Bennett v. Heap

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMAL BENNETT, 	: 	Civ. No. 4:25-CV-1349
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	:
: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
THOMAS HEAP, 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	Factual Background and Procedural History
Jamal Bennett is a state inmate and a prolific, if prodigiously unsuccessful, pro
se 	litigant.1 Bennett’s current federal complaint appears to stem from a prior,
unsuccessful effort at pro se litigation, a state criminal case in which Bennett
represented himself and was convicted at trial. The factual background of these state
charges has been aptly summarized by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in its decision
affirming Bennett’s conviction. At that time the Court explained that:
1 Commonwealth v. Bennett, No. 1435 MDA 2022, 2025 WL 2542683, at *1 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2025); Bennett v. Shoemaker, No. 1:22-CV-0354, 2024 WL
3969682, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2024); Bennett v. Shoemaker, No. 1:22-CV-0354,
2023 WL 5434769 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2023); Bennett v. Cnty. of Lycoming, No.
1:22-CV-0838, 2022 WL 4079622 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2022).
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On March 18, 2021, a confidential informant (CI) arranged a transaction
to purchase cocaine by calling a cellular telephone number. [Bennett] ...
arrived at the meeting location. Detective Jonathan Rachael, in an
undercover capacity, purchased 8 vials of crack cocaine from [Bennett]
for $200.00 	in 	pre-recorded 	and 	identified 	$20.00 	bills. 	[Bennett]
retrieved the vials from a plastic grocery bag that contained additional
controlled substances. By Information filed on September 17, 2021 in
CR-1141-2021, the Commonwealth charged [Bennett] with Delivery of
a Controlled Substance (cocaine) and Criminal Use of a Communication
Facility.
After [Bennett] left the residence where the transaction occurred, he
drove away in a black Honda Accord and stopped at a convenience store.
Other officers, having observed [Bennett] enter and leave the residence
where the drug purchase occurred, followed [Bennett] to the convenience
store. [Bennett] entered the store, purchased some items and returned to
his vehicle. The officers removed [Bennett] from the black Honda
Accord and arrested him on a warrant in another case. [Bennett] was
searched incident to arrest. The officers discovered $180.00 of the $200
in pre-recorded buy money. The plastic grocery bag was on the passenger
seat of the vehicle. Officers impounded the vehicle, obtained a search
warrant, and searched the vehicle. Inside the plastic grocery bag[,] the
officers discovered a Glock 43 firearm, 32 vials of crack cocaine, 97 blue
waxen 	bags 	of 	fentanyl, 	and 	approximately 	3.25 	grams 	of
methamphetamine. By Information filed on April 23, 2021 in CR-478-
2021, 	the 	Commonwealth 	charged 	[Bennett] 	with 	three 	counts 	of
Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance (PWID) and
one count of Persons Not to Possess a Firearm, as [Bennett] had a prior
conviction from December 15, 1996[,] which made him ineligible to
possess firearms.
Commonwealth v. Bennett, No. 1435 MDA 2022, 2025 WL 2542683, at *1 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2025) (footnotes omitted).
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Bennett’s current federal lawsuit, which was filed prior to the Superior Court’s
decision affirming his state court convictions in Lycoming County, rests upon a
curious 	and 	ultimately 	unpersuasive 	premise. 	Bennett 	does 	not 	attribute 	this
conviction in any way to his conduct. Instead, in his complaint Bennett sues Thomas
Heap, the Clerk of Court/Prothonotary of Lycoming County alleging that, despite his
requests, Mr. Heap’s office failed to include some items that Bennett wished to
incorporate into the record on appeal. Alleging that Mr. Heap’s conduct was part of
some larger, amorphous conspiracy, Bennett asserted that the failure to include these
items 	in 	the record 	on 	appeal 	resulted 	in 	his 	unjust 	conviction, violated 	the
Pennsylvania Constitution and state criminal laws, and constituted violations of the
First, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
(Doc. 1-3). Bennett’s complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages, the
revocation of Mr. Heap’s notary license, and other injunctive relief. (Id.)
