id. § 1915A(b)(1).
4 	See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien
v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);
cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
5 	Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.
1996).
6 	Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
7 	Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
8 	Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).
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plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” 9 Second, the court should distinguish well-
pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal
conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be
disregarded.10 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations
“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 11
Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 12
Because Major proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed
and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” 13 This is particularly true
when the pro se litigant, like Major, is incarcerated. 14
II. 	DISCUSSION
Major’s complaint is straightforward and concise. He asserts that since his
arrival at SCI Frackville in 2012, his constitutional rights have been violated by
being housed in a double cell. 15 He concedes that his Unit Management Teams
have informed him that he does “not fit the set criteria for a single cell,” 16 yet he
9 	Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).
10 	Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
11 	Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
12 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
13 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
14 	Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
15 	See Doc. 1 at 4-5.
16 	See id. at 4.
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alleges that the cells at SCI Frackville are “not in compliance with the standards to
house two inmates.” 17 He maintains that his cramped living conditions have
caused depression, anxiety, and insomnia, and that they lead to verbal and physical
confrontations with his cell mates. 18 He thus concludes that his conditions of
confinement violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. 19
Major names five defendants: Superintendent K. Brittain, Grievance
Coordinator B. Lazusky, S. Kane, T. Sokaloski (an SCI Mahanoy employee), and
S. Kephart (who is retired). 20 He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as
well as injunctive relief in the form of “single cell status” and transfer to a different
prison.21 Upon review of Major’s complaint, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),
he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will address
his pleading deficiencies in turn.
A. 	Personal Involvement
It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be
“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”22 Rather, a Section
17 	See id.
18 	See id.
19 	See id. at 5.
20 	See id. at 2-3.
21 	See id. at 5.
22 	Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens context).
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1983 plaintiff must aver facts that demonstrate “the defendants’ personal
involvement in the alleged misconduct.”23 Personal involvement can include direct
wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through
allegations of “personal direction” or of “actual knowledge and acquiescence”;
however, such averments must be made with particularity.24 Furthermore, it is
equally settled that involvement in the post-incident grievance process alone does
not give rise to Section 1983 liability. 25
Major’s first and primary pleading deficiency is his failure to allege personal
involvement for any Defendant. Although he names five Defendants in the
defendant-identification section of the form complaint, he does not include any
specific allegations of wrongdoing that would establish personal involvement by
these Defendants in the purported constitutional violations. In other words, Major
never pleads what each Defendant did or did not do. Major, however, must specify
each Defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional misconduct in
order to state a Section 1983 claim against them. Accordingly, the Court must
23 	Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).
24 	Id. (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).
25 	See id. at 374 (affirming dismissal of claims against prison officials for lack of personal
involvement when officials’ “only involvement” was “their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s
grievance”); Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp. 3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (collecting cases);
Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential); Alexander v.
Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner’s
claims against certain defendants were “properly dismissed” because the allegations against
them “merely assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance process”).
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dismiss the complaint against all Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)
for lack of personal involvement.
B. 	Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
“[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.” 26 To state a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, a
prisoner must allege “that he was treated differently than other similarly situated
inmates, and that this different treatment was the result of intentional
discrimination based on his membership in a protected class[.]” 27 An equal
protection claim can also be asserted under a “class of one” theory, whereby a
plaintiff alleges that a state actor intentionally treated him differently than others
who are similarly situated “and there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment.” 28
Major fails to plausibly state an equal protection violation. He does not
allege membership in a protected class or intentional discrimination based on this
membership, and thus he appears to be attempting to raise a “class of one” equal
protection claim. Nevertheless, he has failed to identify others who are similarly
situated to him and who received intentionally different treatment by a Defendant
26 	U.S. CONST . amend. XIV, § 1.
27 	Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305 (3d Cir. 2016).
28 	Phillips, 515 F.3d at 243 (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)).
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(or Defendants) without a rational basis, and thus he has failed to plausibly plead a
class-of-one equal protection claim against any Defendant.29 So Major’s
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim must be dismissed pursuant to
Section 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim.
