USA v. Dimitris Smith, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DIMITRIS SMITH, JR.,
Defendant.
3:24-CR-00106
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is a motion in limine filed by Defendant Dimitris Smith, Jr. (“Smith”),
in which he seeks to exclude evidence regarding a prior drug relationship between Smith,
Olga Stevenson (“Stevenson”), and Samantha Pennell (“Pennell”). (Doc. 104). For the
following reasons, Smith’s motion in limine will be DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A federal grand jury indicted Smith with one count of distribution of fentanyl resulting
in serious bodily injury and death in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and four counts of
distribution of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). (Doc. 23). Count
one alleges Smith’s delivery of a controlled substance on December 11, 2023, resulting in the
death of Pennell. (Doc. 23, at 1-2). Counts two through five reflect drug deliveries Smith
allegedly made to an undercover officer on March 14, 2024 (Count 2); March 20, 2024 (Count
3); March 26, 2024 (Count 4); and April 1, 2024 (Count 5). (Doc. 23, at 2-4). Trial is scheduled
to begin on Monday, January 5, 2026, at 9:30 AM in Scranton, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 83).
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion in limine allows a trial court to rule in advance of trial on the admissibility
and relevance of certain evidence, and evidence should only be excluded “when the evidence
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is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” United States v. Tartaglione, 228 F. Supp. 3d
402, 406 (E.D. Pa. 2017). A court exercises its discretion in ruling on a motion in limine to
ensure that juries are not exposed to unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or irrelevant evidence.
Ridolfi v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 3198006, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2017).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Smith moves to exclude any evidence regarding a prior drug relationship between
Smith, Stevenson, and Pennell as alleged in the Government’s Notice of Intent to Introduce
Evidence Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). (Doc. 104, at 1; Doc. 94). Smith avers
that, as he is not charged with any crimes prior to December 2023 or with conspiracy offenses
outside the five specific dates in the Indictment, introduction of evidence of a prior drug
relationship would only serve to establish a prior bad act as a character trait of Smith. (Doc.
105, at 2). The Government counters that evidence of a prior drug relationship between
Smith, Stevenson, and Pennell is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show
consciousness of guilt, identity, preparation, plan, and knowledge, as well as to supply helpful
background information to the finder of fact. (Doc. 107, at 4-8).
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong,
or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).
However, such evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Rule 404(b) is generally a rule of exclusion, directing that
“evidence of prior bad acts be excluded – unless the proponent can demonstrate that the
evidence is admissible for a non-propensity purpose.” United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278,
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290 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2014)). The
Government, as the party seeking to admit the evidence under Rule 404(b)(2), bears the
burden of demonstrating its applicability. Brown, 765 F.3d at 290.
Four steps must be satisfied before evidence of a prior bad act may be introduced at
trial:
(1) the other-acts evidence must be proffered for a non-propensity purpose; (2)
that evidence must be relevant to the identified non-propensity purpose; (3) its
probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for
causing unfair prejudice to the defendant; and (4) if requested, the other-acts
evidence must be accompanied by a limiting instruction.
United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 239 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Huddleston v.
United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988); Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 277-78).
Smith contends that evidence of Smith’s prior drug relationship with Stevenson and Pennell
must be excluded for failing steps one and two of this four-step Rule 404(b) analysis. (Doc.
105, at 4). To satisfy step one of the applicable Rule 404(b) analysis, the proffering party must
show that the evidence falls into a permitted use exception to Rule 404(b). Caldwell, 760 F.3d
at 276. Permitted uses for the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts include
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, and
lack of accident. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Courts also permit the admission of other-acts
evidence to demonstrate consciousness of guilt. United States v. Cammarata, 145 F.4th 345, 367
(3d Cir. 2025); United States v. Arrington, 13 F.4th 331, 333 (3d Cir. 2021); United States v. Gatto,
995 F.2d 449, 454 n.8 (3d Cir. 1993) (collecting cases). Additionally, the Third Circuit has
held that evidence that will “supply[ ] helpful background information to the finder of fact,”
is a “proper purpose under Rule 404(b). United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 250 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citing United States v. Simmons, 679 F.3d 1042, 1050 (3d Cir. 1982)).
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To satisfy step two of the applicable Rule 404(b) analysis, relevance to the identified
non-propensity purpose, the proffered evidence must fit into a “chain of inferences – a chain
that connects the evidence to a proper purpose, no link of which is a forbidden propensity
inference.” United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 442 (3d Cir. 2013). “[T]his chain [must] be
articulated with careful precision because, even when a non-propensity purpose is ‘at-issue’
in a case, the evidence offered may be completely irrelevant to that purpose, or relevant only
in an impermissible way.” Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 281; Repak, 852 F.3d at 243. The proffering
party’s articulation of the logical chain of inferences showing relevance should be detailed
and on the record; mere recitation of the purposes in Rule 404(b)(2) is insufficient. Caldwell,
760 F.3d at 277 (citing Davis, 726 F.3d at 442).
The Government submits that the evidence regarding a prior drug relationship
between Smith, Stevenson, and Pennell is proffered for relevant, non-propensity purposes.
