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AUTHENT:

Case 3:25-cv-02388-JKM

IN THE UN

Document 15 Filed 02/25/26 Page 1 of 14

TED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JASHANDEEP SINGH,
Petitioner

Vv.

No. 3:25cv2388
(Judge Munley)

(Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)

FILED
CRANTON
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director S
Immigration and Customs FEB 25 2026
Enforcement, et al., orn KA
Respondents DEPUTY CLERK

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Jashandeep Singh was working as a truck driver for a federally

registered motor carrier based out of Indiana.! He was issued a commercial

driver’s license by that state.

On November 19, 2025, Singh was transporting a

load of Mexican food products from Georgia to New York.

At approximately 10:30 AM, at a rest area along Interstate 84, Singh was

subject to a roadside inspection. According to the inspection report, petitioner

could not produce physical co

pies of his tractor or trailer registration cards. And

based on a Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (“PUC”) officer’s review of

Singh’s logbooks, he had allegedly exceeded the 14-hour rule by 26 minutes two

1 These facts are derived from records supplied by the United States Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”). (Docs. 8-1 to 8-4).

Cage 3:25-cv-02388-JKM
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J

days earlier. For the observe

i

Regulations, Singh and Singh

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In conjunction with the

1

another type of review, that

of the kind t

Document 15 Filed 02/25/26 Page 2 of 14

d violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety

’s employer received citations.

equipment and logbook inspection, Singh faced

ypically conducted by agents from United

States Immigration and cate Enforcement (“ICE”). That is, ICE agents were

working alongside the PUC pees at the rest area.
|

Singh came to the Uni

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ted

States from the Republic of India. He entered

the country on foot at the southern border in November 2023. Shortly thereafter,

‘| he was arrested by United St
|
form. DHS charged Singh wi

admission or parole in violati

tes Border Patrol and issued a Notice to Appear

K being present in the United States without

id of Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”)

Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i).2, He was provided a hearing date for removal

proceedings. Thereafter, the

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on his own recognizance. He

and obtained employment as

petitioner was released from custody at the border
made his way to the Chicago metropolitan area

an over-the-road truck driver. He has a pending

application for asylum. He fears being returned to India.

Returning to the roadside inspection in November 2025, ICE agents

conducted a records check and determined that that Singh was subject to

removal proceedings. They a

1

2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

)
t
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7
}

rrested the petitioner. Since that time, he has been

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Case 3:25-cv-02388-JKM | Document15_ Filed 02/25/26 Page 3 of 14

in immigration detention at the Pike County Correctional Facility (“Pike CCF”) and
is ostensibly being held pursuant to revised DHS policies and administrative
reinterpretations of federal law. Id.

Singh has a merits hearing on his application for asylum in September
2026. With the prospect of spending ten months or more of immigration
detentior in a county jail, Singh filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on
December 11, 2025 in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1).

The petition was referred to Chief United States Magistrate Judge Daryl F.
Bloom and he issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) on February 10,
2026. (Doc. 13). The R&R recommends that Singh’s petition for writ of habeas
corpus be denied. (Doc. 13). | Singh filed objections to the R&R shortly
thereafter. (Doc. 14).

Like many of the recent immigration-related habeas petitions in this district,

the overarching legal issue in this matter is whether Singh may be detained

without a.bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), a mandatory detention

provision: see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018) (Alito, J.,

|
plurality op.) (“And neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything
whatsoever about bond hearings.”). Most district court decisions to address the

issue hold that individuals like|Singh are not subject to mandatory detention

|
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Cage 3:25-cv-02388-JKM

|
under Section 1225(b)(2)(A),
Middle District of Pennsylvani
The R&R here, howeve
The magistrate judge determi

detention. In support, he look

Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,
|

6, 2026) and several out-of-di

the minority view on the issue.

