Green v. Warden of FCI-Lewisburg

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DUANE GREEN,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, FCI-LEWISBURG,
Respondent.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-02150
(SAPORITO, J.)
ORDER
Duane Green, a prisoner incarcerated at FCI-Lewisburg, proceeds
on a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Doc. 1). He contends that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has improperly
failed to apply his earned time credits under the First Step Act (“FSA”)
by 	denying him an 	individualized review of his risk 	of 	recidivism.
Because he has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the petition
will be dismissed.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On October 28, 2024, in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia, Green was sentenced to 24 months
imprisonment 	following a conviction 	for distribution of a controlled
substance in or near a school zone.
See United States v. Green, No. 5:19-
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CR-00040 (Doc. 792) (N.D. W.Va.). He filed this petition on November 13,
2025, at which time his projected release date was October 24, 2026. He
had participated in recidivism reduction programming and received a
conditional date of June 15, 2026, for placement in pre-release custody;
however, he received a PATTERN recidivism score of medium, making
him ineligible for expedited placement in pre-release custody pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(I).
Green contends that notwithstanding this score, he has not received
an “individualized determination” of his eligibility required by another
provision of the statute. He alleges that he “attempted administrative
relief 	through 	the 	BOP 	Administrative 	Remedy 	Program,” 	but 	the
respondent has “refused to recalculate or apply his earned credits or
adjust his prerelease date.” He requests that the respondent be ordered
to conduct this individualized determination, order “proper recalculation
and application” of his time credits, and order his immediate release to a
residential reentry center or to home confinement, among other relief.
II. 	DISCUSSION
The FSA generally allows inmates who complete evidence-based
recidivism programming or other “productive activities” to receive earned
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time credits toward expedited placement in pre-release custody.
See 18
U.S.C. 	§ 	3632(d)(4)(A). 	Among 	other 	prerequisites 	for 	expedited
placement, the inmate must have a “minimum” or “low” recidivism risk
each of the last two times he was assessed, as determined under the
PATTERN 	risk 	system1, 	which 	“assigns 	a 	recidivism 	risk 	score 	of
minimum, low, medium, or high risk.”
See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D);
Brennerman v. Warden, FCI-Allenwood Low, No. 3:24-CV-2029, 2025 WL
52469, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2025).
If an inmate cannot meet this recidivism-risk requirement, he can
petition the warden to be considered on an individualized basis for
placement in prerelease custody.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(II). If
the warden determines that a prisoner “would not be a danger to society
if transferred to prerelease custody or supervised release,” has made “a
good faith effort to lower their recidivism risk through participation in
recidivism reduction programs or productive activities,” and is “unlikely
to recidivate,” the inmate will satisfy the recidivism-risk requirement.
1 The “Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and
Needs” (“PATTERN”) risk score was developed as prescribed in the FSA,
and accounts for factors such as an inmate’s prior crimes, history of
violence, and incident reports in prison, among other factors.
See 18
U.S.C. § 3632; (Doc. 6-6).
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Id.;
see also 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(c)(2).
In this case, Green’s petition must be dismissed because the record
shows that he has not exhausted administrative remedies. An inmate
seeking habeas relief pursuant to section 2241 must generally exhaust
the BOP’s administrative remedy process.
See Vasquez v. Strada, 684
F.3d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,
98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996)); 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-18. Exhaustion may
be excused if “the issue presented involve[s] only statutory construction,”
Vasquez, 684 F.3d at 434, or “if an attempt to obtain relief would be futile
or where the purposes of exhaustion would not be served.”
Cerverizzo v.
Yost, 	380 	F. 	App’x 	115, 	116 	(3d 	Cir. 	2010) 	(unpublished);
	see 	also
Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (“[a]n exception is made [to
the exhaustion requirement] only if there is no opportunity to obtain
redress . . . [or] if the corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render
futile any effort to obtain relief”).
Green argues that exhaustion must be excused as “unavailable,
inadequate, and futile” because “the remedy process routinely takes 6-12
months to complete” and he asserts an entitlement to prerelease custody
before that time elapses. However, “district courts within the Third
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Circuit have repeatedly rejected the argument that an inmate can be
excused from the exhaustion requirement simply because his projected
release date is approaching.”
Meadows v. Warden,
FCI-Allenwood Low,
No. 3:24-CV-952, 2024 WL 3871810, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2024)
(listing cases). To the extent Green argues that exhaustion is futile
because the BOP has “taken a fixed legal position” that petitions from
medium-risk inmates can never be granted, the record of this case lacks
evidence to support that assumption.
See (Doc. 6 at 4, 18-19) (citing BOP
Program Statement 5410.01 at 15) (requiring that “the Warden will
consult with the Regional Director before approving an inmate under [28
C.F.R. § 523.44(c)(2)], unless an exemption is granted by the Regional
Director . . . ”).
Ultimately, the relevant statute provides that the method for an
inmate with a medium-risk recidivism score to seek an “individualized
determination” is to petition the warden. Green has not done so.2 He
2 Despite his vague allegation that he “attempted administrative
relief,” Green does not dispute the BOP’s evidence showing that he has
never filed an administrative remedy while in BOP custody.
See (Doc. 6-
2, ¶ 4; Doc. 6-4). Regardless, he has not alleged that he requested the
“individualized determination” of his recidivism risk that he now claims
he was denied.
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cannot bypass administrative remedies to obtain such relief from a
federal court when the statute explicitly requires him to request it from
the warden.
See,
e.g.,
Jells v. Warden of FPC Schuylkill, No. 1:25-CV-
02260, 2026 WL 406463, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2026);
Chandler v.
United States, No. 3:25-1248, 2025 WL 3270524, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Nov.
24, 2025);
Fowler v. Wertzman, No. 4:23-CV-00290, 2023 WL 4853720, at
*2 (M.D. Pa. July 28, 2023) (“This exception to the minimum- or low-
recidivism-risk precondition requires an inmate to directly petition the
warden, 	and 	therefore 	by 	statute 	(and 	regulation) 	demands
administrative exhaustion.”).
III. 	CONCLUSION
Because Green has not exhausted administrative remedies, his
petition will be dismissed. Green has also sought to amend his petition to
add an apparently unrelated claim arising from a disciplinary sanction.
This relief is denied without prejudice to a re-filed petition addressing
the disciplinary sanction.
See,
e.g.,
Credico v. Warden, FCI-Allenwood
Medium, No. 3:18-CV-465, 2019 WL 418428, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2019).
Green is advised that, as with the instant petition, petitioners must
generally 	exhaust 	administrative 	remedies 	before 	challenging 	a
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disciplinary sanction under section 2241.
	See,
	e.g.,
	Rivera-Lebron v.
Rectenwald, 525 F. App’x 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	The petition (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. 	The 	petitioner’s 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	file 	a 	supplemental
pleading (Doc. 9) and “combined motion to expedite and motion for
immediate injunctive relief” (Doc. 11) are DENIED.
3. 	The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
Dated: March 13, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
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