Dicent v. Land Home Financial Services, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARIAJACQUELINE DICENT : CIV. NO. 3:25-cv-00406
a/k/a MARIA J. DISEN a/k/a :
MARIA JIMENEZ DISEN-COLON : (Judge Mariani)
:
Plaintiff, : (Magistrate Judge Schwab)
:
v. :
:
LAND HOME FINANCIAL :
SERVICES, INC., et al., :
:
Defendants. :
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction.
The plaintiff, MariaJacqueline Dicent (“Dicent”), also known as Maria J.
Disen and Maria Jiminez Disen-Colon, proceeding pro se, raises claims under the
Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., in
addition to state law claims for “slander of title” and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The defendants move to dismiss Dicent’s complaint pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). After consideration, we recommend the court grant the
pending motion to dismiss. We also recommend the court grant Dicent leave to
amend her complaint.
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II. Background and Procedural History.
Dicent began this action by filing a complaint on March 5, 2025, against
Land Home Financial Services, Inc. (“Land Home”) and Magerick, LLC
(“Magerick”). Doc. 1. Dicent then filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, which we later granted. Docs. 2, 5. On July 25, 2025, the defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Doc. 18. And on August 1, 2025, Dicent timely filed a brief
in opposition. Doc. 21.
Dicent complains about the defendants’ actions in attempting to collect
payments on her mortgage loan. But her complaint is confusing. It contains
causes of action interspersed with factual allegations, which are not set forth
chronologically, and attaches sixty pages of exhibits, many of which are
duplicative. Additionally, the complaint is partially written in the format of a brief
with a separate section titled “statement of issues” and a separate section titled
“analysis,” which is a mix of allegations, legal arguments, and conclusions. Doc. 1
¶¶ 5–13, 50–69. Although the complaint is difficult to understand, we attempt to
summarize Dicent’s allegations and contentions below.
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A. Mortgage History.
Dicent purchased the property in question on June 23, 2000. Doc. 1 at 6.
The first mortgage for the property was with GMAC Mortgage Corporation. Doc.
1 ¶ 14. On December 29, 2005, Dicent refinanced with Century 21 Mortgage
(“Century 21”). Id. ¶ 15. Soon after, GMAC Mortgage Corporation was paid
$18,307.07, and the assignment to Century 21 was recorded. Id. Although Dicent
states that Century 21 sold the mortgage to JP Morgan Chase Mortgage, National
Association (“JP Morgan Chase”) in or around 2007, id. ¶ 16, the complaint
exhibits show the assignment occurred on September 26, 2012. Doc. 1-1 at 12–14.
The assignment to JP Morgan Chase was recorded by the Monroe County
Recorder of Deeds on October 12, 2012. Doc. 1-1 at 13.
JP Morgan Chase sold its interest to Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
(“Bayview”) on February 15, 2019, the assignment for which was recorded on
February 26, 2019. Doc. 1 ¶ 17. Bayview sold the mortgage to Nationstar
Mortgage, LLC (“Nationstar”), also known as RightPath Servicing and Mr.
Cooper, on either May 31 or June 1, 2022. Id. ¶ 18. The assignment to Nationstar
was recorded on August 30, 2022. Id.
On December 15, 2022, Dicent received a letter from Mr. Cooper stating
that the right to collect payment for her mortgage had been transferred from
Mr. Cooper to Land Home, effective January 4, 2023. Id. ¶ 27. In addition to this
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letter, on an unspecified date, Dicent received a letter from Land Home dated
December 15, 2022, titled “Notice of Sale of Ownership of Mortgage Loan.” Id.
¶ 28. The notice stated that the original loan of $39,000 was “sold to the new
creditor on November 18, 2022,” which Dicent alleges caused her to believe that
Land Home was the new owner of the loan. Id. (internal quotations omitted). But,
Dicent also alleges there is no assignment recorded for Land Home. Doc. 1 ¶ 19.
Rather, Nationstar sold the mortgage to Magerick on March 10, 2023, the
assignment for which was recorded on the same day. See id. ¶ 20; doc. 1-1 at 19,
22.
