4:25-cv-00540•Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable
Testo completo
1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA LAKIESHA WATSON, : Civil No. 4:25-CV-540 : Plaintiff, : (Judge Neary) : v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson) : FRANK BISIGNANO,1 : Commissioner of Social Security : : Defendant. : REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. Introduction The instant Social Security appeal highlights several familiar guiding tenets of law in this field. On one hand, we employ a limited scope of review when considering Social Security appeals; our task is simply to determine whether substantial evidence supports the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Consistent with this deferential standard of review, when, as here, we are called upon to assess whether an ALJ has sufficiently articulated a rationale for the mental and 1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano should be substituted as the defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 1 of 31
2 emotional components of a claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC), we have recently been instructed that this aspect of an RFC is sufficient as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation’” for the mental and emotional limitations imposed upon a worker. Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). On the other hand, case law imposes a clear obligation upon ALJs to fully articulate their rationale when denying benefits to disability applicants. This is particularly true where an ALJ finds an impairment nonsevere at Step 2 of the sequential analysis that governs Social Security disability cases. Indeed, it is well settled that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has described this Step 2 inquiry as a “de minimus screening device to dispose of groundless claims” McCrea v. Comm. of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004), and “[a]ny doubt as to whether this showing has been made is to be resolved in favor of the applicant.” Velazquez v. Astrue, No. 07–5343, 2008 WL 4589831, *3 (E.D. Pa., Oct. 15, 2008). Moreover, even where an ALJ concludes an impairment is nonsevere under this de minimus standard at Step 2, the ALJ must still thoroughly consider the non-severe impairments at all subsequent steps in the disability analysis process. See Salles v. Comm. of Soc. Sec., 229 Fed. App'x 140, 145, n. 2 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005)); McClease v. Comm. of Soc. Sec., No. 8–CV–1673, 2009 WL 3497775, *10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009). Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 2 of 31
3 These standards compel remand in the instant case where both the ALJ’s Step 2 evaluation of the plaintiff, Lakiesha Watson’s, mental impairments and the subsequent RFC assessment are flawed. First, the ALJ’s Step 2 conclusion that Watson’s mental impairments are nonsevere was based upon a misstatement of fact – the ALJ stated that Watson had not “persistently received treatment or persistently used any prescribed psychotropic medication,” when, in fact, she had been prescribed an antidepressant and participated in counseling. Based, in part, upon this factual error, the ALJ concluded that Watson’s mental impairments were nonsevere, but that she nonetheless suffered from mild limitations in each of the four areas of mental functioning. Despite concluding Watson’s nonsevere impairments still caused mild limitations in functioning, the ALJ did not address or discuss how these mild impairments would affect Watson’s ability to perform work-related activity and included no limitations for these mental impairments in the RFC. Thus, the ALJ’s misstatement of facts which partially led to the finding that Watson’s mental impairments were nonsevere was not cured by a subsequent discussion of her mental impairments during the RFC assessment. Indeed, although the ALJ used the boilerplate statement: “The following residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has found in the ‘paragraph B’ Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 3 of 31
4 mental function analysis,” the ALJ did not discuss Watson’s mental impairments in fashioning the RFC. Thus, this case illustrates the importance of providing “a clear and satisfactory explication,” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981), of the basis for the limitations that are revealed by substantial medical evidence. Here, the ALJ’s decision fails to accurately summarize and fully consider all the evidence with regard to the plaintiff’s mental impairments both in finding these impairments nonsevere at Step 2 and throughout the RFC analysis. Accordingly, while we acknowledge there is no categorical rule that an ALJ must incorporate mild limitations in mental functioning in the residual functional capacity, in this case, the ALJ failed to fully articulate the reasons these limitations were not included in the assessment. Since the ALJ’s burden of articulation has not been met we recommend the Court remand this case for further consideration and evaluation by the Commissioner. II. Statement of Facts and of the Case A. Watson’s Mental Impairments On October 11, 2022, Lakiesha Watson protectively filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning October 25, 2021. (Tr. 17). While Watson cited to a number of physical and emotional impairments in her disability application, the issue on remand relates Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 4 of 31