Bennett initially lodged this case in state court on May 29, 2025. In July of
2025, the defendant removed Bennett’s complaint to federal court, (Doc. 1), and
moved to dismiss this complaint. (Doc. 4). In his motion to dismiss, Mr. Heap asserts
that Bennett’s complaint is flawed in multiple ways which cannot be remedied through
any more artful form of pleading. This motion is now ripe for resolution. For the
reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss will be granted.
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II. 	Discussion
A. Motions to Dismiss—Standard of Review.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this
benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing
pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.
2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards
have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened
form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility
of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d
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1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s bald
assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not
“assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.”
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide
some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555.
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored
that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be
granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should
“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are
not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. According to the Supreme Court,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of
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the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they
must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain
more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations
sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the
factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District
Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but
may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words,
a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.
A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for
overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The
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plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when
the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). This standard
requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent
with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1861, 182 L.Ed.2d 644 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-
step analysis:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to
state a claim.’ Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify
allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.’ Id. at 1950. Finally, ‘where there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for
relief.’ Id.
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint,
attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,
268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]
that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims
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are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol.
Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents
are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are
not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v.
Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court
may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the
motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely
on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining
whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d
1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
It is against these legal guideposts that we assess the legal sufficiency of this
complaint.
B. The Motion to Dismiss Will Be Granted
As discussed below, Bennett’s current legal foray—like those which have
preceded it—runs afoul of a host of insurmountable legal obstacles. Therefore, this
complaint will be dismissed.
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1. Bennett’s Federal Constitutional Claims Fail
At the outset, Bennett’s federal Constitutional claims against the county
clerk/prothonotary all fail as a matter of law. In his complaint, Bennett alleges in a
summary fashion that the alleged failure of the prothonotary to forward certain
documents to the Superior Court violated the First, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. However, none of these averments can withstand critical scrutiny.
For example, liberally construed it appears that Bennett has attempted to allege
a First Amendment claim against the prothonotary premised upon an alleged denial of
access to the courts. Bennett faces an exacting burden in advancing such a claim. It
is well-settled that:
Asserting an actionable claim for denial of access to the courts requires
a 	prisoner 	to 	allege 	that 	(1) 	they 	“lost 	a 	chance 	to 	pursue 	a
‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim” and (2) they have no
available remedy for the lost claim other than the present denial of
access action. Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 915 (3rd Cir. 2022)
(citing Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3rd Cir. 2008)). Most
significant is the nonfrivolous nature of the claim allegedly lost. The
lost 	claim 	must 	be 	“more 	than 	hope” 	in 	order 	to 	be 	deemed
nonfrivolous. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002).
Payne v. Stanbaugh, No. 1:22-CV-2063, 2023 WL 11015035, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July
18, 2023), report and recommendation adopted in part, No. 1:22CV2063, 2024 WL
1536735 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2024).
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Judged against these legal guideposts, Bennett’s First Amendment allegations
fail to satisfy either of the elements of a First Amendment access to courts claim. First,
Bennett has not shown that the legal claims advanced in his Superior Court appeal
were more than a mere hope. Quite the contrary, the Superior Court expressly rejected
Bennett’s claims on appeal, observing that: “The evidence is clearly sufficient to
support his convictions. No relief is due” to Bennett. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 2025
WL 2542683, at *16. In addition, Bennett cannot credibly contend that he had no
available remedy for the lost claim other than the present denial of access action since
it is evident that state appellate practice provides the means for Bennett to supplement
his record on appeal, see Pa. R.A.P. 1926, and it was Bennett’s responsibility to ensure
that the record was complete since: “Ultimate responsibility for a complete record
rests with the party raising an issue that requires appellate court access to record
materials.” Pa.R.A.P. 1921 (Note). Further, it is apparent from the Superior Court’s
decision that Bennett actually availed himself of this relief on appeal. Commonwealth
v. Bennett, 2025 WL 2542683, at *2. Therefore, this claim fails.
