Mier-Garces v. Greene

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EDGAR RENE MIER-GARCES,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFREY GREENE,
Respondent.
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Civil No. 1:25-CV-02444
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Edgar Rene
Mier-Garces (“Petitioner”). (Doc. 1.) Specifically, Petitioner alleges that a federal
statute and his constitutional rights have been violated by the Bureau of Prisons’
(“BOP”) refusal to apply his earned time credits under the First Step Act (“FSA”)
in excess of 365 days towards placement in prerelease custody due to his status as
a non-citizen. (Id.) He also challenges the lack of the five-factor review under the
Second Chance Act (“SCA”). The court finds that Petitioner’s claims under the
FSA are not cognizable under Section 2241 and his claims under the SCA are not
exhausted. The court will dismiss the petition.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner initiated this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
December of 2025. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner provides documentation that shows he
was granted the full 365 days of early release based on earned time credits under
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the FSA. (Doc. 1-7, p. 2.) 1 However, it appears that he has earned time credits in
excess of the 365-days, totaling 775 days, which the BOP now refuses to apply
towards early placement in prerelease custody based on his status as an “IHP”
participant or a non-citizen with an active detainer. (Doc. 1; Doc. 1-4; Doc. 1-7, p.
2.) Additionally, the records attached to the petition demonstrate that the BOP
determined that Petitioner is not eligible for placement in prerelease custody under
the SCA because of an immigration detainer. (Doc. 1-7, p. 4.)
Based on this denial by the BOP, Petitioner filed in the instant petition with
the following seven challenges: (1) “[t]he BOP has unlawfully violated the
statutory test and mandatory provisions of the [FSA], which is federal law”; (2)
“[t]he BOP has illegitimately exceeded its statutory authority based on: (i) its
categorical denial and/or refusal to transfer me to Prerelease Custody entirely
based on discretionary criteria; and , (ii) its calculated failure to provide notice or
publish its unlawful policies contained in its Covert Memoranda”; (3) “[t]he BOP
has unlawfully imposed a 365-day limit on the application of earned and accrued
FSA Time Credits which ‘caps’ or ‘limits’ the application and use of all earned and
accrued FSA Time Credits even though I do not have an immigration detainer; (4)
“[p]ursuant to its covert April 8, 2025 BOP Internal Memorandum, the BOP has
also unlawfully and illicitly eliminated ‘Prerelease Custody’ as other statutory
1 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
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mandated by the U.S. Congress under the FSA”; (5) “[t]he BOP has patently
violated my Constitutionally protected liberty interest because the FSA has created
a new and separate entitlement to early release to Prerelease Custody and
supervised release based on my earned and accrued FSA Time Credits . . . which
must be applied as I am fully eligible for such application(s)”; (6) “[t]he BOP has
additionally materially violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment because due process protections do apply as I have appropriately
demonstrated and evidenced a protected liberty interest under the FSA, which is a
federal law”; and (7) “[t]he BOP has additionally violated specific non-
discretionary statutory provisions of the SCA as under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). I had
a statutory right for individual consideration of the five SCA factors descried in 18
U.S.C. § 3621(b); but the BOP has utterly refused to conduct such determination
based on a categorical refusal to conduct such determination for Non-U.S. Citizen
prisoners with immigration detainers and/or IHP Participant designation.” (Docs
1, 1-1.)
Petitioner paid the requisite filing fee on December 30, 2025. (Doc. 4.) The
court will now screen the petition pursuant to Rule 4.
VENUE
A § 2241 petition must be filed in the district where the petitioner is in
custody. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484,
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494–95 (1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the person who seeks
relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful
custody.”) Petitioner is being held at FCI-Allenwood in Union County,
Pennsylvania, which is in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 118(b). Therefore, this
court is the proper venue for the action.
