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4:25-cv-00540Pamd18 feb 2026

Testo completo

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAKIESHA WATSON, 	: 	Civil No. 4:25-CV-540
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	(Judge Neary)
:
v. 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
FRANK BISIGNANO,1 :
Commissioner of Social Security 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
The instant Social Security appeal highlights several familiar guiding tenets
of law in this field. On one hand, we employ a limited scope of review when
considering Social Security appeals; our task is simply to determine whether
substantial evidence supports the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
Consistent with this deferential standard of review, when, as here, we are called upon
to assess whether an ALJ has sufficiently articulated a rationale for the mental and
1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano
should be substituted as the defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to
continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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emotional components of a claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC), we have
recently been instructed that this aspect of an RFC is sufficient as long as the ALJ
offers a ‘valid explanation’” for the mental and emotional limitations imposed upon
a worker. Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019).
On the other hand, case law imposes a clear obligation upon ALJs to fully
articulate their rationale when denying benefits to disability applicants. This is
particularly true where an ALJ finds an impairment nonsevere at Step 2 of the
sequential analysis that governs Social Security disability cases. Indeed, it is well
settled that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has described this Step 2 inquiry as a
“de minimus screening device to dispose of groundless claims” McCrea v. Comm.
of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004), and “[a]ny doubt as to whether this
showing has been made is to be resolved in favor of the applicant.” Velazquez v.
Astrue, No. 07–5343, 2008 WL 4589831, *3 (E.D. Pa., Oct. 15, 2008). Moreover,
even where an ALJ concludes an impairment is nonsevere under this de minimus
standard 	at 	Step 	2, 	the 	ALJ 	must 	still 	thoroughly 	consider 	the 	non-severe
impairments at all subsequent steps in the disability analysis process. See Salles v.
Comm. of Soc. Sec., 229 Fed. App'x 140, 145, n. 2 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Rutherford
v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005)); McClease v. Comm. of Soc. Sec.,
No. 8–CV–1673, 2009 WL 3497775, *10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009).
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These standards compel remand in the instant case where both the ALJ’s Step
2 evaluation of the plaintiff, Lakiesha Watson’s, mental impairments and the
subsequent RFC assessment are flawed. First, the ALJ’s Step 2 conclusion that
Watson’s mental impairments are nonsevere was based upon a misstatement of fact
– the ALJ stated that Watson had not “persistently received treatment or persistently
used 	any 	prescribed 	psychotropic medication,” 	when, in 	fact, she had 	been
prescribed an antidepressant and participated in counseling. Based, in part, upon this
factual error, the ALJ concluded that Watson’s mental impairments were nonsevere,
but that she nonetheless suffered from mild limitations in each of the four areas of
mental functioning.
Despite 	concluding 	Watson’s 	nonsevere 	impairments 	still 	caused 	mild
limitations in functioning, the ALJ did not address or discuss how these mild
impairments would affect Watson’s ability to perform work-related activity and
included no limitations for these mental impairments in the RFC. Thus, the ALJ’s
misstatement of facts which partially led to the finding that Watson’s mental
impairments were nonsevere was not cured by a subsequent discussion of her mental
impairments during the RFC assessment. Indeed, although the ALJ used the
boilerplate statement: “The following residual functional capacity assessment
reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has found in the ‘paragraph B’
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mental function analysis,” the ALJ did not discuss Watson’s mental impairments in
fashioning the RFC.
Thus, this case illustrates the importance of providing “a clear and satisfactory
explication,” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981), of the basis for the
limitations that are revealed by substantial medical evidence. Here, the ALJ’s
decision fails to accurately summarize and fully consider all the evidence with regard
to the plaintiff’s mental impairments both in finding these impairments nonsevere at
Step 2 and throughout the RFC analysis. Accordingly, while we acknowledge there
is no categorical rule that an ALJ must incorporate mild limitations in mental
functioning in the residual functional capacity, in this case, the ALJ failed to fully
articulate the reasons these limitations were not included in the assessment. Since
the ALJ’s burden of articulation has not been met we recommend the Court remand
this case for further consideration and evaluation by the Commissioner.