Singh’s objections to the
petitioner argues that the R&F

interpretation debate. He alsc

3 See Mamatkulov v. Lowe, No. 3:2

Diallo v. Lowe, No. 3:26CV286, 20
Hernandez v. Kunes, No. 1:25-CV-

Document 15 Filed 02/25/26 Page 4 of 14

including at least 16 decisions from jurists in the
as

r, found respondents’ position more persuasive.
ned that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to Singh’s
ed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in
et al., --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb.

strict immigration detention cases, which represent

> R&R are now ripe for disposition. In short, the
2 landed on the wrong side of the statutory

) asserts that prolonged detention raises serious

-6CV99, 2026 WL 456917, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2026);
26 WL 458294, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2026); Villa
01847, 2026 WL 411726, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2026)

(Wilson, J); Patel v. O'Neill, No. 3:25-CV-02289, 2026 WL 323121, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6,

2026) (Mehalchick, J.); Viantsko v.

Lowe, No. 4:25-CV-02523, 2026 WL 313473, at *4 (M.D.

Pa. Feb. 5, 2026) (Brann, C.J.); Ca

rrero Romero v. Lowe, No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL

296215, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 20

3:25CV2518, 2026 WL 94642, at *

26) (Brann, C.J.); Gonzalez Centeno v. Lowe, No.
4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2026), adhered to, No. 3:25CV2518,

2026 WL 196513 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2026); Vadel v. Lowe, No. 3:25-CV-02452, 2025 WL

3772059, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 31,
CV-02411; 2025 WL 3709045, at *

2025) (Mehalchick, J.); Ramirez-Montoya v. Rose, No. 3:25-
5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025) (Mehalchick, J.); Samassa v.

Lowe, No. 1:25-CV-02197, 2025 WL 3653751, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2025); Quispe v. Rose,

