Jeffers v. Lycoming County Prison

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KRYSTOPHER M. JEFFERS,
Plaintiff
V.
LYCOMING COUNTY PRISON,
Defendant
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-2394
(JUDGE MANNION)
MEMORANDUM
Currently before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Krystopher M. 	Jeffers
("Jeffers")'s complaint in which 	he asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983
against the Lycoming County Prison ("LCP"). The Court has screened the
complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a). For the reasons
stated below, the Court will dismiss the complaint with prejudice and direct
the Clerk of Court to close this case.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural History
Jeffers commenced this action by filing a complaint and an application
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 	both of which the Clerk of Court
docketed on December 11, 2025. (Docs. 1, 2.)1 Jeffers used an incorrect
1 Jeffers appears to have been incarcerated in the LCP at the time he
filed his complaint. See (Doc. 1 at 7).
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form 	for 	seeking 	leave 	to 	proceed 	in 	forma 	paupens; 	as 	such , 	an
Administrative Order issued requiring him to either remit the fee or submit a
proper 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	application 	and 	prisoner 	trust 	fund 	account
statement within 	thirty 	days. (Doc. 	4.) 	Jeffers timely 	complied 	with 	the
Administrative Order in part by filing an application for leave to proceed in
forma 	pauperis 	("IFP 	Application ") 	on 	the 	proper 	form, 	along 	with 	an
uncertified prisoner trust fund account statement, both of which the Clerk of
Court docketed on 	December 22 , 2025. (Docs. 5, 6.) However, because
Jeffers's account statement was not certified as required 	by the in forma
pauperis statute, see 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2) ("A prisoner seeking to bring a
civil action . . . without prepayment of fees . .. shall submit a certified copy
of the 	trust 	fund 	account 	statement 	(or 	institutional 	equivalent) 	for the
prisoner for the 	6-month 	period 	immediately 	preceding 	the filing 	of the
complaint ... , obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which
the 	prisoner 	is 	or was 	confined ."), another Adm inistrative Order issued
requiring 	the 	Warden 	of the 	LCP 	to 	submit 	Jeffers's 	certified 	account
statement. (Doc. 8.) Jeffers's certified account statement was submitted on
January 20, 2026. (Doc. 	10 .) On the same date, Jeffers filed a motion to
amend his complaint. (Doc. 11.)
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On January 21 , 2026, the Court issued an Order which, inter alia: (1)
granted the IFP Application and allowed Jeffers to proceed in forma pauperis
in this case; (2) denied Jeffers's motion to amend his complaint as moot
because he did not require leave of Court to file an amended complaint at
this stage under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15; (3) granted Jeffers thirty
days to file an amended complaint; and (4) informed Jeffers that if he did not
timely file an amended complaint, the Court would proceed to screen his
original complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2)(8) and 1915A(a)-(b). See
(Doc. 10 at 5-6).
On January 27, 2026, the Clerk of Court docketed a notice of change
of address in which Jeffers indicated that he would be released from the LCP
on January 19 , 2026, and provided his new mailing address. (Doc. 12.) On
the same date, the Clerk of Court updated Jeffers's address of record.
Approximately a week later, on February 2, 2026, the envelope containing
the Court's January 21 , 2026 Order, which was mailed to Jeffers at the LCP,
was returned as undeliverable. (Doc. 14 .) The Clerk of Court promptly mailed
Jeffers a copy of the Court's January 21, 	2026 Order to 	him at his new
address of record . To date, Jeffers has not filed an amended complaint or a
motion for an extension of time to do so , and the time for him to file an
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amended complaint has passed. Therefore, Jeffers's complaint is ripe for
screening under Sections 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a)-(b).
