Scocozzo v. Henry et al

3:24-cv-01748Pamd12 gen 2026

Testo completo

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY SCOCOZZO, 	: 	Civ. No. 3:24-CV-1748
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	(Judge Munley)
:
v. 	:
: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
MICHELLE HENRY, et al, 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, who is proceeding 	pro se, commenced this action by a
complaint, (Doc. 1), which he has amended on several occasions. (Docs. 95, 98). In
this a pro se lawsuit Scocozzo names multiple local, state and federal defendants and
brings a host of legal challenges relating to the ability of the plaintiff to possess
firearms following what is alleged to have been his involuntary mental health
commitment in 2009. Scocozzo’s amended complaint, the operative pleading in this
case, stitches together disparate events involving distinct actors and distinct episodes
spanning some fourteen years between 2009 and 2023 into a single seamless gestalt.
(Doc. 98 passim).
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It is thus hardly surprising that this seeping complaint has inspired a series of
pretrial motions, including a motion to dismiss filed by Detective Michael Mallick
and the Moscow Police Department. (Doc. 102). With respect to these defendants
Scocozzo’s allegations are both cryptic and dated. Moreover, some of his allegations
are refuted by the exhibits which Scocozzo attaches to his pleadings. Thus, the
amended complaint asserts that Defendant Mallick falsely arrested him in March of
2009 when he initiated involuntary commitment proceedings against Scocozzo
based upon Scocozzo’s voiced threats of suicide. (Id. at 20). While Scocozzo alleges
that Detective Mallick undertook this course of action without probable cause, the
exhibits he attached to his amended complaint demonstrate that there was ample
cause to believe that Scocozzo presented a threat to himself in March of 2009.
According to Detective Mallick’s March 2009 declaration in support of this
involuntary commitment request, during a March 9, 2009, traffic stop Scocozzo told
the police officer: “I am going to take 50 ambient [sic] and 90 zanax [sic] and kill
myself. I can’t take this anymore. I am going to kill myself.” (Doc. 98-1 at 31).
Scocozzo’s amended complaint also reveals that he has known of this
involuntary commitment, which he now alleges violated his constitutional rights, for
many years prior to filing this lawsuit in October of 2024. Thus, while Scocozzo
denies specifically being aware of the involuntary nature of his mental health
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commitment in March of 2009, his amended complaint plainly states that he became
aware of this event in March of 2020, when he attempted to purchase a firearm and
was denied the right to acquire a weapon due, in part, to this involuntary mental
health commitment. (Doc. 98 at 15). Thus, on the face of his amended complaint,
Scocozzo was fully aware that he had been subjected to an involuntary mental health
commitment in March of 2009 no later than March of 2020. Despite this knowledge,
Scocozzo failed to file any federal civil rights claims relating to Detective Mallick
and this 2009 mental health commitment until October of 2024, more than four years
later.
Given the well-pleaded facts alleged by Scocozzo in this amended complaint,
Detective Mallick and the Moscow Police Department have moved to dismiss this
complaint, arguing that Mallick’s claims are both time-barred and meritless. (Doc.
102). This motion is fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for resolution. For the
reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted.
II. 	Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss–Standard of Review
The defendants have moved to dismiss Scocozzo’s amended complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
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can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard
for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in
federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.
2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards
have 	seemingly 	shifted 	from 	simple 	notice 	pleading 	to 	a 	more
heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than
the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,
20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s
bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court
need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not
alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of
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Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a
plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In 	keeping 	with 	the 	principles 	of 	Twombly, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	has
underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon
which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to
dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679.
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather,
in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has
advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
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Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain
more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations
sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,
the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The
District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as
true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court
must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement
with its facts.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for
overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The
plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard
when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts
“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”
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Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a
three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should
identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.”
