Charles v. County of Lycoming et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RUTH CHARLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF LYCOMING,
PENNSYLVANIA, RYAN
GARDNER, individually, and
LISA DIMASSIMO, individually,
Defendants.
No. 4:21-CV-00883
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DECEMBER 31, 2025
I. 	BACKGROUND
On May 14, 2021, Plaintiff Ruth Charles (“Charles”) filed a four-count
complaint against Defendants County of Lycoming (“Lycoming”), Ryan Gardner
(“Gardner”), and Lisa DiMassimo (“DiMassimo”). 1 On December 13, 2021, Charles
filed an amended complaint which expanded the number of counts to seven. 2 Counts
One and Two brought claims against Lycoming for discrimination and retaliation
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). 3 Counts Three and Four
were claims against all Defendants for discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C.
1 	Doc. 1 (Compl.).
2 	Doc. 15 (Am. Compl.).
3 	Id.
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§ 	1981 	(“Section 	1981”).4 Counts 	Five 	and 	Six 	bring 	state 	law 	claims 	for
discrimination 	and 	retaliation 	under 	the 	Pennsylvania 	Human 	Relations 	Act
(“PHRA”) against all three Defendants, while Count Seven brings a claim for aiding
and abetting under the PHRA against Garder and DiMassimo. 5
After the close of discovery, on June 20, 2025, the three Defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment. The motion is now ripe for disposition; for the
reasons below, it is granted.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate
where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”6 Material facts are those “that
could alter the outcome” of the litigation, “and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence
exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person
with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.” 7 A defendant “meets this
standard when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff’s
case.” 8 Conversely, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “point to
4 	Id.
5 	Id.
6 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
7 	EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).
8 	Clark v. Mod. Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993).
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admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a prima facie
case under applicable substantive law.” 9
In assessing “whether there is evidence upon which a jury can properly
proceed to find a verdict for the [nonmoving] party,”10 the Court “must view the
facts and evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.”11 Moreover, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of
fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule
56(c),” the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” 12
Finally, although “the court need consider only the cited materials, . . . it may
consider other materials in the record.” 13
B. 	Undisputed Facts
With that standard outlining the Court’s framework for review, I now turn to
the undisputed facts.
Ruth Charles is a woman of Asian descent who was hired in 2013 as a clerk
in the Assessment Office of Lycoming County.14 In September 2019, Charles
received a prior written warning while in that role that precipitated a transfer to a
9 	Id.
10 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (quoting Schuylkill & Dauphin Imp.
Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)).
11 	Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020).
12 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613-14 (3d
Cir. 2018).
13 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
14 	Doc. 35 (Defs.’ SOF) ¶¶ 1-2; Doc. 38 (Pl.’s SOF) ¶¶ 1-2.
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position as a full-time clerk in the District Attorney’s Office. 15 When she joined the
office, she was placed in a probation period for 180 days.16
On April 6, 2020, one of Charles’ co-workers, Karen Chianelli, made a
statement in the office that used the racial slur “chinks.” 17 The statement was made
in the vicinity of Charles and was made at a loud enough decibel to be heard by her.18
Both Charles and the other worker in the office made immediate reports of the
incident to her supervisor DiMassimo, with Charles’ report being made via email.19
Her report included the statements: “I am Asian and that word is one of the most
Racist/demeaning words you could use towards an Asian person. I understand it’s
not about me, but it was very inappropriate to hear.” 20 DiMassimo reported the
incident to the Human Resources Department and the District Attorney.21 That same
day, DiMassimo also held a meeting with both Charles and Chianelli where
Chianelli “acted as if she did nothing wrong.”22 Further, DiMassimo told Chianelli
in the meeting that there was zero tolerance for this type of behavior. 23
While there may have been other instances of discomfort between Charles and
Chianelli, there was no other reported incidents of racist remarks being used in the