5 exclusively to her mental impairments of intermittent explosive disorder, anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder. On this score, the longitudinal medical record of these impairments is fairly meager but at least demonstrates Watson was more significantly affected by these impairments than suggested by the ALJ. On this score, she reported to her primary care provider in May 2022 reporting anxiety and depression symptoms and scored in the “moderate” range on the depression screening. (Tr. 430-31). She was prescribed mirtazapine, which she continued to take through at least January 2023. (Tr. 442, 615, 623, 736, 1033, 1150, 1171, 1199). Moreover, while the ALJ focused on normal mental status examinations showing normal mood, attention, cognition, affect, and judgment, the record demonstrates that Watson reported anxiety on several occasions at her examinations throughout 2021 and 2022, (Tr. 500, 505, 537, 551), and in November 2021 reported having anxiety over eating and a “fear of food” stemming from side effects of gastric bypass surgery and it was noted she would benefit from a psychiatric evaluation and possible psychotherapy. (Tr. 508) In January 2023, Watson underwent a mental status evaluation by consultative examiner Leah Bielski, Psy.D., who summarized her psychiatric symptoms as follows: The claimant has difficulties with staying asleep, waking at least eight times per night. Appetite is described as normal, though fluctuates. Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 5 of 31
6 Depressive symptomatology includes dysphoric moods, loss of interest in activities, irritability, fatigue/loss of energy, concentration difficulties, diminished sense of pleasure, and social withdrawal. Suicidal or homicidal ideation, intent, and plan were denied. Anxiety- related symptomatology includes excessive worry and apprehension, easily fatigued, irritability, restlessness, racing and ruminating thoughts, difficulties concentrating, muscle tension, and avoidance of social settings. Phobic responses and trauma were denied. Panic attacks include heart palpitations, dizziness, breathing difficulties, and chest pain. Frequency: Occurs occasionally. She reported that it is triggered by "too much," noting heightened anxiety and stress. Manic symptomatology and thought disorder were denied. Cognitive symptomatology includes short-term memory deficits and concentration difficulties. (Tr. 1172). Dr. Bielski’s examination of Watson revealed coherent thought processes, appropriate affect, full orientation, and average intellectual functioning but anxious and euthymic mood, mildly impaired attention and concentration, mildly impaired recent and remote memory skills, and fair insight and judgment. (Tr. 1174). Diagnoses of generalized anxiety disorder with panic attacks and persistent depressive disorder were noted. (Id.) In April 2023, Watson began treatment at Pennsylvania Counseling Services for anxiety disorder. (Tr. 1662-99). At intake, it was noted that she had issues with anger, (tr. 1698), and she was diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder. (Tr. 1691). She attended sixteen counseling sessions through January 2024 at which she worked on coping skills for anger and anxiety reduction. (Tr. 1662-99). Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 6 of 31
7 Based upon this medical record, two state agency mental consultants and consultative examiner Dr. Leah Bielski opined on Watson’s mental RFC. Based upon their review of Watson’s medical records, state agency mental consultants Dr. John Robert Vigna and Dr. Marci Cloutier concluded Watson had mild limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information, interacting with others, concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and adapting or managing oneself. (Tr. 78, 90). Both medical experts concluded her mental impairments were nonsevere. (Id.) Dr. Leah Bielski opined that Watson’s impairments would be slightly more limiting in some regards and less in others, stating she had mild impairments in understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions, but moderate impairments in interacting appropriately with supervisors, coworkers, and the public and responding to changes in a routine work setting, and no limitations in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace or adapting or managing oneself. (Tr. 1176-77). 2 It was against this clinical backdrop that this disability claim was heard by the ALJ. 2 The opinions of Dr. Vigna and Dr. Cloutier were issued in February 2022 and July 2023, and the opinion of Dr. Bielski was issued in January 2022. These opinions did not consider Watson’s 2023 diagnosis and treatment for intermittent explosive disorder. Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 7 of 31
8 B. The ALJ Hearing and Decision On February 21, 2024, an ALJ conducted a hearing regarding Watson’s disability claim. (Tr. 42-71). The ALJ did not question Watson about the limiting effects of her mental impairments on her ability to perform work-related activities nor did the ALJ pose any hypothetical scenarios to the vocational expert that would address any limitations in mental functioning. Following this hearing, the ALJ issued a decision denying the plaintiff’s disability application on May 21, 2024. (Tr. 14-40). In that decision, the ALJ first concluded that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 25, 2021, the alleged onset date, and meets the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2026. (Tr. 19-20). At Step 2 of the sequential analysis that governs Social Security cases, the ALJ found that the plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with spinal stenosis, generalized osteoarthritis, inflammatory arthropathy, lupus, tarsal tunnel syndrome (bilateral), chronic pain syndrome, astigmatism, optic neuritis, optic neuropathy, and optic atrophy. (Tr. 20). The ALJ concluded at this step that Watson’s medically determinable mental impairments of intermittent explosive disorder, anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder were nonsevere. In considering these impairments, the ALJ first Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 8 of 31
