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Case 3:26-cv-00237-JKM Document5 Filed 03/12/26 Page 1 of 12

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BOUBOU CAMARA, : No. 3:26cv237
Petitioner :
(Judge Munley)

Vi

CRAIG A. LOWE, in his official
capacity as Warden of Pike County:
Correctional Facility in Lords Valley, :
PA; BRIAN McSHANE, in his official
capacity as Acting Philadelphia
Field Office Director, United States
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; TODD LYONS, in his
official capacity as Acting Director
of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, in her
official capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Homeland
Security; THE U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General
of the United States,

Respondents

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MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the court is Boubou Camara’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The petition asserts that Camara has been
misclassified under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), that his due process rights have

been violated, and that he is entitled to immediate release from immigration

Case 3:26-cv-00237-JKM Document5 Filed 03/12/26 Page 2 of 12

detention. After reviewing Camara’s circumstances on an individual basis, the
court will reach the same result as it has on several prior occasions with other
petitioners. !

Petitioner is a native of Mauritania. He entered the United States at the
southern border in December 2023.2 He was apprehended by the United States
Customs and Border Protection and briefly detained near Yuma, Arizona. He
was charged with violation of Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") §
212(a)(6)(A)(i). On December 6, 2023, he was released on his own
recognizance and with a hearing date approximately 18 months later. That is,
ICE instructed the petitioner to appear before an immigration judge (“lJ”) on June
4, 2025 in Philadelphia. There is no evidence that Camara failed to appear at
that hearing.

On September 24, 2025, Camara reported to the ICE Enforcement and

Removal Operations Field Office in Philadelphia for a scheduled check-in.

1 Federal district courts are authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
where the petitioner is detained “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Camara filed the instant petition while he was detained within
the jurisdiction of this court, and he is still currently in ICE custody within this court's
jurisdiction. Petitioner asserts that his continued detention violates his right to due process.
He also asserts that the wrong provision of the INA is being used to justify his potentially
indefinite detention. Thus, the court has habeas jurisdiction over Camara’s petition. Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004).

2 These facts are derived from Camara’s petition, (Doc. 1), and from the administrative records
provided by the parties, (Docs. 1-4 to 1-5 and Docs. 4-2 to 4-5).

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There, he was served with a warrant for arrest from an ICE officer. Camara
refused the government's offer of $1,000 to voluntarily depart the country. He
was taken into custody and now faces an additional charge of inadmissibility
under INA§ 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). ICE subsequently moved Camara to the Pike
County Correctional Facility (“Pike CCF”) in Lords Valley, Pennsylvania and he
has been detained there for approximately five months.

Camara’s detention is the product of a revised policy under which
individuals present in the United States without admission are treated as
applicants for admission subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A) rather than discretionary detention under § 1226(a). Because
Camara is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), according to the
respondents, he is ineligible for a bond hearing.

This case, like many others before it, turns on whether 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) applies to the petitioner. There is no decision of the
Supreme Court or the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to guide the analysis.* Most
district court decisions to address the issue hold that individuals like Camara are

not subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A), including rulings

3 A split panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agrees with the respondents’ view of
Section 1225. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). The dissenting
opinion is more persuasive. Id. at 508-21 (Douglas, J.).

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by the jurists in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.* The issues here have been
approached from just about every angle possible. Most decisions reach the
same conclusion, and the undersigned will not deviate from that majority view in
this case. Camara’s detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) violates the INA and
due process. Therefore, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be granted.
Camara will be released.

Briefly, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides: “in the case of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an
alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,
the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Individuals detained under Section 1225 are not entitled

to a bond hearing. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018) (Alito,

J., plurality op.) (“And neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything
whatsoever about bond hearings.”).

