Thomas et al v. Orozco-Pineda et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Randolph Thomas, Bridgette
Palmatierre, and Diane Thomas,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Jorge Orozco-Pineda, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-288
(JUDGE MANNION)
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court is Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration filed
on October 3, 2025. (Doc. 83). In this instant motion and the accompanying
brief in support (Doc. 84 ), Plaintiffs argue that the court should reconsider or
amend its September 30, 2025, memorandum and order, (Docs. 81 , 82),
granting Defendants' motion for partial summary judgement. (Doc. 50). The
parties have briefed the issues, and the matter is now ripe for disposition.
For the reasons stated herein, the court will DENY Plaintiff's motion.
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
The factual background of this case, well known to the parties at this
stage, is outlined in the court's recent summary judgement memorandum.
(Doc. 81 ). 	In 	sum , this case involves a motor vehicle collision 	in which
Defendant Orozco-Pineda was driving a tractor-trailer on the highway before
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colliding into the back of a pickup truck driven by Plaintiff Randolph Thomas,
accompanied by his passenger, Plaintiff Bridgette Palmatierre. (Doc. 21 ).
Orozco-Pineda 	was 	operating 	a 	commercial 	tractor-trailer 	owned 	by
Defendant Lopez-Calleja, as a contracting agent of Defendant Food Haulers.
Id.
On September 30 , 2025, after reviewing materials submitted by the
parties, 	the 	court 	granted 	Defendants' 	motion 	for 	partial 	summary
judgement, finding that, inter alia , Plaintiffs had failed to present sufficient
evidence to support their claims for punitive damages. 	(Docs. 81 ). Following
the court's judgement, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion asking the court to
reconsider its decision. On October 17, 2025, Defendants filed a brief in
opposition, (Doc. 86), to which Plaintiffs filed a reply brief. (Doc. 88). On the
same day, Plaintiffs filed their first motion for leave to supplement their reply
brief with 	additional 	evidence, 	(Doc. 	87), 	which 	the 	court 	granted 	as
uncontested. (Doc. 95).
II. 	Legal Standard
A motion for reconsideration is governed by Rule 59( e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which gives a party 28 days to move to alter or
amend a judgement. 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	59(e). The purpose of a motion for
reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
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discovered 	evidence. Harsco 	Corp. v. 	Zlotnicki, 	779 	F.2d 	906, 909 	(3d
Cir.1985). Under Rule 59( e ), "a judgment may be altered or amended if the
party seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the following grounds:
(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new
evidence that was 	not available when 	the court granted the 	motion for
summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or
to prevent manifest injustice ." Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. 	Lou-Ann, Inc. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). "A motion for reconsideration
is 	not to 	be 	used 	as 	a means to 	reargue 	matters already 	argued 	and
disposed of ... [n]or is it to be used to put forth additional arguments which
could 	have 	been 	made 	but which 	the 	party 	neglected 	to 	make 	before
judgment. " Waye v. 	First Citizen's Nat. Bank, 846 F.Supp. 310, 314 (M.D.
Pa. 	1994) 	(citation 	omitted). 	Reconsideration 	of 	a 	judgment 	is 	an
extraordinary remedy, and the court grants such motions sparingly. O'Angio
v. Borough of Nescopeck, 56 F.Supp.2d 502 , 504 (M.D. Pa . 1999).
Ill. 	Discussion
Plaintiffs' instant motion sets forth several arguments falling under Rule
59(e). First, Plaintiffs contend that newly obtained expert testimony provides
evidence that highlights a factual error in the court's findings and also creates
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Orozco-Pineda was
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traveling at an excessive speed prior to the collision. (Doc. 84 , p.12). Second ,
Plaintiffs argue that the court erred as a matter of law in dismissing their
claims of reckless supervision and training, relying solely on deficiencies in
the pleadings and a heighted standard of "excessive speeding. 11
A. Expert Testimony
In the court's September 30, 2025, memorandum granting Defendants'
motion for partial summary judgement, the court concluded from the Motive
data on the record that the tractor-trailer driven by Orozco-Pineda was last
recorded traveling 26 mph before the "immediate halt" of the collision . (Doc.