9 summarized Watson’s reported symptoms from the consultative examination including dysphoric moods, loss of interest in activities, irritability fatigue/loss of energy, concentration difficulties, diminished sense of pleasure, social withdrawal, excessive worry and apprehension, easily fatigued, irritability, restlessness, racing and ruminating thoughts, difficulties concentrating, muscle tension, and avoidance of social settings, and panic attacks with associated heart palpitations, dizziness, breathing difficulties, and chest pain as well as the examination findings of the consultative examiner including fair insight and judgment, mildly impaired attention and concentration and mildly impaired recent and remote memory skills. (Tr. 20). Nonetheless, the ALJ cast these findings against a summary of the medical record that both mischaracterized and omitted relevant evidence. The ALJ stated: However, the claimant’s medical records do not indicate the claimant has been persistently assessed with abnormal clinical examination findings pertaining to the claimant’s mental impairments. To the contrary, the claimant’s medical records indicate the claimant has been assessed with clinical examination findings of normal attention, a normal mood, normal behavior, a normal thought content, normal cognition, clear sensorium, normal motor activity, a coherent thought process, a normal affect, and normal judgment (Exhibits 5F, 7F, 20F, and 37F). Furthermore, the claimant’s medical records do not indicate the claimant persistently received treatment or persistently used any prescribed psychotropic medication (Exhibits 1F – 74F). Given such collective evidence, the undersigned concludes the claimant’s mental impairments of intermittent explosive disorder, anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder, considered singly or in combination, are non-severe impairments because they do not cause more than minimal Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 9 of 31
10 limitation in the claimant's ability to perform basic mental work activities. (Tr. 21). This summary was problematic in at least two ways. First, the ALJ’s statement, which rather unhelpfully cites to the entire medical record, incorrectly states that the claimant did not persistently receive treatment or use prescribed psychotropic medication despite the record clearly showing that Watson was prescribed mirtazapine for anxiety. Moreover, this summary ignores medical records from Pennsylvania Counseling Services showing she was receiving counseling in 2023 and 2024 for anxiety and intermittent explosive at which she worked on coping skills for anger and anxiety reduction. (Tr. 1662-99). The ALJ went on to consider the four areas of cognitive functioning known as “paragraph B” criteria. The ALJ’s analysis of these factors mentioned her subjective complaints and activities of daily living, and referred to clinical examination findings of a normal thought content, normal behavior, a normal mood, a normal affect, and normal judgment and that the claimant was noted to be pleasant and cooperative but glossed over and ignored well-reported treatment for these mental impairments, including treatment of her anxiety with medication and her counseling for anxiety and intermittent explosive disorder. The ALJ then acknowledged in boilerplate language that: Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 10 of 31
11 The limitations identified in the “paragraph B” criteria are not a residual functional capacity assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process. The mental residual functional capacity assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment. The following residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has found in the “paragraph B” mental function analysis. (Tr. 22). At Step 3 the ALJ determined that the plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 22-25). The ALJ then fashioned the following RFC for the plaintiff: After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform less than the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). She is limited to occasional balancing, kneeling, stooping, crouching, crawling, or climbing. She must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery. (Tr. 25). Notably, this RFC made no accommodations for the plaintiff’s mild limitations in mental functioning. Moreover, despite the ALJ mentioning at Step 2 that “the mental residual functional capacity assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires more detailed assessment” the ALJ never conducted this detailed assessment of Watson’s mental impairments, notably Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 11 of 31
