Voyton v. Voyton et al

3:26-cv-00027Pamd24 feb 2026

Testo completo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
COURTNEY VOYTON, 	: Civil No. 3:26-CV-27
:
Plaintiff, 	:
: (Judge Munley)
v. 	:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
JOSEPH VOYTON, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This is a civil action filed by the
pro se plaintiff, Courtney Voyton.1
Voyton’s claims arise out of state court custody proceedings and allege
violations of her civil rights by her ex-husband, Joseph Voyton; his
attorney, Gregory Skibitsky, Jr.; her former attorney, James Mulligan;
the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) appointed to represent her child, Cara
Phillips; Luzerne County; Luzerne County Children and Youth Services
(“CYS”); the Luzerne County District Attorney’s Office (“DA’s Office”);
and the Nanticoke Police Department (“NPD”).2 	In her complaint, she
asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a conspiracy among
1 Doc. 1.
2
Id.
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2
the 	defendants 	to 	deny 	her 	due 	process 	during 	these 	state 	court
proceedings in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights; retaliate
against her and block her right of access to the courts in violation of the
First Amendment; a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act; a discrimination claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); a qui tam action under the
False 	Claims 	Act; 	and 	several 	state 	law 	claims. 3 	She 	requests
declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.4
Along with her complaint, Voyton filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”). 5 	In this motion, Voyton requests that we
enjoin 	Attorney 	Skibitsky’s 	continued 	participation 	in 	the 	ongoing
custody 	proceedings, 	alleging 	that 	Skibitsky’s 	role 	as 	an 	Assistant
County Solicitor for Luzerne County inherently conflicts with his role in
representing 	Joseph 	Voyton 	in 	the 	custody 	proceedings. 6 	Voyton
further requests that the orders in state court “influenced by Skibitsky”
3
Id.
4
Id. at 18.
5 Doc. 4.
6 Doc. 5.
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3
be vacated, that we appoint a new GAL for her child, and that we issue a
protective order prohibiting disclosure of her mental health records. 7
Along with her complaint and motion for TRO, Voyton filed a
motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, as well as a motion to
appoint counsel. 	Accordingly, we will recommend that her motion to
proceed
in forma pauperis be granted, but that her motions for TRO and
to appoint counsel be denied and her complaint dismissed.
II. 	Background
Voyton’s complaint alleges that on December 5, 2023, she was
involved in a domestic dispute with her ex-husband, Joseph Voyton,
during which she called the NPD.8 	She contends that instead of taking
her 	complaint, 	the 	police 	officers 	told 	Voyton 	the 	incident 	“never
happened” and threatened her with criminal charges.9 	Voyton asserts
that she reported multiple domestic violence incidents to NPD, but rather
than protect her, officers told her she needed mental health treatment to
7
Id. at 3.
8 Doc. 1 ¶ 14.
9
Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
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4
discredit her. 10 	She further alleges that she reported these instances of
abuse to the DA’s Office and was told to “get out of the county.” 11
Due to the December 5 domestic incident, the Voytons’ minor child
was 	adjudicated 	dependent, 	and 	Defendant 	Voyton 	was 	ordered 	to
participate in anger management and batterer programming. 12 	Roughly
ten months later, in October of 2024, the court closed the dependency
case, finding that the child was safe in the custody of both parents. 13
The 	plaintiff 	then 	filed 	an 	emergency 	petition 	based 	on 	Defendant
Voyton’s alleged substance abuse and refusal to permit the child to have
a medically necessary surgery, as well as the child’s ongoing anxiety. 14
Voyton contends that the court refused to hear from a witness she wanted
to present; appointed a GAL for the child; denied her petition; and
reduced her custodial time to two hours per week.15
10
Id. ¶ 16.
11
Id. ¶ 18.
12
Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
13
Id. ¶ 22.
14
Id. ¶ 23.
15
Id. ¶¶ 25-26.