S TANDARD
This matter is before the court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
The § 2241 petition has been given preliminary consideration pursuant to Rule 4 of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (applicable to § 2241 petitions under Rule 1(b)). Rule 4 may be
applied at the discretion of the district court as it is the duty of the court to screen
out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the
respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer. Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141
(6th Cir. 1970).
DISCUSSION
A. Petitioner’s Habeas Challenge to the BOP’s Application of the First
Step Act Is Not Cognizable Under Section 2241.
In his habeas petition, Petitioner argues that the BOP has improperly denied
pre-release custody he alleges is mandatory under the FSA and has refused to
complete the five-factor analysis under the Second Chance Act (“SCA”). The
initial question Petitioner presents concerning the application of FSA earned time
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credits in excess of 365-days has been controversial among federal courts. The
question is whether it is mandatory or discretionary for the BOP to apply credits
accrued under the FSA in excess of the 365-day early release period and applicable
to early pre-release custody.
The FSA allows eligible inmates who successfully complete evidence-based
recidivism reduction programs or productive activities to receive time credits to be
applied toward time in pre-release custody or supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. §
3632(d)(4)(A), (C). An inmate can earn ten (10) days of credit for every thirty (30)
days of successful participation. See id. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(i). Furthermore, eligible
inmates assessed at a minimum or low risk of recidivism who do not increase their
risk of recidivism over two (2) consecutive assessments may earn five (5)
additional days of time credit for every thirty (30) days of successful participation,
for a total of fifteen (15) days’ time credit per thirty (30) days’ successful
participation. See id. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(ii).
If time credits under the FSA are properly earned by an eligible inmate,
application of those time credits to a prisoner’s sentence is governed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(g). Section 3632(d)(4)(E)(i) provides “[a] prisoner is ineligible to apply
time credits under subparagraph (C) if the prisoner is the subject of a final order of
removal under any provision of the immigration laws[.]” However, there are
individuals, such as petitioner, who are subject to an immigration detainer that is
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not a final order of removal. Therefore, Petitioner is still considered eligible for
the application of his FSA credits.
The FSA further states “the Director of the Bureau of Prisons may transfer
the prisoner to begin any such term of supervised release at an earlier date, not to
exceed 12 months, based on the application of time credits under section 3632.”
18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3). “Thus, the time credits may be used to transfer a prisoner
into prerelease custody earlier than he otherwise would be and to release the
prisoner to supervised release up to 12 months earlier than he would be.” Malik v.
Warden Loretto FCI, No. 23-2281, 2024 WL 3649570, at *1 (3d Cir. Aug. 5,
2024).
There is currently a split among district courts as to whether earned time
credits in excess of the maximum 365 days is statutorily required to be applied
towards time in prerelease custody, or if the application of credits to prerelease
custody is in the sole discretion of the BOP.
A number of courts have interpreted § 3632(d)(4)(C) to mandate that all
earned time credits must be applied either toward early supervised release or
toward pre-release custody because there is no statutory cap on time credits applied
toward pre-release custody. See Mohammed v. Engleman, No. 2:25-CV-01011-
MWC-MBK, 2025 WL 1909836, at *13 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:25-CV-01011-MWC-MBK, 2025 WL 2294325
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(C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025); see Mateo v. Warden, FCI Danbury, No. 3:25-CV-00814
(VAB), 2025 WL 2625263, at *8 (D. Conn. Sept. 11, 2025) (“The BOP’s decision”
to deny application of time credits in excess of those applied to supervised release
“conflicts with the First Step Act’s express language: time credits “shall be applied
toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release.””); Williams v. Warden,
FCI Berlin, No. 23-CV-509-LM-AJ, 2025 WL 2207024, at *5 (D.N.H. Aug. 4,
2025) (“Because the [BOP] memoranda purport to cap the application of
Williams’s time credits and deny him the ability to apply time credits toward
placement in prerelease custody on the basis of an ineligibility criterion that does
not appear in the FSA, the memoranda violate the FSA.”)