No. 3:25-CV-02276, --- F.Supp. 3d]

~~~, 2025 WL 3537279, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025)

(Mehalchick, J.); Cunin v. McShane, No. 3:25-CV-1887, 2025 WL 3542999, at *2 (M.D. Pa.

Dec. 10, 2025) (Neary, J); Patel v.

O'Neil, No. 3:25-CV-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *5 (M.D.

nandez v. Rose, No. 1:25-CV-2221, 2025 WL 3284447, at

Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (Mariani, J.); Her

*2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025) (Neary, J.); Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr.

Facility, No. 3:25-CV-01896, 2025

WL 3522932, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (Camoni,

M.J), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part on other grounds, No. 3:25-

CV-01896, 2025 WL 3513152 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (Wilson, J.).

4

Case 3:25-cv-02388-JKM

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Document 15 Filed 02/25/26 Page 5of 14

due process concerns based on the date of his next immigration hearing which is

presently scheduled for Septe
They will be sustained. The F
ordered released from immigr
within seven days.
Jurisdiction
Federal district courts ar
28 U.S.C. § 2241 where the p
or laws or treaties of the Unite
instant petition while he was d
is still currently in ICE custody
that his continued detention vi
that the wrong provision of the

indefinite detention. Thus, the

petition.> Rumsfeld v. Padilla,

4 The Fifth Amendment entitles non

mber 2026. Singh’s objections are persuasive.

2&R will not be adopted, and the petitioner will be

ation detention if he is not provided a bond hearing

e authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus under

etitioner is detained "in violation of the Constitution
d States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Singh filed the

etained within the jurisdiction of this court, and he

within this court's jurisdiction. Petitioner asserts

olates his right to due process.* He also asserts

INA is being used to justify his potentially
court has habeas jurisdiction over Singh’s

942 U.S. 426, 443 (2004).

citizens to due process of law in the context of removal

proceedings, and thus, they are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard, appropriate

to the nature of the case. See Tru

1

pv. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (citing Reno v.

Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,

313 (1950).

5 Although it initially raised a jurisdic

tional challenge, the government now concedes that the

court has jurisdiction over Singh’s petition. (Doc. 11).

5

Case 3:25-cv-02388-JKM

Standard of Review

Under the Federal Magi

!

determination of those portion

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see

Document 15 ‘Filed 02/25/26 Page 6 of 14

strates Act, the district court must make a de novo

s of the R&R against which objections are made.

also Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077, 1085 (3d

Cir. 1983). The court may acc

t

findings or recommendations

Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 877 (3

receive further evidence or rec

instructions. Id.
Analysis
Singh’s objections are s
conducting that review, the pe
provision relied upon by the gc
apply to the petitioner. His co
From a legal standpoint,
Third Circuit Court of Appeals
on the issue—and there are m
a determination, not even a pr
V. Greene. 563 U.S. 692, 709

in Buenrostro-Mendez may on

ept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

made by the magistrate judge. Henderson v.

d Cir. 1987). The district court judge may also

commit the matter to the magistrate judge with

pecific enough to require full de novo review. After
atitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, as the
overnment, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), does not
ntinued detention under Section 1225 is unlawful.
there is no decision of the Supreme Court or the
to guide the analysis. Of the district courts to rule
any—no single decision binds the court in making

evious decision of the undersigned. See Camreta

n.7 (2011). The divided decision of the Fifth Circuit

ly be considered for its persuasive value, or lack

6

Case 3:25-cv-02388-JKM

Document 15 ‘Filed 02/25/26 Page 7 of 14

thereof. As for the majority and minority views on Section 1225(b)(2)(A), it goes

without saying that no legal d

spute is resolved by counting noses. See Shurtleff

v. City of Bos., Massachusetts, 596 U.S. 243, 256 (2022). Furthermore, despite

the frequently recurring issues found in many immigration-related habeas

petitions, each case must be considered on an “ad hoc basis” according to the

matters at issue. Diallo v. Bon

di, No. CV 25-7421, 2026 WL 36534, at *2 (E-D.

Pa. Jan. 6, 2026) (Rufe, J.).
In this case, Singh is an

detained:and released, and w

United States after a period of

of whether his detention is go\

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) or by t

1226(a).

1. The Statutes at Issu

Starting with 8 U.S.C. §

immigration officers; expeditec

hearing.”6 Id.

i es
|
i
i
|
1

6“ "Tithe title of a statute and the h

individual who entered the United States, was

as then later apprehended in the interior of the

; continuous residence. What follows is an analysis
yerned by the mandatory detention provision of 8

he discretionary detention provision of 8 U.S.C. §
e

1225, that section bears the title: “Inspection by

1 removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for

eading of a section’ are ‘tools available for the resolution of

a doubt’ about the meaning of a statute.” Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,

Itimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-529 (1947)).

234 (1998).(quoting Trainmen v. Ba

\ .

7

Case 3:25-cv-02388-JKM |Document15_ Filed 02/25/26 Page 8 of 14

“Applicant for Admission” —Section 1225(a)(1) provides that “[a]n alien

present in the United States who has not been admitted (whether or not ata

designated port of arrival andlincluding an alien who is brought to the United
States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters) shall