“Applicant for Admission” — Section 1225(a)(1) provides that “[a]n alien

present in the United States who has not been admitted (whether or not at a

designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United

4 See Meeran v. Rose, No. 3:26CV187, 2026 WL 540379, at *2 n.3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2026)
(collecting cases); Chaudhari v. Rose, No. 3:26-CV-242, 2026 WL 540378, at *4 n.4 (M.D. Pa.
Feb. 26, 2026) (collecting cases).

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States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters)
shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 8
U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Definitionally, all unadmitted persons, including Camara,
are “applicants for admission.”

“Alien Seeking Admission” — Unlike “applicant for admission,” the phrase

“alien seeking admission” is not defined in Section 1225. Under the view
adopted by the government every “applicant for admission” is an “alien seeking
admission.” This would subject all unadmitted aliens to mandatory detention
without bond whether they are located at the border or have spent months or
years living in the interior. Under that reading, “for purposes of immigration

detention, the border is now everywhere.” Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 520

(Douglas, J., dissenting op.).

In contrast, the consensus district court view is that the phrase “alien
seeking admission” does independent work and requires “active and ongoing
conduct, such as physically attempting to come into the United States at a border

or port of entry[,]” Quispe v. Rose, No. 3:25-CV-2276, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025

WL 3537279, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025) (Mehalchick, J.) (citations omitted),
and does not apply to “noncitizens like [p]etitioner who have resided in the United

States for years[,]” Patel v. O’Neil, No. 3:25-CV-2185, 2025 WL 3516865 at *5

(Mariani, J.) (citations omitted).

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As these district court cases and the Buenrostro-Mendez dissent have

recognized, to adopt the government’s position would, inter alia, negate the plain
meaning of the text, ignore context and history, violate the rule against
surplusage, and render the mandatory detention of “criminal aliens” under
Section 1226(c) as arising from a recently-expanded, redundant statutory

provision. See Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *5 (citing Centeno Ibarra v. Warden of

the Fed. Det. Ctr. Philadelphia, No. CV 25-6312, 2025 WL 3294726, at *6 (E.D.

Pa. Nov. 25, 2025) (Rufe, J.)); Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 509-16

(Douglas, J., dissenting op.).

Here, Camara was residing in the interior of the United States for
approximately 22 months when he was re-arrested and re-detained.
Consequently, a reading of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) against petitioner's
circumstances reflects that this statute does not apply to him. “[T]he difference in
treatment between a noncitizen at the border and one already in the United

States fits within the broader context of our immigration law.” Castanon-Nava Vv.

U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025).

At this point, Camara’s detention would be governed by Section 1226(a).
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (Alito, J., plurality op.). Section 1226(a) “sets out the
default rule: The Attorney General may issue a warrant for the arrest and

detention of an alien ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed

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from the United States.’ ” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). Pending such
decision, the Attorney General may: 1) “continue to detain the arrested alien’;
and 2) “may release the alien on...bond of at least $1,500 with security approved
by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General;
or...conditional parole[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2); see also 8 C.F.R. §§
1003.19, 1236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(d)(1). “At a bond hearing, a noncitizen ‘may
secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he

1.0

poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.’ ” Quispe, 2025 WL

3537279, at *6 (quoting Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397-98 (2019)).

Camara, however, will be released. He enjoys the protections of the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673

(2025). Whether Camara’s continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
violates procedural due process requires a consideration of: 1) the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; 2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if
any, of additional procedural safeguards; and 3) the government's interest,
including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute

procedures would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

Each factor favors Camara. First, his private interest is the interest in not

being physically detained by the government, which “is the most elemental of

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liberty interests[.]” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). “The restriction

of liberty is particularly acute here where, absent a bond hearing, he would be

detained for months or even years while his case proceeds.” Cunin v. McShane,

No. 3:25-CV-1887, 2025 WL 3542999, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025) (Neary, J.)
(citation omitted). Second, he has been detained erroneously under Section
1225(b) without any apparent procedural safeguards, including the ability to
obtain a bond hearing. See id. (“There is a certainty—not merely a risk—that the
failure to grant [petitioner] a bond hearing would unlawfully deprive him of the
opportunity to make the case for his release and incarcerate him indefinitely.”);

see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *6 (citing Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, No. 25-

