3:26-cv-00613•Vasapolli v. The President of the United States et al
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA JOSEPH VASAPOLLI, : CIVIL NO. 3:26-CV-00613 : Plaintiff, : (Magistrate Judge Schwab) : v. : : THE PRESIDENT OF THE : UNITED STATES, et al., : : Defendants. : REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. Introduction. Currently pending are the plaintiff’s, Joseph Vasapolli’s (“Vasapolli”), “Motion for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order,” and “Emergency Master Motion for Injunctive Relief” (collectively “the pending emergency motions”) Docs. 22, 23; see also docs. 3, 7. Herein, we discuss the pending emergency motions, and we conduct a preliminary review of the amended complaint. After our review of the amended complaint, we recommend that the court dismiss the complaint, because we conclude that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We further recommend that the court deny the pending emergency motions. We finally recommend that the court grant Vasapolli leave to amend his complaint Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 1 of 15
2 II. Background and Procedural History. Vasapolli commenced this action pro se on February 13, 2026, by filing a complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Docs. 1, 2. On that same date, Vasapolli also filed the pending motion for temporary restraining order. Doc. 3. On February 18, 2026, the Eastern District issued an order (1) directing Vasapolli to file a declaration to cure the fact that Vasapolli failed to sign his complaint or emergency motion for temporary restraining order; and (2) denying Vasapolli’s application to proceed in forma pauperis without prejudice to Vasapolli filing a new application with sufficient financial information. Doc. 6. On March 3, 2026, Vasapolli filed his “emergency master motion for injunctive relief” and his second application to proceed in forma pauperis. Docs. 7, 8. And on March 4, 2026, Vasapolli filed the declaration described in the Eastern District’s February 18, 2026 Order. Doc. 9. Between March 4, 2026, and March 11, 2026, Vasapolli filed nine documents: one requesting relief (but is unsigned and not titled a motion, and requests the same relief as the “emergency master motion for injunctive relief”), seven that purport to be evidence of his claims, and one titled “Plaintiff’s Narrative Statement in Support of Amended Complaint[.]” Docs. 10–18. Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 2 of 15
3 On March 11, 2026, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania transferred the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania because “it is apparent the majority of the events, which appear to be largely based on incidents taking place at or related to medical facilities, occurred in Wayne County, which is located in the Middle District of Pennsylvania” “and [Vasapolli] appears to allege other incidents occurring in Lackawanna County which is also located in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.” Doc. 19 at 1, n.1 (internal citations omitted). On March 12, 2026, Vasapolli filed an amended complaint. Doc. 21. The following allegations are taken from the amended complaint. Id. The amended complaint purports to “add[] Joseph Lavin as Defendant” in addition to the defendants named in the initial complaint, who are named only in the amended complaint’s caption. Id. at 1. Vasapolli alleges that Joseph Lavin (“Lavin”), a “court employee of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania[,]” engaged in a “pattern of conduct[.]” Id. But the amended complaint contains sparse factual allegations. See generally id. Vasapolli alleges that Lavin contacted Vasapolli via “pretextual phone call” in order to transfer the instant case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to the present venue, the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 2; see also id. generally. It is unclear how this singular phone call constitutes a “pattern of conduct.” See generally id. Vasapolli summarily alleges that this phone call “directly resulted in the sua sponte transfer of this case to the Middle Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 3 of 15
4 District of Pennsylvania; and [] furthered the coordinated pattern of retaliation against Plaintiff’s presidential candidacy and whistleblower disclosures documented throughout this complaint.” Id. at 1. Vasapolli also alleges that Lavin is a part of a “RICO enterprise” which “consists of: (1) Multiple licensed Pennsylvania casinos coordinating account freezes post-jackpot; (2) Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board—stalling investigation HY-I-0987441-24, allowing fraud to continue; (3) Pennsylvania Department of Revenue—applying false liens and offsets; (4) Pennsylvania Attorney General—bouncing [sic] whistleblower disclosures; (5) IRS—rejecting returns based on corrupted casino data; (6) SSA— delaying disability benefits until congressional intervention; (7) Judgment Fund— rejecting $25M claims as ‘unauthorized’; (8) Joseph Lavin—court employee who transferred case into defendants’ jurisdiction via pretextual phone call.” Id. at 2. Vasapolli concludes that “[t]his is not coincidence[;] [t]his is a RICO enterprise.” Id. Vasapolli brings the following claims against Lavin: (1) a Bivens claim for violation of unspecified constitutional rights; (2) civil RICO claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d); (3) criminal charges for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503; and (4) claims for “whistleblower retaliation” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). For relief, Vasapolli seeks millions of dollars, criminal referrals of Lavin and an individual who is unnamed in the factual allegations of the amended Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 4 of 15