12 omitting any summary of her treatment with Pennsylvania Counseling Services, her psychiatric medication prescribed by her PCP, and any reports of anxiety symptoms throughout the clinical record. The only place in the RFC assessment that the ALJ considered the evidence of Watson’s mental impairments was in evaluating the medical opinion evidence. The ALJ did consider the opinion of Dr. Leah Bielski,3 but concluded that it was only partially persuasive, stating that “the aspects of [Dr. Bielski’s] opinion pertaining to interacting appropriately with the public, co-workers, and supervisors and responding appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting are not persuasive.” (Tr. 29-30). In finding Dr. Bielski’s opinion unpersuasive, the ALJ concluded it was not consistent with Watson’s medical records of normal mood, affect, behavior, judgment, and thought content and notes that she was pleasant and cooperative but notably ignored the evidence showing Watson was being treated for intermittent explosive disorder, a condition often characterized by difficulties interacting with others and angry outbursts. Instead, the ALJ credited the opinions of the state agency psychological consultants as consistent 3 The ALJ misnamed Dr. Bielski as “Kathleen Ledermann, Psy.D..” The plaintiff does not challenge this error, which, in our view, is harmless since it is clear from the context of the decision the ALJ referenced the correct consultative examiner’s opinion. Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 12 of 31
13 with the previously cited clinical examination findings but, again, made no mention of her mental health treatment or medication. Based upon this RFC determination, which failed to consider or address the majority of the treatment records regarding Watson’s mental impairments, the ALJ determined that Watson could perform her past skilled work as a telephone representative, patient representative, eligibility worker, and instructor and denied her claim. (Tr. 31-32). This appeal followed. (Doc. 1). On appeal, the plaintiff argues, inter alia, that the ALJ failed to account for her mild limitations in mental functioning in the RFC assessment. In the past, we have declined a categorical rule with regard to the requirement that an ALJ include limitations in an RFC based upon only mild limitations in areas of mental functioning. Instead, we have adopted a more fact specific approach to this issue, an approach which recognizes that when a Step 2 analysis is based upon a factual error, and mental impairments are not addressed in a meaningful way at later stages of the sequential process, a remand may be necessary. Applying this analytical paradigm, in this case due to the cursory and incomplete treatment of the well-documented effects of these impairments, more is needed here. Thus, we find that the ALJ’s failure to address or account for these Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 13 of 31
14 medically determinable conditions in the RFC assessment was error and recommend the Court remand this case for further consideration and evaluation of the evidence. III. Discussion A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D.Pa. 2012). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 14 of 31
15 from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D.Pa. 2003). The Supreme Court has underscored for us the limited scope of our review in this field, noting that: The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––, 135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial- evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see, e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly- erroneous standard). Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at1154. The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether the claimant is disabled, but rather whether the Commissioner’s finding that she is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 15 of 31
16 of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.”) (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp.2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review of all legal issues . . . .”). Several fundamental legal propositions which flow from this deferential standard of review. First, when conducting this review “we are mindful that we must not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552). Thus, we are enjoined to refrain from trying to re-weigh the evidence. Rather our task is to simply determine whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings. However, we must also ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of articulation demanded by the courts to enable informed judicial review. Simply put, “this Court requires the ALJ to set forth the reasons for his decision.” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). As the Court of Appeals has noted on this score: Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 16 of 31
17 In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for his decision. 220 F.3d at 119. Conclusory statements . . . are insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir.2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505. Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009). Thus, in practice ours is a twofold task. We must evaluate the substance of the ALJ’s decision under a deferential standard of review, but we must also give that decision careful scrutiny to ensure that the rationale for the ALJ’s actions is sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful judicial review. This principle applies with particular force to legal challenges, like the claim made here, based upon alleged inadequacies in the articulation of a claimant’s mental RFC. In Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 212 (3d Cir. 2019), the United States Court of Appeals recently addressed the standards of articulation that apply in this setting. In Hess the court of appeals considered the question of whether an RFC which limited a claimant to simple tasks adequately addressed moderate limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace. In addressing the plaintiff’s argument that the language used by the ALJ to describe the claimant’s mental limitations was legally insufficient, the court of appeals rejected a per se rule which Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 17 of 31