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1950).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and
matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant
attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the
[attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998
F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged
in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not
physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate
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Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd.
v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court
may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the
motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not
rely on other parts of the record in determining whether to dismiss a complaint or
when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild,
O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the
requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what
a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and
plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the
court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought,
which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and
conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations that
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are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, this amended complaint fails as a
matter of law on several scores as discussed below.
B. Defendants Mallick and Moscow Police Department Should Be
Dismissed.
With respect to Defendants Mallick and the Moscow Police Department,
Scocozzo’s amended complaint brings claims which are both untimely and lacking
in merit.
1. The Moscow Police Department is Not a Proper Defendant
At the outset, as Scocozzo concedes, any claims against the Moscow Police
Department should be dismissed. These claims founder on an insurmountable legal
obstacle—the police department is not a proper defendant in a §1983 federal civil
rights lawsuit. Indeed, it has long been held that a police department is not a proper
institutional defendant under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, since
police departments serve only as an administrative arm of a municipality, and it is a
municipality through which any liability must flow to the police department. Indeed,
it has been repeatedly held that a police department is not a “person” for purposes of
§ 1983 and therefore is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action. McCreary v. Owen,
No. 1:21-CV-1022, 2021 WL 11114949, at *6–7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2021), report
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and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-CV-01022, 2021 WL 11114480 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 28, 2021); Blackwell v. Middletown Borough Police Dep't, 1:12-CV-825, 2012
WL 6012568 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 1:12-
CV-825, 2012 WL 6002689 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2012) (citing Golya v. Golya, 2007
WL 2301085, *9, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58093 (M.D. Pa. 2007)) (explaining that
courts within the Third Circuit have concluded that a police department is merely a
sub-unit of the local government and is not amenable to suit under § 1983)); Wivell
v. Liberty Township Police Dept., 2007 WL 2155540, *2, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
54306 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (explaining that police department not subject to suit in a §
1983 action); Mitros v. Cooke, 170 F.Supp.2d 504, 507 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (city police
department is a sub-unit of the city government that is merely a vehicle through
which the city fulfills its policing functions, and is not a separate entity for purposes
of suit); Tobin v. Badamo, 3:00CV783, 2000 WL 1880262 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2000)
(municipal police department is not a proper party to a section 1983 action because
it is merely a subunit of the city and not a separate corporate entity); McMahon v.
Westtown-East Goshen Police Dept., No. Civ.A. 98-3919, 1999 WL 236565 at *4,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5551 at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1999) (citing Johnson v. City
of Erie, 834 F. Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D. Pa. 1993) and Agresta v. City of
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Philadelphia, 694 F. Supp. 117, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1988)); Johnson v. City of Erie, Pa.,
834 F. Supp. 873, 879 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
In light of this consistent case law rejecting efforts to name local departments
as institutional defendants in § 1983 actions, the constitutional claims against this
institutional defendant must be dismissed.
2. Scocozzo’s Claims Against Detective Mallick Are Time-Barred.
With respect to Detective Mallick, Scocozzo’s claims are profoundly flawed
in at least two respects. First, these allegations—which relate to a March 2009 civil
commitment but were first presented in October of 2024, some fifteen years later—
are clearly time barred. It is well-settled that civil rights claims brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury
actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). In Pennsylvania, the statute
of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524. A cause
of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes when the plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of the cause of action. Sameric
Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998);
see also, Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010 (3d Cir. 1995).
While this two-year limitations period may be extended based upon a
continuing wrong theory, a plaintiff must make an exacting showing to avail himself
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of this grounds for tolling the statute of limitations. For example, it is well settled
that the “continuing conduct of [a] defendant will not stop the ticking of the
limitations clock [once] plaintiff obtained requisite information [to state a cause of
action]. On discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must choose to sue or
forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir.
1998) (quoting Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F. 2d 356, 360 (3d Cir.