Dicent alleges that she first learned of the assignment to Magerick in or
around November 2024, when she requested a copy of the mortgage lien history
for her property. Doc. 1 ¶ 20. Dicent alleges that Land Home’s notice of
December 15, 2022, indicated that it was the new owner of the loan, and that its
failure to inform her of Magerick’s involvement constitutes “fraud and civil
tort[s].” Id.
B. Name, Address, and Balance Confusion.
In addition to the confusion surrounding who owns the mortgage, Dicent
alleges that there was unlawful confusion pertaining to her name, street address,
and the outstanding balances for her property.
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When Dicent purchased the property, the deed listed her name as Maria
Jimenez Disen-Colon. Id. at 6. Her “complete first name is MariaJacqueline,
Jimenez is [her] father’s last name, Disen was a typographical error from [her]
mother’s last name Dicent, and Colon was [her] ex-husband’s last name.” Id. On
January 26, 2023, Dicent emailed copies of her identification to Land Home and
requested that her name be updated to MariaJacqueline Dicent. Id. ¶ 32. Land
Home confirmed receipt of the documents by email, but did not update Dicent’s
name; for this reason, Dicent alleges that Land Home “continued to create
confusion on purpose.” Id.
As for the address, Dicent alleges that Magerick recorded her address
incorrectly, but that Land Home knew of and frequently used her correct address
when sending her correspondence.1 Specifically, Dicent alleges that when the
mortgage assignment to Magerick was recorded, Magerick used the incorrect
address of 2149 Titania Street rather than 2149 Titania Road. Id. ¶ 26 (emphasis
added). Despite this, Land Home used the correct address of 2149 Titania Road
when sending her correspondence. Id. Thus, Dicent claims, Land Home and
1 Dicent’s address was known as 1519 Titania Road until approximately
January 1, 2012. Doc. 1 at 1. After that date, the address became known as 2149
Titania Road. Id. The complaint exhibits demonstrate that Monroe County and
Coolbaugh Township engaged in an “addressing project” during which they altered
the street number of Dicent’s address. Doc. 1-1 at 55–58.
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Magerick “were manipulating everything with a process that was conducted in
malice.” Id.
Dicent alleges that the defendants further confused her by sending
correspondence and documents with conflicting balances. Dicent alleges that Land
Home’s December 15, 2022, notice indicated an original loan amount of $39,000
and did not indicate any escrow balance. See id. ¶ 28; doc. 1-1 at 27.
“Consequently,” Dicent alleges, “[she] started paying the taxes and insurance as
requested by Land Home.” Doc. 1 ¶ 29. And on January 11, 2023, Dicent received
an account disclosure statement from RightPath also indicating the escrow balance
was zero. Id. On January 19, 2023, Dicent received an email from Land Home
requesting information for a loan modification. Id. ¶ 30. Dicent alleges that she
was given conflicting information about the amount owed over the phone, but that
she emailed the requested documents to Land Home on January 20, 2023. Id. ¶ 30–
31.
In a Land Home mortgage statement dated March 20, 2023, the outstanding
balance was $31,334.25 and the escrow balance was zero. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. Dicent
alleges this outstanding balance conflicted with the $39,000 balanced listed on the
notice of December 15, 2022. Id. Although Dicent does not specify the dates, she
alleges that “[t]he following mortgage statements changed [the balance owed to
$]40,044.15 without any explanation.” Id. ¶ 33. The statements also listed an
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unapplied partial payment of $21.88 “under the category of past payment
breakdown,” which Dicent alleges neither Land Home nor Magerick ever
explained or applied to the balance. Id.
The mortgage statement from July 19, 2023, listed the amount due as
$20,457.79 and the escrow balance as negative $12,073.94. Id. ¶ 35. Dicent
received an additional mortgage statement dated July 19, 2024, which she alleges
contained “false and misleading information.” Id. ¶ 42. These conflicting balances,
Dicent alleges, “were created and recreated without any debt validation and to
confuse [her].” Id. ¶ 38. Dicent also alleges that the conflicting balances were
“false and misleading information” that inflicted emotional distress on her. Id.
¶ 42.
C. Loan Delinquency.
Dicent alleges that on June 19, 2024, she noticed that one of the mortgage
statements contained inaccurate information regarding delinquency of the loan. Id.
