Leon v. FCI Schuylkill Warden

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LUIS LEON,
Petitioner,
v.
FCI SCHUYLKILL WARDEN,
Respondent.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-02182
(SAPORITO, J.)
ORDER
Luis Leon, presently incarcerated at FCI Allenwood Low1, proceeds
on a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Doc. 1). Leon alleges that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has failed to
grant him time credits to which he is entitled under the First Step Act
(“FSA”). For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be dismissed.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In August 2020, Leon was sentenced to 120 months’ incarceration
after pleading guilty to one count of possession of 400 grams or more of
fentanyl with intent to distribute, and one count of possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute.
See (Docs. 5-5, 5-6);
United States v. Leon, No.
1 Leon filed his initial petition from FCI Schuylkill, but he was later
transferred to FCI Allenwood.
See (Doc. 1 at 5, Doc. 7).
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19-CR-00051 (D.R.I.); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The criminal judgment
referred to the general provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), § 841(b)(1)(A),
and § 841(b)(1)(C), but did not refer to specific subsections of the statute
that prescribe minimum and maximum penalties based on the quantity
of drugs involved.
See (Doc. 5-5); § 841(b)(1)(B)(i)-(viii).
The FSA allows eligible inmates who complete recidivism reduction
programs or other productive activities to receive credit toward time in
prerelease custody or supervised release.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4).
However, 	inmates 	who 	have 	been 	convicted 	of 	certain 	crimes 	are
ineligible. 	The 	BOP 	determined 	that 	Leon’s 	convictions 	made 	him
ineligible pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(lxvi), because his offenses
involved the intended distribution of more than 40 grams of fentanyl.
See
(Doc. 5-2, ¶¶ 9-11) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi)).
Leon 	filed 	this 	petition 	without 	exhausting 	administrative
remedies, 	claiming 	that 	exhaustion 	should 	be 	excused 	because 	his
“proper release date” was approaching. (Doc. 1). He argues that because
his criminal judgment did not include a specific citation to the subsection
addressing the quantity of drugs involved, the BOP should not have
found that he was convicted under that subsection.
See (Doc. 6 at 2-3).
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Ultimately, he asks that the Court “find [him] FTC eligible under the
statute.”
II. 	DISCUSSION
Leon’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies means that his
petition must be dismissed. An inmate seeking habeas relief pursuant to
Section 2241 must generally exhaust the BOP’s administrative remedies.
See Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Moscato v.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996)); 28 C.F.R. §§
542.10-18. Exhaustion may be excused only if “the issue presented
involve[s] only statutory construction,”
Vasquez, 684 F.3d at 434, or “if an
attempt 	to 	obtain 	relief 	would 	be 	futile 	or 	where 	the 	purposes 	of
exhaustion would not be served.”
Cerverizzo v. Yost, 380 F. App’x 115, 116
(3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished).
Here, Leon claims that he should be able to bypass exhaustion
because he asserts an entitlement to immediate release2, but “district
2 	Further, Leon’s petition is not limited to issues of statutory
construction. He relies in part on evidence that for unexplained reasons,
the BOP once marked him as “eligible” (Doc. 1-3 at 2), and he claims that
he had been recognized as eligible “for the last three years.” Any dispute
as to Leon’s prior eligibility status, or the basis on which he is now
deemed ineligible, would call for exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(continued on next page)
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courts within the Third Circuit have repeatedly rejected the argument
that an inmate can be excused from the exhaustion requirement simply
because his projected release date is approaching.”
Meadows v. Warden,
FCI-Allenwood Low, No. 3:24-CV-952, 2024 WL 3871810, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 19, 2024) (listing cases).
Regardless, Leon would not be entitled to relief on the merits. The
FSA lists a series of convictions that make a prisoner ineligible for time
credits. 	As 	relevant 	here, 	that 	list 	includes 	convictions 	under
“Subparagraph (A)(vi) or (B)(vi) of section 401(b)(1) of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)) . . . relating to manufacturing,
distributing, 	dispensing, 	or 	possessing 	with 	intent 	to 	manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidinyl] propanamide, or
any analogue thereof.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(lxvi). “The compound of
N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidinyl] propanamide is commonly
known as Fentanyl.”
Saldana v. Warden, No. 3:25-CV-02472, 2026 WL
See Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 761-62 (3d Cir. 1996)
(“We require exhaustion [because] allowing the appropriate agency to
develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review
. . . [and] providing agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors
fosters administrative autonomy.”).
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196512, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2026) (citation omitted).
In this case, Leon admitted in his plea agreement that his crimes
involved the possession of 400 or more grams of fentanyl with intent to
distribute.
See (Doc. 5-6 at 6, ¶ 4). To assess whether a conviction under
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)) makes a prisoner ineligible for FSA credits, the
BOP 	can 	consider 	the 	prisoner’s 	own 	plea 	agreement 	and 	other
documents from the criminal case, even if the judgment does not refer to
the statutory subsection at issue.3
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Leon’s petition (Doc. 1) is
DISMISSED, and the Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
Dated: October 14, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
3 Despite Leon’s claim that “no district court has ever agreed with
the BOP on this issue,” courts in this district have repeatedly dismissed
habeas petitions that rely on arguments similar to Leon’s.
See,
e.g.,
Baez-
Acevedo v. Warden, No. 1:26-CV-02662, 2026 WL 3016088, at *5 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 7, 2026);
Moore v. Cruz, No. 3:26-CV-01291, 2026 WL 2271444,
at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2026);
Regalado v. Greene, No. 1:25-CV-00054,
2025 WL 411672, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2025);
see also Maitland v.
Warden, FCI Berlin, No. 23-CV-074, 2024 WL 3541213, at *2-3 (D.N.H.
Jan. 31, 2024) (“[T]here is no talismanic significance in the lack of an
explicit reference to subsection (vi) in [the] judgment.”) (listing cases).
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