B. 	Allegations and Legal Claims in the Complaint
Jeffers's complaint lists the LCP as the only named Defendant,2 and
he 	alleges 	that 	he 	was 	sexually 	harassed 	and 	assaulted 	by 	his 	male
cellmate, and fought with his cellmate, while incarcerated in the LCP in June
2019. See (Doc. 1 at 2). Following this assault, Jeffers submitted a request
slip to the LCP's medical staff so he could receive care for rectal bleeding he
was experiencing. See (id.). Jeffers later went to the medical department and
had a doctor "look[] into the bleeding." (Id.) The doctor allegedly said that
they saw "rectal tearing" and prescribed Jeffers a suppository to suppress
the bleeding. (Id.)
The following day, Jeffers's cellmate submitted a request slip stating
that he was bleeding from his penis. See (id.). A "supervisor" then spoke to
2 Jeffers uses a phrase, "etc. all [sic] ," in the caption of his complaint,
which the Court construes as a misspelling of "et al." (Doc. 1 at 1.) The use
of this Latin phrase, which means "[a]nd other persons," Et al., Black's Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024), in the caption of the original complaint is improper
under the 	Federal 	Rules 	of Civil 	Procedure 	because 	"[t]he title 	of the
complaint 	must name 	al/ the 	parties." 	Fed. R. 	Civ. P. 10(a) (emphasis
added). Only "the title of other pleadings, after naming the first party on each
side, may refer generally to other parties" by using phrases such as "et al."
Id. 	Therefore, the 	Court 	construes 	the 	complaint 	as 	containing 	claims
against only the LCP.
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Jeffers and inquired , "what's going on?" (Id.) At that point, Jeffers "finally
reported the fighting and rape. " (/d.) He also reported these events to the
LC P's Prison Rape Elimination Act Coordinator. See (id.).
Despite these reports, "[n]othing else happened with it." (Id.) Jeffers
alleges that he did not get proper medical treatment or counseling , and he
"d[id] 	not 	appreciate 	them 	dismissing 	[his 	reports] 	so 	easily." 	(/d.)
Consequently, 	Jeffers 	filed 	"grievances 	in 	and 	[sic] 	everything." 	(/d.)
Thereafter, 	Jeffers 	observed 	multiple 	LCP 	correctional 	officers 	"kidding
about it [and] inmates spreading rumors about it. " (/d.)
Jeffers asserts that he "want[s] compensation for failure to administer
proper [m]edical treatment, as well as [m]ental and emotional anguish, and
improper investigation." (Id.) He attempts to raise clai ms under Section 1983
for violations of his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth , and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. See (id. at 3--4 ). For relief,
he seeks at least $1 	million in compensatory and punitive damages for the
mental and emotional anguish he continues to suffer. See (id. at 3, 6).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Screening 	Complaints 	Under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§§191 SA 	and
1915(e)(2)
The Court must "review . .. a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
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a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). If such a complaint fails to state
a claim 	upon which 	relief may 	be 	granted, 	the Court must dismiss the
complaint. 	See 	id. 	§1915A(b)(1 ). 	The 	Court 	has 	a 	similar 	screening
obligation 	regarding 	actions 	filed 	by 	individuals 	proceeding 	in 	forma
pauperis. See id. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) ("[T]he [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at
any time if the [C]ourt determines that ... the action or appeal ... fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted .... ").
In reviewing legal claims under Sections 1915A(b) or 1915(e)(2)(B),
the Court applies the standard governing motions to dismiss filed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Smithson v. Koons, No.
15-cv-1757, 2017 WL 3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 26, 2017) ("The legal
standard 	for 	dismissing 	a 	complaint 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	under
§1915A(b)(1) [and] §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) ... is the same as that for dismissing
a 	complaint 	pursuant 	to 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil
Procedure." ), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3008559 (M . D.
Pa. July 14 , 2017); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 	(M.D. Pa.
2010) (explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to Section
1915A, "a court employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"). To avoid dismissal under Rule
12(b )(6), a plaintiff must set out "sufficient factual matter" in the complaint to
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show that their claims are facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). This plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility
that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. "[W]here the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]' - 'that the
pleader is entitled to relief."' Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. 	R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)).
When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the Court accepts as
true all factual allegations and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from those allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
id.; 	In re Ins. 	Brokerage Antitrust Litig. , 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).