In contrast, other courts have found that the application of excess earned
time credits to placement in pre-release custody is in the discretion of the BOP.
See, e.g., Akinmadeyemi v. Warden Thompson, FCI Fort Dix, No. 27-7003, 2025
WL 2857084, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 9, 2025) (finding that the sole discretion of where
an inmate is housed is held with BOP) citing Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319,
331 (2011) and Pisman v. Warden, Allenwood FCI Low, No. 23-2048, 2023 WL
6618238, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 11, 2023) (“pre-release placement decisions are
committed to the BOP’s sole discretion”).
Other courts have taken a third approach and held that the application of
excess credits under the FSA is not cognizable under Section 2241. See, e.g.,
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Balsam v. Warden, Coleman – Low, No. 5:24-cv-360-SPC-PRL, 2025 WL
2687234 (M.D. Fl. Sep. 19, 2025) (finding that such claims concern the conditions
of his confinement and not the execution of his sentence and is not redressable
through a habeas proceeding).
This district, too, has differing decisions on the issue of whether the claim is
cognizable under Section 2241. In Miles v. Arviza, District Judge Munley
explained:
The core of habeas corpus primarily involves a challenge to the fact or
duration of confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-
88, 500 (1973). In Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235
(3d Cir. 2005), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that—in addition to the fact or duration of confinement—a
prisoner may also challenge the “execution” of their sentence via a
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	See id. at 241-44. 	In Woodall, the
petitioner asserted a challenge to BOP regulations that affected whether
he served a portion of his sentence in a federal penal institution or in a
“Community Corrections Center” (CCC). See id. at 237.
The Third Circuit agreed with the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits and held that habeas jurisdiction lies for prisoners challenging
the 	“manner 	of 	their 	imprisonment,” 	including 	the 	place 	of
confinement, when the differences in custody reflect more than a
“simple” or “garden variety” prison transfer. See Woodall, 432 F.3d at
242-43. 	The panel highlighted the significant disparities between
carrying out a sentence in a CCC and carrying out a sentence in an
ordinary penal institution and concluded that the petitioner’s claim was
a “proper challenge to the ‘execution’ of his sentence,” and thus
“habeas jurisdiction lies.” Id. at 243-44.
Following Woodall, confusion arose as to what exactly “execution of
the sentence” meant for a habeas petitioner. 	Even the Woodall panel
conceded that the precise meaning of this phrase is “hazy.” Id. at 242.
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In Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2012), the court of
appeals endeavored to clarify execution-of-sentence habeas challenges
in the Third Circuit. 	The Cardona panel first performed an in-depth
review of Woodall and McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933 (3d Cir.
2010), 	precedential 	decisions 	that 	had 	considered 	execution-of-
sentence habeas claims and had determined that the claims presented
were cognizable under Section 2241. 	See Cardona, 681 F.3d at 536-
37.
From these decisions, the Cardona panel distilled that the linchpin for
habeas jurisdiction for an execution-of-sentence claim was whether the
petitioner was challenging the “carrying out” or “putting] into effect”
of their sentencing order. See id. The reason the petitioners in Woodall
and McGee could seek review of the execution of their sentences under
Section 2241, the court of appeals explained, was because their
petitions “both challenged BOP conduct that conflicted with express
statements in the applicable sentencing judgment.” 	Id. at 536. 	The
Cardona panel thus held that “[i]n order to challenge the execution of
[a] sentence under § 2241, [a petitioner] would need to allege that [the]
BOP’s 	conduct 	was 	somehow 	inconsistent 	with 	a 	command 	or
recommendation in the sentencing judgment.” Id. at 537. In that case,
the petitioner had not made such an allegation, so the panel found that
he was not properly challenging the “execution” of his sentence and
therefore the district court had no jurisdiction to consider his Section
2241 petition. See id. at 537, 538.