5 complaint, debt forgiveness and “clean slates” for four individuals who are otherwise unnamed in the amended complaint, “[b]usiness recovery and debt relief” for a fifth individual who is otherwise unnamed in the amended complaint, and injunctive relief—specifically, “medevac/transfer, federal investigations, [and] whistleblower protections[.]” Doc. 21 at 2–3. After an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint has no role in the future litigation of the case. See Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992); Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019). Accordingly, we will not consider Vasapolli’s initial complaint. Nevertheless, because Vasapolli purports to “add” his claims against Lavin in addition to the claims in his initial complaint, we note that in his initial complaint Lavin alleged the President of the United States, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal Election Commission (hereafter collectively the “initial defendants”) violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights and committed battery and kidnapping. Doc. 2. Vasapolli bases these claims on his “unlawful[] seiz[ure] and place[ment] in a mental institution against his will” and his “inject[ion] with GHB without consent” which “directly caused [Vasapolli’s] initial heart attack and the subsequent sequence of 11 heart surgeries/events[.]” Id. Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 5 of 15
6 III. Standard of Review. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court shall dismiss a complaint brought in forma pauperis if it determines that the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This statutory text mirrors the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, “[w]e must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether [the] plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F. 3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In making that determination, we “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff’s] claims are based upon these documents.” Id. at 230. “Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the plaintiff’s claim and of the grounds upon which the claim rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 6 of 15
7 allegations are not required, but more is required than “labels,” “conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). “A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.” Id. In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court “‘must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). But a court “need not credit a complaint’s bald assertions or legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 7 of 15
8 speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis: First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679). A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and “‘however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). III. Discussion. Vasapolli’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). “This already liberal standard is ‘even more pronounced’ where a plaintiff files the complaint without the assistance of counsel.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 8 of 15
9 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Erickson, 5 51 U.S. at 94). “[A] court must make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from the inadvertent forfeiture of important rights due merely to their lack of legal training.” Id. Thus, “[c]ourts are more forgiving of pro se litigants for filing relatively unorganized or somewhat lengthy complaints.” Id. Liberally construing Vasapolli’s amended complaint, however, we nevertheless conclude that it fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, which requires, among other things, that a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and allegations that are “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 8 (d)(1). Moreover, “[f]undamentally, Rule 8 requires that a complaint provide fair notice of ‘what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 92 (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93). Here, the amended complaint does not provide fair notice of what Vasapolli’s claims against the initial defendants are. Vasapolli includes no factual allegations against the initial defendants, nor does he state what claims he brings against them in the amended complaint. As to the claims Vasapolli brings against Lavin in the amended complaint, these claims also fail. Despite bringing Bivens claims against Lavin, Vasapolli does not identify what constitutional rights Lapin allegedly violated. Moreover, it is entirely unclear from the complaint how Lavin’s phone call to Vasapolli, and the Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 9 of 15
10 later transfer of this case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, violated Vasapolli’s rights. Similarly, it is unclear what Vasapolli disclosed such that he is entitled to whistleblower protections or how that was connected to Lavin’s phone call and the later transfer of this case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Thus, Vasapolli’s “whistleblower retaliation” claim fails as well. Vasapolli also brings claims against Lavin pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d), subsections of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Doc. 21 at 2. “Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful for a person employed by or associated with an enterprise to conduct the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 330 (2016) (footnote omitted). And section “1962(d) makes it unlawful to conspire to violate any of the other three prohibitions.” Id. To state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege the following elements: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010). RICO defines “racketeering activity” to include “a host of so-called predicate acts” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647 (2008). These predicate acts include “dozens of state and federal offenses.” RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 330. “A predicate offense implicates RICO when it is part of a ‘pattern of racketeering activity’—a series of related predicates that together demonstrate Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 10 of 15