However, the Court will not accept legal conclusions as true, and "a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not survive a district
court's screening under Sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). Bell At/. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
In addition, in the specific context of pro se litigation, the Court must
be mindful that a document filed prose is "to be liberally construed ." Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333,
339 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that "when presented with a prose litigant, we
have a special obligation to construe [their] complaint liberally" (citation and
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internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, a prose complaint, "however
inartfully pleaded ," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. " Erickson v. Pardus, 551 	U.S. 89 , 94 (2007)
(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted) 	(quoting 	Estelle , 	429 	U.S. 	at 	106).
Moreover, when construing a pro se complaint, the Court will "apply the
relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it. " Mala
v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). However, pro
se litigants "cannot flout procedural rules-they must abide by the same rules
that apply to all other litigants." Id. at 245.
B. 	Section 1983
Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress
for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See
42 U.S.C. §1983. This statute states in pertinent part:
Every 	person 	who, 	under 	color 	of 	any 	statute, 	ordinance,
regulation , custom, 	or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected , any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution of laws, shall be liable to the party
injured 	in 	an 	action 	at 	law, suit 	in 	equity, 	or 	other 	proper
proceeding for redress .. . .
Id. "Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights ," but is merely a means
through which 	"to vindicate violations of federal 	law committed 	by 	state
actors. " Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 	F. Supp. 2d 311 , 315 (M.D. 	Pa.
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2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). "To
state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law. " West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Ill. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Screening of Jeffers's Complaint
After 	screening 	Jeffers's 	complaint 	pursuant 	to 	Sections
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A, the Court will dismiss his complaint. There are
at least three reasons warranting dismissal of Jeffers's complaint, and the
Court will discuss each reason in turn.
1. 	Jeffers Fails to Name a Proper Defendant
First, Jeffers names only the LCP as a Defendant in his complaint (Doc.
1 at 1), and the LCP is not a proper Defendant under Section 1983 insofar
as it is not a "person" amenable to suit under this statute. See Edwards v.
Northampton 	Cnty. , 663 F. App'x 132, 136 (3d 	Cir. 2016) (unpublished)
(affirming 	district 	court's 	dismissal 	of 	prisoner-plaintiff's 	conditions-of-
confinement claims against a county prison because it is not a person subject
to suit under Section 1983 (citing Fischerv . Cahill, 474 F.2d 991,992 (3d
Cir. 1973))); Lenhart v. Pennsylvania , 528 F. App'x 111, 114 (3d Cir. 2013)
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(unpublished) 	(concluding 	that 	district 	court 	properly 	dismissed 	claims
against county prison because even though "[a] local governmental agency
may be a 'person' for purposes of§ 1983 liability[, the county prison] is not a
person 	capable 	of being 	sued 	within 	the 	meaning 	of §1983") 	(internal
citations omitted); Mincy v. Deparlos, 497 F. App'x 234, 239 (3d Cir. 2012)
(unpublished) (determining that district court properly concluded that county
prison 	is 	not 	"person" 	within 	meaning 	of 	section 	1983); 	Wilkerson 	v.
Lycoming Cnty. Prison, No. 25-cv-411, 2025 WL 1239329, at *3 (M. D. Pa.
Apr. 29, 2025) (dismissing prisoner-plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against
LCP because it "is not a 'person' subject to suit under Section 1983" (citing
Lenhart, 528 F. App'x at 114 and Clay v. Lycoming Cnty. Prison, No. 21-cv-
1415, 	2021 	WL 4552236, 	at 	*2 	(M.D. 	Pa. 	Oct. 	5, 	2021 ))). 	Accordingly,
Jeffers's failure to 	name 	a proper Defendant warrants 	dismissal 	of his
Section 1983 claims for failure to state a claim for relief under Sections
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
2. 	The Statute of Limitations Bars Jeffers's Claims
Second, 	it is apparent from the face of Jeffers's complaint that the
applicable statute of limitations bars his Section 1983 claims in this case.