¶ 38. Specifically, the mortgage statement indicated that the loan became
delinquent as of November 1, 2018, and that the “first notice of filing required to
start foreclosure was completed on October 17, 2019.” Id. Dicent also alleges that
she was on an unemployment forbearance plan with JP Morgan Chase from July 1,
2018, to January 1, 2019, which, she appears to suggest, protects her from
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delinquency stemming from that time period. See id. Dicent alleges that since
Land Home only purchased the mortgage in 2022, this “information is false and
misleading.” Id.
D. Debt Validation and Communication Issues.
Dicent alleges that she made multiple requests to Land Home for a
validation of the debt and never received one. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 31, 39. Specifically,
Dicent requested a debt validation on January 20, 2023, and June 27, 2024. Id.
¶¶ 31, 39.
In addition, Dicent alleges that there were several instances where Land
Home either failed to respond to her communications or refused to communicate
with her. In particular, on May 9, 2023, Land Home denied Dicent’s requested
mortgage modification, “stating that the ‘investor’ had not given [Land Home]
contractual agreement to modify the loan.” Id. ¶ 37. In response, Dicent alleges
that she requested the identification of the investor, but that Land Home “did not
want to disclose” the identity. Id.
On June 27, 2024, Dicent “initially informed Land Home . . . of a mortgage
payment totaling $5,530.00 that was omitted or stolen.” Id. ¶ 39. And on July 1,
2024, Dicent sent an email to Land Home regarding the conflicting balances
discussed above. Id. ¶ 40. Dicent alleges that “they would not speak with [her]
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about the debt.” Id. Instead, Land Home representatives asked that Dicent
communicate with Roger Fay, an attorney. Id. Dicent alleges that when she
attempted to do so, the “office was permanently closed, and the phone number was
disconnected.” Id. Dicent further alleges that Land Home not only refused to give
her another phone number to contact, but that it blocked her phone number. Id.
E. Failed House Listing.
Dicent alleges that on an unspecified date, she listed her house for sale and
that offers were submitted. Id. ¶ 41. Soon after, Dicent received a payoff letter
which listed a payoff figure of $74,598.91. Id. Dicent alleges that the payoff letter
included amounts never discussed with her, particularly a corporate advance of
$4,185.70 that she never received. Id. Dicent alleges that she lost the opportunity
to sell her house because of the confusion clouding the title to her property. Id.
She further alleges that the “breakdown is crooked, distorted, cooked, manipulated,
just like the entire process,” and argues that this constitutes a violation of the
FDCPA and “slander of title.” Id. ¶¶ 41, 45.
F. “False” Liens and Bankruptcy Status.
Dicent alleges that Magerick falsely recorded a mortgage lien. Id. ¶ 45.
Although unclear, Dicent appears to state that Magerick’s lien is “false” because
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she filed for bankruptcy on July 22, 2024. Id. ¶ 47. Dicent also alleges that Land
Home falsely indicated in its correspondence that it had recorded a lien. Id. ¶ 45.
In addition, Dicent alleges that Land Home “threatened to take ‘action’ against the
property” on January 7, 2025, by challenging the lien in the bankruptcy court. Id.
¶ 55. Dicent alleges that Land Home “legally cannot do so” because it does not
have a recorded lien for the property. Id. Finally, Dicent alleges that her debt for
the property was discharged by the bankruptcy court on October 4, 2024, which,
she suggests, prevents the defendants from future collection efforts. Id. ¶ 55.
G. Claims & Jurisdiction.
Dicent brings federal claims under the FDCPA as well as state law claims
for “slander of title” and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dicent
specifically cites to Section 1692e of the FDCPA, pertaining to false and
misleading information, which would fall within the court’s federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dicent’s state law claims would fall within
the court’s supplemental jurisdiction, which we discuss below in further detail.
III. Motion to Dismiss Standards.
In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court may dismiss a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When
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reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “[w]e must accept all factual
allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to
the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief
under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223,
229 (3d Cir. 2010). In making that determination, we “consider only the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as
undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff’s] claims are based upon these
documents.” Id. at 230.
“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the
pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).” I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch.
Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 769–70 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2012). “Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The statement required by
Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the plaintiff’s
claim and of the grounds upon which the claim rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required
than “labels,” “conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “In other
words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.”
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Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). “A complaint has
to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.” Id.
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, the court “‘must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true
and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’”
Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v.
Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). But a court “need not credit a
complaint’s bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to
dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A
court also need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff
has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council
of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more
than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations
sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint
entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff
must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify
allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
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assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and
citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
In sum, “[w]e accept as true all factual matters [the plaintiff] alleges, but his
complaint cannot survive unless the facts it recites are enough to state plausible
grounds for relief.” Beasley v. Howard, 14 F.4th 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But “[a]
claim that relies just on ‘conclusory statements,’ or on ‘threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action’ without supporting factual allegations, does not
establish plausible grounds for relief.” Beasley, 14 F.4th at 231 (quoting Fischbein
v. Olson Rsch. Grp., Inc., 959 F.3d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 2020)).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and
“‘however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). “Notwithstanding the rule of liberal
construction, a pro se complaint may not survive dismissal if its factual allegations
do not meet Iqbal’s basic plausibility standard.” Beasley, 14 F.4th at 231.
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IV. Discussion.
The defendants contend that the complaint fails to state a FDCPA claim
upon which relief can be granted for two reasons. The first, and main reason, is
that the complaint fails to demonstrate that they are debt collectors, and, therefore,
the FDCPA does not apply to them. Doc. 19 at 4. In addition, the defendants argue
that Dicent’s allegation that the lien is “fake” is meritless. Id. at 5. In her brief in
opposition, Dicent does not respond to the defendants’ argument regarding their
debt collector status; rather, she only addresses their argument regarding the lien.
See doc. 21. Because we conclude the complaint fails to state a FDCPA claim
upon which relief can be granted, we do not address the merits of Dicent’s state
law claims.
A. FDCPA Claims.
“The FDCPA is a consumer protection statute that prohibits certain abusive,
deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices.” Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568
U.S. 371, 374 n.1 (2013). It “authorizes any aggrieved person to recover damages
from ‘any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision’ of the FDCPA.”
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)). To state a claim under the FDCPA upon which
relief can be granted, a plaintiff must allege facts from which it can be reasonably
inferred that: “(1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the
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defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the Act
defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in
attempting to collect the debt.” Moyer v. Patenaude & Felix, A.P.C., 991 F.3d 466,
470 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Jenson v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 417 (3d
Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted)).
The Third Circuit has long acknowledged that the FDCPA “generally only
appl[ies] to ‘debt collectors.’” Pollice v. National Tax Funding, 225 F.3d 379, 403
(3d Cir. 2000). But “an entity may satisfy the statutory definition of ‘creditor’ and
yet be a ‘debt collector.’” Tepper v. Amos Fin., LLC, 898 F.3d 364, 371 (3d Cir.
2018). Under the FDCPA, “[a] ‘creditor’ is any person: (1) ‘who offers or extends
credit creating a debt’ or (2) ‘to whom a debt is owed.’” Id. at 366 (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(4)). And a “debt collector” is defined as:
[A]ny person who uses any instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of
which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects
or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due
or asserted to be owed or due another. Notwithstanding the
exclusion provided by clause (F) of the last sentence of this
paragraph, the term includes any creditor who, in the process of
collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own
which would indicate that a third person is collecting or
attempting to collect such debts. For the purpose of
[§1692f(6)], such term also includes any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any
business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of
security interests.
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15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The statute also provides a number of exclusions:
The term [“debt collector”] does not include—
(A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of
the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor;
(B) any person while acting as a debt collector for another
person, both of whom are related by common ownership or
affiliated by corporate control, if the person acting as a debt
collector does so only for persons to whom it is so related or
affiliated and if the principal business of such person is not the
collection of debts;
(C) any person or employee of the United States or any State to
the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in
the performance of his official duties;
(D) any person while serving or attempting to serve legal
process on any other person in connection with the judicial
enforcement of any debt;
(E) any nonprofit organization which, at the request of
consumers, performs bona fide consumer credit counseling and
assists consumers in the liquidation of their debts by receiving
payments from such consumers and distributing such amounts
to creditors; and
(F) any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed
or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extend such
activity (i) is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a
bona fide escrow arrangement; (ii) concerns a debt which was
originated by such person; (iii) concerns a debt which was not
in default at the time it was obtained by such person; or (iv)
concerns a debt obtained by such person as a secured party in a
commercial credit transaction involving the creditor.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(6)(A)–(F).