be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(1). Definitionally, all non-admitted noncitizens, including Singh, are
‘applicants for admission.”
Section 1225(b) is entitled “Inspection of applicants for admission.” Under
Section 1225(b) applicants for admission fall into one of two categories, (b)(1) or
(b)(2). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Section 1225(b)(1) does not apply to Singh.’
| Moying on to Section 1225(b)(2), that section is entitled “Inspection of other
aliens.” Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides in relevant part:
| ...In the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission,
' if the examining immigration officer determines that an
alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a

proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

” Section 1225(b)(1) applies to noncitizens “arriving in the United States,” who are determined
to be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (misrepresentation of material facts
provisions)'or 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (lacking documentation provisions). DHS has.charged
Singh with being present in the United States without admission or parole in violation 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

8

Case 3:25-cv-02388-JKM

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) c

“alien seeking admission,” wh

Document 15 ‘Filed 02/25/26 Page 9 of 14
ontains two terms, “applicant for admission” and

ich the minority of decisions hold are synonymous.

Id. Interpretation of that section will follow below.

Apprehension and Dete

ntion - Section 1226, by contrast, bears the title

“Apprehension and detention
to aliens already present in th

Section 1226(a) provide
General, an alien may be arre
the alien is to be removed[.]."

default rule for those aliens by

General to issue warrants for t

proceedings|[,] and further “per

on bond[.]” Jennings, 583 U.S

of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. This section “applies

e United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303.

s that, "[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney
sted and detained pending a decision on whether

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). “Section 1226(a) creates a

permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney
heir arrest and detention pending removal
mits the Attorney General to release those aliens

at 303.

2. Section 1226(a) Applies to Singh, Not Section 1225(b)(2)(A)

“Alien Seeking Admissio

n” — Returning to Section 1225(b)(2)(A),

respondents’ position is that th
prescribed by statute in Sectio

seeking admission” later in the

e definitional label of “applicant for admission” as
n 1225(a)(1) is the same as the language “alien

tsentence. The R&R, after review of the statute,

also concludes that every “applicant for admission” is, by definition, “seeking

admission.” (Doc. 13 at 9-14).

According to that view, this would subject all

9

Case 3:25-cv-02388-JKM |Document15 Filed 02/25/26 Page 10 of 14

unadmitted aliens to mandatory detention without bond pending removal
proceedings regardless of whether they are located at the border or have spent
months or years living in the interior. Under that reading, “for purposes of

immigration detention, the border is now everywhere.” Buenrostro-Mendez, No.

25-20496, 2026 WL 323330 at *18 (Sth Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting Op.).
The court disagrees with that reading of the text. “Applicant for admission”
is specifically defined by Section 1225(a)(1), but “alien seeking admission’ is not.
Thus, in short, the court reads “an alien seeking admission,” as the operative
language of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). That is, “seeking admission” is the functional
condition that triggers mandatory detention, not merely the definitional status of
“applicant for admission” created by Section 1225(a)(1). By statute, all non-
admitted noncitizens are deemed “applicants for admission.” That is different
than a noncitizen who is actively or functionally “seeking admission” through the
process governed by Section 1225.
As another district court analogized:
[S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing
a ticket and then! proceeds to sit through the first few
minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be described as
| “seeking admission” to the theater. Rather, that person
would be described as already present there. Even if that
person, after being detected, offered to pay for a ticket, one

' would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission”
' (or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say

| 10

Case 3:25-cv-02388-JKM

that they had ent
means of remainin

to those noncitize
to the United Sta

Document 15 Filed 02/25/26

Page 11 of 14

ered unlawfully but now seek a lawful

ig there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only
ns who are actively “seeking admission”
tes, it cannot, according to its ordinary

meaning, apply to [petitioner], because he has already

been residing in the United States for several years.

Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795
Moreover, the consensu
admission” in Section 1225(b)

and ongoing conduct, such as

F. Supp. 3d 475, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). ®
s in this district is that the phrase “alien seeking
(2)(A) does independent work and requires “active

physically attempting to come into the United

States at.a border or port of entry.) Quispe, 2025 WL 3537279, at *5 (citations

omitted), ‘and does not apply t
the United States for years[,]”

As these other well-reas

Mendez dissent have recogniz

inter alia, negate the plain mee

the rule against surplusage, ar

aliens” urider Section 1226(c)

arising from a redundant statut

|
8 As for the fact that Singh is seekin

o “noncitizens like [p]etitioner who have resided in
Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *5 (citations omitted).

oned district court cases and the Buenrostro-

fed, to adopt the position taken in the R&R would,

