Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VICTORIA STASH,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO, 1
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
: 	NO. 4:24-CV-00002
:
:
:
: 	(CAMONI, M.J.)
:
:
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), seeking
judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Plaintiff Victoria Stash’s claim for disability and disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The Court
has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3)
(incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference). For the reasons stated
herein, the Court vacates the decision of the Commissioner and remands
to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
1 	Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on
May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Frank Bisignano should be substituted as the defendant in
this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason
of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural History
On 	September 	29, 	2020, 	Stash 	applied 	for 	disability 	benefits,
alleging disability beginning January 31, 2020. Transcript, Doc. 9-5 at 2.
Following an initial denial, Stash submitted an appeal, requesting a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Doc. 9-4 at 24. The
ALJ conducted the hearing and determined that Stash is not disabled.
Doc. 9-2 at 32, 39.
Stash filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the
Appeals Council denied. Doc. 9-2 at 1. The ALJ’s decision, therefore,
became the final decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g).
Pending before this Court is Stash’s action seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision. Complaint, Doc. 1. This case is fully briefed
(docs. 10, 16, 17) and ripe for resolution. The parties consented to the
jurisdiction 	of 	a 	United 	States 	Magistrate 	Judge 	to 	conduct 	all
proceedings in this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 73, including entry of final judgment. Consent Form,
Doc. 7.
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B. 	The Disability Determination Process
To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act (“Act”),
a claimant must be unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable . . . impairment which can . . .
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
Under the Act, a claimant is disabled “only if his . . . impairments are of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 	§ 423(d)(2)(A). 	An 	impairment 	is 	one 	that 	“results 	from
anatomical, 	physiological, 	or 	psychological 	abnormalities 	which 	are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” § 423(d)(3).
Social 	Security 	regulations 	provide 	a 	“five-step 	sequential
evaluation process” to determine if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through
step four, while at step five, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show
that the claimant can perform substantial gainful employment other
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than the claimant’s past relevant work. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d
1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1992), citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5
(1987)).
At the first step, the claimant must establish that he has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset of the alleged
disability. See § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At the second step, claimant must
establish that he suffers from a “severe medically determinable . . .
impairment that meets the duration requirement . . . (“impairment . . .
must have lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous period of at
least 12 months”).” § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At the third step, the claimant
must provide evidence that his impairment “meets or equals one of our
listings in appendix 1.” § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant demonstrates
his impairments meet those listings, he is considered to be disabled. See
id.; § 404.1520(d). If he cannot establish severity of impairment at the
third step, the eligibility analysis proceeds to step four in which the ALJ
determines whether the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
allows 	the 	claimant 	to 	continue 	his 	previous 	employment.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). RFC “is the most [a claimant] can still do despite”
impairments. 	§ 404.1545(a)(1). 	To 	prevail 	on 	step 	four, 	claimant’s
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“impairment(s) must prevent [him] from doing . . . past relevant work.”
§ 404.1520(f). At the fifth step, the Commissioner bears the burden to
demonstrate that the claimant’s RFC and his “age, education, and work
experience . . . [allows] adjustment to other work.” § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If
the Commissioner cannot satisfy this burden, the claimant’s claim is
granted. See § 404.1520(g).
C. 	The ALJ’s Decision
Here, 	the 	ALJ 	determined 	that 	Stash 	“has 	not 	been 	under 	a
disability, . . . from January 31, 2020, through the date of this decision.”
Doc. 9-2 at 31. The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding through
the five-step sequential analysis required by the Social Security Act.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v); see Doc. 9-2 at 20-31.
At step one, the ALJ determined that Stash “has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since January 31, 2020, the alleged onset
date,” of disability. Doc. 9-2 at 20. At step two, the ALJ found that Stash
has the following severe impairments: lynch syndrome, degenerative disc
disease of the spine, fibromyalgia, hepatic steatosis, migraine headache,
history of pulmonary embolism and deep vein thrombosis, metabolic
syndrome, morbid obesity, and major depressive disorder. Id. at 21. At
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step three, the ALJ determined that Stash “does not have an impairment
or 	combination 	of 	impairments 	that 	meets 	or 	medically 	equals 	the
severity of one of the listed impairments in” 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart
P, appendix 1. Id. at 21.