Bennett’s Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims are also unavailing because
the prothonotary is not a proper defendant with respect to these allegations. To be sure
the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	forbids 	unreasonable 	searches 	and 	seizures, 	but 	it 	is
undisputed that Mr. Heap, the Clerk of Court, did not engage in any investigative
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search or seizure in Bennett’s state case. Holding the prothonotary liable for police
searches would stretch this Constitutional guarantee beyond recognition. Likewise,
the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, applies to the
conduct of jailers. Mr. Heap, the Clerk of Court/Prothonotary, plays absolutely no role
in determining the place, manner or conditions of Bennett’s confinement. This claim
plainly fails.
Finally, Bennett’s vague and general reference to the Fourteenth Amendment
cannot save this case, particularly when the plaintiff’s more specific Constitutional
claims fail as a matter of law. On this score, Bennett’s Fourteenth Amendment
averments run afoul of the more specific provision rule. As the Court of Appeals has
explained:
Noting its “reluctan[ce] to expand the concept of substantive due
process,” 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	established 	the 	“more-specific-
provision rule.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843–44,
118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). Under this rule, “if a
constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision,
such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed
under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the
rubric of substantive due process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,
272 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (clarifying prior holing
in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443
(1989)).
Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2010).
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Here, Bennett’s more specific First, Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims fail
as a matter of law. The failure of these more specific legal claims, in turn, defeats any
reliance by Bennett on the general rubric of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process.
Simply put, none of these federal Constitutional claims can withstand scrutiny.
Therefore, these claims will be dismissed.
2. Heap is Entitled to Quasi-Judicial Immunity.
Bennett’s 	claims 	for 	damages 	against 	the 	Clerk 	of 	Court/Prothonotary
encounter yet another legal obstacle. Defendant Heap is cloaked in immunity for his
quasi-judicial functions. As we have noted in this regard:
[N]umerous 	courts 	have 	held 	that 	certain 	tasks 	performed 	by
prothonotaries and court clerks are shielded by quasi-judicial immunity.
See Marcedes v. Barrett, 453 F.2d 391 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that a
prothonotary who allegedly refused to send the plaintiff a requested
transcript was acting as a “quasi-judicial official”); Lockhart, 411 F.2d at
460 (holding that a prothonotary who was acting under court direction
was immune from suit); Locke, 2008 WL 2096815, at *3 (holding that a
prothonotary who determined that a motion for reconsideration was not
timely filed was performing a discretionary function and was immune
from suit); see also Denlinger, 2007 WL 4615960, at *3 (using “court
clerks and prothonotaries” as examples of individuals who may be
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); O'Nembo, 2006 WL 3857487, at *2
(same); Hurst, No. 06-146, 2006 WL 1328729, at *6 (D.Del. May 16,
2006) 	(same); 	McKnight 	v. 	Baker, 	415 	F.Supp.2d 	559, 	563
(E.D.Pa.2006) (same).
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Conklin v. Warrington Twp., No. CIV.A. 1:06-CV-2245, 2008 WL 2704629, at *9
(M.D. Pa. July 7, 2008). This quasi-judicial immunity is grounded upon and derived
from the immunity enjoyed by judges, and acknowledges that:
