Bicking v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GUY BICKING,
Plaintiff
v.
PENNSYLVANIA 	DEPARTMENT 	OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-00422
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is a motion to compel filed by Plaintiff Guy Bicking (“Bicking”).
(Doc. 48). Also pending is a motion for an extension of time to file dispositive motions filed
by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) (Doc. 71), a motion to for sanctions
filed by Bicking (Doc. 74), a motion to amend/correct Defendant’s answer to preserve their
jury demand (Doc. 76), a motion for an extension of time to file mediation position by the
DOC (Doc. 77), a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the DOC (Doc. 78), and a
motion for an extension of time to file a brief in opposition to Bicking’s motion for sanctions.
(Doc. 80). The Court will deny Bicking’s motion to compel, resolve the pending motions that
ripe, and set forth a briefing schedule for the motions pending adjudication.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Bicking, who is an inmate currently housed at the State Correctional Institution
Benner (“SCI-Benner”) in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, initiated this action by filing a Complaint
alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by the DOC, which was
received and docketed by the Court on March 12, 2024. (Doc. 1). Bicking then paid the filing
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fee in full, and the Court forwarded the waiver of service form to Defendant. (Doc. 4; Doc.
5).
Following some extensions by the Court, the DOC answered the Complaint on
November 22, 2024. (Doc. 24). This answer was amended com February 6, 2025 (Doc. 35).
The Court filed its initial scheduling order on December 10, 2024 with a fact discovery
deadline of February 10, 2025 and dispositive motions deadline of March 10, 2025. (Doc. 26.)
Following multiple motions for additional time, the Court had extended the deadlines to June
30, 2025 and July 31, 2025 respectively. (Doc. 47). In the last order extending the fact
discovery deadline to August 29, 2025, the Court did not extend the dispositive motions
deadline. (Doc. 49). Therefore, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b), the deadline for any motion for
summary judgment was September 29, 2025.
On June 27, 2025, Bicking filed a motion to compel discovery setting forth four
requests for production that he viewed as not properly filled by the DOC. (Doc. 48). The
Court received and docketed the brief in support of his motion on July 15, 2025 that addresses
only one of the four requests for production. (Doc. 53)1. Following an order of the Court
requiring a response by November 17, 2025, the DOC filed a brief in opposition on at 12:35
a.m. on November 18, 2025. (Doc. 52; Doc. 67; Doc. 682).
1 Because Bicking is proceeding in this matter pro se, the Court will liberally construe
his filings and consider the arguments he set forth in his motion to compel despite the fact
that these arguments were not addressed in his brief in support. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976).
2 Doc. 68 is a duplicate of Doc. 67, except Doc. 68 was filed with multiple attachments.
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On October 21, 2025, the Court received and docketed Bicking’s request for an
appointment of a settlement officer. (Doc. 61.) On October 23, 2025, the Court ordered the
DOC to respond to Bicking’s request by November 6, 2025. (Doc. 63).
On December 4, 2025, new counsel was appointed for the DOC. (Doc. 70).
On December 10, 2025, the DOC filed a motion for an extension of time to file their
motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 71).
On December 31, 2025, Bicking filed a motion for sanctions against the DOC alleging
that the DOC failed to respond to the motion to compel by the November 17, 2025 deadline
set forth by the Court and that it failed to respond to his request for a settlement officer. (Doc.
74; Doc. 75).
On January 6, 2026, the DOC filed a motion to amend their answer so as to preserve
their right to a jury trial. (Doc. 76).
On January 13, 2026, the DOC filed a motion for an extension of time to file mediation
position, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a motion for extension of time to file a
brief in opposition to the pending motion for sanctions. (Doc. 77; Doc. 78; Doc. 80).
The Court will now address the pending motions that are ripe and address the briefing
schedule of those not yet ready for adjudication.
II. 	D ISCUSSION
A. BICKING ’S M OTION TO C OMPEL
1. 	Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) defines the scope of discovery as “any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case . . . Information within the scope of discovery need not be admissible in
evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(1); see also Democratic Nat’l Committee v.