Between steps three and four, the ALJ found that Stash has the
following RFC:
[T]o perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)
except the claimant can only stand and walk 4 hours each,
with standing and walking in increments of no more than one
hour and sitting in increments of no more than two hours. She
can have frequent bilateral overhead reaching but no stooping
or crouching and an ability to occasionally balance, kneel,
crawl and climb without utilizing ladders, ropes or scaffolds
and without exposure to high heat, humidity or wetness. The
claimant 	is 	able 	to 	carry 	out 	detailed 	but 	uninvolved
instructions to perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks;
involving only simple work-related decisions and occasional
workplace changes. Additionally, she can tolerate frequent
interaction with coworkers and supervisors and no interaction
with the public.
Id. at 24.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Stash “is unable to perform
any past relevant work.” Id. at 30. At the fifth and final step, the ALJ
denied Stash’s disability claims because after considering her “age,
education, work experience, and [RFC], there are jobs that exist in
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significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can
perform.” Id. at 30.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Stash 	primarily 	argues 	that 	the 	ALJ 	erred 	at 	the 	RFC
determination step and step five of the disability determination process
by failing “to include – or discuss the decision to exclude – a limitation to
‘one and two step tasks’.” Pl.’s Br., Doc. 10 at 1, 6; Pl.’s Reply Br., Doc. 17
at 1, 3.2 Stash is correct.
Because the ALJ here found persuasive two agency psychologists’
RFC 	limitations 	but 	failed 	to 	incorporate 	them 	in 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC
determination 	without 	any 	explanation, 	and 	the 	two 	agency
psychologists’ RFC limitations are inconsistent with the reasoning level
of 	the 	jobs 	the 	ALJ 	identified 	at 	step 	five, 	the 	decision 	of 	the
Commissioner will be vacated and remanded to the Commissioner.
2 	Because 	the 	Court 	vacates 	and 	remands 	the 	decision 	of 	the
Commissioner for further consideration, concluding that the ALJ erred
by failing to include or explain his decision to exclude a limitation to one
and two step tasks, the Court declines to address Stash’s remaining
argument. “A remand may produce different results on these claims,
making discussion of them moot.” Burns v. Colvin, 156 F. Supp. 3d 579,
598 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
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A. 	The requirements at the RFC stage
Generally, “[a]n ALJ is entitled to credit parts of an opinion without
crediting the entire opinion.” Durden v. Colvin, 191 F. Supp. 3d 429, 455
(M.D. Pa. 2016). But an ALJ opinion “that fails properly to consider,
discuss and weigh relevant medical evidence,” may require remand when
there is conflicting probative evidence in the record but an explanation of
the reasoning behind the ALJ’s conclusion is not provided. Fargnoli v.
Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001).
When, as in this case, an ALJ finds persuasive a medical opinion
that identifies a claimant’s RFC limitation, the ALJ errs by failing to
include that limitation in the RFC determination without explanation.
See Shipman v. Kizakazi, No. 22-636, 2023 WL 5599607, at *9 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 29, 2023); Michelle M. v. Bisignano, No. 23-2163, 2025 WL 2713737,
at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting cases); Warren v. Dudek, No.
24-635, 2025 WL 1168276, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2025), citing Durden,
191 F. Supp. 3d at 455, (“While an ALJ is not required to accept every
limitation set forth in an opinion that is found to be persuasive, the
decision 	must 	adequately 	explain 	the 	rationale 	behind 	the 	RFC
determination.”). 	That 	error 	is 	nevertheless 	harmless 	if 	the 	RFC
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determination is consistent with the vocational expert’s indication of
representative jobs from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).
Soto v. Kijakazi, No. 21-1531, 2022 WL 4358087, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Sept.