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5
Voyton then sought a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order based on
allegations that Defendant Voyton was sending sexually inappropriate
content to a minor, as well as “finding unexplained marks on her
daughter and hearing sexually inappropriate comments from the child.” 16
The PFA was denied, and Voyton was told to take her complaints to the
DA’s Office, which she claims took no action.17
Voyton also takes issue with the attorney she retained to represent
her in these state court proceedings, her ex-husband’s attorney, and the
GAL appointed to represent her child. 	Thus, Voyton alleges that her
former attorney, James Mulligan, “permitted a ‘stipulated’ order to be
entered,” without explaining that the plaintiff was agreeing to her
emergency 	petition 	being 	denied 	and 	to 	her 	medical 	records 	being
disclosed. 18 	Attorney Mulligan then withdrew as her counsel after
Voyton raised concerns about “missing filings, possible tampering, and
safety issues[.]”19 	Mulligan gave Voyton her case file, which she claims
16
Id. ¶¶ 28-29.
17
Id. ¶ 29.
18
Id. ¶¶ 34-35.
19
Id. ¶ 36.
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included an email chain between Mulligan, Defendant Voyton, and the
GAL 	discussing 	the 	plaintiff’s 	apparent 	mental 	health 	issues 	and
accusing the plaintiff of posting Defendant Voyton’s sexual conduct
online. 20
Voyton 	also 	contends 	that 	her 	ex-husband’s 	attorney, 	Gregory
Skibitsky, had a conflict of interest because he was an assistant solicitor
for Luzerne County at the time he was representing Joseph Voyton in
these proceedings. 21 	Voyton further alleges that Cara Phillips, the GAL,
“became 	part 	of 	the 	problem” 	because 	she 	was 	not 	permitted 	to
communicate with Jones directly and was responsible for part of the GAL
fee.22 	Finally, Voyton alleges that all of these issues with her state court
proceedings demonstrate a “systemic policy of deliberate indifference” to
the safety of children and allegations of domestic violence by Luzerne
County CYS and the NPD. 23
20
Id. ¶¶ 38-39.
21
Id. ¶¶ 40-44.
22
Id. ¶¶ 45-48.
23
Id. ¶¶ 48-51.
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Thus, Voyton brought this action, asserting her claims against all
of the defendants pursuant to Section 1983 and alleging violations of due
process, denial of access to the courts and retaliation, conspiracy, and
municipal liability; ADA violations; and a civil RICO claim. 	She also
purports to bring this action as a qui tam action on behalf of the United
States under the False Claims Act.24 	Finally, Voyton brings state law
claims of abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Voyton’s 	motion 	for 	TRO, 	requests 	that 	we 	enjoin 	Attorney
Skibitsky’s participation in the underlying court proceedings due to his
conflict of interest and vacate any state court orders that he purportedly
influenced by Skibitsky, .25 	Voyton also requests that we appoint a new
GAL to represent her child, enter a protective order prohibiting the state
24 The plaintiff’s claim under the False Claims Act should be summarily
dismissed, as “every circuit that has [addressed the issue] is in agreement
that a pro se litigant may not pursue a qui tam action on behalf of the
Government.”
	Gunn v. Credit Suisse Group AG, 610 F. App’x 155, 157
(3d Cir. 2015);
see also Brown v. Patel, 2019 WL 2502337, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 13, 2019) (recommending dismissal of the
pro se plaintiff’s False
Claims Act claim).
25 Doc. 4.
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court from compelling her mental health records and appoint counsel to
represent her. 26
After consideration, we conclude that Voyton’s complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 	Accordingly, we will
recommend that her complaint be dismissed and her motion for TRO be
denied. 	We will further recommend that her motion to appoint counsel
be denied at this time.
III. 	Discussion
A. Screening of
Pro Se Complaints – Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review
	pro se
complaints 	brought 	by 	plaintiffs 	given 	leave 	to 	proceed
	in 	forma
pauperis. 27 	We review such complaints to determine whether there are
frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim
upon 	which 	relief 	may 	be 	granted. 28 	This 	statutory 	preliminary
screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to
26
Id. and Doc. 6.