aning of the text, ignore context and history, violate
nd render the mandatory detention of “criminal

(as expanded last year by the Laken Riley Act) as

tory provision. ? See Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *5

g asylum, that application does not make him an “alien

seeking admission” under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) or provide him with lawful entry to the United

States; rather, that application is to
F. Supp. 3d at 488 n.7.

® The court will briefly address Sing

determination in this case. Even if §

obtain a lawful means to remain here. Lopez Benitez, 795

h’s due process argument without making it the dispositive
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) was amenable to the respondents’

11

¢

Case 3:25-cv-02388-JKM

1

(citing Centeno |barra v. Ward

Document 15

Filed 02/25/26 Page 12 of 14

en of the Fed. Det. Ctr. Philadelphia, No. CV 25-

6312, 2025 WL 3294726, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025) (Rufe, J.)); Buenrostro-

Mendez,’ 2026 WL 323330 at

After careful considerati
Singh’s detention.’° Jennings

above, Section 1226(a) autho

*11-16 (Douglas, J., dissenting op.).

on, Section 1226(a) is the statute that applies to

583 U.S. at 288 (Alito, J., plurality op.). As noted

rizes release from immigration detention on bond

and/or with conditions. “At a bond hearing, a noncitizen ‘may secure his release

if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and

|

construction, which it is not, the canon of constitutional avoidance would counsel against this
interpretation. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L.

Rev. 109, 141-42 (2010) (“[While
judge ought to eschew the best, bu
but constitutional one.”).

a court may not twist the text beyond what it will bear, a

unconstitutional interpretation in favor of a less plausible,

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United

States, including [noncitizens], whe

her their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or

permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). Mandatory and indefinite

detention of long-resident interior a
dangerousness raises serious due
not reach those questions about Se
terms.

iens without any individualized determination of flight risk or

process questions. Id. at 690-92. However, the court need

ction 1225(b)(2)(A) if Section 1226(a) governs on its own

10 Exhibit 1 of the government's response includes a Form I-286, entitled "Notice of Custody

Determination," which was execute

Office and served on petitioner on h

ECF p. 5). The form cites INA § 23

the issuing officer and the date of is

INA § 235 or 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)

document or the accuracy of the Se

determination by ICE that Section 1

the court independent factual groun

|

}
|
|

d by an ICE supervisory officer at the Pike County Sub
November 19, 2025, the date of his arrest. (Doc. 8-1 at
6, i.e., 8 U.S.C. § 1226. The form bears the signature of

suance. No reference is made anywhere on the form to
A). Respondents have not disputed the authenticity of the
ction 1226 designation at that time. Consequently, this
226 applied to Singh shortly after his arrest would provide
ds to sustain the petitioner's objections to the R&R.

12

Case 3:25-cv-02388-JKM

no danger to the community.’

Document 15 Filed 02/25/26 Page 13 of 14

” Quispe, 2025 WL 3537279, at *6 (quoting Nielsen

v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397-98 (2019) (Alito, J. plurality op.)).

Singh has requested a bond hearing in his objections to the R&R. (Doc. 14

at 6). Petitioner will be grante

d that relief since his detention is governed by

Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2)(A)."" The court will add one caveat. If

respondents provide a bond h
applicable procedural requirer

the conditions or denial of bon

earing within seven days that complies with the

ments, the immigration judge's determination as to

d will govern. If respondents fail to provide a

hearing within seven days, however, Singh must be released immediately from

detention on his own recogniz

immigration proceedings. '2

3. Attorneys’ Fees and

ance and without conditions pending further

Costs

Finally, Singh requests attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to

Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
habeas proceeding challengin

a “civil action” for purposes of

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), and th

The Third Circuit recently confirmed that a
g immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is
the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28

at the EAJA “unambiguously applies to habeas

1 See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(d)(1).

12 To the extent that Craig Lowe, Warden of Pike CCF is the only proper respondent in this

matter, Lowe is acting as an agent
Vadel v. Lowe, No. 3:25-CV-02452|

of ICE and the government will be bound by the order. See
2025 WL 3772059, at *1n.1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2025).

13

Case 3:25-cv-02388-JKM |Document15 Filed 02/25/26 Page 14 of 14

challenges to immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Michelin v. Warden

Moshannon Valley Corr. Ctr.,|No. 24-2990, 2026 WL 263483, at *1-2, *10 (3d

Cir. Feb. 2, 2026). Singh will thus be permitted to file a motion for costs and fees
pursuant to the EAJA within 30 days of the entry of judgment. 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(B); Villa Hernandez v. Kunes, No. 1:25-CV-01847, 2026 WL 411726,

at *7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2026) (Wilson, J.).
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Singh’s objections to the R&R are

sustained. The R&R will not be adopted. Singh’s petition for writ of habeas

corpus under Section 2241 will be granted. Respondents shall provide Singh
with a bond hearing within seven days. Otherwise, Singh must be released
without bond or conditions. The government will be ordered to provide a sworn

declaration next week. An appropriate order follows.

Date: THE COURT:

| a .
JUDGEMULIA K. MUNLE
United States Distri

14