CV-16200, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2976572, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025);
Quispe, 2025 WL 3537279, at *7 (citations omitted). Third, the government's
interest in detaining noncitizens “to ensure the appearance of aliens at future
immigration proceedings and to prevent danger to the community” is important,
but there is no indication that Camara is a convicted criminal or engaged in any

criminal activity. See Quispe, 2025 WL 3537279, at *7. In response to the

petition, the government has not provided any information suggesting that
Camara is a danger to the community or a flight risk. Upon entry to this country,
the government released the petitioner on his own recognizance. That will

happen again today.

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Habeas courts “have the power to order the conditional release of an
individual unlawfully detained—though release need not be the exclusive remedy
and is not the appropriate one in every case in which the writ is granted.”

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008). Camara’s continued detention

without bond under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) violates his due process rights.
Therefore, respondents shall immediately release Camara from their custody
because he was unlawfully detained without the opportunity for a bond hearing.°

See Kashranov v. Jamison, No. 2:25-CV-05555-JDW, 2025 WL 3188399, at *8

(E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (Wolson, J).

Furthermore, the respondents, including DHS and ICE will be permanently
enjoined from re-detaining Camara under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Id.
Respondents will be temporarily enjoined from re-arresting Camara for a period
of 14 days to ensure that this habeas remedy is effective. Id. Respondents,
including ICE, may not impose any other restrictions on Camara’s release,
including any form of body-worn electronic monitoring. Camara may move to
reopen this matter if the government later seeks to detain him under Section

1226(a) and fails to schedule a timely bond hearing.®

5 To the extent that Craig Lowe, Warden of Pike CCF is the only proper respondent in this
matter, Lowe is acting as an agent of ICE and the government will be bound by the order. See
Vadel v. Lowe, No. 3:25-CV-02452, 2025 WL 3772059, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2025).

8 Camara’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412 is not yet ripe for disposition. The Third Circuit recently confirmed that a habeas

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Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1) Boubou Camara’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, (Doc. 1), is
GRANTED;

2) Respondents shall immediately release Camara from their custody;

3) Within 72 hours, respondents shall file a declaration or affidavit pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1746 confirming that Camara has been released;

4) Respondents shall release Camara under the same conditions that existed
prior to his detention, including, release: (1) within the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania; (2) without the imposition of additional conditions (such as
ankle monitors or electronic tracking devices); (3) with all clothing and
outerwear worn at the time of the detention or other appropriate attire; and
(4) with all personal property, including, but not limited to, any driver's
license, passport, immigration documents, currency, or cell phone that was

seized at the time of detention and that is currently in their custody,

proceeding challenging immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is a “civil action” for
purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), and that the
EAJA “unambiguously applies to habeas challenges to immigration detention under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.” Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Corr. Ctr., No. 24-2990, 2026 WL 263483, at
*4-2, *10 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2026). Camara will thus be permitted to file a motion for costs and
fees pursuant to the EAJA within 30 days of the entry of judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B);
Villa Hernandez v. Kunes, No. 1:25-CV-01847, 2026 WL 411726, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13,
2026) (Wilson, J.).

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possession, or control, whether maintained directly by respondents or by
any contracted or affiliated facility;

5) Respondents are permanently enjoined from re-detaining Camara under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A);

6) Respondents are temporarily enjoined from re-arresting Camara for a
period of 14 days to ensure that this habeas remedy is effective;

7) Should respondents detain Camara pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),
petitioner may move to reopen this matter if the government fails to
schedule a timely bond hearing in which an IJ assesses whether he poses
a flight risk or a danger to the community;

8) Camara may file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 within thirty (30) days of final
judgment; and

9) The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

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Date:

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