15 	Doc. 35 ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 38 ¶¶ 3-4.
16 	Doc. 35 ¶ 5, Ex. 2.
17 	Doc. 35 ¶ 9; Doc. 38 ¶ 9.
18 	Doc. 35 ¶ 10; Doc. 38 ¶ 10.
19 	Doc. 35 ¶ 11; Doc. 38 ¶ 11.
20 	Doc. 35 ¶ 12; Doc. 38, Ex. J.
21 	Doc. 38, Ex. J.
22 	Id.; Doc. 35 ¶ 13.
23 	Doc. 35 ¶ 14; Doc. 38 ¶ 14.
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office. 24 However, superiors in the office began to allege performance issues with
Charles’ work.25 On April 30, 2020, these allegations came to a head when an
assistant district attorney in the office, Michael Sullivan, 	sent an email to District
Attorney 	Gardner 	describing 	four 	instances 	when 	Charles 	had 	acted
inappropriately. 26 The email described her as “very stand-offish” and said that the
attorney “avoid[s] her at this point.”27 The four instances of alleged inappropriate
conduct were laid out as follows:
On one recent occasion she got upset while I was talking with the clerk seated
next to her. We weren’t loud, but she said I needed to leave because she needs
quiet to work. It was very awkward and an inappropriate reaction for the
situation.
On another occasion while I was trying to get discovery done with her, I asked
her to get an MVR and she told me I can just email the officer and get it
myself. She turned away from me and went back to her other work. I had
another clerk do it instead.
On another occasion I asked her to get a lab report which was missing the
second page because I needed to list the technician on a subpoena. She asked
me if I reached out to the PSP to get it and I told her no, but that I thought she
had a system she could pull it from. She was not happy, later that day she
“tossed” the paper I gave her (which listed the case) towards me there isn’t a
report in the system. I told her it had to exist because I have pages 1 and 3 and
she said that she couldn’t find it and turned her back to me. I asked Jill and
Jill got it for me.
This afternoon I received an email with an ARD question from April
McDonald asking if we would have our ARD paperwork ready by June 8th. I
was told to check with Ruth. When l approached Ruth and asked her If l could
24 	Doc. 35 ¶¶ 17-18; Doc. 38 ¶¶ 17-18.
25 	Doc. 35 ¶ 19; Doc. 38 ¶ 19.
26 	Doc. 35 ¶ 20, Ex. 9; Doc. 38 ¶ 20.
27 	Doc. 35, Ex. 9.
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ask her a question about an email from April McDonald, and she got
defensive. I tried to explain what I needed and she made statements that she
saw the email and she wasn’t going to respond because “I don’t do that
because I don’t know what that is so I just don’t do it unless It is a DUI case”;
“I am just a little person and I don’t do things like that”; “attorneys get paid
to figure that stuff out”, etc. I don’t remember all of her comments but they
were all designed to push me away and not bother her. All I wanted to know
was if there was any paperwork our office needed to do so I could respond to
April. Ruth clearly didn’t want to discuss it. She said she filed what she was
supposed to file in PMS today and that I got a copy so she is not involved any
further. Again, it was not a helpful interaction. 28
On May 1, 2020, a separate email from Sullivan to DiMassimo described
another issue where Charles had not provided requested documents that were needed
for court hearings.29 That same day DiMassimo sent an email to Gardner reporting
a meeting she had with Charles to discuss some of the issues with her work. 30 The
email began by noting that “Charles was once again extremely hostile” in the office
and that “this was not the first time our staff has encountered this behavior from
Ruth.” 31 At the meeting, Charles was said to have broken down into tears and
brought up an issue about having to come into the office on that day.32 Charles said
that it was “bullshit ” that she had to come into the office. 33 DiMassimo stated that
Charles had to come into the office on a day outside of her normal weekly rotation
because she “needed a clerk.” 34 A final email was sent by a paralegal in the office,
28 	Id.
29 	Doc. 35 ¶ 21, Ex. 10; Doc. 38 ¶ 21.
30 	Doc. 35 ¶ 22, Ex. 11; Doc. 38 ¶ 22.
31 	Doc. 35, Ex. 11.
32 	Id.
33 	Id.
34 	Id.
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Jill Schriner, recounting three separate instances of alleged work issues. 35 These
three reports also involved Charles’ sending work to be done elsewhere and
questioning her work responsibilities. 36
On May 1, 2020, Charles was called into a meeting with then District Attorney
Gardner and informed that she was being terminated for insubordination.37 Gardner
told Charles that this “was the worst case of insubordination he had ever seen in his
30 year career of being an attorney.”38 Gardner made the ultimate decision to
terminate Charles, but did so with the input of DiMassimo. 39
C. 	Analysis
Respondents argue that Charles has failed to produce admissible evidence to
establish a prima facie case for any of the seven counts in her amended complaint.40
Because the same analytical framework applies to Title VII, Section 1981, and the
PHRA claims, each claim of discrimination and retaliation will be addressed
together.41 Finally, I will analyze the aiding and abetting PHRA claim brought
against Gardner and DiMassimo.
