1:25-cv-02440•Yarrington et al v. Gardens of Gettysburg 741 et al
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA GARRY YARRINGTON and : Civil No. 1:25-CV-2440 JODIE LOUISE BYRNE, : : Plaintiffs, : : (Judge Mehalchick) v. : : (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom) : GARDENS OF GETTYSBURG 741, : et al., : : Defendants. : REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. Factual Background This case comes before us for a screening review of the plaintiffs’ pro se civil complaint.1 The plaintiffs, Garry Yarrington and Jodie Byrne, filed this action against various institutional defendants, private individuals, and a state court judge, claiming elder abuse, embezzlement, and violations of unspecified constitutional rights. The plaintiffs vaguely claim they endured abuse by the defendants from their handling of 1 Doc. 1. Case 1:25-cv-02440-KM Document 7 Filed 02/12/26 Page 1 of 10
2 Yarrington’s estate and his treatment in a nursing home. As relief, they request fifty million dollars in compensatory damages. Along with this complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.2 We will conditionally grant the motion to proceed in forma pauperis for screening purposes only, but after a screening review, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed. II. Discussion A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints – Standard of Review We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis.3 We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.4 This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”5 2 Doc. 5. 3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 4 Id. 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Case 1:25-cv-02440-KM Document 7 Filed 02/12/26 Page 2 of 10
3 With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”6 In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true7 and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-movant.”8 However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”9 As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized: [A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two- part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 . Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 7 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 8 Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). 9 Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”). Case 1:25-cv-02440-KM Document 7 Filed 02/12/26 Page 3 of 10
4 complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 10 Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record.11 A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.”12 Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination.13 However, the 10 Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). 11 Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). 12 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). 13 See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). Case 1:25-cv-02440-KM Document 7 Filed 02/12/26 Page 4 of 10
5 court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss.14 Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.’”15 We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name.16 B. This Complaint Should be Dismissed After review, we conclude that the complaint should be dismissed. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.17 14 Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. 15 Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f)). 16 Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)). 17 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Case 1:25-cv-02440-KM Document 7 Filed 02/12/26 Page 5 of 10
6 “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”18 Section 1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.”19 To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must plead two elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a “person” acting under color of law; and (2) that conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.20 To the extent the plaintiffs are attempting to assert a federal civil rights action against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is not clear from the complaint that the defendants are state actors, and thus, subject 18 See Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 19 See id. (citation omitted). 20 See Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141– 42 (3d Cir. 1990). Case 1:25-cv-02440-KM Document 7 Filed 02/12/26 Page 6 of 10
7 to liability under Section 1983.21 Further, while action by a private individual can satisfy the mandate of Section 1983 if the deprivation of a federal right is “fairly attributable to the state[,]” even a liberal reading of the complaint does not indicate that the plaintiffs have alleged a deprivation of a federal right.22 Accordingly, this complaint fails to state a Section 1983 claim against the defendants. Additionally, it is well established that state judges are entitled to immunity from civil liability for claims arising out of acts taken in their official capacities. As the Third Circuit has explained, “[a] judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties has absolute immunity from suit.”23 Here, the plaintiffs’ complaint lists Judge Shawn Wagner. While the complaint does not appear to assert any specific claims against the judge, the plaintiffs aver that Judge Wagner “fail[ed] to hold a hearing on Guardianship and waiver court fees.”24 Accordingly, any claims against him would plainly be barred by absolute immunity. 21 See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638–39 (3d Cir. 1995). 22 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). 23 Kwasnik v. LeBlon, 228 F. App’x 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)). 24 Doc. 1 at 7. Case 1:25-cv-02440-KM Document 7 Filed 02/12/26 Page 7 of 10
8 Lastly, the plaintiffs seek disbarment of Defendant Steve Burgoon and to hold him criminally liable for embezzlement.25 They also allege the defendants’ conduct amounts to elder abuse.26 However, this Court does not have jurisdiction over such matters. The power to disbar attorneys from the practice of law solely rests with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.27 Additionally, it is well settled that “there is no private right of action for alleged violations of criminal statutes,”28 and that the plaintiffs have no right to the enforcement of such criminal statutes against the defendants.29 Accordingly, any such claim fails as a matter of law. However, while we have concluded that the complaint does not state a claim at this time, recognizing that the plaintiffs are pro se litigants, we recommend that the court allow them an opportunity to 25 See Doc. 1 at 4–5. 26 Id. at 3. 27 Pa. Const. art. V, § 10(c). 28 Graf v. United States Army, No. 1:23-CV-2133, 2024 WL 579086, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4711980 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2024) (collecting cases). 29 See id.; Rodriguez v. Salus, 623 F. App’x 588, 590 (3d Cir. 2015); Capogrosso v. The Supreme Ct. of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009). Case 1:25-cv-02440-KM Document 7 Filed 02/12/26 Page 8 of 10
9 amend their complaint to endeavor to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.30 III. Recommendation Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiffs’ complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination because of that record. The judge may 30 See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston, 363 F.3d at 235. Case 1:25-cv-02440-KM Document 7 Filed 02/12/26 Page 9 of 10
10 also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Submitted this 12th day of February 2026. s/ Daryl F. Bloom Daryl F. Bloom Chief United States Magistrate Judge Case 1:25-cv-02440-KM Document 7 Filed 02/12/26 Page 10 of 10
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