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Republican Nat’l Committee, 2019 WL 117555, at *2 (3rd Cir. Jan. 7, 2019) (“The court may
limit discovery to ensure its scope is proportional to the needs of a case.”). As such, “all
relevant material is discoverable unless an applicable evidentiary privilege is asserted.”
Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 65 (3d Cir. 2000). A matter is relevant if “it has any tendency
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. It is well-established that the
scope and conduct of discovery are within the sound discretion of the trial court. In re Find
Paper Antitrust Litg., 685 F.2d 810, 817–18 (3d Cir. 1982); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
A party who has received evasive or incomplete discovery responses may seek a
court order compelling disclosures or discovery of the materials sought. Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a). The moving party must demonstrate the relevance of the information sought to a
particular claim or defense; the burden then shifts to the opposing party, who must
demonstrate in specific terms why a discovery request does not fall within the broad scope
of discovery or is otherwise privileged or improper. Goodman v. Wagner, 553 F. Supp. 255,
258 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
On January 9, 2025, Bicking served a request for production of documents on the
DOC. (Doc. 74, at 1). The DOC states that this request for production of documents was
received on January 13, 2025. (Doc. 67, at 3). On April 11, 2025, Bicking received the
DOC’s initial production of documents dated April 1, 2025 and included all Bicking’s
medical records. (Doc. 74, at 1; Doc. 67, at 3-4; Doc. 68-2). On May 9, 2025, the parties
conferred in a telephone conference in an attempt to resolve discovery issues. (Doc. 67, at 3;
Doc. 74, at 1). The DOC states that at the conference Bicking agreed to send additional
information to narrow the scope of the discovery requests made in January. (Doc. 67, at 3.)
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On June 27, 2025, Bicking filed the instant motion to compel. (Doc. 48). On November 14,
2025, the DOC provided supplemental responses to the request for production of
documents. (Doc. 68-3).
Bicking appears to be challenging four responses to his January request for
production of documents, which he identifies as response numbers one, four, six, and seven.
(Doc. 48; Doc. 53). The Court will now address each of Bicking’s challenges in turn in
consideration of the supplemental production of documents received after the filing of his
motion to compel.
2. 	Response One
Bicking’s request for production is as follows:
All documents, including but not limited to, E-mails, written correspondence,
electronically stored information, and minutes of meetings at which anyone
discussed plaintiff’s medical condition, disability accommodation request,
and/or 	plaintiff’s 	refusal 	of 	medical 	treatment. 	This 	shall 	include
communications, of any type, between staff at SCI Smithfield and the
Defendant’s Bureau of Health Care Services (BHCS) as well as from BHCS to
SCI Smithfield from June 23, 2021 through January 12, 2023.
(Doc. 68-1, at 1). In the April 1, 2025 response, the DOC raised the following four objections:
(1) the request is unclear, vague, and subject to multiple interpretations; (2) the request is
overly broad, burdensome, and disproportionate to the needs of the case; (3) the request seeks
compunctions or other documents that are protected by the attorney-client privilege, work
product doctrine, or other privilege; and (4) the request encompasses documents that contain
information related the Bicking another inmates in the same document. (Doc. 53, at 4-6; Doc.
68-2, at 4-6). As an answer, the DOC stated that it provided Bicking’s medical records from
May 2019 to May 2024. (Doc. 53, at 7; Doc. 68-2, at 7).
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In his motion to compel, Bicking argues that the request is not vague or unclear and
he provides a list of 15 specific communications “regarding plaintiff and would not span this
length of time had the defendant acted appropriately in July of 2021.” (Doc. 48, at 3-4). It is
unclear if he has documents concerning the 15 specific communications or if he is requesting
those documents. Bicking also states that he is not seeking records of any other inmates “as
those records do not bear on the medical terrorism inflicted on plaintiff by the defendant.”