20, 2022) (holding harmless an ALJ’s error in failing to include proper
RFC limitation because the RFC determination was consistent with at
least one of the jobs identified at step five); Reep v. Bisignano, No. 24-712,
2025 WL 1508453, at *9 (M.D. Pa. May 27, 2025) (holding same).
B. 	The ALJ’s RFC finding requires remand.
In this case, the ALJ erred when he failed to include, without an
explanation, the RFC limitations from Drs. Vigna and Mrykalo, two state
agency psychological consultants, that he found persuasive. Doc. 9-2 at
24, 29; See Mabry v. Bisignano, 791 F. Supp. 3d 556, 563 (M.D. Pa. 2025),
quoting Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F. 3d 429, 433 (3d Cir.
1999), (“ALJ must ‘indicate in his decision which evidence he has rejected
and which he is relying on as the basis for his finding.’”).
Compare first the RFC limitation determined by the ALJ and Drs.
Vigna and Mrykalo. The two doctors found that Stash can carry out “very
short and simple instructions.” Doc. 9-3 at 79, 105. The ALJ found that
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Stash can carry out “detailed but uninvolved instructions.” Doc. 9-2 at
24. These two limitations are distinct and inconsistent.
The court in 	Cowher v. O’Malley 	clarified this distinction. No.
21-178, 2024 WL 3161865, at *7–9 (W.D. Pa. June 24, 2024). In Cowher,
the court explained that “a difference exists between an individual
capable of following ‘simple instructions,’ and an individual only capable
of following ‘very short and simple instructions (i.e., perform one and two
step tasks).’” 2024 WL 3161865, at *7. It concluded that while a limitation
to very short and simple instructions is consistent with jobs at reasoning
level one, courts generally find that a limitation to simple instructions is
consistent with jobs at both reasoning level one and level two. 	Id.
(collecting cases).
Here, Drs. Vigna and Mrykalo, by finding that Stash is limited to
carrying out “very short and simple instructions,” Doc. 9-2 at 79, 105,
opined that Stash is limited to performing one and two step tasks—
consistent with jobs at reasoning level one. Cowher, 2024 WL 3161865,
at *7; see, e.g., Warren v. Dudek, No. 24-635, 2025 WL 1168276, at *7
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2025) (“Here, the jobs identified by the ALJ at Step 5
require a reasoning level 2, which could be inconsistent with a limitation
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to one-to-two-step tasks.”); 	Latourette v. King, No. 24-516, 2025 WL
580597, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2025); Reep, 2025 WL 1508453, at *8–9.
Therefore, the ALJ’s RFC finding that Stash can carry out “detailed but
uninvolved instructions,” Doc. 9-2 at 24, was inconsistent. See Mabry, 791
F. Supp. 3d at 564 (explaining that detailed but uninvolved instructions
are consistent with jobs at reasoning level two). Because the ALJ found
Drs. Vigna and Mrykalo’s opinions persuasive but failed to include their
RFC findings without an explanation, the ALJ has erred.
C. 	The error is not harmless.
The ALJ’s failure to include or to explain the exclusion of the RFC
limitation findings by Drs. Vigna and Mrykalo is not harmless because
at 	step 	five, 	the 	ALJ 	only 	identified 	jobs 	that 	are 	consistent 	with
reasoning level two. Doc. 9-2 at 31; see Small Parts Assembler (DICOT
706.684-022), 1991 WL 679050 (2016); Marker (DICOT 209.587-034),
1991 WL 671802 (2016); Router (DICOT 222.587-038), 1991 WL 672123
(2016). Had the ALJ included at least one job consistent with a reasoning
level one, the error would be harmless. Soto, 2022 WL 4358087, at *11
(holding harmless an ALJ’s error in failing to include proper RFC
limitation because the RFC determination was consistent with at least
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one of the jobs identified at step five); Reep, 2025 WL 1508453, at *9
(holding same). He did not, so the error is not harmless.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision will be VACATED, and
the case REMANDED to the Commissioner to fully develop the record,
conduct a new administrative hearing, and appropriately evaluate the
evidence pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
An appropriate order follows.
Date: January 27, 2026 	s/Sean A. Camoni
Sean A. Camoni
United States Magistrate Judge
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