The Court will 	first recite the applicable 	law before discussing 	how the
applicable statute of limitations bars Jeffers's claims.
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a. 	Applicable Law
The statute of limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, see Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	8(c) (listing statute of limitations among affirmative defenses);
however, a district court may dismiss claims based on an affirmative defense
if the affirmative defense is obvious from the face of the complaint. 	See
Wisniewski v. 	Fisher, 857 F.3d 	152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017) ("A complaint is
subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim 	on 	statute of limitations
grounds only when the statute of limitations defense is apparent on the face
of the complaint."); 	see also Ball v. 	Famiglio, 	726 F.3d 448, 459 (3d Cir.
2013) (explaining that if affirmative defense appears on face of complaint,
court 	can 	dismiss 	complaint 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(6)), 	abrogated on 	other
grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015); Jablonski v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 	863 F.2d 289, 	292 	(3d 	Cir. 	1988) (affirming district
court's denial of leave to amend where proposed amended complaint would
not survive renewed motion for judgment on pleadings because it would be
barred 	by statute of limitations). This legal principle applies equally to a
district court's screening under Section 1915. See Whitenight v. Commw. of
Pa. State Police, 674 F. App'x 142, 144 (3d Cir. 2017) (unpublished) ("When
screening a complaint under §1915, a district court may sua sponte dismiss
the complaint as untimely under the statute of limitations where the defense
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is obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is
requ i red. " (citations omitted)); Peele v. McLaughlin , 641 	F. App'x 111 , 112
(3d 	Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (explaining that even though "the statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense [under Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure], a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under
§1915(e) 	where 	the 	defense 	is 	obvious 	from 	the 	complaint 	and 	no
development of the factual record is required" ); see a/so Fogle v. Pierson,
435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) ("A complaint may be dismissed sua
sponte under §1915 based on an affirmative defense-such as statute of
limitations-only when the defense is obvious from the face of the complaint
and 	no further factual 	record 	is 	required to 	be developed. " (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, Jeffers's Section 	1983 claims 	are subject to 	the 	applicable
state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (concluding that statute of limitations for section
1983 actions " is governed by the personal injury tort law of the state where
the cause of action arose"). 	Because Jeffers's claims arose in 	Lycoming
County, Pennsylvania, this Court applies Pennsylvania's relevant limitations
period , which is two years. See Wisniewski, 857 F.3d at 157 (stating that
"[t]he statute of limitations applicable to §1983 claims in Pennsylvania is two
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years" (c itation omitted)); 42 Pa . C.S. §5524(2) ("The following actions and
proceedings must be commenced within two years . .. 	(2) An action to
recover damages for injuries to the person . .. caused by the wrongful act or
neglect or 	unlawful violence 	or 	negligence 	of another. " ). 	This two-year
limitations period accrues "when a plaintiff has a complete and present cause
of action, that is, when [the plaintiff] can file suit and obtain relief." Dique v.
N.J. 	State Police , 603 F.3d 181 , 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). This means that the statute of limitations generally "accrues
when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [the]
action is based. " Sameric Corp. of Del ., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia , 142 F.3d
582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).
In certain circumstances, Pennsylvania's discovery rule may operate
to delay the running of the statute of limitations. See Nicolaou v. Martin , 195
A.3d 880, 892 (Pa. 2018) ("[T]he discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations
where the plaintiff is reasonably unaware that he has been injured and that
his injury has been caused by another party's conduct. " ). In other words,
[w]here the plaintiff's injury or its cause was neither known nor
reasonably ascertainable, [Pennsylvania's] discovery rule tolls
the 	statute 	of 	limitations 	. 	. 	. 	. 	The 	statute 	of 	limitations
accordingly begins to run when the plaintiff knew or, exercising
reasonable diligence, should have known (1) [they were] injured
and (2) that the injury was caused by another. That reasonable
diligence standard 	is an 	objective one, but at the same time
sufficiently flexible to take into account the differences between
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persons and their capacity to meet certain situations and the
circumstances confronting them at the time in question.