(Doc. 48, at 4). He further complains about the volume of records the DOC had already
provided, “[t]he defendant needlessly dumped documents from May 2019 through May 2024,
which total over 1,000 pages of predominately non-responsive records.” (Doc. 48, at 5.)
Bicking does not address this request in his brief in support. (Doc. 53).
Here, it is unclear to the Court what precisely he is seeking that was not provided by
the DOC in their production of documents. The DOC provided Bicking his medical records
for the period he requested. Furthermore, the Court notes that in the November 14, 2025
supplemental response, the DOC, while maintaining their objections3, produced additional
correspondence, the DOC’s ADA file for Bicking, and a declaration of the Secretary of the
DOC, Laurel R. Harry. (Doc. 38-3, at 7). Therefore, without a clearer request of the
documents that the DOC failed to produce and a statement as to whether the supplemental
productions fulfilled any of the request, the Court is unable to make a determination as to
whether the DOC is required to produce additional evidence at this time.
3 The DOC provided a fifth objection that the request “seeks to invade the deliberate
process privilege of the Defendant Department of Corrections by requiring the disclosure of
confidential deliberations of law or policy making reflecting opinions, recommendations, or
advice.” (Doc. 68-3, at 6).
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3. 	Response Four
Bicking’s request for production is as follows: “A copy of any of defendant’s Form
DC-121, Extraordinary Occurrence Reports, concerning plaintiff between June 27, 2021 and
January 12, 2023.” (Doc. 68-1, at 3). In the April 1, 2025 response, the DOC provided the
following two objections: (1) the request is overly broad, burdensome, and disproportionate
to the needs of the case; and (2) the request seeks confidential records. (Doc. 68-2, at 9). As
an answer the DOC, without waiving the above objections, stated that it did not have any
documents responsive to the request. (Doc. 68-2, at 10). This response did not change in the
November 14, 2025 supplemental production. (Doc. 68-3, at 11).
In his motion to compel, Bicking disagrees with the DOC’s objections:
There is nothing overly broad, burdensome or disproportionate about this
request. The defendant has a Procedure Manual, 13.1.1, that states if a life-
threatening medical condition exists and treatment is refused, a Form DC-121,
Extraordinary Occurrence Report must be prepared. Since the defendant states
no such reports exist, there must not have been any life-threatening medical
condition involved and should have so stated.
(Doc. 48, at 5). Again, Bicking’s response does not specifically seek the production of any
document. Instead, he appears to be seeking an admission that there was no life-threating
medical condition. Seeking an admission is not the purpose of a request for production of
documents. Such a response is properly elicited through a request for admission under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 36. Furthermore, the Court cannot order the DOC to produce a document that
does not exist. Therefore, Bicking’s motion to compel a response to his request for production
will be denied.
4. 	Response Six
Bicking’s request for production is as follows: “A copy of any and all assessments,
evaluations, interviews, or memoranda conducted pursuant to defendant’s policy DC- ADM
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006, Reasonable Accommodations for Inmates with Disabilities, Section 2.B, filed between
July 14, 2021 and January 12, 2023.” (Doc. 68-1, at 3). In the April 1, 2025 response, the
DOC 	asserted 	three 	objections: 	(1) 	the 	request 	is 	overly 	broad, 	burdensome, 	and
disproportionate to the needs of the case; (2) the request seeks communications or other
documents that are protected by the attorney -client privilege, work product doctrine, or other
privilege; and (3) the request encompasses documents that contain information related to
Bicking and other inmates in the same document. (Doc. 68-2, at 11-12). As a form of answer
the request, the DOC refers to the medical records from May 2019 and May 2024. (Doc. 68-
2, at 12).
In the motion to compel, Bicking states that as part of the documents provided in
response to this request, the DOC provided redacted pages (DOC000482-DOC000483)
asserting privilege. (Doc. 48, at 5.) Bicking asserts that any privilege has been waived due to
the delay in responding and for failing to include a declaration from the Secretary of the DOC
stating why the privilege applies. (Doc. 48 at 5-6.) 	Additionally, Bicking alleges that these
documents 	“go 	to 	the 	heart 	of 	the 	claim 	that 	plaintiff’s 	request 	for 	a 	reasonable
accommodation was impermissibly denied and may also support his coercion and retaliation
claims.” (Doc. 48, at 6.) He seeks to have these documents unredacted. (Doc. 48, at 6). This
is also the focus of Bicking’s brief in support of his motion in which he includes a copy of the
redacted document. (Doc. 53; Doc. 53-3).