35 	Doc. 35 ¶ 23, Ex. 12; Doc. 38 ¶ 23.
36 	See Doc. 35, Ex. 12.
37 	Doc. 35 ¶ 26; Doc. 38 ¶ 26.
38 	Doc. 35, Ex. 5 (Charles Dep.) 120235-121:3.
39 	Doc. 35 ¶¶ 27, 30; Doc. 38 ¶ 29.
40 	Doc. 36, at 7.
41 	Qin v. Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th 458, 470 (3d Cir. 2024); Atkinson v. Lafayette Coll., 460 F.3d
447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Claims under the PHRA are interpreted coextensively with Title
VII claims.”); Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 915 n.5 (3d Cir. 1983) (explaining
that actions brought under § 1981 require the same elements of proof as a Title VII action).
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1. 	Discrimination Claims
Charles brings discrimination claims under Title VII, Section 1981, and the
PHRA. 42 Nested within the three claims are two theories of discrimination—hostile
work 	environment 	and 	disparate 	treatment. 43 Each 	theory 	will 	be 	addressed
separately.
a. 	Hostile Work Environment
In both Charles’ Title VII and Section 1981 discrimination claims she includes
an argument that various defendants “subjected her to a hostile work environment”
due to her race. 44 To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment, “the
plaintiff must establish that 1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination
because of his/her [race], 2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive, 3) the
discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would
detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) the existence
of respondeat superior liability.” 45
Where this claim ultimately rises or falls is on the second element—whether
the discrimination was severe or pervasive. “Whether an environment is hostile
requires looking at the totality of the circumstances, including: ‘the frequency of the
42 	All three claims are brought against Lycoming, but only the 1981 and PHRA discrimination
claims are brought against Gardner and DiMassimo. See Doc. 15.
43 	See Doc. 15 ¶¶ 54, 61. The PHRA claim includes only the disparate treatment theory of
discrimination. See id. ¶ 67.
44 	See Doc. 15 ¶¶ 54, 61.
45 	Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013); Castleberry v. STI Grp.,
863 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2017).
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discriminatory 	conduct; 	its 	severity; 	whether 	it 	is 	physically 	threatening 	or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s work performance.’” 46 While one instance of severe harassment
can be sufficient to establish such a claim, the plaintiff must establish that the
incident was “extreme [enough] to amount to a change in the terms and conditions
of employment.” 47
Despite Charles’ unsupported claims to the contrary, the undisputed facts of
this case show that there was one isolated incident of discriminatory conduct—when
Charles’ co-worker, Karen Chianelli, made an inflammatory set of statements using
the word “chink(s).”48 While this is an offensive word to use in any environment,
this singular incident is not severe enough to allow for the second element of the
hostile work environment standard to be met. 49 Though clearly an offensive and
46 	Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
47 	Id. (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). Charles focuses on the
Castleberry case to advance here argument that a singular instance of discriminatory conduct
can serve as the basis of a hostile work environment claim. See Doc. 37, at 5-6. While the
Court acknowledges that this can be the case, that case is distinguishable from the case at hand
because here the employee’s supervisor did not make the discriminatory statement and there
was no accompaniment of threats of termination present. See id. The Third Circuit has found
that these differences can be determinative in a hostile work environment analysis. Gladden v.
Ambler Healthcare Grp., LLC, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1638, at *4-5 (3d Cir. 2024).