II. 	Statement of Facts and of the Case
A. Watson’s Mental Impairments
On October 11, 2022, Lakiesha Watson protectively filed a Title II application
for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging disability
beginning October 25, 2021. (Tr. 17). While Watson cited to a number of physical
and emotional impairments in her disability application, the issue on remand relates
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exclusively to her mental impairments of intermittent explosive disorder, anxiety
disorder, and major depressive disorder.
On this score, the longitudinal medical record of these impairments is fairly
meager but at least demonstrates Watson was more significantly affected by these
impairments than suggested by the ALJ. On this score, she reported to her primary
care provider in May 2022 reporting anxiety and depression symptoms and scored
in the “moderate” range on the depression screening. (Tr. 430-31). She was
prescribed mirtazapine, which she continued to take through at least January 2023.
(Tr. 442, 615, 623, 736, 1033, 1150, 1171, 1199). Moreover, while the ALJ focused
on normal mental status examinations showing normal mood, attention, cognition,
affect, and judgment, the record demonstrates that Watson reported anxiety on
several occasions at her examinations throughout 2021 and 2022, (Tr. 500, 505, 537,
551), and in November 2021 reported having anxiety over eating and a “fear of food”
stemming from side effects of gastric bypass surgery and it was noted she would
benefit from a psychiatric evaluation and possible psychotherapy. (Tr. 508)
In 	January 	2023, 	Watson 	underwent 	a 	mental 	status 	evaluation 	by
consultative examiner Leah Bielski, Psy.D., who summarized her psychiatric
symptoms as follows:
The claimant has difficulties with staying asleep, waking at least eight
times per night. Appetite is described as normal, though fluctuates.
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Depressive symptomatology includes dysphoric moods, loss of interest
in 	activities, 	irritability, 	fatigue/loss 	of 	energy, 	concentration
difficulties, diminished sense of pleasure, and social withdrawal.
Suicidal or homicidal ideation, intent, and plan were denied. Anxiety-
related symptomatology includes excessive worry and apprehension,
easily 	fatigued, 	irritability, 	restlessness, 	racing 	and 	ruminating
thoughts, difficulties concentrating, muscle tension, and avoidance of
social settings. Phobic responses and trauma were denied. Panic attacks
include heart palpitations, dizziness, breathing difficulties, and chest
pain. Frequency: Occurs occasionally. She reported that it is triggered
by 	"too 	much," 	noting 	heightened 	anxiety 	and 	stress. 	Manic
symptomatology 	and 	thought 	disorder 	were 	denied. 	Cognitive
symptomatology 	includes 	short-term 	memory 	deficits 	and
concentration difficulties.
(Tr. 	1172). 	Dr. 	Bielski’s 	examination 	of 	Watson 	revealed 	coherent 	thought
processes, appropriate affect, full orientation, and average intellectual functioning
but anxious and euthymic mood, mildly impaired attention and concentration, mildly
impaired recent and remote memory skills, and fair insight and judgment. (Tr. 1174).
Diagnoses 	of 	generalized 	anxiety 	disorder 	with 	panic 	attacks 	and 	persistent
depressive disorder were noted. (Id.)
In April 2023, Watson began treatment at Pennsylvania Counseling Services
for anxiety disorder. (Tr. 1662-99). At intake, it was noted that she had issues with
anger, (tr. 1698), and she was diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder. (Tr.
1691). She attended sixteen counseling sessions through January 2024 at which she
worked on coping skills for anger and anxiety reduction. (Tr. 1662-99).
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Based upon this medical record, two state agency mental consultants and
consultative examiner Dr. Leah Bielski opined on Watson’s mental RFC. Based
upon their review of Watson’s medical records, state agency mental consultants Dr.
John Robert Vigna and Dr. Marci Cloutier concluded Watson had mild limitations
in understanding, remembering, or applying information, interacting with others,
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and adapting or managing oneself.
(Tr. 78, 90). Both 	medical 	experts 	concluded 	her mental 	impairments were
nonsevere. (Id.) Dr. Leah Bielski opined that Watson’s impairments would be
slightly more limiting in some regards and less in others, stating she had mild
impairments in understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions, but
moderate impairments in interacting appropriately with supervisors, coworkers, and
the public and responding to changes in a routine work setting, and no limitations in
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace or adapting or managing oneself. (Tr.