18 would require the ALJ to adhere to a particular format in conducting this analysis. Instead, framing this issue as a question of adequate articulation of the ALJ’s rationale, the court held that: “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’ a ‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has ‘moderate’ difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, or pace.’ ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). On this score, the appellate court indicated that an ALJ offers a valid explanation a mental RFC when the ALJ highlights factors such as “mental status examinations and reports that revealed that [the claimant] could function effectively; opinion evidence showing that [the claimant] could do simple work; and [the claimant]’s activities of daily living, . . . . ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2019). In our view, the teachings of the Hess decision are straightforward. In formulating a mental RFC the ALJ does not need to rely upon any particular form of words. Further, the adequacy of the mental RFC is not gauged in the abstract. Instead, the evaluation of a claimant’s ability to undertake the mental demands of the workplace will be viewed in the factual context of the case, and a mental RFC is sufficient if it is supported by a valid explanation grounded in the evidence. Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 18 of 31
19 B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§404.1505(a), 416.905(a). To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1505(a), 416.905(a). To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a). In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a), 416.920(a). Under this process, the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 19 of 31
20 impairment; (4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1), 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2). Once the ALJ has made this determination, our review of the ALJ's assessment of the plaintiff's RFC is deferential, and that RFC assessment will not be set aside if it is supported by substantial evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Metzger v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1483328, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Metzgar v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1479426 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017); Rathbun v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-00301, 2018 WL 1514383, at *6 (M.D. Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 20 of 31
21 Pa. Mar. 12, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-301, 2018 WL 1479366 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2018). At Steps 1 through 4, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at Step 5 to show that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could perform that are consistent with the claimant’s age, education, work experience and RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512(f), 416.912(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. There is an undeniable medical aspect to an RFC determination, since that determination entails an assessment of what work the claimant can do given the physical limitations that the claimant experiences. Yet, when considering the role and necessity of medical opinion evidence in making this determination, courts have followed several different paths. Some courts emphasize the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC determination and state that “[r]arely can a decision be made regarding a claimant's residual functional capacity without an assessment from a physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant.” Biller, 962 F.Supp.2d at 778–79 (quoting Gormont v. Astrue, Civ. No. 11–2145, 2013 WL 791455 at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2013)). In other instances, it has been held that “[t]here is no legal Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 21 of 31
22 requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006). Further, courts have held in cases where there is no evidence of any credible medical opinion supporting a claimant’s allegations of disability that “the proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a physician is misguided.” Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F.Supp.3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015). These seemingly discordant legal propositions can be reconciled by evaluation of the factual context of these decisions. Those cases which emphasize the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically arise in the factual setting, like that presented here, where well-supported medical sources have opined regarding limitations which would support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected the medical opinion which supported a disability determination based upon a lay assessment of other evidence. Biller, 962 F.Supp.2d at 778–79. In this setting, these cases simply restate the commonplace idea that medical opinions are entitled to careful consideration when making a disability determination, particularly when those opinions support a finding of disability. In contrast, when no medical opinion supports a disability finding or when an ALJ is relying upon other evidence, such as contrasting clinical or opinion evidence or testimony Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 22 of 31