48 	Doc. 35 ¶ 9; Doc. 38 ¶ 9.
49 	Compare Ali v. Woodbridge Twp. Sch. Dist., 957 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that
obviously racial comments, including being greeted with “Hey Arabia Nights” or “Hey, Big
Egypt” and condescending questions about technology in the plaintiff’s home country, were
not so severe as to make a hostile work environment) and Qin v. Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th 458,
470-71 (3d Cir. 2024) (holding that three obviously racist statements using phrases like “China
Man” in an office with only one Chinese employee were not severe or pervasive enough to
establish a hostile work environment) with Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 265 (holding that the use
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humiliating comment, Charles has provided no tangible evidence that the statements
of Chianelli interfered with her work performance after the day the incident occurred
or injected any hostility or abuse into the work environment. 50 Combined, the
evidence — or lack thereof —proffered by Charles is insufficient to qualify the
discrimination as severe. 51 The isolated statement is also simply far too infrequent
to be pervasive enough to meet the standard. 52 As the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has said, “it is a rare and extreme case in which a single incident
will be so severe that it would … make the working environment hostile.” 53 The
matter before the Court is the unfortunate case of an isolated offensive comment
over an employee’s seven years of employment that does not rise to the level of
creating a hostile work environment. 54 As such, these discrimination claims cannot
of an unambiguous racial epithet by a supervisor, immediately followed by a threat of
termination, created a hostile work environment).
50 	See Qin, 100 F.4th at 471.
51 	See id.
52 	See id. (“three comments over the course of almost nineteen years simply do not reach the
requisite level of frequency or severity”); Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67 F.4th 565, 571 (3d
Cir. 2023) (determining that seven comments over three-and-a-half years were neither severe
nor pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment).
53 	Ali, 957 F.3d at 181 (quoting Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 626 A.2d 445, 455
(1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court wishes to note that whether the content
of the statements was “I can’t stand the chinks” and “I can’t believe these chinks” as Charles
alleged or another statement using the racial slur is ultimately immaterial. See Doc. 37 at 5.
Both parties agree that this was a patently offensive statement, and the Court’s analysis should
not be taken as anything other than a complete condemnation of the use of the word. However,
whether its use created a hostile work environment is a separate question from its
offensiveness. Based on the Court’s analysis, the former question must be answered in the
negative.
54 	See id.
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survive the current summary judgment motion through a hostile work environment
theory.
b. 	Disparate Treatment
In all three discrimination claims, Charles alleges a disparate treatment theory
of discrimination.55 “A disparate treatment violation is made out when an individual
of a protected group is shown to have been singled out and treated less favorably
than others similarly situated on the basis of an impermissible criterion.” 56 This
claim requires “proof of the employer’s discriminatory motive,” which “can either
be shown by direct evidence … or through indirect or circumstantial evidence.” 57
When there is a lack of direct evidence of disparate treatment, courts use the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.58 Under this test, “the plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) s/he is
a member of a protected class; (2) s/he was qualified for the position s/he sought to
attain or retain; (3) s/he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action
occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional
discrimination.”59 If they are able to do so, “then an inference of discriminatory
motive arises and the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-
55 	See Doc. 15 ¶¶ 54, 61, 67.
56 	E.E.O.C. v. Metal Serv. Co., 892 F.2d 341, 347 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n. 15 (1977)).
57 	Id.
58 	Qin v. Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th 458, 472-73 (3d Cir. 2024).
59 	Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
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discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” 60 Finally, if the defendant
accomplishes this, “the inference of discrimination drops and the burden shifts back
to the plaintiff to show that the defendants’ proffered reason is merely pretext for
intentional discrimination.”61
Here too, Charles’ claim rises and falls on a single element—the fourth
element requiring that the action occurred under circumstances that could give rise
to an inference of intentional discrimination.62 A plaintiff may show that an inference
of intentional discrimination is possible “by demonstrat[ing] that similarly-situated
persons outside the protected class were treated more favorably.” 63 Charles alleges
that there are other ways to show that an inference of intentional discrimination, but
provides no legal support for such proposition.64 The Court recognizes that this test
is not “rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic” so it agrees that it is possible to prove this
interference in another fashion.65 However, when a comparator is not offered, what
is required is the offering of “sufficient evidence” to allow “the court [to] infer that
60 	Id.
61 	Id.
62 	The Court notes that elements one through three have all likely been met here. Charles is an
Asian woman—an assuredly protected class, she was clearly qualified for the position as she
was hired to the position and worked there for seven years, and she suffered the adverse
employment action of termination. Given that defendants did not present any argument to the
first three elements of the prima facie case, they seemingly concede that these elements have
been made out. See Doc. 36, at 11-14.
