Ingram v. Williamsport Bureau of Police

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GERRAL INGRAM, 	: Civil No. 4:25-CV-1022
:
Plaintiff, 	:
: (Judge Munley)
v. 	:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
OFFICER TYLER CORTER, 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Background
Before the court is the second amended complaint filed by the
pro
se plaintiff, Gerral Ingram.1 	Ingram initially filed a complaint against
the Williamsport Bureau of Police (“WBP”), alleging that Officer Tyler
Corter made false statements to obtain a warrant for his arrest.2 	We
read Ingram’s complaint as asserting a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, but recommended that the complaint be dismissed because it failed
to name Corter as a defendant, failed to allege sufficient facts to state
what we read as a Fourth Amendment claim against Corter, and failed
1 Doc. 12.
2 Doc. 1.
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to allege municipal liability by WBP.3 	The district court adopted our
recommendation and permitted Ingram to file an amended complaint.4
Ingram’s first amended complaint was slightly more detailed than
the original complaint, but after a screening review, we concluded that
the complaint similarly failed to allege sufficient facts against Corter or
the WBP to state a Section 1983 claim.5 The district court again adopted
our recommendation but permitted Ingram to file a second amended
complaint, which he filed on January 7, 2026.6 The district court’s order
specifically directed Ingram to file an amended complaint that is
[A] stand-alone document, complete in itself and without
reference to any previous pleadings. The amended complaint
should set forth Ingram’s claims in short, concise, and plain
statements, and in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a
single fact per paragraph as far as practicable. Ingram shall
attach 	all 	exhibits 	filed 	with 	his 	previous 	pleadings 	as
exhibits to the second amended complaint[.]7
3 Doc. 4.
4 Doc. 5.
5 Doc. 8.
6 Docs. 11, 12. Before the court ruled on the Report and Recommendation,
Ingram filed another amended complaint, which the court did not accept
as being filed.
7 Doc. 11 at 2.
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Ingram was also advised that he could file or refile an exhibit that he
attempted to attach to his first amended complaint, which he claimed
was body camera footage from the incident.8
Despite the district court’s clear order, Ingram’s second amended
complaint is a two-page document, with only the application for the
search warrant attached as an exhibit.9 	Ingram again alleges that
Officer Corter omitted information, allegedly contained on the body
camera 	footage, 	from 	his 	warrant 	application 	to 	secure 	the 	search
warrant, which he claims is a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights
and his right to privacy.10 He requests $150,000.00 as relief.
After 	consideration, 	we 	will 	recommend 	that 	the 	amended
complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of
Pro Se Complaints – Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review
	pro se
complaints 	brought 	by 	plaintiffs 	given 	leave 	to 	proceed
	in 	forma
8
Id. at 3.
9 Doc. 12.
10 Doc. 12 at 1.
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pauperis.11 	We review such complaints to determine whether there are
frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim
upon 	which 	relief 	may 	be 	granted.12 	This 	statutory 	preliminary
screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”13
With 	respect 	to 	this 	legal 	benchmark, 	under 	federal 	pleading
standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement
of 	the 	claim 	showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.”14 	In
determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this
pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-
11
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
12
Id.
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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movant.”15 	However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions
or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”16
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter
Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-
part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim
should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions.
	Id. Second, a District Court must then
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for
relief.”
Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more
than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint
has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.
See Phillips,
515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in
Iqbal,
“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’ ”
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility”
determination will be “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.”
Id.17
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on
the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public
15
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007);
Jordan v.
Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
16
Id.;
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice”).
17
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
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record.18 	A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]
that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.”19 Additionally,
if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically
attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the
court may consider such document in its determination.20 	However, the
court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion
to dismiss.21
Finally, when reviewing a
pro se complaint, we are reminded that
such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial
justice.’”22 	We must apply the relevant law even if the
pro se plaintiff
does not mention it by name.23
18
Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
19
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192,
1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
20
See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.
2002).
21
Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
22
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(f)).
23
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Higgins v.
Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
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B. The Second Amended Complaint should be Dismissed.
After review, we conclude that Ingram’s second amended complaint
should be dismissed. 	As we have noted, Ingram’s second amended
complaint 	spans 	less 	than 	two 	pages 	and 	contains 	sparse 	factual
allegations regarding his Fourth Amendment claim against Corter. 	We
again read Ingram’s complaint as asserting a Fourth Amendment claim
against Corter for unlawful search and seizure.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.24 To state a Fourth
Amendment 	claim, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	plead 	facts 	to 	show 	that 	“the
defendants’ actions (1) constituted a ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) were ‘unreasonable’ in light
of the surrounding circumstances.”25 	When a plaintiff is contesting the
validity of a search warrant signed by a neutral magistrate, alleging that
the 	affidavit 	contained 	false 	statements, 	“probable 	cause 	must 	be
determined on the basis of a[] hypothetical affidavit that ‘reads’ as though
24 U.S. Const. amend IV;
Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595
(1989).
25
Open Inns, Ld. v. Chester Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 24 F. Supp. 2d 410, 424
(E.D. Pa. 1998) (citations omitted).
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it did not contain the false statements[.]”26 The alleged false statements
“must also be material in that it reasonably could have affected the
magistrate’s judgment in finding probable cause.”27
Based on Ingram’s filing, it is undisputed that Corter applied for,
and a magistrate signed, a search warrant for any firearms and related
paraphernalia at the residence where he was staying.28 Ingram appears
to 	allege 	that 	Officer 	Corter’s 	affidavit 	of 	probable 	cause 	omitted
statements he made to the witness, allegedly captured on the body
camera footage.29 But we cannot conclude that the alleged statements—
indicating that the witness brought Corter a bag belonging to Ingram
that 	contained 	a 	firearm— 	“reasonably 	could 	have 	affected 	the
magistrate’s judgment in finding probable cause.”30 	Rather, the search
warrant application stated that the witness, Mercedes Joyce, told Corter
that she looked in Ingram’s room and found a bag that contained what
looked like a pistol, and Corter then applied for a search warrant given
26
United States v. Conley, 856 F. Supp. 1010, 1027 (W.D. Pa. 1994)
(citations omitted).
27
Id. (citation omitted).
28
See Doc. 12 at 3-4.
29
Id. at 1.
30
Conley, 856 F. Supp. at 1027.
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that Ingram was a felon not to possess a firearm.31 	Accordingly, we
conclude that the second amended complaint fails to state a Fourth
Amendment claim against Corter.
Finally, while we recognize that
pro se plaintiffs should generally
be permitted to amend their complaints,32 Ingram has already been
provided leave to file an amended complaint on two occasions and the
amended complaints continue to be materially flawed. Thus, we believe
leave to amend would now be futile. 	Accordingly, we recommend that
this complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
III. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED
that the plaintiff’s second amended complaint be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule
72.3:
Any 	party 	may 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
31 Doc. 12 at 4.
32
See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247,
253 (3d Cir. 2007);
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
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habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written 	objections 	which 	shall 	specifically 	identify 	the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions 	of 	the 	report 	or 	specified 	proposed 	findings 	or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may 	also 	receive 	further 	evidence, 	recall 	witnesses 	or
recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Submitted this 13th day of February 2026.
s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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