Specifically, the Government avers that Stevenson’s testimony regarding Smith’s drug activity
after Pennel’s death will establish that Smith knew of Pennell’s death, knew of his
involvement in it, and changed his behavior as a result. (Doc. 107, at 5). Such evidence is
properly offered for the non-propensity purpose of demonstrating consciousness of guilt. See
Arrington, 13 F.4th at 333 (finding evidence that defendant fled from parole and was using a
different name at the time of his arrest was admissible for the purpose of proving
consciousness of guilt as a non-propensity purpose under Rule 404(b)(2)); see also Gatto, 995
F.2d at 454 n.8 (collecting cases). The Government further contends that the remaining
evidence of a prior drug relationship between Smith, Stevenson, and Pennell, including that
Stevenson knew and can identify Smith by describing the car he drove, the nicknames she
and Pennell used when referring to him, the CashApp application she and Pennell used to
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send him payments, how he distributed fentanyl before and after Pennell’s death, is offered
for the proper purposes of showing identity, preparation, plan, and knowledge. (Doc. 107, at
6-7). The Court agrees. This evidence is admissible to show Smith’s plan, preparation and
knowledge of how to identify, traffic, package, and price fentanyl through Stevenson’s
testimony on Smith’s method of packaging and delivering drugs immediately prior to
Pennell’s overdose death and Smith’s ability to accept mobile payment in exchange for drugs.
(Doc. 107, at 7); see United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 274 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding admission
of evidence of past conviction of trafficking cocaine was relevant to the defendant’s
knowledge of narcotics). Finally, evidence of the prior drug relationship is properly admissible
to supply helpful background information to the factfinder on how Stevenson and Pennell
knew Smith, how they communicated with Smith, how Smith packaged and distributed
fentanyl, and how Stevenson and Pennell paid Smith. (Doc. 107, at 8); see Green, 617 F.3d at
250 (finding evidence of defendant’s threat was admissible background information was
admissible as background information which “completed the story of the crime”); see United
States v. O’Leary, 739 F.2d 135, 136 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding evidence of earlier drug transactions
was relevant to show “the background of the charges, the parties’ familiarity with one another,
and their concert of action”); see also United States v. Jackson, 619 F. App’x 189, 194 (3d Cir.
2015) (finding evidence of prior drug transactions was necessary background information to
provide context to testimony and circumstantial evidence that defendant was dealing with
large quantities of cocaine).
The Government also proffers this evidence for the non-propensity purpose of linking
Smith to both the distribution of fentanyl to Pennell on December 11, 2023 and the
distributions of cocaine and fentanyl to an undercover officer in March and April of 2024.
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(Doc. 107, at 6). The Government’s detailed explanations of the non-propensity purposes of
the prior drug relationship evidence demonstrate that it is more probable than it would be
without the evidence that Smith distributed fentanyl and cocaine in the five instances charged
in the Indictment.1 See Green, 617 F.3d at 251 (finding the definition of relevance is “very
broad” and encompasses the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable that it would be without the evidence); see United
States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 274 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding the defendant’s knowledge of the
presence of heroin made it more probable than it would have been without the evidence that
the defendant had knowledge of drugs and drug distribution); see Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 277
(requiring the proffering party to articulate with precision the “relationship between the
evidence and a material fact at issue which much be demonstrated by reasonable inferences
that make a material fact more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence”). The Government has demonstrated that any evidence of a prior drug relationship
between Smith, Stevenson, and Pennell is proffered for relevant, non-propensity purposes.
(Doc. 107, 5-11).
1 In the alternative, Smith argues that the prior drug relationship evidence must be
excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because “its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of. . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [and] misleading the
jury.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. The evidence of Smith’s prior drug relationship with Stevenson and
Pennell is probative to the counts in the Indictment and are not substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. See Garner, 961 F.3d at 274 (finding the defendant’s knowledge
of how to identify, package, and sell cocaine was not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403);
Jackson, 619 F. App’x at 193 (finding evidence of past drug distribution was not unfairly
prejudicial under Rule 403); United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 461 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding
that with a limiting instruction, the probative value of a prior felony drug conviction was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice). Smith has not requested a limiting
instruction related to the evidence of a prior drug relationship with Stevenson and Pennell.
(Doc. 107, at 11; see Doc. 105).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Smith’s motion in limine to exclude any evidence regarding
a prior drug relationship between Smith, Stevenson, and Pennell is DENIED. (Doc. 104).
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
Dated: January 4, 2026 	s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
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