In 	certain 	circumstances, 	the 	doctrine 	of 	quasi-judicial 	immunity
insulates from suit those public officials who “perform functions closely
associated with the judicial process.” Locke v. Caldwell, No. 07-2272,
2008 WL 2096812, at *3 (E.D.Pa. May 16, 2008) (quoting Cleavinger v.
Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985)). The
dispositive inquiry in determining whether to afford an individual quasi-
judicial immunity is “the nature of the function performed, not the
identity of the actor who performed it.” Tucker v. I'Jama, 173 F. App'x
970, 971 (3d Cir.2006). In other words, quasi-judicial immunity attaches
when a “public official's role is ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a
judge,” Dotzel v. Ashbridge, 438 F.3d 320, 325 (3d Cir.2006) (quoting
Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 785 (3d Cir.2003)), or when a public
official acts “pursuant to court directive,” see Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411
F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir.1969) (basing the aforementioned rule upon the
“manifest unfairness of subjecting one to suit as a consequence of action
taken at the direction of officials over whom the individual actor has no
power or control”); see also Alexander v. McMonagle, No. 99-1298,
1999 WL 1210844, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Dec.9, 1999) (“Quasi-judicial officers
who act in accordance with their duties or at the direction of a judicial
officer are immune from suit.”)
Id. at *8.
In this case, Bennett attempts to sue Heap for performing one of his core
ministerial 	functions, 	transmitting 	a 	record 	on 	appeal. 	Since 	this 	act 	is 	a
nondiscretionary duty which is an integral part of the judicial process, Heap’s
performance 	of 	this 	function 	is 	cloaked 	in 	quasi-judicial 	immunity 	and 	the
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prothonotary 	may 	not 	be 	sued 	for 	the 	manner 	in 	which 	he 	discharged 	this
responsibility.
3. Bennett’s References to Criminal Statutes Do Not Provide Grounds
for Action by This Court.
Bennett’s complaint is also replete with references to state and federal criminal
statutes. While these references serve as illustrations of the vehemence of Bennett’s
views, they add nothing to the legal sufficiency of his claims. At the outset, to the
extent that the plaintiff invites us to order the criminal investigation or prosecution of
any state official, it has long been recognized that the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion is a matter “particularly ill-suited to judicial review.” Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). Recognizing this fact, courts have long held that a
civil rights plaintiff may not seek relief in civil litigation in the form of an order
directing the criminal investigation or prosecution of some third party, finding that
civil plaintiffs lack standing to make such claims and concluding that such relief
simply is unavailable in a civil lawsuit. See, e.g., Ostrowski v. Mehltretter, 20 F.
App’x 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2001); Kim v. Romero, 877 F.2d 64, 1989 WL 67116 at *1 (9 th
Cir. June 14, 1989) (affirming the dismissal of a suit against various prosecuting
authorities for their failure to bring charges against a sheriff for alleged battery);
McMinn v. Damiani, 765 F. 2d 145, 1985 WL 13323 (6th Cir. May 3, 1985).
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Nor can Bennett imply some right to bring a civil cause of action based upon
some criminal statute. Quite the contrary, in this regard:
The Court is guided by the general principle that courts are “reluctant to
infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition alone,”
especially where the criminal statute is “bare” as to private enforcement.
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
190 (1994); see also Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86 (1981)
(holding that private citizens cannot compel criminal prosecution). To
this end, the Third Circuit has repeatedly held that criminal statutes
generally do not create private rights of action. See Tezler v. Borough of
Englewood Cliffs, 783 F. App'x 253, 257–58 (3d Cir. 2019); Timm v.
Wells Fargo Bank, 701 F. App'x 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2017); Coleman v.
Academy Bus, LLC, 858 F. App'x 584, 585 (3d Cir. 2021); see also
Caterbone v. Lancaster City Bureau of Police, Civil Action No. 18-CV-
2710, 2018 WL 3549266 at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2018) (“Criminal
statutes do not generally provide a basis for a litigant's civil claims, and
this Court lacks the authority to initiate criminal proceedings.”).
Lewis v. Chance, No. 1:25-CV-446, 2025 WL 1808777, at *8 (M.D. Pa. July 1, 2025)
(quoting Miller v. Nelling, No. CV 22-3329-KSM, 2023 WL 2743564, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 31, 2023)). 	In this case none of the state criminal statutes cited by Bennett
provide him with a private right of action against the prothonotary. See e.g., Williams
v. Wetzel, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20105, at *47 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (no private cause of
action for “tampering with public records” under Pennsylvania Crimes Code); Barnes
v. City of Coatesville, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9112, 1993 WL 259329, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
1993) aff’d, 60 F.3d 813 (3d Cir. 1995) (no civil remedy for false swearing); Simpson
v. City of Coatesville, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154964, 2015 WL 7251546, at *5-6
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(E.D. Pa. 2015) (declining to find a private cause of action to impost civil liability for
§ 4902 (perjury)); Elansari v. Ramirez, 816 F. App’x 630, 632 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Pa.