1176-77). 2
It was against this clinical backdrop that this disability claim was heard by the
ALJ.
2 The opinions of Dr. Vigna and Dr. Cloutier were issued in February 2022 and July
2023, and the opinion of Dr. Bielski was issued in January 2022. These opinions did
not consider Watson’s 2023 diagnosis and treatment for intermittent explosive
disorder.
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B. The ALJ Hearing and Decision
On February 21, 2024, an ALJ conducted a hearing regarding Watson’s
disability claim. (Tr. 42-71). The ALJ did not question Watson about the limiting
effects of her mental impairments on her ability to perform work-related activities
nor did the ALJ pose any hypothetical scenarios to the vocational expert that would
address any limitations in mental functioning.
Following this hearing, the ALJ issued a decision denying the plaintiff’s
disability application on May 21, 2024. (Tr. 14-40). In that decision, the ALJ first
concluded that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
October 25, 2021, the alleged onset date, and meets the insured status requirements
of the Act through December 31, 2026. (Tr. 19-20). At Step 2 of the sequential
analysis that governs Social Security cases, the ALJ found that the plaintiff suffered
from the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar
spine with spinal stenosis, generalized osteoarthritis, inflammatory arthropathy,
lupus, tarsal tunnel syndrome (bilateral), chronic pain syndrome, astigmatism, optic
neuritis, optic neuropathy, and optic atrophy. (Tr. 20).
The ALJ concluded at this step that Watson’s medically determinable mental
impairments 	of 	intermittent 	explosive 	disorder, 	anxiety 	disorder, 	and 	major
depressive disorder were nonsevere. In considering these impairments, the ALJ first
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summarized 	Watson’s 	reported 	symptoms 	from 	the 	consultative 	examination
including dysphoric moods, loss of interest in activities, irritability fatigue/loss of
energy, concentration difficulties, diminished sense of pleasure, social withdrawal,
excessive worry and apprehension, easily fatigued, irritability, restlessness, racing
and ruminating thoughts, difficulties concentrating, muscle tension, and avoidance
of social settings, and panic attacks with associated heart palpitations, dizziness,
breathing difficulties, and chest pain as well as the examination findings of the
consultative examiner including fair insight and judgment, mildly impaired attention
and concentration and mildly impaired recent and remote memory skills. (Tr. 20).
Nonetheless, the ALJ cast these findings against a summary of the medical record
that both mischaracterized and omitted relevant evidence. The ALJ stated:
However, the claimant’s medical records do not indicate the claimant
has been persistently assessed with abnormal clinical examination
findings pertaining to the claimant’s mental impairments. To the
contrary, the claimant’s medical records indicate the claimant has been
assessed with clinical examination findings of normal attention, a
normal mood, normal behavior, a normal thought content, normal
cognition, clear sensorium, normal motor activity, a coherent thought
process, a normal affect, and normal judgment (Exhibits 5F, 7F, 20F,
and 37F). Furthermore, the claimant’s medical records do not indicate
the claimant persistently received treatment or persistently used any
prescribed psychotropic medication (Exhibits 1F – 74F). Given such
collective evidence, the undersigned concludes the claimant’s mental
impairments of intermittent explosive disorder, anxiety disorder, and
major depressive disorder, considered singly or in combination, are
non-severe impairments because they do not cause more than minimal
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limitation in the claimant's ability to perform basic mental work
activities.
(Tr. 21). This summary was problematic in at least two ways. First, the ALJ’s
statement, which rather unhelpfully cites to the entire medical record, incorrectly
states that the claimant did not persistently receive treatment or use prescribed
psychotropic medication despite the record clearly showing that Watson was
prescribed mirtazapine for anxiety. Moreover, this summary ignores medical records
from Pennsylvania Counseling Services showing she was receiving counseling in
2023 and 2024 for anxiety and intermittent explosive at which she worked on coping
skills for anger and anxiety reduction. (Tr. 1662-99).