11 the existence or threat of continued criminal activity.” Id. A “pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of racketeering activity” within a ten-year period. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Here, Vasapolli conclusively asserts that predicate acts have occurred including “wire fraud (electronic bouncing [sic] of whistleblower disclosures), mail fraud (false IRS data), obstruction of justice (Lavin transfer), and extortion (casino seizure of winnings).” Doc. 21 at 2. But these allegations are conclusory, such that we do not assume their truth. There are no non-conclusory factual allegations of behavior which amount to a predicate act or racketeering activity. See id. Moreover, Vasapolli does not allege any agreement between Lavin and any other individual as required to state a conspiracy claim. Vasapolli thus fails to state a RICO claim against Lavin. Finally, Vasapolli “requests this Court refer the conduct of [] Lavin . . . to the appropriate federal authorities for investigation” regarding a purported crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Id. Because 18 U.S.C. § 1503 is a criminal statute, Vasapolli cannot seek these punishments through a civil complaint because there is no “federal right to require the government to initiate criminal proceedings.” Rodriquez v. Salus, 623 F. App’x 588, 590 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”). Vasapolli, therefore, fails to state a claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 11 of 15
12 IV. Leave to Amend. Before dismissing a complaint under a screening provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). “Under Rule 15(a), futility of amendment is a sufficient basis to deny leave to amend.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010). “Futility ‘means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.’” Id. (quoting In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 493 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 2007)). Thus, in determining whether an amendment would be futile, we apply the same standard as we apply in determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Id. “In other words, ‘[t]he District Court determines futility by taking all pleaded allegations as true and viewing them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 330–31 (3d Cir. 2007)). Because Vasapolli has not presented a single complaint with all of his allegations, and because so many of the allegations he does present in his amended complaint are conclusory, we cannot say at this juncture that it would be futile for Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 12 of 15
13 him to amend his complaint. We thus recommend that the court grant him leave to amend. V. The Pending Emergency Motions. The pending emergency motions seek temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions. Docs. 22, 23. We recommend the court deny both of the pending emergency motions. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. Motions for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are judged against exacting legal standards. Preliminary injunctive relief “is not granted as a matter of right.” Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). Rather, it “is an ‘extraordinary remedy.’” Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 526 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004)). A motion for such is properly granted only if such relief is the “only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). “It has been well stated that upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937). Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 13 of 15
14 “When evaluating a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, a court considers four factors: (1) has the moving party established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits (which need not be more likely than not); (2) is the movant more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) does the balance of equities tip in its favor; and (4) is an injunction in the public interest?” Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 152 (3d Cir. 2019). “The first two factors are prerequisites for a movant to prevail.” Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 286 (3d Cir. 2018). “If these gateway factors are met, a court then considers the remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.” Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017). Here, our decision rests on the first factor: whether Vasapolli has established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that he has not. Accordingly, we recommend that the court deny the pending emergency motions. VI. Recommendations. As discussed above, we recommend that the court deny the pending emergency motions. Docs. 22, 23. We further recommend that the court dismiss Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 14 of 15
15 Vasapolli’s amended complaint (doc. 21) and grant him leave to file a second amended complaint which is complete in all respects and will stand alone from both preceding complaints. The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Submitted this 18th day of March 2026. S/Susan E. Schwab Susan E. Schwab United States Magistrate Judge Case 3:26-cv-00613-SES Document 25 Filed 03/18/26 Page 15 of 15
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