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As the statutory language quoted above shows, the primary definition of
“debt collector” provides two main paths to establish whether an entity is a “debt
collector”: the principal purpose approach and the regularly collects approach.
Barbato v. Gresystone Alliance, LLC, 916 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)).
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the scope of the principal
purpose definition, see Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 82
(2017), the Third Circuit has adopted a rather broad interpretation, see Campbell v.
LVNV Funding, LLC, 2022 WL 6172286, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2022) (citing
Barbato, 916 F.3d at 267). Under this definition, “an entity whose principal
purpose of business is the collection of any debts is a debt collector regardless
whether the entity owns the debt it collects.” Tepper, 898 F.3d at 371 (emphasis
added). So long as “a business’s raison d’être is obtaining payment on the debts
that it acquires, it is a debt collector. Who actually obtains the payment or how
they do so is of no moment.” Barbato, 916 F.3d at 266. In other words, if an
entity’s business is primarily debt collection, either on its own behalf or that of
another entity, it is a “debt collector” under this approach, even if it hires another
company to actually collect on its behalf. Id. at 268.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has interpreted the regularly collects
approach. See Henson, 582 U.S. at 83, 88. Under this definition, the statutory
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language focuses on “third party collection agents working for a debt owner—not
on a debt owner seeking to collect debts for itself.” Id. at 83. In other words, only
“an entity that . . . regularly collects debts due a third party” is considered a “debt
collector.” Tepper, 898 F.3d at 370 (citing Henson, 582 U.S. at 83). The Supreme
Court has held that it is “irrelevant whether the debt acquired and sought to be
collected was in default . . . ‘[a]ll that matters is whether the target of the lawsuit
regularly seeks to collect debts for its own account or does so for another.’”
Barbato, 916 F.3d at 263 (quoting Henson, 582 U.S. at 83 (internal quotations
omitted)).2
Even if an entity meets one or both of the main statutory definitions of a
“debt collector,” there are several exceptions which may exclude it from the
definition of a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. See § 1692a(6). The exceptions
include, in relevant part:
[A] creditor’s officers and employees collecting debts for the
creditor, a company collecting debts only for its non-debt-
collector sister company, an entity collecting a debt it
originated, and one collecting a debt it obtained that was not in
default at the time of purchase.
Tepper, 898 F.3d at 366 (citing §§ 1692a(6)(A), (B), (F)). Thus, if an entity is both
a “debt collector” and “creditor” under the FDCPA, and its own officers and
2 Because Dicent does not cite Section 1692f in her complaint, we do not
address the “debt collector” definition applicable to that section and pertaining to
the enforcement of security interests.
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employees are the ones collecting the debts, it is not a “debt collector” for purposes
of the FDCPA. Similarly, if an entity strictly collects debts on behalf of its sister
company, or if it is the original creditor who originated the debt, it also is not a
“debt collector.” And if the entity is attempting to collect on a debt that it
purchased, which was not in default at the time it was acquired, it also is not a
“debt collector.” But, as set forth above, notwithstanding these exceptions, a
creditor who uses or operates under another name—such that it appears a third
party is the one collecting or attempting to collect a debt—is a “debt collector”
under the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
Here, accepting the factual allegations as true and construed in the light most
favorable to Dicent, as we are required to do at this juncture, the complaint lacks
factual allegations from which we can infer that the defendants qualify as “debt
collectors” under the FDCPA.
With regard to Land Home, Dicent does not allege facts indicating that its
principal purpose of business is the collection of debts, or that it regularly attempts
to collect debts owed to another entity. Rather, although Dicent alleges that Land
Home attempted to collect mortgage payments from her on several occasions by
mailing her mortgage statements, and that it acted or failed to act in other regards,
she does not address Land Home’s principal or regular business practices.
Dicent’s allegations pertaining to collection efforts for her mortgage alone are
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insufficient. See Raciti v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 2020 WL 13816459,
at *10 (D.N.J. May 7, 2020) (finding that plaintiff’s allegations of defendant’s debt
collection activities with respect to plaintiff was “plainly insufficient” to support an
inference that the defendants engaged in regular debt collection practices).