The ALJ went on to consider the four areas of cognitive functioning known
as “paragraph B” criteria. The ALJ’s analysis of these factors mentioned her
subjective 	complaints 	and 	activities 	of 	daily 	living, 	and 	referred 	to 	clinical
examination findings of a normal thought content, normal behavior, a normal mood,
a normal affect, and normal judgment and that the claimant was noted to be pleasant
and cooperative but glossed over and ignored well-reported treatment for these
mental impairments, including treatment of her anxiety with medication and her
counseling 	for 	anxiety 	and 	intermittent 	explosive 	disorder. 	The 	ALJ 	then
acknowledged in boilerplate language that:
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The limitations identified in the “paragraph B” criteria are not a residual
functional capacity assessment but are used to rate the severity of
mental impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation
process. The mental residual functional capacity assessment used at
steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more
detailed 	assessment. 	The 	following 	residual 	functional 	capacity
assessment reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has found
in the “paragraph B” mental function analysis.
(Tr. 22).
At Step 3 the ALJ determined that the plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the
listed impairments. (Tr. 22-25).
The ALJ then fashioned the following RFC for the plaintiff:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds
that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform less
than the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). She
is limited to occasional balancing, kneeling, stooping, crouching,
crawling, or climbing. She must avoid concentrated exposure to
hazards such as unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery.
(Tr. 25).
Notably, 	this 	RFC 	made 	no 	accommodations 	for 	the 	plaintiff’s 	mild
limitations in mental functioning. Moreover, despite the ALJ mentioning at Step 2
that “the mental residual functional capacity assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the
sequential evaluation process requires more detailed assessment” the ALJ never
conducted this detailed assessment of Watson’s mental impairments, notably
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omitting any summary of her treatment with Pennsylvania Counseling Services, her
psychiatric medication prescribed by her PCP, and any reports of anxiety symptoms
throughout the clinical record.
The only place in the RFC assessment that the ALJ considered the evidence
of Watson’s mental impairments was in evaluating the medical opinion evidence.
The ALJ did consider the opinion of Dr. Leah Bielski,3 but concluded that it was
only partially persuasive, stating that “the aspects of [Dr. Bielski’s] opinion
pertaining to interacting appropriately with the public, co-workers, and supervisors
and responding appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine
work setting are not persuasive.” (Tr. 29-30). In finding Dr. Bielski’s opinion
unpersuasive, the ALJ concluded it was not consistent with Watson’s medical
records of normal mood, affect, behavior, judgment, and thought content and notes
that she was pleasant and cooperative but notably ignored the evidence showing
Watson was being treated for intermittent explosive disorder, a condition often
characterized by difficulties interacting with others and angry outbursts. Instead, the
ALJ credited the opinions of the state agency psychological consultants as consistent
3 The ALJ misnamed Dr. Bielski as “Kathleen Ledermann, Psy.D..” The plaintiff
does not challenge this error, which, in our view, is harmless since it is clear from
the context of the decision the ALJ referenced the correct consultative examiner’s
opinion.
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with the previously cited clinical examination findings but, again, made no mention
of her mental health treatment or medication.
Based upon this RFC determination, which failed to consider or address the
majority of the treatment records regarding Watson’s mental impairments, the ALJ
determined that Watson could perform her past skilled work as a telephone
representative, patient representative, eligibility worker, and instructor and denied
her claim. (Tr. 31-32).
This appeal followed. (Doc. 1). On appeal, the plaintiff argues, inter alia, that
the ALJ failed to account for her mild limitations in mental functioning in the RFC
assessment. In the past, we have declined a categorical rule with regard to the
requirement that an ALJ include limitations in an RFC based upon only mild
limitations in areas of mental functioning. Instead, we have adopted a more fact
specific approach to this issue, an approach which recognizes that when a Step 2
analysis is based upon a factual error, and mental impairments are not addressed in
a meaningful way at later stages of the sequential process, a remand may be
necessary. Applying this analytical paradigm, in this case due to the cursory and
incomplete treatment of the well-documented effects of these impairments, more is
needed here. Thus, we find that the ALJ’s failure to address or account for these
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medically determinable conditions in the RFC assessment was error and recommend
the Court remand this case for further consideration and evaluation of the evidence.
