Bennett v. Heap

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMAL BENNETT, 	: 	Civil No. 4:25-CV-1349
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	:
:
THOMAS HEAP, 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
Defendant. 	:
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
This is a pro se civil rights action brought by a state inmate against the Clerk
of Courts/Prothonotary for the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County.
There is a motion to dismiss pending in this case. (Doc. 4). Notwithstanding this
pending, and potentially dispositive, motion, the plaintiff has begun engaging in
discovery serving subpoenas on the defendant and the President Judge on the court,
both of whom have filed motions to quash these subpoenas. (Docs. 19 and 21).
We believe that the pending motion to dismiss is a significant development
in this litigation and one which cautions in favor of deferring discovery litigation at
this time. Simply put, before we consider directing further discovery in this case, it
would be prudent to await a determination of what issues, if any, survive.
Therefore, we will GRANT these motions to quash at this time without prejudice
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to renewal of discovery, if necessary, following resolution of the pending motion
to dismiss.
II. 	Discussion
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant motion
to compel. At the outset, rulings regarding the proper scope and timing of
discovery are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and judgment. Thus, it
has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are “committed to the
sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp., 506
F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the timing and scope of
discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the Court.
Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, a
court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery will be disturbed only upon a
showing of an abuse of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129,
134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States
Magistrate Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:
District 	courts 	provide 	magistrate 	judges 	with 	particularly 	broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs.
Nat'l Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572,
585 (D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] 	matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United
States, 943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a
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magistrate judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and
is reversible only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic
Commc'ns and Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also
Hasbrouck 	v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 	190 	F.R.D. 42, 44-45
(N.D.N.Y.1999) (holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under
abuse of discretion standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v.
Mr. Gold, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a
magistrate 	judge's 	resolution 	of 	discovery 	disputes 	deserves
substantial deference and should be reversed only if there is an abuse
of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
We also note that our broad discretion over discovery matters extends to
decisions under Rule 26 relating to the issuance of orders regulating the timing of
discovery. Indeed, it is undisputed that: “ ‘[t]he grant and nature of [a protective
order] is singularly within the discretion of the district court and may be reversed
only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Dove v. Atlantic Capital Corp.,
963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d
Cir. 1973) (citation omitted)).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. One of these
cardinal principles governing the exercise of discretion in this field is that the
district court may properly defer or delay discovery while it considers a potentially
dispositive pretrial motion, provided the district court concludes that the pretrial
motion does not, on its face, appear groundless. See, e.g., James v. York County
Police Dep’t, 160 F.App’x 126, 136 (3d Cir. 2005); Nolan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
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973 F.2d 843,849 (10th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. New York Univ. Sch. of Ed., 205
F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Briefly deferring discovery in such a case, while
the court determines the threshold issue of whether a complaint has sufficient merit
to go forward, recognizes a simple, fundamental truth: parties who file motions
that may present potentially meritorious and dispositive legal issues in civil actions
should not be put to the time, expense, and burden of additional factual discovery
for themselves and others until after these legal issues are addressed by the court.
In such instances, it is clearly established that:
“[A] 	stay 	of 	discovery 	is 	appropriate 	pending 	resolution 	of 	a
potentially dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have
substantial grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be
without foundation in law.’ ” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust
Litigation, 2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting
Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 209-
10 (S.D.N.Y.1991)) (citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 203
F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001); Anti-
Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
March 7, 1996)).
Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
Guided by these legal tenets, we conclude that further discovery should be
briefly deferred at this time until after the court resolves the pending motion to
dismiss. We reach this conclusion finding that deferring “discovery is appropriate
pending resolution of a potentially dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s]
to have substantial grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be
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without foundation in law.’” Johnson, 205 F.R.D. at 434. Following this course
will enable us to determine what legal issues, if any remain in this case. This
determination, in turn, will greatly inform any judgment regarding whether and to
what extent discovery is warranted here.
An appropriate order follows.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: January 14, 2026
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