27
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
28
Id.
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state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 29
With 	respect 	to 	this 	legal 	benchmark, 	under 	federal 	pleading
standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement
of 	the 	claim 	showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.” 30 	In
determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this
pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-
movant.” 31 	However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions
or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”32
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter
Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-
part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim
should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions.
	Id. Second, a District Court must then
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
30 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
31
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007);
Jordan v.
Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
32
Id.;
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice”).
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determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for
relief.”
Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more
than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint
has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.
See Phillips,
515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in
Iqbal,
“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’ ”
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility”
determination will be “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.”
Id. 33
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on
the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public
record. 34 	A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]
that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.”35 	Additionally,
if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically
attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the
court may consider such document in its determination. 36 	However, the
33
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
34
Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
35
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192,
1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
36
See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.
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court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion
to dismiss. 37
Finally, when reviewing a
pro se complaint, we are reminded that
such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial
justice.’” 38 	We must apply the relevant law even if the
pro se plaintiff
does not mention it by name. 39
B. This Complaint Should be Dismissed.
After consideration, we conclude that the plaintiff’s complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should be dismissed.
As we have noted, Voyton asserts several claims pursuant to Section 1983
against the defendants, alleging violations of her constitutional rights.
As 	to 	CYS, 	Voyton’s 	claims 	are 	barred 	by 	Eleventh 	Amendment
immunity. 	The Eleventh Amendment provides sovereign immunity to
states and state agencies that are sued by citizens in federal court. 40 	The
2002).
37
Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
38
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(f)).
39
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Higgins
v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
40 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
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Commonwealth’s 	immunity 	exists 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law 	unless 	that
immunity is waived or abrogated by Congress. The Commonwealth has
expressly invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity. 41 This immunity
extends to state agencies such as CYS.42 	Accordingly, Voyton’s claims
against CYS should be dismissed.
As to Defendants Joseph Voyton, Skibitsky, Phillips, and Mulligan,
it is not clear from the complaint that these defendants are state actors
subject to Section 1983 liability. 	Section 1983 provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen 	of 	the 	United 	States 	or 	other 	person 	within 	the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress. 43
“Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under
41 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b).
42
See Plaunt v. Perry Cnty. Children and Youth Servs., 2025 WL
1585037, at *8 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 2025) (finding Eleventh Amendment
immunity applicable to CYS).
43
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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the 	color 	of 	state 	law, 	deprives 	another 	individual 	of 	any 	rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.” 44 	Section 1983 “does not create any new substantive
rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal
constitutional or statutory right.” 45
Accordingly, to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
plead two elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a
“person” acting under color of law; and (2) that conduct deprived the
plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States
.46 	The Third Circuit has set forth three broad
tests to determine if a private entity or actor can be said to have acted
under color of state law:
(1) “whether the private entity has exercised powers that are
traditionally 	the 	exclusive 	prerogative 	of 	the 	state”; 	(2)
“whether the private party has acted with the help of or in
concert with state officials”; and (3) whether “the [s]tate has
so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
44
See Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir.
2005) (citation omitted).
45
See id. (citation omitted).
46
	See Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted);
Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141–
42 (3d Cir. 1990).
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the 	acting 	party 	that 	it 	must 	be 	recognized 	as 	a 	joint
participant in the challenged activity.”47
Here, there are no allegations from which we can conclude that
these defendants are state actors subject to Section 1983 liability. 	First,
it is clear that Defendant Joseph Voyton, the ex-husband of the plaintiff,
is a private individual. 	Second, the named attorneys are privately
retained or court-appointed counsel, who have routinely been found not
to qualify as state actors for purposes of Section 1983.48 	Further, Voyton
fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that any of these private
individual defendants engaged in the requisite “joint activity” with state
actors to deprive her of her rights, since as we will explain, Voyton has
failed 	to 	allege 	facts 	to 	establish 	a 	conspiracy 	among 	any 	of 	the
defendants. 49 	Accordingly, we conclude that these defendants are not
47
	Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
	Mark v.
Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1142 (3d Cir. 1995)).
48
See Goodson v. Maggi, 797 F. Supp. 2d 624, 637 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (“Court
appointed counsel, especially one serving as a guardian ad litem, does not
qualify as a state actor for purposes of § 1983”);
	Haeussler v. Child
Support Agency of Bucks Cnty., 2025 WL 606176, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25,
2025) (finding private attorneys representing clients in child custody
cases are not state actors under Section 1983).
49 While Voyton alleges that Attorney Skibitsky was also an assistant
county solicitor at the time he represented Joseph Voyton in the state
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state actors subject to Section 1983 liability.
Regarding her conspiracy claim, Voyton’s complaint fails to allege
sufficient facts to support this claim. 	To allege a conspiracy, a plaintiff
must 	establish 	“some 	factual 	basis 	to 	support 	the 	existence 	of 	the
elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action.”50 	“It is ‘not
enough that the end result of the parties’ independent conduct caused
plaintiff harm or even that the alleged perpetrators of the harm acted in
conscious parallelism.’”51 	Here, the complaint vaguely alleges that the
Court, CYS, and the DA’s Office “worked in concert to silence Plaintiff
and shield her abuser,” and that all defendants collectively “entered into
an agreement, express or implied, to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.” 52 	These bare and conclusory allegations fall far short of what
court 	proceedings, 	in 	our 	view 	this 	allegation, 	standing 	alone, 	is
insufficient to find that Skibitsky is a state actor.
	See Francis v. Smith,
2024 WL 2156242, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2024) (“[A] municipal attorney
. . . does not act under color of state law simply by virtue of acting as an
attorney or solicitor on behalf of a municipal entity.”).
50
	Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2018)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
51
Eichelman v. Lancaster County, 510 F. Supp. 2d 377, 393 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (quoting
Spencer v. Steinman, 968 F. Supp. 1011, 1020 (E.D. Pa.
1997)).
52 Doc. 1 ¶ 30; Doc. 1 at 14.
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is 	needed 	to 	state 	a 	conspiracy 	claim 	against 	the 	defendants.
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s conspiracy claim fails.
As to Luzerne County, the DA’s Office, and the NPD, Voyton has
failed to allege a claim for municipal liability against these entities. 	A
municipal 	entity 	may 	be 	liable 	for 	a 	constitutional 	violation 	under
Section 1983 if the violation was a direct result of the entity’s policy,
custom, or practice.53 	However, an entity may not be held liable “solely
because injuries were inflicted by its agents or employees.”54 	Rather, a
plaintiff must demonstrate a “direct causal link” between the alleged
constitutional violation and the municipal policy or custom. 55
In cases where a plaintiff is alleging a failure to train, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the “municipality’s failure to train [individuals]
... amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom
[they] come into contact.” 56 	To establish such a claim, the plaintiff must
53
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 695
(1978).
54
Jiminez v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir.
2007).
55
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
56
Id. at 388.
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demonstrate “contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or
knowledge 	of 	a 	prior 	pattern 	of 	similar 	incidents,” 	coupled 	with
“circumstances under which the supervisor’s actions or inaction could be
found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending
subordinate.”57
Here, Voyton attempts to establish
Monell liability by asserting
that these municipal defendants’ actions or inactions in her case reflect
a policy or custom of the county in family court matters. 	But the
complaint 	contains 	no 	factual 	allegations 	to 	support 	this 	assertion.
Rather, Voyton solely relies on occurrences in her own family court
matter, such as failing to investigate 	her 	complaints 	of 	abuse 	and
imposing unfair financial demands regarding the guardian ad litem.
The plaintiff makes one conclusory assertion that the conduct alleged in
her case is similar to allegations made in another case before this court,
Miller v. Miller,
et al., 58 in an attempt to show that the alleged conduct
57
Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing
Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)).