III. 	Discussion
A. 	Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court
When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s
application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the question of whether the
findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200
(3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D.Pa. 2012).
Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but
rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial
evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not
substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a
conflict created by the evidence. 	Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir.
1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be
“something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision]
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from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n,
383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). 	“In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.”
Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D.Pa. 2003).
The Supreme Court has underscored for us the limited scope of our review in
this field, noting that:
The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout
administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency
factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––,
135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial-
evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record
and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the
agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis
deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts,
the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial
evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see,
e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks
omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999)
(comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-
erroneous standard).
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at1154.
The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether the claimant is
disabled, but rather whether the Commissioner’s finding that she is not disabled is
supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application
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of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205,
at *1 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote
a lack of substantial evidence.”) (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.
Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s determination as to the status of
a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v.
Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal
matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp.2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review
of all legal issues . . . .”).
Several fundamental legal propositions which flow from this deferential
standard of review. First, when conducting this review “we are mindful that we must
not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777
F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552). Thus, we are
enjoined to refrain from trying to re-weigh the evidence. Rather our task is to simply
determine whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings. However, we
must also ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of articulation
demanded by the courts to enable informed judicial review. Simply put, “this Court
requires the ALJ to set forth the reasons for his decision.” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). As the Court of Appeals has noted
on this score:
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In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for
his 	decision. 	220 	F.3d 	at 	119. 	Conclusory 	statements 	. 	. 	. 	are
insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and
an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable
meaningful judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d
501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir.2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ
particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use
particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his
analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.
Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009).
Thus, in practice ours is a twofold task. We must evaluate the substance of the
ALJ’s decision under a deferential standard of review, but we must also give that
decision careful scrutiny to ensure that the rationale for the ALJ’s actions is
sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful judicial review.
This principle applies with particular force to legal challenges, like the claim
made here, based upon alleged inadequacies in the articulation of a claimant’s
mental RFC. In Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 212 (3d Cir. 2019), the
United States Court of Appeals recently addressed the standards of articulation that
apply in this setting. In Hess the court of appeals considered the question of whether
an RFC which limited a claimant to simple tasks adequately addressed moderate
limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace. In addressing the plaintiff’s
argument that the language used by the ALJ to describe the claimant’s mental
limitations was legally insufficient, the court of appeals rejected a per se rule which
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would require the ALJ to adhere to a particular format in conducting this analysis.
Instead, framing this issue as a question of adequate articulation of the ALJ’s
rationale, the court held that: “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’ a
‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has ‘moderate’
difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, or pace.’ ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931
F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). On this score, the appellate court indicated that an ALJ
offers a valid explanation a mental RFC when the ALJ highlights factors such as
“mental status examinations and reports that revealed that [the claimant] could
function effectively; opinion evidence showing that [the claimant] could do simple
work; and [the claimant]’s activities of daily living, . . . . ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2019).
In our view, the teachings of the Hess decision are straightforward. In
formulating a mental RFC the ALJ does not need to rely upon any particular form
of words. Further, the adequacy of the mental RFC is not gauged in the abstract.
Instead, the evaluation of a claimant’s ability to undertake the mental demands of
the workplace will be viewed in the factual context of the case, and a mental RFC is
sufficient if it is supported by a valid explanation grounded in the evidence.
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B. 	Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ
To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a
claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C.
§1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§404.1505(a), 416.905(a). 	To satisfy this
requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that
makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful
activity that exists in the national economy. 	42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C.
§1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1505(a), 416.905(a). 	To receive benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed
to the insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the
date on which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a).
In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a
five-step sequential evaluation process. 	20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a), 416.920(a).
Under this process, the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant
is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe
impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed
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impairment; (4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and
(5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or her age,
education, work experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 	20 C.F.R.
§§404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also assess a claimant’s residual
functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able
to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§404.1520(e), 	404.1545(a)(1), 	416.920(e), 	416.945(a)(1). 	In 	making 	this
assessment, 	the 	ALJ 	considers 	all 	of 	the 	claimant’s 	medically 	determinable
impairments, including any non-severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step
two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).