63 	Qin, 100 F.4th at 474; Collins v. Kimberly-Clark Pennsylvania, LLC, 708 F. App’x 48, 52 (3d
Cir. 2017).
64 	See Doc. 37, at 11. The singular case she cites does not even analyze the fourth prong. See
Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 1999).
65 	Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
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if the employer’s actions remain unexplained, it is more likely than not that such
actions were based on impermissible reasons.” 66
In the present case, Charles does not offer a direct comparator, but does
indirectly imply that Chianelli could be one.67 While the Court recognizes that
comparators “need not be identical [, they] must be similarly situated in all material
respects.” 68 At first blush, it seems as though Chianelli would be a suitable
comparator given their seemingly identical supervisor, job responsibilities, and
standards that they were subject to. 69 Nevertheless, the actions leading to their
respective punishments for their conduct are not similar enough. While both
employees used words that the office disapproved of, the overriding difference is the
additional infractions having to do with job performance that Charles’ record
reflects. If she had been fired solely because of the use of the word “bullshit,”
Chianelli would be a perfect comparator for Charles. However, this was not the case,
and 	Charles’ 	record 	indicates 	multiple 	additional 	infractions 	based 	on 	job
performance and insubordination. No similar incidents regarding Chianelli have
been shown to have occurred. Ultimately, they may have been similarly situated in
66 	E.E.O.C. v. Metal Serv. Co., 892 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1990).
67 	See Doc. 37, at 11.
68 	Qin, 100 F.4th at 474 (quoting In re Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 403 (3d Cir. 2018))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
69 	Id.
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their job titles and roles, but their conduct was not similar enough to say that they
were materially similarly situated and treated differently.70
Further, Charles provides no — let alone sufficient — evidence to allow the
Court to utilize a different method to find that “it is more likely than not that such
actions were based on impermissible reasons.”71 This fact, combined with the lack
of a valid comparator, leads the Court to the belief that Charles has not sufficiently
made out the fourth element of the prima facie discrimination claim. This finding is
sufficient 	to 	grant 	summary 	judgment 	to 	the 	employer,72 and, 	as 	such, 	the
discrimination claims cannot survive this summary judgment motion on a disparate
treatment theory either. 73
70 	See Glass v. First Jud. Dist. of Pennsylvania, 734 F. App’x 136, 140 (3d Cir. 2018).
71 	E.E.O.C. v. Metal Serv. Co., 892 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1990).
72 	See Glass, 734 F. App’x at 140; Ammar v. McDonough, No. CV 22-1608-GBW, 2025 WL
692084, at *13 (D. Del. Mar. 4, 2025).
73 	Even if the Court were to find that Charles has made out a prima facie case of discrimination,
it would still find that she failed to prove that the defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory
proffered reason is merely pretext. Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008).
Regarding the issue of pretext, Charles first contends that the termination was in direct conflict
with the County’s own policies. See Doc. 37, at 14. This is simply not the case, as their
disciplinary policy plainly allows for termination upon a singular incident of insubordination
to a supervisor. See Doc. 37, Ex. N, at 3. She next claims that the timing of the complaints and
decision proves that it is pretext. See Doc. 37, at 15. The timing of these events is short in
duration, but it does not rebut the adequacy of the evidence supporting termination. The timing
discrepancies can likely be explained by the recollection difficulties of remembering events
that happened half a decade prior. But even if the timing were odd, it does not allow the Court
“to infer that discrimination was more likely than not the motivating factor or determinative
cause of the adverse employment action” — a requirement to avoid summary judgment under
this standard. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1994). Because Charles has failed
to provide sufficient doubt that the proffered reasons were pretext, summary judgment would
be proper even if a prima facie case had been made out here. See id.
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Because Charles’ discrimination claims cannot survive summary judgment
under either hostile work environment or disparate treatment theories, Defendants’
summary judgment motion is granted with respect to Charles’ discrimination claims.
