Hoffman v. Cuffaro et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOEY HOFFMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
JILLIAN CUFFARO, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 3:25-CV-02360
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court is Plaintiff Joey Hoffman’s complaint alleging
that the staff at Dauphin County Prison are denying him supplies necessary to
pursue his legal actions. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff is a pro se litigant and is currently
housed at the Dauphin County Prison as a pretrial detainee for a parole violation.
(Id.) The court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, screen
the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, dismiss the complaint without
prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and grant
Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint.
BACKGROUND
On December 9, 2025, the court received and docketed Plaintiff’s complaint.
(Doc. 1.) The complaint names the following four defendants: (1) Jillian Cuffaro
(“Cuffaro”), Director at Dauphin County Prison; (2) William Weldon (“Weldon”),
Unit Manager at Dauphin County Prison; (3) Louis Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”),
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Grievance Coordinator at Dauphin County Prison; and (4) Gregory Briggs
(“Briggs”), Warden at Dauphin County Prison. (Doc. 1, pp. 2–3.) 1 Plaintiff’s
alleged facts are contained in the following paragraph:
I am indigent 14 months now and trying to get some free paper,
envelopes other than indigent pack. I ask for pro se status because I’m
pro se in 4 civil cases in which I need the supplies for and am refused
all and copies. Director Jill is denying all.
(Id., p. 5.) With respect to his injury, Plaintiff further alleged that he is trading
food off his tray for supplies. (Id.) Plaintiff brings the action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and alleges that defendants are violating the First, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. (Id., p. 3.)
On December 9, 2025, the court entered an administrative order instructing
Plaintiff to pay the outstanding filing fee in full or file a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis within thirty days or the case would be dismissed. (Doc. 3.) On
December 29, 2025, the court received and docketed Plaintiff’s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis and a certified prisoner trust account statement. (Docs. 4, 5.)
The court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, screen
the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and dismiss the complaint. The court
will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint curing the pleading defects
identified in this memorandum.
1 For ease of reference, the court utilizes the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
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J URISDICTION AND V ENUE
The court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which allows a district court to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction in civil cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States. Venue is proper in this district because the alleged acts and
omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in Dauphin County, which is located
in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 118(b).
S TANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a court “shall dismiss” an in forma
pauperis case “at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” The legal standard for
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is
identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions
to dismiss. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d
Cir. 2002).
In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all well pleaded allegations as
true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Doe
v. Univ. of the Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020). The pleadings of self-
represented plaintiffs are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by attorneys and are to be liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d. Cir. 2011). Self-
represented litigants are to be granted leave to file a curative amended complaint
even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, unless such an amendment
would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
245 (3d Cir. 2008).
DISCUSSION
A. Claims Against Defendants Weldon, Rodriguez, and Briggs Will Be
Dismissed.
Plaintiff is raising multiple constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Doc. 1.) To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must meet two
threshold requirements. He must allege: 1) that the alleged misconduct was
committed by a person acting under color of state law; and 2) that as a result, he
was deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). It is also well
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established that “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for
a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved.”
See Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007).
Here, Plaintiff only names one defendant in the alleged facts by generally
stating that “Director Jill is denying all.” (Doc. 1, p. 5.) Therefore, without some
alleged personal involvement on the part of Defendants Weldon, Rodriguez, and
Biggs, all claims against them will be dismissed without prejudice.
B. All Claims Against Defendant Cuffaro Will Be Dismissed.
Turning to the claim that “Director Jill is denying all,” nothing in this
allegation supports a constitutional violation. The court acknowledges that
Plaintiff’s complaint references the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, but his allegations fail to raise a claim for which relief may be
granted.
Asserting an actionable claim for denial of access to the courts under the
First Amendment requires a prisoner to allege that (1) they “lost a chance to pursue
a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim” and (2) they have no available
remedy for the lost claim other than the present denial of access action. Rivera v.
Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 915 (3rd Cir. 2022) (citing Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198,
205 (3rd Cir. 2008)). Here, Plaintiff has not stated that he has lost a chance to
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pursue a nonfrivolous underlying claim. Instead, he alleges that he is currently
pursuing four civil actions and trading food for supplies. Nothing in the alleged
facts speaks to the merits of the underlying claims. Instead, Plaintiff specifically
alleges that Defendants state they are following the prison’s handbook and that he
has been provided the indigent packet at the prison. (Doc. 1, pp. 4–5.) 	Since there
are no allegations concerning the merits of the underlying claims and no
allegations that Plaintiff has been prevented from pursuing such claims, the First
Amendment claim against Defendant Cuffaro will be dismissed without prejudice.
The court also finds that Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim fails as matter of
law because the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable to
state officials, such as Defendant Cuffaro. The Fifth Amendment provides, in
pertinent part, that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law[.]” See U.S. Const. amend. V. The provisions of the
Fifth Amendment only concern, however, federal action, not state or private action.
See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) (stating that “[t]he
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from
depriving any person of property without ‘due process of law’ ”); Nguyen v. U.S.
Cath. Conf., 719 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that “[t]he limitations of the
[F]ifth [A]mendment restrict only federal governmental action and not the actions
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of private entities” (citing Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461
(1952)); Nemeth v. Off. of Clerk of Superior Ct. of New Jersey, 837 F. App'x 924,
929 n.5 (3d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (noting that the district court had properly
concluded that, because all of the named defendants were state and private officials
and entities, the plaintiff could not pursue a Fifth Amendment claim against any of
them because the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause only “protects against
federal governmental actions, not state actions”).
Here, Defendant Cuffaro is an employee of the Dauphin County and not a
federal employee. Thus, the court finds that this Fifth Amendment claim fails as a
matter of law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). As such, the court will dismiss
the Fifth Amendment claim with prejudice.
Plaintiff has also raised an Eighth Amendment claim. (Doc. 1, p. 3.) The
Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. Amend.
VIII. The Eighth Amendment does not apply until an inmate has been both
convicted of and sentenced for his crimes. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
392 n. 6 (1989); Hubbard v. Taylor,399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005). Thus, an
inmate awaiting sentencing must look to either the Fifth Amendment’s or the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for protection. See Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979). Therefore, the Eighth Amendment claim will be
dismissed with prejudice.
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Instead, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs
claims brought by pretrial detainees challenging their conditions of confinement.
See Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 166. To establish a constitutional violation under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee plaintiff would have to plausibly allege
that the challenged conditions of confinement amount to punishment. See Bell,
441 U.S. at 538 (“In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of
pretrial detention that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty
without due process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those
conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”). Here, Plaintiff has made no
such allegations concerning punishment. Therefore, all Fourteenth Amendment
claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
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CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis, file the complaint, and dismiss the complaint without
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The court will grant Plaintiff
leave to file an amended complaint to cure the above stated pleading defects. Any
amended complaint must be titled “Amended Complaint” and filed under the
above captioned case number.
An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: January 5, 2026
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