Once the ALJ 	has made this 	determination, our review 	of the ALJ's
assessment of the plaintiff's RFC is deferential, and that RFC assessment will not be
set aside if it is supported by substantial evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113,
129 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Metzger v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL
1483328, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub
nom. Metzgar v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1479426 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21,
2017); Rathbun v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-00301, 2018 WL 1514383, at *6 (M.D.
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21
Pa. Mar. 12, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-301, 2018
WL 1479366 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2018).
At Steps 1 through 4, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating
the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in
engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this
burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at Step 5 to show
that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could
perform that are consistent with the claimant’s age, education, work experience and
RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512(f), 416.912(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
There is an undeniable medical aspect to an RFC determination, since that
determination entails an assessment of what work the claimant can do given the
physical limitations that the claimant experiences. Yet, when considering the role
and necessity of medical opinion evidence in making this determination, courts have
followed several different paths. Some courts emphasize the importance of medical
opinion support for an RFC determination and state that “[r]arely can a decision be
made regarding a claimant's residual functional capacity without an assessment from
a physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant.” Biller, 962 F.Supp.2d
at 778–79 (quoting Gormont v. Astrue, Civ. No. 11–2145, 2013 WL 791455 at *7
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2013)). In other instances, it has been held that “[t]here is no legal
Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 21 of 31
22
requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts
in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11
(3d Cir. 2006). Further, courts have held in cases where there is no evidence of any
credible medical opinion supporting a claimant’s allegations of disability that “the
proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a
physician is misguided.” Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F.Supp.3d 209, 214–15 (W.D.
Pa. 2015).
These 	seemingly 	discordant 	legal 	propositions 	can 	be 	reconciled 	by
evaluation of the factual context of these decisions. Those cases which emphasize
the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically arise in
the factual setting, like that presented here, where well-supported medical sources
have opined regarding limitations which would support a disability claim, but an
ALJ has rejected the medical opinion which supported a disability determination
based upon a lay assessment of other evidence. Biller, 962 F.Supp.2d at 778–79. In
this setting, these cases simply restate the commonplace idea that medical opinions
are entitled to careful consideration when making a disability determination,
particularly when those opinions support a finding of disability. In contrast, when
no medical opinion supports a disability finding or when an ALJ is relying upon
other evidence, such as contrasting clinical or opinion evidence or testimony
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regarding the claimant’s activities of daily living, to fashion an RFC courts have
adopted 	a 	more 	pragmatic 	view 	and 	have 	sustained 	the 	ALJ’s 	exercise 	of
independent judgment based upon all of the facts and evidence. See Titterington,
174 F. App'x 6; Cummings, 129 F.Supp.3d at 214–15. In either event, once the ALJ
has made this determination, our review of the ALJ's assessment of the plaintiff's
RFC is deferential, and that RFC assessment will not be set aside if it is supported
by substantial evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113; see also Metzger v.
Berryhill, 2017 WL 1483328, at *5; Rathbun v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 1514383, at *6.
The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive
requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the
ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination.
Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence
standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory
explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d
Cir. 1981). 	Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate
which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for
rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-707. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in
his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis
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for his finding.” 	Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F. 3d 429, 433 (3d Cir.
1999).
It is against these legal benchmarks that we assess the instant appeal.
C. 	This Case Should Be Remanded.
In the past, we have affirmed cases in which an ALJ concluded a claimant had
mild impairments in some areas of mental functioning but did not include any mental
limitations in the RFC. See e.g. Nelson v. Bisignano, No. 4:24-CV-263, 2025 WL
2713743 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2025); Lankford v. O'Malley, No. 3:23-CV-1106, 2024
WL 5078104 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2024). In doing so, we have declined to adopt a
categorical rule regarding when an ALJ must include mental limitations in the RFC.
This approach is guided by Hess, which instructs us not to gauge the adequacy of
the mental RFC in the abstract but rather view the evaluation of a claimant’s ability
to undertake the mental demands of the workplace in the factual context of the case,
finding a mental RFC sufficient if it is supported by a valid explanation grounded in
the evidence. Our assessment of the ALJ’s decision is further guided by the Third
Circuit’s mandate that “the ALJ must provide a discussion of the evidence and an
explanation of reasoning for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial
review.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted).