2. 	Retaliation Claims
Charles also brings retaliation claims under Title VII, Section 1981, and the
PHRA. 74 In retaliation cases, courts also use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework when there is no direct evidence of retaliation, as is the case here. 75 Under
this framework, the plaintiff “first must establish a prima facie case by showing (1)
[that she engaged in] protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer
either after or contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity; and (3) a
causal connection between the employee's protected activity and the employer's
adverse action.” 76 Similar to disparate treatment claims, if the plaintiff can make out
a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate, non-
retaliatory rationale for the adverse action and then “the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's proffered explanation was false, and that
retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment action.”77
74 	Similar to the discrimination claims, all three retaliation claims are brought against Lycoming,
but only the 1981 and PHRA claims are brought against Gardner and DiMassimo. See Doc.
15.
75 	Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015).
76 	Id. (quoting Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir.2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
77 	Id.
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Both parties agree that Charles has satisfied the first and second elements of
the prima facie case. 78 Therefore, whether a prima facie case is made out is
dependent on the third factor—whether she has established a causal connection
between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action. To
establish the third prong, courts “consider a broad array of evidence.” 79 One such
type of evidence is “[w]here the temporal proximity between the protected activity
and the adverse action is unusually suggestive.” 80 That temporal proximity can, by
itself, in some instances establish a prima facie case of retaliation.” 81 However, there
is no set number of days that are considered to be unusually suggestive. 82 Where the
temporal proximity is not unusually suggestive, “[a]mong the kinds of evidence that
a 	plaintiff 	can 	proffer 	are 	intervening 	antagonism 	or 	retaliatory 	animus,
inconsistencies in the employer’s articulated reasons for terminating the employee,
or any other evidence in the record sufficient to support the inference of retaliatory
animus.” 83
78 	See Doc. 36, at 16.
79 	LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 284 (3d Cir.2000)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
80 	Id. at 232.
81 	Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (temporal proximity alone,
when “very close,” can in some instances establish a prima facie case of retaliation).
82 	LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 232 (“There is no bright line rule as to what constitutes unduly suggestive
temporal proximity”).
83 	Id.
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Here, the temporal proximity could be unusually suggestive. Charles took her
protected activity—informally complaining to DiMassimo about the discriminatory
comments made by Chianelli—on April 6, 2020.84 On May 1, 2020, the adverse
employment action was taken—Charles was fired.85 This four-week period is within
the temporal proximity that courts around the Third Circuit have found to be
unusually suggestive. 86 This close timeframe can be, and is here, sufficient “to create
an inference of causality.” 87 Therefore, all three elements of a prima facie case could
be found to have been met.
The next step under the McDonnell Douglas framework is for the defendants
to put forth a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action. 88 They have
done just that by providing evidence of the multiple instances of insubordination.
Thus, the burden shifts yet against. Finally resting with Charles “to demonstrate that
the employer’s proffered explanation was false, and that retaliation was the real
reason for the adverse employment action.” 89 This is ultimately where her retaliation
claims crumble.
84 	Doc. 35 ¶ 9; Doc. 38 ¶ 9.
85 	Doc. 35 ¶ 26; Doc. 38 ¶ 26.
86 	Fasold v. Just., 409 F.3d 178, 190 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that a three-month period may justify
“an inference of retaliation”); see also Nesselrotte v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., No. CIV A 06-
01390, 2009 WL 703395 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2009) (finding that a less than three month period
between the protected activity and the action satisfied the causation prong); Anderson v. Coors
Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that two months and one week
was sufficient temporal proximity to establish causation).
87 	LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 232; Clark County School Dist., 532 U.S. at 273-74.
88 	Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015).
89 	Id.
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“[T]he plaintiff’s evidence rebutting the employer’s proffered legitimate
reasons must allow a factfinder reasonably to infer that each of the employer's
proffered 	non-discriminatory 	reasons 	… 	was 	either 	a post 	hoc fabrication 	or
otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action (that is, the proffered
reason is a pretext).” 90 To do this, the “plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s
proffered 	legitimate 	reasons 	for 	its 	action 	that 	a 	reasonable
factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.” 91
Charles has provided almost no evidence that the Defendants’ proffered
explanation was false, let alone that retaliation was the real reason for her ultimate
termination. She argues that the “insubordination” reasoning provided for her
dismissal “was a label slapped on Plaintiff as a result of her complaining about
discrimination.”92 But to support this, Charles only sets forth two things: (1) that the
timing of the complaints and termination are suspicious and (2) that Chianelli was
not fired for her use of a racial slur.93 Neither of these purported submissions of
evidence fully address the incidents demonstrating insubordination and, combined
90 	Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
91 	Id. at 765 (quoting Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis–Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d
Cir.1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92 	Doc. 37, at 19.