81 at 15). The court based this finding on the fact that, at 2: 17 am, the only
recorded speed before O mph was 26 mph . However, Plaintiff argues that
the court's findings are materially incorrect and directly conflict with the
opinion of Defendants' own expert, Dr. Justin Schorr. (Doc. 84 at 4 ).
Specifically, Plaintiffs cite to three portions of 	Dr. Schorr's deposition
to argue that the Motive data does not disprove their eyewitness, Mr. Stith,
who testified that Orozco-Pineda was travelling nearly 80 mph during the
moments leading up to the collision. 	First, Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Shorr
"testified that the crash occurred at 2: 16 am around the 45.3 mph entry 11
,
rather than 2: 17 am around the 26 mph entry. (Doc. 84 at 8). Plaintiffs explain
that the remaining seven recorded speeds from 2: 16 am to 2: 17 am reflect
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the speed of the tractor-trailer after the collision, 	while Orozco-Pineda's
trailer was decelerating for approximately 600 feet. Id at 7. Second, Plaintiffs
claim that Dr. Schorr testified that the Motive data "contains an approximately
two minute blind spot of unrecorded speeds just prior to the collision." Id at
8-9. 	Therefore, they 	argue, 	it 	is 	entirely 	plausible 	that 	Orozco-Pineda
accelerated his tractor trailer to excessive speeds during this "two minute
blind spot. " 	Finally, Plaintiffs claim that the Motive data "can't be accepted
as a scientific certainty in all respects" due to Dr. Shorr's testimony that the
Motive data may have had a "drift or delay in recordings." Id at 11.
To the extent that the court incorrectly concluded that the collision
occurred at 2: 17 am rather than 2: 16 am, the error is harmless to the court's
findings. According to the deposition transcripts, Dr. Shorr stated, "We know
that 	between 	the 	45.3 	and 	the 	39.5 	data 	step, 	the 	impact 	must 	have
occurred ." (Doc. 83-4 at 16). Dr. Shorr further stated, "We know the speed
just prior to the collision was 45.3 miles per hour." Id. From this perspective,
Orozco-Pineda was still significantly below the 65-mph speed limit, let alone
traveling at 80 mph , seconds before the collision. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs'
attempt to 	bolster this "new evidence" 	by 	mischaracterizing 	Dr. 	Shorr's
testimony. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Shorr "conceded that as much
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as two minutes of unrecorded speed data exist in the critical period before
the impact. " (Doc. 84 at 4 ). In reality, Dr. Shorr testified to the following :
Q: The second 2: 15 entry and the second speed taken at
2: 16 is 	much 	as 	a minute and 	58 	seconds could 	have
elapsed?
Dr. Shorr: Yeah , I mean, I agree. I would say approximately
two 	minutes 	would 	be 	the 	maximum 	that 	can 	elapse
between two entries.
(Doc. 83-3 at 11 ). 	In other words, since there are gaps of unrecorded time
in between each speed entry, there can theoretically be as much as one
minute and 58 seconds between the speed entry from one minute to the
speed entry from the next minute. However, the court acknowledged the
potential gaps in the Motive data during its memorandum, and it is not "new
evidence ". 	(Doc. 	81 	at 	14). 	The 	facts 	remain 	that, 	throughout 	the
approximately 16 minutes that Orozco-Pineda was traveling on 1-81 leading
up to the collision , Motive recorded roughly 70 speed entries, and not a single
one exceeded the 65 	mph speed 	limit. 	Dr. Shorr's testimony 	does not
eliminate or reduce the speculative nature of Plaintiffs' arguments.
Regarding the argument that the Motive data can't be relied on in light
of Dr. Shorr's testimony that it may contain a "drift or delay," Plaintiffs once
aga in mischaracterize Dr. Shorr's testimony. 	During the exchange in the
deposition cited by Plaintiffs, Dr. Shorr testified to following :
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Q: But [the Motive data] tells you the precise time of the
impact, correct?