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Moreover, in cases such as this involving a finding of nonseverity at Step 2,
we view the RFC assessment of these impairments with a particularly skeptical eye,
since the Third Circuit has described this inquiry as a “de minimus screening device
to dispose of groundless claims” McCrea, 370 F.3d at 360, and “[a]ny doubt as to
whether this showing has been made is to be resolved in favor of the applicant,”
Velazquez, 2008 WL 4589831, *3. Thus, even where an ALJ concludes an
impairment is nonsevere under this de minimus standard at Step 2, the ALJ must still
thoroughly consider the non-severe impairments at all subsequent steps in the
disability analysis process. See Salles, 229 Fed. App'x at 145, n. 2; McClease, 2009
WL 3497775, *10.
Under these guideposts, we conclude the ALJ’s RFC assessment in this case
was insufficient in that it first mischaracterized and ignored objective medical
evidence of Watson’s mental impairments and then failed to fully and adequately
address these impairments in the RFC assessment. At the outset, while “the ALJ's
consideration of the individual's non-severe impairments does not amount to a
requirement that the ALJ must include limitations in the RFC associated with mild
impairments,” Weidner v. Kijakazi, No. CV 20-1250-MN, 2022 WL 610702, at *9
(D. Del. Feb. 1, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV201250MNSRF,
2022 WL 610678 (D. Del. Feb. 16, 2022) (citing Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
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2016 WL 3912850, at *9 (D.N.J. July 19, 2016)), it is well settled that, despite a
finding of non-severe mental impairments at Step 2, an ALJ must at least consider
those impairments when fashioning the RFC. Indeed, this Court has recognized the
requirement that:
As a general matter, an ALJ must consider limitations and restrictions
associated with all of a claimant's impairments, both severe and non-
severe, when formulating the RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). “[T]he
Commissioner's procedures do not permit the ALJ to simple rely on his
finding of non-severity as a substitute for a proper RFC analysis.” Wells
v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 2013). “A conclusion that the
claimant's mental impairments are non-severe at step two does not
permit the ALJ to simply disregard those impairments when assessing
a claimant's RFC and making conclusions at step four and five.” Id. at
1068–69.
Kich v. Colvin, 218 F. Supp. 3d 342, 355–56 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
And, while this requirement that an ALJ explain the reasons for excluding
mild mental functional limitations is cabined by the Third Circuit’s holding in Hess
that an ALJ’s mental RFC assessment should be upheld “as long as the ALJ offers a
‘valid explanation,’” for that assessment, Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198,
211 (3d Cir. 2019), it is also well-settled that boilerplate statements indicating these
limitations were considered in the RFC will not do. As our sister court explained:
In short, a boilerplate statement at step two that the ensuing RFC
assessment “reflects” the limitations determined at step two, with no
further discussion of those limitations (except to the extent they match
the limitations noted in the required discussion of the State agency
psychological consultants’ administrative findings) is not the “valid
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explanation” required by Third Circuit case law or the “detailed
assessment” required by SSR 96-8p. See Hess, 931 F.3d at 213-14;
Ramirez, 372 F.3d at 555; SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. It is
inconsistent with regulations requiring the ALJ when formulating the
RFC to “consider” all impairments, even non-severe ones, and at odds
with the only circuit-level decision addressing the viability of such a
statement. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2); Wells, 727
F.3d at 1068-71.
Gunn v. Kijakazi, 705 F. Supp. 3d 315, 333 (E.D. Pa. 2023).
So it is here.
At the outset, the ALJ’s conclusion that Watson’s mental impairments were
nonsevere was based upon a factual error. On this score, at Step 2, the ALJ based his
conclusion that Watson’s mental impairments did not cause more than minimal
limitation on her ability to perform basic mental work activities, in part, on his
statement 	that 	“the claimant’s 	medical records 	do 	not 	indicate the claimant
persistently received treatment or persistently used any prescribed psychotropic
medication.” (Tr. 21). But a review of the record easily reveals that, in May 2022
Watson reported to her PCP that she was experiencing symptoms of anxiety and
depression and scored “moderate” on a depression screening. (Tr. 430-431). She was
prescribed mirtazapine, which she continued to take until at least January 2023. (Tr.