Moreover, Dicent does not clearly allege that Land Home used another name when
attempting to collect the debt such that it appeared to be a third party. As written,
the complaint fails to indicate that Land Home is a “debt collector” under the
FDCPA.
As for Magerick, the factual allegations in the complaint are even more
sparse. The complaint is silent as to whether the principal purpose of Magerick’s
business is the collection of debts or whether it regularly attempts to collect debts
owed to another entity. And there are no allegations that Magerick used another
name such that it would indicate a third party was attempting to collect the debt. In
fact, the allegations pertaining to Magerick revolve around the fact that Dicent
“ha[s] no clue who Magerick, LLC is,” even though it is the recorded lien holder of
her mortgage. Doc. 1 ¶ 20. We therefore conclude the complaint fails to plausibly
allege that Magerick is a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA.
Because we find that Dicent’s complaint fails to demonstrate that the
defendants meet the statutory definition of “debt collectors,” we conclude that the
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complaint fails to state a FDCPA claim upon which relief can be granted.3 Thus,
we recommend that the court dismiss the complaint. But, as set forth below, we
recommend that the court give Dicent leave to amend.
B. State Law Claims.
In addition to federal claims under the FDCPA, Dicent asserts state law
claims for “slander of title” and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Such
claims would fall within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction.4
Whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within the discretion of the
court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if the district court has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. When deciding whether to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction, “a federal court should consider and weigh in
3 Because Dicent’s complaint fails to show that the defendants are debt
collectors, we need not address Dicent’s contention that the lien is “false.” We
note that in a similar complaint she filed against another entity, Dicent also
claimed that the lien on her property was “fake” due to a bankruptcy discharge. See
Dicent v. Boncidium, LLC, No. 3:25-cv-0732 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2025), ECF No. 4
at 8. As Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom indicated in his Report and
Recommendation, a bankruptcy discharge may relieve the individual debtor of
liability, but it does not prevent a mortgage holder from “enforcing its mortgage
lien through foreclosure.” Id. (quoting Tabb v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 798 F.
App’x 726, 728 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (non-precedential)).
4 We note that Dicent does not allege that the court has diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522
U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cahill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
(1988)). The Third Circuit has held that “where the claim over which the district
court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must
decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative
justification for doing so.” Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Borough of West Miflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995)).
There is nothing unique about this case such that considerations of judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness provide an affirmative justification for
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Dicent’s state law claims. Accordingly,
because we conclude that the complaint fails to state any federal claims upon
which relief can be granted, the court should decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Dicent’s state law claims.
V. Leave to Amend.
Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, a court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend, unless amendment
would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips v. Allegheny Cnty., 515 F.3d 224, 245
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(3d Cir. 2008) (citing Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d
Cir. 2002)). Here, because of the liberal amendment standard, we recommend
granting Dicent an opportunity to file an amended complaint to address the
deficiencies with the dismissed claims.
If Dicent decides to file an amended complaint, we note that any such
amended complaint must be titled as an amended complaint and must contain the
docket number of this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). “The plaintiff is advised that any
amended complaint must be complete in all respects.” Young v. Keohane, 809 F.
Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 1992). “It must be a new pleading which
stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaint
already filed.” Id. “In general, an amended pleading supersedes the original
pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity.” Garrett v. Wexford Health,
938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019). “Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint
becomes the operative pleading.” Id. In other words, if an amended complaint is
filed, the original complaint will have no role in the future litigation of this case.
Any amended complaint must also comply with the pleading requirements
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the requirements that the
complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction,” “a short and plain statement of the claim,” and “a demand for the
relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)–(3). Further, “[e]ach allegation must be
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simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). “A party must state its claims
or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single
set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). And to the extent it would promote
clarity to do so, “each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . .
must be stated in a separate count.” Id.
Further, as set forth above, as to her FDCPA claims, Dicent must allege facts
that plausibly show that the defendants are debt collectors. Also, Dicent must
clearly allege what acts each defendant took that allegedly violated the FDCPA.
VI. Recommendation.
For the foregoing reasons, we recommend that the court grant the
defendants’ motion to dismiss (doc. 18) and dismiss Dicent’s complaint with leave
to amend.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to
which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The
briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A
judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
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objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record
developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own
determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive
further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 20th day of November 2025.
S/Susan E. Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
United States Magistrate Judge
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