23 regarding the claimant’s activities of daily living, to fashion an RFC courts have adopted a more pragmatic view and have sustained the ALJ’s exercise of independent judgment based upon all of the facts and evidence. See Titterington, 174 F. App'x 6; Cummings, 129 F.Supp.3d at 214–15. In either event, once the ALJ has made this determination, our review of the ALJ's assessment of the plaintiff's RFC is deferential, and that RFC assessment will not be set aside if it is supported by substantial evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113; see also Metzger v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 1483328, at *5; Rathbun v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 1514383, at *6. The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination. Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-707. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 23 of 31
24 for his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F. 3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). It is against these legal benchmarks that we assess the instant appeal. C. This Case Should Be Remanded. In the past, we have affirmed cases in which an ALJ concluded a claimant had mild impairments in some areas of mental functioning but did not include any mental limitations in the RFC. See e.g. Nelson v. Bisignano, No. 4:24-CV-263, 2025 WL 2713743 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2025); Lankford v. O'Malley, No. 3:23-CV-1106, 2024 WL 5078104 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2024). In doing so, we have declined to adopt a categorical rule regarding when an ALJ must include mental limitations in the RFC. This approach is guided by Hess, which instructs us not to gauge the adequacy of the mental RFC in the abstract but rather view the evaluation of a claimant’s ability to undertake the mental demands of the workplace in the factual context of the case, finding a mental RFC sufficient if it is supported by a valid explanation grounded in the evidence. Our assessment of the ALJ’s decision is further guided by the Third Circuit’s mandate that “the ALJ must provide a discussion of the evidence and an explanation of reasoning for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial review.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 24 of 31
25 Moreover, in cases such as this involving a finding of nonseverity at Step 2, we view the RFC assessment of these impairments with a particularly skeptical eye, since the Third Circuit has described this inquiry as a “de minimus screening device to dispose of groundless claims” McCrea, 370 F.3d at 360, and “[a]ny doubt as to whether this showing has been made is to be resolved in favor of the applicant,” Velazquez, 2008 WL 4589831, *3. Thus, even where an ALJ concludes an impairment is nonsevere under this de minimus standard at Step 2, the ALJ must still thoroughly consider the non-severe impairments at all subsequent steps in the disability analysis process. See Salles, 229 Fed. App'x at 145, n. 2; McClease, 2009 WL 3497775, *10. Under these guideposts, we conclude the ALJ’s RFC assessment in this case was insufficient in that it first mischaracterized and ignored objective medical evidence of Watson’s mental impairments and then failed to fully and adequately address these impairments in the RFC assessment. At the outset, while “the ALJ's consideration of the individual's non-severe impairments does not amount to a requirement that the ALJ must include limitations in the RFC associated with mild impairments,” Weidner v. Kijakazi, No. CV 20-1250-MN, 2022 WL 610702, at *9 (D. Del. Feb. 1, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV201250MNSRF, 2022 WL 610678 (D. Del. Feb. 16, 2022) (citing Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 25 of 31
26 2016 WL 3912850, at *9 (D.N.J. July 19, 2016)), it is well settled that, despite a finding of non-severe mental impairments at Step 2, an ALJ must at least consider those impairments when fashioning the RFC. Indeed, this Court has recognized the requirement that: As a general matter, an ALJ must consider limitations and restrictions associated with all of a claimant's impairments, both severe and non- severe, when formulating the RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). “[T]he Commissioner's procedures do not permit the ALJ to simple rely on his finding of non-severity as a substitute for a proper RFC analysis.” Wells v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 2013). “A conclusion that the claimant's mental impairments are non-severe at step two does not permit the ALJ to simply disregard those impairments when assessing a claimant's RFC and making conclusions at step four and five.” Id. at 1068–69. Kich v. Colvin, 218 F. Supp. 3d 342, 355–56 (M.D. Pa. 2016). And, while this requirement that an ALJ explain the reasons for excluding mild mental functional limitations is cabined by the Third Circuit’s holding in Hess that an ALJ’s mental RFC assessment should be upheld “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’” for that assessment, Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019), it is also well-settled that boilerplate statements indicating these limitations were considered in the RFC will not do. As our sister court explained: In short, a boilerplate statement at step two that the ensuing RFC assessment “reflects” the limitations determined at step two, with no further discussion of those limitations (except to the extent they match the limitations noted in the required discussion of the State agency psychological consultants’ administrative findings) is not the “valid Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 26 of 31