Adams v. Zimmer, 943 F.3d 159, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Whether or not Pennsylvania's discovery rule
applies in a case is a question of fact that the factfinder must resolve, see id.
("[T]he 	question 	'[w]hether 	[a 	plaintiff] 	should 	have 	acted 	with 	greater
diligence to investigate' or otherwise should have known of [their] injury
earlier 'can only be seen as an issue of fact."' (quoting Gleason v. Borough
of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479, 484 (Pa. 2011 ))), unless "reasonable minds would
not differ in finding that a party knew or should have known on the exercise
of reasonable diligence of [the party's] injury and its cause[,]" which would
allow the court to determine that "the discovery rule does not apply as a
matter of law. " Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 858-59 (Pa. 2005) (citation
omitted).
Along 	with 	Pennsylvania's discovery 	rule, the continuing-violations
doctrine can affect the statute of limitations bar. In some circumstances,
courts may toll the statute of limitations if a defendant's conduct constitutes
a "continuing violation ." Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir.
2001 ). This "equitable exception" applies "when a defendant's conduct is part
of a continuing practice[.]" Id. 	Under this exception , "an action is timely so
long 	as 	the 	last 	act 	evidencing 	the 	continuing 	practice 	falls 	within 	the
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limitations 	period[.]" 	Id. 	(citations 	and 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	Courts
consider "at least three factors" when 	assessing whether the exception
applies, namely:
(1) subject matter-whether the violations constitute the same
type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing
violation; (2) frequency-whether the acts are recurring or more
in 	the 	nature 	of 	isolated 	incidents; 	and 	(3) 	degree 	of
permanence-whether the act had 	a degree of permanence
which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of and duty to
assert [their] rights and whether the consequences of the act
would continue even 	in the absence of a continuing intent to
discriminate. The consideration of "degree of permanence" is the
most important of the factors .
Id. (citations omitted).
The continuing-violations doctrine does not toll the statute of limitations
based solely on "the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts. " Id. (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Instead , "[t]he Court must consider carefully the
distinction 	between 	'continuing violations' 	and 	'discrete acts."' 	Anders v.
Bucks Cnty. , No. 	13-cv-5517, 2014 WL 1924114, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 12,
2014) (quoting 	O'Connor v. City of Newark, 	440 F.3d 125, 	128 (3d Cir.
2006)). Thus , "[e]ach discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges
alleging that act." Hunt v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 289 F. App'x 507, 509 (3d Cir.
2008) (unpublished) (citations and quotation marks omitted). For example,
the 	"continuing 	violation" exception 	does 	not 	apply 	to 	a 	Section 	1983
deliberate indifference claim merely because the plaintiff continues to suffer
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pain from an initial fa ilure to provide medical treatment. See Hickox v. Cnty.
of Blair, 591 	F. App'x 107, 110, 111 	(3d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (holding
continuing 	violation 	exception 	to 	limitations 	bar 	inapplicable 	because 	it
"refers to continual unlawful acts [by the defendants] , not continual ill effects
from an original violation[ ]" (alteration in original) (citations and quotation
marks omitted)).