Dr. Shorr: It tells us the time based on that device, sure.
Q: But why doesn't that indicate the precise time of impact?
Dr. 	Shorr: I'm not sure exactly where the clock is being
obtained from. Devices tend to suffer somewhat clock drift
over time so I'm not sure, you know, what the exact time
would've been . It 's - - I use it as an estimate, not an exact
number.
(Doc. 83-4 at 3-4 ). As Defendants correctly point out in their opposition brief,
Dr. Shorr's statement simply indicates that the timestamps recorded on the
Motive Platform may not perfectly synchronize with the official global time. In
other words, Motive's clock may reflect a time that is slightly different from
the global clock. However, whether or not Motive's clock was perfectly
aligned with the global time does not impact the court's analysis. In relation
to the court's reasoning , the timestamps serve solely as reference points to
determine the number of speed entries recorded within each minute leading
up to the collision.
Finally, Plaintiffs submit deposition testimony from Defendants' expert,
Ronald 	Baade, 	and 	suggest 	that 	it 	"further 	undermine[s] 	the 	basis 	for
summary judgement regarding punitive damages." (Doc 88 at 8-9). They
argue that Baade's testimony "confirms" that 	Mr. 	Stith's testimony-that
Orozco-Pineda was traveling approximately 80 mph seconds prior to the
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collision-"cannot 	be 	scientifically refuted". Id. 	Once again, the fact that
Defendants' expert cannot provide a "scientific basis" to disprove Mr. Stith 's
testimony does not render the supporting evidence any less speculative.
B. Legal Error
Turning to 	Plaintiffs' next argument, 	they contend that the 	court's
dismissal of their direct claims for punitive damages against 	Food Haulers
and 	Lopez-Calleja based 	on 	deficiencies in the amended complaint was
inconsistent with its prior statements, where it stated that such claims would
be analyzed based on the evidentiary record under Rule 56. Specifically,
during the July 29, 2025, oral argument, the court stated , "I don't have a
problem with the idea that whenever we decided at the motion to dismiss
stage was good enough for that period, but now we're at a different period
with a different standard and more evidence and facts to look at. " (Doc. 87-
4 at 2-3).
However, as the court stated in its memorandum granting Defendants'
motion fo r partial summary judgement, Defendants' motion to dismiss "was
directed at the punitive claims against Orozco-Pineda and the remaining
Defendants via respondeat superior." (Doc. 81 	at 18-19). Plaintiffs did not
allege reckless conduct directly against Food Haulers and Lopez-Calleja ,
either in their amended complaint or in their brief in opposition to Defendants'
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motion 	to 	dismiss. 	Thus, 	the 	transcript 	does 	not 	provide 	a 	basis 	for
reconsideration of the court's findings.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the court misapplied the law by holding that
Food Haulers and Lopez-Calleja could be held liable for reckless supervision
or training only if Orozco-Pineda was "speeding excessively." (Doc. 84 at
13). Plaintiffs argue that, even if Orozco-Pineda was driving within the speed
limit prior to the collision, Food Haulers and Lopez-Calleja could still be held
liable if Orozco-Pineda was "simply driving too fast for the conditions, " as this
would establish a clear nexus between Orozco-Pineda's speed history and
the collision. Id.
However, this argument was previously raised 	in 	Plaintiffs' brief in
opposition , (Doc. 53 at 17), and was rejected by the court in its subsequent
memorandum. (Doc. 81 	at 15-16). The court concluded that there was no
nexus between Orozco-Pineda's prior speeding record and the conduct that
caused the accident after determining that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently
support their claim of excessive speeding and rejecting their argument that
Orozco-Pineda was driving too fast for the conditions. (Doc. 81 	at 15 , 20).
Therefore, the court will 	not revisit 	an 	argument that 	has already 	been
disposed of.
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IV. 	Conclusion
Accord ing ly, Plaintiffs' 	motion for reconsideration 	(Doc. 83) will 	be
DENIED. 	An appropriate order follows.
United 	tates District Judge
DATE: 	~1/312.~24-288-03
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