No. 3:24-CV-2252, 2025 WL 981870, *2–3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2025). 2 Judge
Munley acknowledged the confusing history on the question in the Third Circuit
and cited Vasquez v. Strada:
Most notably, in Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2012) (per
curiam)—a precedential decision issued just 18 days before Cardona v.
Bledsoe—the Third Circuit plainly stated that a prisoner “may resort to
federal habeas corpus to challenge a decision to limit his RRC
placement.” 	Vasquez, 684 F.3d at 433 (citing Woodall, 432 F.3d at
2 On the same date District Judge Munley entered a second decision using identical logic. Goss
v. Greene, No. 3:24-CV-1133, 2025 WL 981864 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2025).
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243-44). In Vasquez, the petitioner was not asserting that a BOP action
was inconsistent with a command or recommendation in his sentencing
judgment; rather, he claimed that the BOP had failed to comply with
the federal prisoner reentry initiative with respect to RRC placement
and that the BOP had improperly amended 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) by
adding a sixth factor. See id. Nevertheless, the court of appeals did not
find that the Section 2241 petition must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction based on the substance of the petitioner’s habeas claim.
Instead, 	the 	panel 	perfunctorily 	found 	the 	petitioner’s 	prerelease
custody claim to be cognizable. 	See id. (citing Woodall, 432 F.3d at
243-44).
Id., at *3. Judge Munley concluded that under Cardona, “execution-of-sentence
habeas claims in the Third Circuit are tightly circumscribed,” and held that
petitions seeking transfer to pre-release custody based on the FSA that do not
allege that the BOP’s conduct is somehow inconsistent with a command or
recommendation in his sentencing judgment fail to meet the stringent jurisdictional
standards set forth in Cardona. Id., at *5. Directly following this decision, Chief
District Judge Brann entered two decisions in line with Miles: Chaffin v. Warden,
No. 4:24-CV-01909, 2025 WL 1042316 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2025); McMillian v.
Warden, No. 4:24-CV01730, 2025 WL 1042313 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2025).
However, a few days later, in Al Haj v. LCSI-Allenwood Warden, District
Judge Neary held that because Woodall and Vazquez were earlier precedential
holdings of the Third Circuit, Cardona could not overrule them because it was a
subsequent panel decision of the Third Circuit rather than an en banc decision.
No. 1:24-CV-1193, 2025 WL 1115751, *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2025).
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Since the decision in Al Haj, all the decisions addressing the issue in this
district have followed the logic set forth in Miles. Torres-Benitez v. Warden, FPC-
Schuylkill, No. 3:25cv1357, 2025 WL 2550864 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 4, 2025); Barry v.
Greene, No. 3:25cv960, 2025 WL 2983167 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2025); Diarra v.
Greene, No. 3:25-CV-0964, 2025 WL 2997031 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2025); Rafiq v.
Green, No. 1:25-CR-01409, 2025 WL 3110563 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2025).
The undersigned is persuaded by the rationale set forth in the Miles decision.
The court concludes that Cardona “delineate[s] the jurisdictional boundaries of
execution-of-sentence claims raised in Section 2241 petitions in this circuit.”
Miles, 2025 WL 981870 at *4.
Applying the jurisdictional instruction in Cardona, the court observes that
Petitioner does not allege that the BOP’s conduct is somehow inconsistent with a
command or recommendation in his sentencing judgment. (Docs. 1, 1-1.)
Therefore, applying Cardona’s “rigid” jurisdictional boundaries, Petitioner’s
habeas challenge is not cognizable. Therefore, his Section 2241 petition must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court offers no opinion regarding the
availability of other potential avenues of review for Petitioner’s FSA claim
involving pre-release custody, only that it cannot be pursued through a petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
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B. Petitioner’s Challenge Under the Second Chance Act is Unexhausted.
Petitioner’s final challenge invokes the SCA, stating: “[t]he BOP has
additionally violated specific non-discretionary statutory provisions of the SCA as
under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). I had a statutory right for individual consideration of
the five SCA factors descried in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); but the BOP has utterly
refused to conduct such determination based on a categorical refusal to conduct
such determination for Non-U.S. Citizen prisoners with immigration detainers
and/or IHP Participant designation.” (Doc. 1-1.)