b. 	Analysis
When 	determining whether the statute of limitations 	bars Jeffers's
Section 1983 claims, the Court must first identify his specific claims. Jeffers
renders this task somewhat more complicated than usual because most of
his complaint contains references to numerous legal principles , including
several 	Amendments 	to 	the 	Constitution, caselaw, and 	even 	the 	Third
Circuit's Standard Civil Jury Instructions. 	See (Doc. 1 at 1, 3-6) . Despite
Jeffers's numerous legal references, most of them are inapplicable to his
factual allegations. See (id.). For instance, Jeffers mentions (1) violations of
the Fourth Amendment for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
abuse of process, see (id. at 1, 3, 4 ); (2) his Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial tribunal , see (id. at 3) ; (3) deprivations of his due process rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, see (id.); and (4) retaliation in
violation of the First Amendment, see (id. at 4 ). None of these causes of
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action relate to Jeffers's factual allegations in which he complains about
insufficient medical care he received following his report of his cellmate's
assault and a failure to investigate his report of the assault. Therefore, the
Court does not construe Jeffers's complaint as containing any claims for
violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights even though those
Amendments 	are 	mentioned 	in 	Jeffers's 	complaint. 	Instead, 	the 	Court
construes 	the 	complaint 	as 	containing 	deliberate-indifference-to-serious-
medical-needs 	and 	failure-to-investigate 	claims 	in 	violation 	of 	the
Constitution. 3
Starting with Jeffers's Section 1983 deliberate-indifference-to-serious-
medical-needs claim , the limitations period for this claim accrues when the
plaintiff "knew, or had reason to know, of [their] alleged mistreatment." Smith
3 The Court will not characterize Jeffers's Section 1983 claims as falling
under a specific Amendment because it is unclear whether Jeffers was a
pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner when the events described in his
complaint 	allegedly 	occurred . 	If 	Jeffers 	was 	a 	pretrial 	detainee, 	the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause would govern his deliberate-
indifference claims in this case. See, e.g ., Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150,
166 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying Fourteenth Amendment to plaintiff's deliberate-
indifference claims. On the other hand , if Jeffers was a convicted prisoner,
the 	Eighth 	Amendment's 	prohibition 	on 	cruel 	and 	unusual 	punishment
governs his deliberate indifference claims. See McFadden v. Dalmasi, 837
F. App'x 135, 136 n.3 (3d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (noting that the Eighth
Amendment applies to deliberate-indifference claims brought by convicted
prisoners ). 	Despite 	this 	deficiency 	with 	Jeffers's 	complaint, the 	Court's
analysis of the application of the statute of limitations to his Section 1983
claims would remain the same.
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v. 	Mun. 	of 	Lycoming 	Cnty., 	335 	F. 	App'x 	147, 	149 	(3d 	Cir. 	2009)
(unpublished); see Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2013) ("A
§1983 claim to redress a medical injury arising from deliberate indifference
to a [plaintiff's] serious medical needs accrues when the plaintiff knows of
[their] physical injury and its cause. The statute of limitations starts to run
when the plaintiff discovers [their] injury and its cause even if the full extent
or severity of the injury is not yet known ." ); In re Davis, No. 21-cv-5701 , 2022
WL 2052645, at *5 (E.D. Pa . June 7, 	2022) ("A claim alleging deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs accrues when the plaintiff knows or
has 	reason 	to 	know that deliberate 	indifference 	is 	displayed." 	(citations
omitted)). In this case, Jeffers's allegations sufficiently demonstrate that he
was aware of any lack of medical treatment soon after he reported the sexual
assault in June 2019. He failed to file a deliberate-indifference claim within
the two-year limitations period , and he did not file the instant case until more
than 	four 	years 	passed 	after 	the 	expiration 	of 	the 	limitations 	period.
Moreover, he does not allege any facts about deficient medical treatment
relating to his sexual 	assault which occurred within the two-year period
preceding his filing of the complaint. As such, the statute of limitations bars
Jeffers's deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs claim.
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As for Jeffers's failure-to-investigate claim, "courts hold that the claim
accrues when 	it 	becomes 	apparent that the 	defendants 	have failed 	to
investigate. " Hobbs v. 	Unified Gov't of Wyandotte Cnty., 	No. 24-cv-2422,
2025 WL 2054606, at *5 (D . Kan . June 18 , 2025) (citations omitted); see
Soppick v. Borough of W 	Conshohocken , 118 F. App'x 631 , 635 (3d Cir.
2004) (unpublished) ("The Soppicks knew, or had reason to know, that the
injury stemming from the Borough's failure to investigate occurred 	on 	or
around August 6, 2000, when the Borough's failure to investigate became
apparent. " ). Here, it would have become apparent to Jeffers that there was
not going to be any investigation of his claim relating to his cellmate's sexual
assault well more than two years from the filing of his complaint in this case.