Cons. Stat. §§ 7611 [unlawful use of computer] and 7612 [computer trespass] do not
provide an express private right of action, and there is no basis to imply a private right
of action here.”); Johnson v. Koehler, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42145, at *33-34 (M.D.
Pa. 2015) (violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 5301 (official oppression) does not provide a basis
for bringing a claim under Section 1983). Therefore, any claims advanced by Bennett
which 	are 	premised 	upon 	criminal 	statutes, 	or 	designed 	to 	instigate 	criminal
proceedings, fail.
4. The Pennsylvania Constitution Does Not Provide for a Private Right
of Action for Damages.
Likewise, Bennett may not rely upon the Pennsylvania Constitution to bring
damages claims in this case. Such claims are foreclosed by settled legal doctrine;
specifically: “The prevailing view in this circuit [which] is that ‘Pennsylvania does
not recognize a private right of action for damages in a suit alleging violation of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.’” Hamilton v. Spriggle, 965 F. Supp. 2d 550, 577 (M.D.
Pa. 2013) (quoting Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 207 n. 4 (3d Cir.2008)).
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5. Bennett’s Cvil Conspiracy Claim Fails.
Nor can the plaintiff save these otherwise infirm substantive tort claims by
cloaking them in the rubric of some form of conspiracy. In order to sustain this claim
Bennett may not rely upon general vague assertions of conspiratorial misconduct
unadorned by specific facts. Instead:
[T]o maintain a civil conspiracy claim, “[b]are conclusory allegations
of ‘conspiracy’ or ‘concerted action’ will not suffice to allege a
conspiracy. The plaintiff must expressly allege an agreement or make
averments of communication, consultation, cooperation, or command
from which such an agreement can be inferred.” Flanagan v. Shively,
783 F. Supp. 922, 928 (M.D. Pa. 1992). The plaintiff's allegations “must
be supported by facts bearing out the existence of the conspiracy and
indicating its broad objectives and the role each Defendant allegedly
played in carrying out those objectives.” Id. A plaintiff cannot rely on
subjective suspicions and unsupported speculation. Young v. Kann, 926
F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991).
Soto v. RE/MAX of Poconos, No. 3:22-CV-528, 2023 WL 2352241, at *6 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 3, 2023). Furthermore, in order to state such a claim:
The plaintiff must base his or her allegations of a civil conspiracy on an
underlying tort. Festa v. Jordan, 803 F. Supp. 2d 319, 326 (M.D. Pa.
2011) (Caputo, J.); see McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 371 (3d Cir.
2005) (citing Boyanowsky v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d
396, 405 (3d Cir. 2000)). “Ultimately, ‘only a finding that the underlying
tort has occurred will support a claim for civil conspiracy.’ ” Reese v.
Pook & Pook, LLC, 158 F. Supp. 3d 271, 292 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting
Alpart v. Gen. Land Partners, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 491, 506 (E.D. Pa.
2008) (quotation omitted)).
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Kretulskie v. Madison Nat'l Life Ins. Co., Inc., No. 3:18-CV-1357, 2019 WL 5866694,
at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:18-CV-
1357, 2021 WL 2478441 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 2021).
Judged by these guideposts, Bennett’s civil conspiracy claim founders on at
least two independent legal grounds. First, he has failed to properly allege an
underlying tort. Second, his complaint sets forth only conclusory allegations of
conspiracy which under Pennsylvania law will not suffice to allege an actionable civil
conspiracy. Therefore, this claim fails.
6. To The Extent That Bennett is Suing the State Court System for
Damages His Claims Fail.