As to Bicking’s assertion that the DOC has waived all privileges based on their late
response, the Court highlights that Bicking himself states that he and defense counsel have
had ongoing correspondences that included multiple letters and a status conference that
culminated in a proposed production date of June 13, 2025. (Doc. 53, at 2). The DOC filed a
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motion for an extension of time stating that an additional sixty days were required to complete
discovery. (Doc. 49). This Court had entered a standing order in August of 2025 staying this
case until September 22, 2025 due to a cyber attack on the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s
Office. Standing Order 2025-05 (M.D. Pa. August 21, 2025). With the supplemental
production of responses, the DOC provided an affidavit of its Secretary Laurel Harry asserting
the privileges along with the privilege logs for both the April 1, 2025 and the November 14,
2025 production of documents. (Doc. 68-4; Doc. 68-6; Doc. 68-7). Here, the Court finds
evidence that the parties were in contact regarding discovery, and while there was perhaps
some delay on the part of the DOC in the production of documents, none of the delay appears
to be ill intended. Instead, it appears that the DOC was making attempts to narrow the scope
of discovery with additional information from Bicking and making the required disclosures
amid an ongoing data hack. Therefore, the Court will not deem the privileges waived as a
sanction for any delay in discovery.
The document at issue (DOC000482-DOC000483) is redacted with a statement of
“deliberative-process.” (Doc. 53-3). The privilege logs identify the privilege as “Attorney-
Client privilege and work product including hand written note.” (Doc. 68-6; Doc. 68-7). The
DOC states that all three privileges apply to this document, which the DOC identifies as “the
April 25th Memo.” (Doc. 68, at 19).
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that evidentiary privileges “shall be governed
by the principles of the common law . . . in the light of reason and experience.” Fed. Rule
Evid. 501; U.S. v. Jicarialla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 169 (2011). The attorney-client
privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communication known to the common
law. Jicarialla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. at 169 (citation omitted); Montgomery County v.
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MicroVote Corp., 175 F.3d 296, 304 (3d Cir. 1999). The objectives of the attorney-client
privilege apply to governmental clients. Jicarialla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. at 169 (citation
omitted). The Supreme Court has held that “unless applicable law provides otherwise, the
Government may invoke the attorney-client privilege in civil litigation to protect confidential
communications between Government officials and Government attorneys.” Jicarialla Apache
Nation, 564 U.S. at 170.
The work-product doctrine “shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a
privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client’s case.” Holmes v. Pension
Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 138 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Grand Jury
(Impounded), 138 F.3d 978, 981 (3d Cir. 1998)). Courts in the Third Circuit apply a two-part
test in determining whether the work-product doctrine applies: (1) whether litigation could
reasonably have been anticipated; and (2) whether the documents were prepared primarily
for the purpose of litigation. Crawford v. Corizon Health, Inc., No. CV 17-113, 2018 WL
3361147, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 10, 2018) (citing In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 214 F.R.D. 178,
183 (D.N.J. 2003); Louisiana Mun. Police Employees Ret. Sys. v. Sealed Air Corp., 253 F.R.D. 300,
306–07 (D.N.J. 2008)). “Documents created in the ordinary course of business, even if useful
in subsequent litigation, are not protected by the work-product doctrine.” Crawford, 2018 WL
3361147, at *2 (quoting United States v. Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1265-66 (3d Cir. 1990)).
Federal common law recognizes the deliberative-process privilege, which shields
government documents that were created in anticipation of an agency decision. In re Grand
Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 959 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-
54 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89, n.16 (1973)).