C. 	Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement
“[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . .
which house persons convicted of serious crimes[] cannot be free of discomfort.” 30
Nevertheless, the state cannot subject an inmate to cruel and unusual punishment
or “inhumane treatment,” such as deprivation of “identifiable human need[s]” like
“food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety[.]”31
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, a
prisoner-plaintiff must plausibly allege both objective and subjective elements. 32
Objectively, the inmate must demonstrate that “the prison official deprived the
prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” often referred to as
a “sufficiently serious” deprivation.33 Subjectively, the prisoner must show that
“the prison official acted with deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s “health or
29 	See Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F. App’x 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential) (finding that
prisoner failed to state an equal protection claim because he did not “allege facts showing that
he was similarly situated to the inmates who received [better medical treatment], or that there
was no rational basis for his different treatment.”).
30 	Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)).
31 	See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (citation omitted).
32 	See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 226 (3d Cir. 2015)
33 	Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).
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safety.” 34 Deliberate indifference means that the defendant “acted or failed to act
despite having knowledge that her actions or inaction, as the case may be, would
subject the inmate to a substantial risk of serious harm.” 35 Deliberate indifference
is a high bar and requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant “recklessly
disregard[ed] a substantial risk of serious harm.” 36
Major’s Eighth Amendment claim fails at both elements. First, he has not
identified a sufficiently serious deprivation. It is well-settled that double (and even
triple) celling—in itself—is not per se unconstitutional. 37 Beyond being double
celled, the only other housing condition Major mentions in his complaint is that the
cells at SCI Frackville “are not in compliance with the standards to house two
inmates.” 38 In this regard, he appears to be referencing documents he attached to
his complaint, wherein a member of the SCI Frackville maintenance department
(S. Kane) wrote a memo stating that “unencumbered space in general population
34 	Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
35 	Id. at 227 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).
36 	Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 227 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
37 	See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-49 (1981); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d
Cir. 1996); see also Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 232-36 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that
triple celling pretrial detainees for three to seven months did not violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991) (“It is
clear that double or triple celling of inmates is not per se unconstitutional.”); Camps v. Giorla,
843 F. App’x 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 2021) (nonprecedential) (triple celling pretrial detainees did
not violate Fourteenth Amendment); Parkell v. Morgan, 682 F. App’x 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2017)
(nonprecedential) 	(same); 	North 	v. 	White, 	152 	F. 	App’x 	111, 	113 	(3d 	Cir. 	2005)
(nonprecedential) (noting that triple celling is not per se unconstitutional and holding that triple
bunking inmate, in the absence of other unconstitutional conditions, did not amount to an
Eighth Amendment violation); McCree v. Sherrod, 408 F. App’x 990, 992-93 (7th Cir. 2011)
(holding that triple celling does not “constitute cruel and unusual punishment per se”).
38 	See Doc. 1 at 4.
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cells [at SCI Frackville] is three square feet short of compliance” and requested a
waiver during “Accreditation.”39 These conditions alone do not implicate “wanton
and unnecessary infliction of pain,” 40 and thus do not rise to the level of
sufficiently serious deprivation.
Major likewise fails to plead deliberate indifference by any Defendant. He
does not allege that any named Defendant was aware of the purportedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, nor that any Defendant was
deliberately indifferent to the conditions or a substantial risk of serious harm to
inmates. As noted above, Major does not provide any allegations of Defendants’
personal involvement. Thus, Major’s failure to plausibly allege either element of
an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim is an additional reason that
his complaint must be dismissed under Section 1915A(b)(1).
D. 	Leave to Amend
Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” 41 Major will be granted leave to
amend in the event that he can plead additional facts that would plausibly state a
claim for relief.
39 	See Doc. 1-2 at 8.
40 	Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
41 	Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114.
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If Major chooses to file an amended complaint in conformity with this
Memorandum, it should be a stand-alone document, complete in itself and without
reference to any previous pleadings. The amended complaint should set forth his
constitutional claims in short, concise, and plain statements, and in sequentially
numbered paragraphs. Major must leave one-inch margins on all four sides of his
pleading.42 He must also name proper defendants and specify the offending actions
or omissions by a particular defendant. This step is particularly critical for Major,
as his initial complaint is devoid of allegations that demonstrate Defendants’
personal involvement in the purportedly unconstitutional conduct. Major must also
indicate what constitutional provision is allegedly violated by Defendants’ conduct
such that the Court can ascertain what type of Section 1983 claim or claims he is
asserting against a particular Defendant. He must sign the amended complaint and
indicate the nature of the relief sought.
If Major does not timely file an amended complaint, dismissal of his Section
1983 claims without prejudice will automatically convert to dismissal with
prejudice and the Court will close this case.
42 	See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 5.1.
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III. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Major’s complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because he fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. Major may file an amended complaint in accordance with this
Memorandum. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
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