1986)). See also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 266-68 (3d Cir. 2000). Instead:
The continuing violations doctrine is an “equitable exception to the
timely filing requirement.” West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744,
754 (3d Cir.1995). Thus, “when a defendant's conduct is part of a
continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing
the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an
instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would
otherwise be time barred.” Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of
Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir.1991).In
order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant's conduct is “more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic
acts.” West, 45 F.3d at 755 (quotation omitted). Regarding this inquiry,
we have recognized that courts should consider at least three factors:
(1) subject matter-whether the violations constitute the same type of
discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2)
frequency-whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of
isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-whether the act had a
degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of
and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the
act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to
discriminate. See id. at 755 n. 9 (citing Berry v. Board of Supervisors
of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1983)). The
consideration of “degree of permanence” is the most important of the
factors. See Berry, 715 F.2d at 981.
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Cowell v. Palmer Township. 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001).
In this case, Scocozzo attempts to evade the bar of the statute of limitations
by asserting that he was not specifically aware of the fact that he was briefly
involuntarily committed at the time of these events in March of 2009. The problem
with this assertion, however, is that it is evident from Scocozzo’s own complaint that
he knew of this involuntary commitment no later than March of 2020, when the
commitment served as the grounds for denying his application to purchase a firearm.
(Doc. 98 at 15). Thus, Scocozzo concedes that he was fully aware of the fact of this
involuntary commitment no later than March 2020. Yet, he did not file this lawsuit
until October 2024, more than four years after the fact of this involuntary
commitment was known by the plaintiff.
On these facts, by March 2020 Scocozzo plainly had sufficient knowledge of
his injury and its cause, that he was legally required to timely “choose to sue or
forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir.
1998). Scocozzo failed to do so, waiting more than four years before bringing this
claim. Therefore, his claims against Detective Mallick are time-barred and should
be dismissed.
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3. Scocozzo’s Claims Against Detective Mallick Fail on Their
Merits.
Finally, given the factual recitals set forth in Scocozzo’s amended complaint,
his false arrest claims fail on their merits. On this score, the gist of Scocozzo’s
amended complaint is his insistence that Detective Mallick lacked probable cause to
believe that he was a threat to himself at the time of the officer’s March 9, 2009,
encounter with the plaintiff which led to his brief involuntary commitment. Yet, the
actual commitment papers which Scocozzo attached to his amended complaint make
it abundantly clear that Detective Mallick had ample reason to believe that Scocozzo
presented a threat to himself. Detective Mallick reasonably arrived at this conclusion
because Scocozzo plainly stated that he was an imminent suicide risk. According to
Detective 	Mallick’s 	March 	2009 	declaration 	in 	support 	of 	this 	involuntary
commitment request, during this March 9, 2009, traffic stop Scocozzo told the police
officer: “I am going to take 50 ambient [sic] and 90 zanax [sic] and kill myself. I
can’t take this anymore. I am going to kill myself.” (Doc. 98-1 at 31).
Probable cause exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy information or
circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person
of reasonable caution to conclude that” the subject’s detention is warranted. U.S. v.
Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964)). In conducting an inquiry into whether probable cause existed, a court should
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consider the totality of the circumstances presented, and “must assess the knowledge
and information which the officer[] possessed at the time of [the detention], coupled
with the factual occurrences immediately precipitating the [detention].” United
States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, it is entirely undisputed
that Detective Mallick was told by Scocozzo that he planned to kill himself. Given
Scocozzo’s own statements, the officer had an obligation to take appropriate steps
to protect the plaintiff from himself. His actions, therefore, were supported by ample
probable cause, were fully justified and simply do not give rise to federal civil rights
liability some seventeen years later.
III. 	Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant Mallick
and Moscow Police Department’s motion to dismiss, (Doc. 102), be GRANTED.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing
requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
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made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or 	recommendations 	made 	by 	the 	magistrate 	judge. 	The 	judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or
where required by law, and may consider the record developed before
the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis
of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses, 	or 	recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Submitted this 12 th day of January 2026.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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