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These privileges are not absolute. Even if the Court determines that the privileges
apply, Plaintiffs may show that the privileges should be overcome. Though the party asserting
a privilege bears the initial burden of establishing that the privilege applies, the party seeking
discovery ultimately must demonstrate why privileged material should nevertheless be
produced. In re Grand Jury (OO-2H), 211 F. Supp. 2d 555, 557 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (citing United
States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1989)). The Third Circuit has adopted the
balancing act set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia:
[I]n balancing the interests, [district courts] should consider at least the
following factors: “(i) the relevance of the evidence sought to be protected; (ii)
the availability of other evidence; (iii) the ‘seriousness’ of the litigation and the
issues involved; (iv) the role of the government in the litigation; [and] (v) the
possibility of future timidity by government employees who will be forced to
recognize that their secrets are violable.”
Reland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of Army of U.S., 55 F.3d 827, 853–54 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
First Eastern Corp. v. Mainwaring, 21 F.3d 465, 468, n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). In adjudicating such
questions, courts are bound to construe evidentiary privileges strictly. University of Pennsylvania
v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (internal citations
omitted).
The DOC asserts that this “April 25 th Memo was produced and sent to the Department
of Corrections legal counsel for review and was part of the general give-and-take of
deliberations and legal advice.” (Doc. 68, at 20). A review of the redacted document disclosed
on April 1, 2025 demonstrates that it is an internal decision memo to the Superintendent of
SCI-Smithfield from the Director of Bureau of Health Care Services concerning Bicking’s
disability accommodations request that has been copied to multiple individuals at the Office
of Chief Counsel. (Doc. 53-3). The DOC has established that the attorney-client and work
product privileges apply to these pages. The declaration of the DOC Secretary Harry states
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that the memo contains legal advice (Doc. 68-4, at 10) and the privilege log refers to a
handwritten note (Doc. 68-6). Likewise, as an internal memo used to make a determination,
the deliberative-process privilege applies. (Doc. 68-4). Furthermore, according to the DOC
Secretary Harry’s statement, a memo is provided to inmates seeking an ADA accommodation
explaining the rationale behind any ADA accommodation determination. (Doc. 68-4).
Bicking challenges the deliberative process privilege in his brief in support of his
motion by asserting that the DOC did not properly assert the privilege and that the privilege
is waived by the delayed responses by the DOC. (Doc. 53). However, following the November
14, 2025 disclosure, which identified the other privileges raised and provided the required
documentation to assert those privileges, Bicking did not supplement his briefing or file a
reply to address the attorney-client and work product privileges. Neither did he file anything
additional demonstrating why privileged material should nevertheless be produced. The
Court is left with the statements made in his initial motion and briefing: “[t]his is information
in the exclusive control of the defendant and plaintiff has no other way of obtaining the
requested information,” (Doc. 53, at 4); “these documents go to the heart of the claim that
plaintiff’s request for a reasonable accommodation was impermissibly denied and may also
support his coercion and retaliation claims,” (Doc. 48, at 6); and “[t]hese same documents
(DOC000482-DOC000483) identify an assessment by Medical Director Dave Edwards, and
other pertinent records and documents. None of these records, assessments, or other
documents were provided despite a clear request for such information, (Doc. 48, at 6). In
reviewing the redacted document, there is no reference to the Medical Director Dave
Edwards. (Doc. 53-3; Doc. 68-10.) Additionally, Bicking should have been provided a
statement from the DOC as to why his ADA request was denied according to the process set
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forth in Secretary Harry’s declaration. (Doc. 68-4). Bickings’ general assertions that these
documents are vital to his claim are insufficient to justify that the privileges should be
overcome. As such, the Court finds that Bicking has not met his burden and will deny his
motion to compel.