Finally, if Bennett seeks damages in federal court from the state courts as an
institutional defendant, this claim encounters statutory and constitutional barriers. As
a matter of constitutional law, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides
that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the . . . States. . . .” U.S.
Const. amend XI. By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly limits the power of
federal courts to entertain cases brought by citizens against the state and state agencies.
Moreover, a suit brought against an individual acting in his or her official capacity
constitutes a suit against the state and therefore also is barred by the Eleventh
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Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Therefore,
Bennett may not maintain any official capacity damages claims against these state
officials.
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states, state agencies and state officials
who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune from lawsuits in federal
courts brought against them by citizens. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54
(1996). Under the Eleventh Amendment, the Commonwealth's immunity exists as a
matter of law unless waived by the state, or expressly and unequivocally abrogated by
Congress. Congress has not expressly abrogated this constitutional immunity with
respect to federal civil rights lawsuits against the Pennsylvania State Police and the
Commonwealth 	clearly 	has 	not 	waived 	its 	immunity. 	Quite 	the 	contrary, 	the
Commonwealth 	has 	specifically, 	by 	statute, 	invoked 	its 	Eleventh 	Amendment
immunity in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). Thus, while Pennsylvania has, by law,
waived sovereign immunity in limited categories of cases brought against the
Commonwealth in state court under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522, Section 8521(b), flatly
states that, “[n]othing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the
immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in federal courts guaranteed by the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” 42 Pa. Con. Stat. §
8521(b).
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The Eleventh’s Amendment’s bar prohibiting lawsuits in federal court against
agencies expressly applies to claims like those brought here against the state court
system. As we have observed in the past:
These state court agencies, . . ., are defined by statute as arms of the state
courts, and are institutions of state government. See, e.g., Walters v.
Washington County, No. 06–1355, 2009 WL 7936639 (W.D.Pa. March
23, 2009); Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestics Relations Section,
No. 09–266, 2009 WL 3052411 (W.D.Pa. Sept.22, 2009). Therefore,
individual counties cannot be held liable for the actions of state court
judges, who are part of the unified state court system.
Since the courts are institutions of state government, this complaint
further runs afoul of basic constitutional rules limiting lawsuits against
state agencies and officials. As a matter of constitutional law, the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the ... States ....“,
U.S. Const. Amend XI. By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly
limits the power of federal courts to entertain cases brought by citizens
against the state and state agencies. Moreover, a suit brought against an
individual acting in his or her official capacity constitutes a suit against
the state and, therefore, also is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will
v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105
L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states, state agencies and state
officials who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune
from lawsuits 	in 	federal 	courts 	brought 	against 	them 	by 	citizens.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d
252 (1996). The constitutional protections afforded to the states and the
state court system under the Eleventh Amendment also expressly apply
to the state agencies that are integral parts of Pennsylvania's unitary court
system. These court officers and agencies enjoy immunity from lawsuit
under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Walters v. Washington
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County, No. 06–1355, 2009 WL 7936639 (W.D.Pa. March 23, 2009);
Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestics Relations Section, No. 09–
266, 2009 WL 3052411 (W.D.Pa. Sept.22, 2009). Absent an express
waiver of the immunity established by the Eleventh Amendment, all of
these agencies, and their employees who are sued in their official
capacities, are absolutely immune from lawsuits in federal court.
Rose v. York Cty., No. 1:13-CV-2056, 2013 WL 4456220, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 1,
2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:13-CV-2056, 2013 WL 4434748
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2013). Therefore, this settled, constitutionally rooted immunity
defeats any institutional or individual official capacity claims for damages.
Finally, we recognize that in civil rights cases, pro se plaintiffs often should be
afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its
entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253
(3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in
undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, however,
Bennett’s complaint is flawed in multiple ways which are not subject to cure by any
more artful form of pleading. Therefore, this complaint will be dismissed with
prejudice.
III. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss,
(Doc. 4), will be GRANTED.
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An appropriate order follows.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: January 29, 2026.
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