58 Civ No. 3:25-CV-1454.
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is a policy or custom of the county. 59 	Accordingly, we cannot conclude
that the alleged actions or inactions establish a policy or custom of these
municipal agencies or offices such that they would be subject to
Monell
liability.
The 	plaintiff 	also 	asserts 	a 	civil 	RICO 	Act 	claim 	against 	the
defendants. 	“RICO provides for civil actions . . . by which ‘[a]ny person
injured in his business or property’ by a RICO violation may seek treble
damages and attorney’s fees.” 60 	RICO violations are set forth in Section
1962, and “[a] common thread running throughout § 1962 is that an
injured party must demonstrate that the defendant was engaged in a
‘pattern of racketeering activity.’” 61 	The statute sets forth enumerated
acts that constitute “racketeering activity.” 62
Construing 	the
	pro 	se 	complaint 	liberally, 	as 	we 	must, 	the
complaint does not contain any allegations that, in our view, fit within
the definition of “racketeering activity” under the statute. 	While the
59 Doc. 1 ¶ 2.
60
Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 552 (2000) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
61
Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1289 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc).
62
See § 1961(1)(A)-(G).
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plaintiff attempts to set forth four acts that she believes constitute wire
fraud, mail fraud, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice, the
allegations in the complaint do not align with these alleged acts of
racketeering 	activity. 	For 	example, 	while 	the 	plaintiff 	alleges
“concealment of ChildLine reports” as an act of obstruction of justice, the
complaint 	does 	not 	contain 	any 	allegations 	against 	the 	defendants
regarding concealing ChildLine reports.63 	Accordingly, we conclude that
the complaint fails to allege a pattern of racketeering activity under the
statute.
Additionally, while Voyton has alleged personal financial injury,
loss of parental rights, and emotional distress due to the defendants’
alleged conduct, the complaint contains no allegations that Voyton’s
“business or property” has been harmed by the defendants, a requirement
63 	While the plaintiff in
	Miller made these specific allegations, the
plaintiff here did not. 	We note that the two plaintiffs attempted to join
their actions as one in
Miller, which the district court did not permit.
Should the court adopt our recommendation, and the plaintiff file an
amended complaint, she is cautioned that her complaint should contain
only her own allegations regarding her state court case and not the
allegations of another matter.
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under Section 1964(c). 64 	Indeed, the Third Circuit has stated that under
RICO, “a showing of injury requires proof of a concrete financial loss and
not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest.”65 	Voyton has
made no such showing in her complaint. 	Accordingly, the complaint
fails to state a claim against these defendants under the RICO Act, and
this claim should be dismissed.
As to her claim under the ADA, we similarly conclude that the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 	To
assert a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that “(1)
[s]he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) [who] was excluded
from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or was subject to discrimination by any such
entity; (4) by reason of h[er] disability.” 66 	Voyton alleges in a wholly
conclusory 	fashion 	that 	Luzerne 	County 	violated 	the 	ADA 	when 	it
“discriminated against Plaintiff, a qualified individual with PTSD, by
64
See Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn, 604 U.S. 593, 601-02 (2025).
65
	Maio 	v. 	Aetna, 	Inc., 	221 	F.3d 	472, 	483 	(3d 	Cir. 	2000) 	(internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
66
Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 20 of 26
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weaponizing her diagnosis, denying meaningful access to proceedings,
and 	conditioning 	custody 	on 	disclosure 	of 	privileged 	mental 	health
records.” 67 	This single, conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a
discrimination claim under Title II of the ADA. 	Accordingly, this claim
should be dismissed.
Voyton also asserts state law claims against the defendants of
abuse 	of 	process 	and 	intentional 	infliction 	of 	emotional 	distress.
Because we have concluded that the plaintiff’s federal claims fail, this
court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these
state law claims. 68
C. Voyton’s Motion for TRO Should be Denied.
Voyton has also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order.