Therefore, the statute of limitations also bars Jeffers's Section 1983 fa ilure-
to-investigate claim .
3. 	Jeffers Fails to State Plausible Claims for Relief
Third , and finally, even if the statute of limitations did not bar Jeffers's
Section 1983 deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs and failure-
to-investigate 	claims, 	he 	fails 	to 	state 	plausible 	claims 	for 	relief 	in 	his
complaint. 	For Jeffers to state a plausible claim 	based 	on 	the failure to
provide adequate medical treatment, he must allege facts indicating that
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See
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Farmer v. 	Brennan, 511 	U.S. 	825, 	835 	(1994 ). 4 A prison 	official 	is 	not
deliberately 	indifferent 	"unless 	the 	official 	knows 	of 	and 	disregards 	an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could 	be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw the inference. " Id. at 837. A
plaintiff properly alleges deliberate indifference "where the prison official (1)
knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to
provide it ; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical
reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended
medical treatment. " Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999); see
also Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 	526, 	534 	(3d 	Cir. 	2017)
(explaining that a prisoner-plaintiff can show deliberate indifference where
prison official "intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] access to medical care or
4 Even though the Court lacks information about Jeffers's incarceration
status to determine whether the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment applies to
this 	claim , the 	standard 	under the 	Eighth 	Amendment 	and 	Fourteenth
Amendment for claims related to a prisoner's medical needs is essentially
the same. See Parke/I v. 	Morgan , 682 	F. 	App'x 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2017)
(unpublished); see also Moore v. Luffey, No. 18 -1716, 2019 WL 1766047, at
*3 n.2 (3d Cir. Apr. 19 , 2019) (unpublished) (declining to address whether a
new standard applies to claims raised by pretrial detainees based on issues
related to medical care); Thomas v. City of Harrisburg, 88 F.4th 275, 281 &
n.23 	(3d 	Cir. 	2023) 	(applying 	Eighth 	Amendment 	standard 	to 	pretrial
detainee's medical care claim).
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intentionally 	interfer[ed] 	with 	the 	treatment 	once 	prescribed" 	(internal
citations and quotation marks omitted)).
"A medical need is serious, . .. if it is one that has been diagnosed by
a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Monmouth
Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a serious medical need exists
where 	"failure 	to 	treat 	can 	be 	expected 	to 	lead 	to 	substantial 	and
unnecessary suffering ." Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023
(3d Cir. 1991 ).
In this case, although the Court does not underestimate the physical
and emotional impact of the alleged sexual assault upon Jeffers, he does not
allege that he had a serious medical need that officials at LCP failed to
address. To the extent that Jeffers had a serious medical need insofar as the
LCP doctor observed rectal tearing from the alleged assault, 	he does not
appear to complain about the doctor's treatment. Instead, Jeffers complains
only about the lack of counseling he received once he finally reported the
assault.
Although Jeffers complains about not receiving counseling, 	he does
not allege a medical need that LCP officials needed to address, 	and the
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Court wil l not speculate about his possible medical need and whether it was
sufficiently serious. To the extent that Jeffers's allegation is based on his
desire for counseling , such 	a desire 	is 	insufficient to establish 	a prison
official's deliberate indifference. Furthermore, Jeffers fails to plead that any
LCP official knew about his need for medical treatment (such as counseling)
but intentionally refused to provide it, delayed necessary treatment for a non-
medical reason , or prevented him from receiving needed or recommended
medical treatment. Therefore, Jeffers fails to state a plausible deliberate-
indifference-to-serious-medical-needs claim in his complaint.
As for Jeffers's failure-to-investigate claim , such a claim is ordinarily
not cognizable under Section 1983:
[l]t is well established that "there is no constitutional right to the
investigation or prosecution of another. " Sanders v. Downs, 420
F. App'x 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see a/so Linda
R.S. v. Richard D ., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) ("[A] private citizen
lacks 	a 	judicially 	cognizable 	interest 	in 	the 	prosecution 	or
nonprosecution of another. "). Second , "an allegation of a failure
to investigate, without another recognizable constitutional right,
is 	not 	sufficient 	to 	sustain 	a 	section 	1983 	claim. " 	Graw 	v.