442, 615, 623, 736, 1033, 1150, 1199). Thus, the ALJ’s assertion that her
examinations were normal and she did not use psychotropic medication is simply
untrue. Moreover, the ALJ failed to mention that, while her psychiatric treatment
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history was not extensive, she did attend counseling for her intermittent explosive
disorder, anxiety, and depression from April 2023 through January 2024. (Tr. 1664-
98).4
The ALJ’s conclusion, based upon a misstatement of fact, that Watson’s
mental impairments were nonsevere under the de minimus Step 2 standard was not
remedied during the RFC assessment. In fact, despite the ALJ’s boilerplate statement
that “the following residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of
limitation the undersigned has found in the ‘paragraph B’ mental function analysis,”
(tr. 22), the ALJ did not discuss Watson’s mental health impairments or treatment at
Steps 3-5, except in assigning persuasive value to the medical opinions. Indeed, at
no point in the decision did the ALJ acknowledge or address the evidence that she
was treated with mirtazapine or received counseling for intermittent explosive
disorder.5 This was error.
Finally, the ALJ’s error may have prejudiced consideration of Watson’s case.
The 	ALJ’s 	omission 	of 	any 	meaningful 	discussion 	regarding 	the 	medical
4 Moreover, the cursory treatment of Watson’s mental impairments at Step 2 did not
cite to specific portions of the record but rather cited to every medical exhibit in the
record.
5 This intermittent explosive disorder diagnosis and treatment would have been
particularly relevant to the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Bielski’s opinion that Watson
would have moderate limitations in interacting with supervisors, coworkers, and the
general public.
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documentation supporting her subjective complaints deprives the Court of the ability
to conduct meaningful review, since we are without answers as to the ALJ’s
reasoning for failing to include any mental limitations in the RFC assessment. Our
view is consistent with prior findings in this Court and supported by other courts
who have found that remand is necessary when an ALJ omits mild mental functional
limitations identified at Step 2 without a valid explanation. See Wells v. Colvin, 727
F.3d 1061, 1068-71 (10 th Cir. 2013); Gunn v. Kajikazi, 705 F. Supp. 3d 315, 330-31
(E.D. Pa. 2023); Kich v. Colvin, 218 F. Supp. 3d 342, 357 (M.D. Pa. 2016). Indeed,
“judges in this District have consistently held that even mild limitations in the
relevant domains of mental functioning must be included in an RFC assessment and
hypothetical question posed to the VE that the ALJ relies upon.” Meersand v.
Kijakazi, No. 20-1084, 2021 WL 5003331, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2021) (collecting
cases). Here, the ALJ did not include any hypothetical questions to the VE that
would have addressed 	these mild 	limitations in 	functioning. This 	error was
prejudicial to Watson’s case and compels remand.
Simply put, more is needed here. It is axiomatic that the ALJ's decision must
be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it
rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). This means that there must
be a logical nexus between the ALJ's factual findings and legal conclusion. That
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logical bridge is missing here where the limiting effects of Watson’s mental
impairments were never fully evaluated by the ALJ. Since the ALJ’s burden of
articulation is not met in the instant case, we recommend this matter be remanded
for further consideration by the Commissioner. Yet, while we reach this result, we
note that nothing in this Report and Recommendation should be deemed as
expressing a judgment on what the ultimate outcome of any reassessment of this
evidence should be. Rather, the task should remain the duty and province of the ALJ
on remand.
IV. 	Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff’s request
for 	a 	new 	administrative 	hearing 	be 	GRANTED, 	the 	final 	decision 	of 	the
Commissioner denying these claims be vacated, and this case be remanded to the
Commissioner to conduct a new administrative hearing.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing
requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall
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make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or 	recommendations 	made 	by 	the 	magistrate 	judge. 	The 	judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or
where required by law, and may consider the record developed before
the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis
of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses, 	or 	recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Submitted this 18 th day of February 2026.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 31 of 31

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