A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must meet exacting
substantive requirements. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 requires
67 Doc. 1 at 15.
68 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if- ... the
district 	court 	has 	dismissed 	all 	claims 	over 	which 	it 	has 	original
jurisdiction.”);
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
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22
a plaintiff to show “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will
suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting
preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving
party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.”69 The Supreme
Court has underscored that “a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant,
by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”70
As discussed above, we have concluded that Voyton’s complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 	Accordingly, the
plaintiff cannot show a likelihood that she will succeed on the merits of
her claims, and as such, fails to meet the requirements for preliminary
injunctive relief at this time. 	Thus, her motions for TRO should be
denied.
D. The Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Should be Denied.
Finally, we recommend that the court deny Voyton’s motion to
69
Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir.
2004) (citing
Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d
Cir. 1999)).
70
	Mazurek 	v. 	Armstrong, 	520 	U.S. 	968, 	972 	(1997) 	(citation 	and
quotation marks omitted).
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appoint counsel at this time. 	While 	we 	understand 	the 	plaintiff’s
interest in securing court-appointed counsel, we also recognize that there
is neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to counsel for civil
litigants. 71 	Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) provides that “[t]he court
may request an attorney to represent any person unable to employ
counsel.” 	The 	decision 	to 	appoint 	counsel 	under 	§1915(e)(1) 	is
discretionary and must be made on a case-by-case basis.72
The 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	has 	set 	forth 	six 	factors 	to 	guide 	our
consideration of the plaintiff’s request for counsel:
(1) the plaintiff’s ability to present his or her own case; (2) the
complexity of the legal issues; (3) the degree to which factual
investigation will be necessary and the ability of the plaintiff
to pursue such investigation; (4) the amount a case is likely to
turn on credibility determinations; (5) whether the case will
require the testimony of expert witnesses; [and] (6) whether
the plaintiff can attain and afford counsel on his own behalf. 73
Additionally, the Court has recognized several practical considerations
which we must consider, such as the number of
pro se actions filed in
71
Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997);
Tabron v.
Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993).
72
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157-58.
73
Parham, 126 F.3d at 457.
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federal court; the lack of funding for court-appointed counsel; and the
limited number of lawyers willing to undertake representation without
compensation. 74 	“[V]olunteer 	lawyer 	time 	is 	extremely 	valuable.
Hence, 	district 	courts 	should 	not 	request 	counsel 	under 	§ 	1915(d)
indiscriminately.” 75
Here, our analysis of these factors leads us to conclude that counsel
should not be appointed at this time.76 	At the outset, this case is in its
early stages, with the plaintiff being given an opportunity to file an
amended complaint, which will be subject to a mandatory screening
review 	due 	to 	the 	plaintiff’s
	in 	forma 	pauperis 	status. 	While 	the
plaintiff generally cites her indigent status and unfamiliarity with the
law to indicate she is unable to proceed
pro se, the facts of this case
appear to be well known to the plaintiff, who has filed a detailed
complaint and asserted various legal theories and claims against the
74
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157.
75
Id.
76 We decline the plaintiff’s invitation to recognize the appointment of
counsel as a “reasonable accommodation” under Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, as our research has yielded no authority to support
such a finding.
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defendants. 	Accordingly, we recommend that the plaintiff’s request for
counsel be denied at this time without prejudice to re-examining this
issue at the request of the plaintiff, or
sua sponte, as this litigation
progresses.
IV. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED
that:
1. The plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP be conditionally
granted for screening purposes;
2. The complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted;
3. The motion for TRO be DENIED;
4. The motion to appoint counsel be DENIED; and
5. The plaintiff be permitted to file an amended complaint within
21 days of any dismissal order.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule
72.3:
Any 	party 	may 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 25 of 26
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matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written 	objections 	which 	shall 	specifically 	identify 	the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions 	of 	the 	report 	or 	specified 	proposed 	findings 	or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may 	also 	receive 	further 	evidence, 	recall 	witnesses 	or
recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Submitted this 24th day of February 2026.
s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 26 of 26

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