27 explanation” required by Third Circuit case law or the “detailed assessment” required by SSR 96-8p. See Hess, 931 F.3d at 213-14; Ramirez, 372 F.3d at 555; SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. It is inconsistent with regulations requiring the ALJ when formulating the RFC to “consider” all impairments, even non-severe ones, and at odds with the only circuit-level decision addressing the viability of such a statement. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2); Wells, 727 F.3d at 1068-71. Gunn v. Kijakazi, 705 F. Supp. 3d 315, 333 (E.D. Pa. 2023). So it is here. At the outset, the ALJ’s conclusion that Watson’s mental impairments were nonsevere was based upon a factual error. On this score, at Step 2, the ALJ based his conclusion that Watson’s mental impairments did not cause more than minimal limitation on her ability to perform basic mental work activities, in part, on his statement that “the claimant’s medical records do not indicate the claimant persistently received treatment or persistently used any prescribed psychotropic medication.” (Tr. 21). But a review of the record easily reveals that, in May 2022 Watson reported to her PCP that she was experiencing symptoms of anxiety and depression and scored “moderate” on a depression screening. (Tr. 430-431). She was prescribed mirtazapine, which she continued to take until at least January 2023. (Tr. 442, 615, 623, 736, 1033, 1150, 1199). Thus, the ALJ’s assertion that her examinations were normal and she did not use psychotropic medication is simply untrue. Moreover, the ALJ failed to mention that, while her psychiatric treatment Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 27 of 31
28 history was not extensive, she did attend counseling for her intermittent explosive disorder, anxiety, and depression from April 2023 through January 2024. (Tr. 1664- 98).4 The ALJ’s conclusion, based upon a misstatement of fact, that Watson’s mental impairments were nonsevere under the de minimus Step 2 standard was not remedied during the RFC assessment. In fact, despite the ALJ’s boilerplate statement that “the following residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has found in the ‘paragraph B’ mental function analysis,” (tr. 22), the ALJ did not discuss Watson’s mental health impairments or treatment at Steps 3-5, except in assigning persuasive value to the medical opinions. Indeed, at no point in the decision did the ALJ acknowledge or address the evidence that she was treated with mirtazapine or received counseling for intermittent explosive disorder.5 This was error. Finally, the ALJ’s error may have prejudiced consideration of Watson’s case. The ALJ’s omission of any meaningful discussion regarding the medical 4 Moreover, the cursory treatment of Watson’s mental impairments at Step 2 did not cite to specific portions of the record but rather cited to every medical exhibit in the record. 5 This intermittent explosive disorder diagnosis and treatment would have been particularly relevant to the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Bielski’s opinion that Watson would have moderate limitations in interacting with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public. Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 28 of 31
29 documentation supporting her subjective complaints deprives the Court of the ability to conduct meaningful review, since we are without answers as to the ALJ’s reasoning for failing to include any mental limitations in the RFC assessment. Our view is consistent with prior findings in this Court and supported by other courts who have found that remand is necessary when an ALJ omits mild mental functional limitations identified at Step 2 without a valid explanation. See Wells v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061, 1068-71 (10 th Cir. 2013); Gunn v. Kajikazi, 705 F. Supp. 3d 315, 330-31 (E.D. Pa. 2023); Kich v. Colvin, 218 F. Supp. 3d 342, 357 (M.D. Pa. 2016). Indeed, “judges in this District have consistently held that even mild limitations in the relevant domains of mental functioning must be included in an RFC assessment and hypothetical question posed to the VE that the ALJ relies upon.” Meersand v. Kijakazi, No. 20-1084, 2021 WL 5003331, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2021) (collecting cases). Here, the ALJ did not include any hypothetical questions to the VE that would have addressed these mild limitations in functioning. This error was prejudicial to Watson’s case and compels remand. Simply put, more is needed here. It is axiomatic that the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). This means that there must be a logical nexus between the ALJ's factual findings and legal conclusion. That Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 29 of 31
30 logical bridge is missing here where the limiting effects of Watson’s mental impairments were never fully evaluated by the ALJ. Since the ALJ’s burden of articulation is not met in the instant case, we recommend this matter be remanded for further consideration by the Commissioner. Yet, while we reach this result, we note that nothing in this Report and Recommendation should be deemed as expressing a judgment on what the ultimate outcome of any reassessment of this evidence should be. Rather, the task should remain the duty and province of the ALJ on remand. IV. Recommendation For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff’s request for a new administrative hearing be GRANTED, the final decision of the Commissioner denying these claims be vacated, and this case be remanded to the Commissioner to conduct a new administrative hearing. The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 30 of 31
31 make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Submitted this 18 th day of February 2026. S/ Martin C. Carlson Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge Case 4:25-cv-00540-KMN Document 16 Filed 02/18/26 Page 31 of 31
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