Under the SCA, the decision of whether to transfer an inmate to prerelease
custody is left to the discretion of the BOP. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(4). When
exercising this discretion, the BOP must conduct an individualized assessment of
whether an inmate should be transferred to prerelease custody based on the
following factors:
(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;
(2) he nature and circumstances of the offense;
(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;
(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence--
(A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment
was determined to be warranted; or
(B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as
appropriate; and
(5) 	any 	pertinent 	policy 	statement 	issued 	by 	the 	Sentencing
Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28.
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18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); Woodall, 432 F.3d at 247. Petitioner states this five-step
analysis never occurred. (Doc. 1-1.) However, Petitioner admits that he did not
exhaust his administrative remedies. (Doc. 1.)
While there is no statutory exhaustion requirement for habeas corpus
petitions brought pursuant to Section 2241, the Third Circuit has recognized that
“[f]ederal prisoners are ordinarily required to exhaust their administrative remedies
before petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to [Section] 2241.”
Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted); Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000). Exhaustion is
required because: “(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record
and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to grant
the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the
opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.” Moscato,
98 F.3d at 761–62 (citations omitted); Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052
(3d Cir. 1981).
Petitioner freely admits that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies.
(Doc. 1.) Therefore, he did not provide the BOP the opportunity to correct any of
its alleged errors. Instead, Petitioner argues that such exhaustion is not necessary
because he is challenging the statutory construction of the FSA and because
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exhaustion would be futile based on the memorandum issued by the BOP. (Doc. 1,
pp. 3–4.)
Petitioner is correct that that there are situations in which exhaustion is
excused. Exhaustion is not required if there is no opportunity to obtain adequate
redress, if the issue presented only pertains to statutory construction, or if the
prisoner makes an affirmative showing of futility. Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d
156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998); Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir.
1986); Bradshaw, 682 F.2d at 1052. “Courts in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania have consistently held that ‘exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not rendered futile simply because a prisoner anticipates he will be unsuccessful in
his administrative appeals.’” See Ross v. Martinez, No. 4:09-cv-1770, 2009 WL
4573686, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2009) (quoting Malvestuto v. Martinez, No. 1:09-
cv-1339, 2009 WL 2876883, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2009)); see also Suarez-
Sanchez v. Lane, No. 4:18-cv-1431, 2019 WL 1645231, at *3–4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5,
2019) (concluding that the petitioner’s § 2241 petition was subject to dismissal for
failure to exhaust because the petitioner “never fully and properly appealed [his]
grievance because he apparently deemed the grievance process to be a waste of
time”), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1620339 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 16,
2019).
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While the court makes no determination about whether Petitioner is required
to exhaust his challenge to the FSA 3, the court concludes that exhaustion is
required in his challenge to the SCA. Here, such administrative exhaustion would
have given the BOP an opportunity to complete the five-factor analysis required by
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) or state why no such determination is required. Petitioner’s
challenge to the SCA determination does not challenge statutory construction, and
his argument that such exhaustion was futile because the BOP’s internal
memorandum means his administrative exhaustion would be denied is
unpersuasive. Therefore, the court will dismiss the SCA challenge in the petition.
3 The court does not make a determination regarding the necessity to exhaust the FSA challenge
in this instance because it finds that such a challenge is not cognizable under Section 2241.
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CONCLUSION
The Section 2241 petition asserts a challenge under the FSA regarding time
in pre-release custody but does not allege that the BOP’s conduct is somehow
inconsistent with a command or recommendation in his judgment of sentence. As
a result, this petition does not meet the jurisdictional requirements set forth in
Cardona. Additionally, the petition’s challenge to the SCA is not exhausted.
Therefore, the court must dismiss the petition.
An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: January 5, 2026
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