93 	See id. at 19-20.
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with all of the other evidence in the record, would not allow a reasonable factfinder
to determine that Defendants’ reasoning was simply pretext.
Ultimately, the fact that Charles complained about having to show up, in-
person, to her job and was fired the next day, does not throw into question the
proffered reason for her termination.94 It is also unsurprising that a manager would
ask his subordinates to put complaints into writing prior to dismissing an employee.95
Finally, as previously stated, Charles and Chianelli were not entirely similarly
situated — Chianelli lacked any of the reports of insubordination that Charles had
in her record. That one was only reprimanded and the other fired cannot serve as the
basis to find that discrimination or retaliation was the determinative cause of the
termination when the reported misconduct is just of a different nature and kind.
Looking past the proffered arguments, the record is devoid of any further evidence
that could rebut the proffered reasoning.96
94 	See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 766.
95 	See id.
96 	The Court notes that it did consider all of the evidence in the record to adduce evidence of the
proffered reason being pretext. It could discern no other evidence that could or should have
been argued. The evidence proffered in other sections of the brief in opposition to this motion
also do not support a finding of pretext. For example, Charles repeatedly argues that there are
discrepancies in the reasons given for the firing and the timing of when the termination was
decided. See Doc. 37, at 12, 20. There are simply no inconsistencies in the record on these
issues that are not inconsequential differences. Notably, whether the decision to terminate
Charles was made on the night of April 30 or the morning of May 1 is ultimately an
inconsequential distinction in a determination of whether the proffered reasoning is pretext.
Further, there are no discrepancies in the reasons given for the actual termination. This is but
one example of the lack of evidence in the record supporting Charles’ ultimate contention that
insubordination was a pretextual reason for her termination.
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In sum, Charles has submitted no evidence raises a material issue of fact
related to the ultimate reason for Charles’ firing. As such, her three retaliation claims
fail the McDonnell Douglas test and cannot survive summary judgment.
3. 	Aiding and Abetting Claim under the PHRA
Charles’ final count of her amend complaint argues that Gardner and
DiMassimo violated the PHRA by aiding and abetting the allegedly discriminatory
firing. The PHRA “makes it unlawful [f]or any person, employer, employment
agency, labor organization or employe, [sic] to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the
doing of ... an unlawful discriminatory practice.” 97 However, “[f]or liability to be
imposed under the PHRA on an aiding and abetting theory, there must be a
cognizable predicate offense, i.e., a violation by the employer of the PHRA.”98 This
Court has just found that Lycoming County “has not violated the PHRA at the
institutional level,” nor has it violated Title VII or Section 1981.99 Therefore, the
97 	De Piero v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 769 F. Supp. 3d 329, 356 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (quoting
43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 955(e)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98 	Id. (quoting Williams v. Aramark Campus LLC, 2020 WL 1182564, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12,
2020)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Kaniuka v. Good Shepherd Home, No. 05–CV–
02917, 2006 WL 2380387, *10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2006) (“Individual defendants cannot
violate PHRA section 955(e) when there is no corresponding section 955(a) violation”). The
Court’s finding that there was no predicate PHRA violation by the employer makes it
unnecessary to determine whether Gardner and DiMassimo are supervisory employees for the
purposes of the PHRA. Kaniuka, 2020 WL 1182564, at *10.
99 	De Piero, 769 F. Supp. 3d at 356 n.9.
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claims for individual liability under the PHRA § 955(e) necessarily must fail, 100 and
summary judgment will be granted for Count VII.101
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
granted.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
100 See id.; Williams, 2020 WL 1182564, at *10; Lombard v. Lassip, Inc., No. 17-964, 2017 WL
6367956, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2017).
101 Even if the Court did not find that there was a lack of predicate offense that merited granting
summary judgment over Count VII, the Court would find that with there would “exist[] no
independent jurisdictional basis to maintain a PHRA claim against [Gardner and DiMassimo]
in federal court” and would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count VII with
summary judgment being granted to the Defendants on Counts I–VI. Dici v. Com. of Pa., 91
F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 1996).
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