Fantasky, 	68 	F. 	App'x 	378, 383 	(3d 	Cir. 2003) 	(quotations
omitted); see a/so Boseski v. 	N. Arlington Municipality, 621 	F.
App'x 	131 , 135 (3d 	Cir. 2015) (per curiam) ("Boseski has no
cognizable claim against a government entity for its failure to
investigate 	or 	bring 	criminal 	charges 	against 	another
individual. " ).
Hernandez v. Dep'tofCorr., No. 25-cv-2018 , 2025 WL 3207519, at *4 (E.D.
Pa . Nov. 17 , 2025); see a/so Hakala 	v. Klem , No. 	09-cv-833, 	2009 WL
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3852787, at *5 (M .D. Pa . Nov. 18 , 2019) ("[T]he failure to favorably address,
respond to and/or investigate .. . do[es] not implicate a constitutional right."
(citing Bailey v. Pa/akovich, 	No . 06-cv-1640, 2007 WL 1450698, at * 3--4
(M .D. Pa. May 14 , 2007))).
Jeffers's failure-to-investigate claim fails he re because:
There is no other "recogn izable constitution right" involved here
because, as at least one court has held, there is no protected
liberty interest to support a due process claim associated with a
prisoner's demand that an alleged rape be investigated by prison
officials. SeePietrakv. Litz , No . 25-[cv]-1121, 2025WL3015788,
at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2025) (dismissing claims asserting that
warden and prison medical contractor refused to investigate a
prisoner's claim of sexual assault because the prisoner had "not
identified a protected interest that is at stake. There is simply no
due 	process 	'life, 	liberty, 	or 	property' 	interest 	involved 	with
investigating , or failing to investigate, a sexual assault in prison ." ;
and stating that a violation of the Prison Rape El imination Act of
2003 (PREA) "would not constitute a Fourteenth Amendment
due process infringement" ).
Hernandez, 2025 WL 3207519, at *4. Accordingly, even if Jeffers's failure-
to-investigate claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, his claim
would be subject to dismissal for failure to state a plausible claim for relief.
B. 	Leave to Amend
Having determined that Jeffers's claims against Defendants 	in 	his
complaint are subject to dismissal, the Court must decide whether to grant
him leave to file 	an 	amended complaint. 	Although 	district courts should
generally give leave to amend, they may dismiss a complaint with prejudice
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where leave to amend would be inequitable or futile . See Fletcher-Harlee
Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc ., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007)
("[l]n civil rights cases district courts must offer amendment-irrespective of
whether it is requested-when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim
unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. " ); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) ("When a plaintiff does not seek
leave to amend a deficient complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it,
the court must inform the plaintiff that [they have] leave to amend within a
set period of time, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. " ). " In
determining whether [amendment] would be futile, the district court applies
the same standard of legal sufficiency as [it] applies under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) ." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d
Cir. 1997).
Here, the 	Court 	will 	not 	grant 	Jeffers 	leave 	to 	file 	an 	amended
complaint because doing so would be futile. Even if Jeffers could replead his
Section 1983 claims in this case by naming the individuals from the LCP who
allegedly violated his constitutional rights or by adding facts to his deliberate-
indifference-to-serious-medical-needs claim , the statute of limitations bars
his Section 1983 cla i ms . Accordingly, the Court will dismiss with prejudice
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Jeffers's 	Section 	1983 	claims 	under 	Sections 	1915(e )(2)(B)(ii) 	and
1915A(b)(1).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons , the 	Court 	will 	dismiss 	with 	prejudice
Jeffers's complaint and direct the Clerk of Court to close this case. An
appropriate Order follows.
tates District Judge
DATE:
25-2394-01
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