5. 	Response Seven
Bicking’s request for production is as follows: “A copy of any and all reports generated
by SCI Smithfield medical staff pursuant to defendant’s Procedure Manual 13.1.1.8.E1 and
all responses.” (Doc. 68-1, at 3). In the April 1, 2025 response, the DOC provided the
following three objections: (1) the request is overly broad, burdensome, and disproportionate
to the needs of the case; (2) the request seeks communications or other documents that are
protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, or other privilege; and (3)
the request seeks documents containing information pertaining to another inmate. (Doc. 68-
2, at 13-14). As an answer the DOC, without waiving the above objections, points to the
medical records from May 2019 to May 2024. (Doc. 68-2, at 15). In the November 14, 2025
supplemental disclosure, the DOC raises the objection that the request seeks to invade its
deliberative process privilege. (Doc. 68-3, at 16-17). As an answer, without waiving any
privileges, the DOC cites to the previously produced medical records and the newly produced
ADA file for Bicking. (Doc. 68-3, at 17).
Bicking disagrees with the objections as follows:
What is overly broad and burdensome is the defendant dumping over 1,000
pages of mostly immaterial documents dating from 2019 when the complaint
clearly indicates it is based, with one exception, on actions occurring after June
[]23, 2021. Plaintiff has no need for, nor does he seek, any information about
other 	individuals. 	Information 	regarding 	misconduct 	by 	or 	within 	a
government agency should not be afforded any evidentiary protection. This
matter would not be where it is at the present time had the defendant not
engaged in gross misconduct resulting in violation of federal law.
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(Doc. 48, at 6). Again, Bicking has only asserted that he disagrees with the objections raised.
He does not state what he seeks to be produced that has not been produced thus far by the
DOC. As such the Court is unable to order production of unknown documents. Bicking’s
motion to compel will be denied in full.
B. D EADLINE FOR D ISPOSITIVE M OTIONS AND S ETTLEMENT R ESPONSE
On December 10, 2025, the DOC filed a motion for an extension of time to file
dispositive motions after observing that in the final discovery extension the Court did not
extend the deadline for dispositive motions. (Doc. 71). Since that time, the DOC has also filed
a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. 78.) This pending motion is potentially
dispositive. Therefore, the Court will grant the DOC’s motion for an extension of time for
motions for summary judgment with the caveat that such motions shall be due within thirty
days of the Court entering an order on the pending motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Likewise, the DOC’s motion for an extension to respond to Bicking’s request for a
settlement officer (Doc. 77) will be granted with a deadline set fourteen days following this
Court’s order addressing the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The Court will enter a briefing schedule regarding the motion for judgment on the
pleadings in the order accompanying this memorandum.
C. BICKING ’S M OTION FOR SANCTIONS
Bicking filed a motion for sanctions against the DOC on December 31, 2025. (Doc.
74). In this motion and the brief in support, Bicking reiterates the claims made in the motion
to compel concerning the DOC’s alleged delay in responding to discovery requests and seeks
sanctions in the form of ordering an in-camera review of multiple documents and attorney
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fees. (Doc. 74; Doc. 75). As discussed above, there were multiple factors that lead to the
DOC’s delay in discovery and both parties agree that they were in communication throughout
this delay. Therefore sanctions will be denied.
The DOC’s motion for an extension to time to reply to Bicking’s motion for sanctions
will be denied as moot.
D. THE DOC’S M OTION TO AMEND THE A NSWER
On December 4, 2025, the DOC obtained new counsel in this action. (Doc. 70). On
December 6, 2025 the DOC filed a motion seeking to preserve its jury demand on all claims
and requests for relief sought against it. (Doc. 76.) Allegedly, the demand by the DOC was
inadvertently left out of the answer by prior counsel. (Doc. 76). In light of the review of the
newly appointment counsel that this was overlooked at the time the answer was filed, the
Court will grant the DOC’s motion and deem the DOC’s jury demand as timely filed and
served.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Bicking’s motion to compel will be denied. The Court will
set a briefing schedule for the motion for judgment on the pleadings and the DOC’s motions
for an extension of time in line with this briefing schedule. Additionally, the Court will deny
Bicking’s motion for sanctions and grant the DOC’s motion to deem its jury demand timely
filed.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: January 20, 2026 	s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
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