Rivera-Rodriguez v. Frith

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JULIO ALBERTO RIVERA-
RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN FRITH,
Respondent.
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Civil No. 1:25-CV-02245
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court is Petitioner Julio Alberto Rivera-Rodriguez’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
2241. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be dismissed as
moot.
BACKGROUND
On November 17, 2025, while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional
Institution Schuylkill (“FCI- Schuylkill”) in Minersville, Pennsylvania, Petitioner
commenced the above-captioned action by filing a Section 2241 petition seeking a
recalculation of his sentence. (Doc. 1.) The court received and docketed the
petition on November 24, 2025. (Id.) On December 3, 2025, the court received
payment of the filing fee. (Doc. 4.) The following day, the court entered an order
serving a copy of the petition on Warden Frith (“Respondent”). (Doc. 6.)
Respondent filed a suggestion of mootness on January 6, 2026 stating that
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Petitioner had been released from custody the day prior. (Doc. 10.) Petitioner did
not respond to Respondent’s suggestion of mootness.
Following the suggestion of mootness, the court reviewed the BOP inmate
locator, which revealed that Petitioner was released from federal custody on
January 5, 2026. The BOP inmate locator is available at the following website:
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/. This website reflects that Petitioner, having a
“Register Number” of “23103-069,” was “not in BOP custody as of: 01/05/2026.”
See id.
DISCUSSION
“Article III of the [United States] Constitution limits federal ‘judicial Power’
to the adjudication of ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” Abreu v. Superintendent
Smithfield SCI, 971 F.3d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp.
of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2)).
In order “[f]or a case or controversy to exist, a petitioner, throughout each stage of
the litigation, ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable
to the [respondent] and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’”
See id. (quoting DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 2005)) (quoting
Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). Consequently, “a habeas
corpus petition generally becomes moot when a prisoner is released from custody
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because the petitioner has received the relief sought.” See id. (citing DeFoy, 393
F.3d at 441).
Nevertheless, a petitioner who has been released from custody “may obtain
judicial review of a [habeas] petition by showing that he continues to suffer from
secondary or collateral consequences of his conviction,” see id. (citations omitted),
or sentence, see Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2009). Generally
speaking, “collateral consequences will be presumed when the [petitioner] is
attacking his conviction while still serving the sentence imposed for that conviction
[and] where the [petitioner] is attacking that portion of his sentence that is still
being served.” See id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 242 (3d Cir.
2008)).
Once a petitioner has been released, however, the court does “not presume
that a conviction carries collateral consequences.” See Abreu, 971 F.3d at 406
(citing Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148). Instead, the court “must ‘address[ ] the issue of
collateral consequences in terms of the likelihood that a favorable decision would
redress the injury or wrong.’” See id. (quoting Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148). For that
reason, “[i]t is not enough if ‘collateral consequences proffered by the petitioner’
amount to ‘a possibility rather than a certainty or even a probability.’” See id.
(quoting Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148).
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Consistent with these principles, the court finds that, while the instant
petition is generally moot, as Petitioner is no longer in federal custody as of
January 5, 2026, Petitioner may still obtain judicial review of his federal sentence
if he can show that he continues to suffer from secondary or collateral
consequences of that sentence. See id. Here, Petitioner was put on notice of the
potential mootness of his petition by Respondent’s suggestion of mootness. (Doc.
10.) Despite this notice, Petitioner has not timely demonstrated that he continues
to suffer from secondary or collateral consequences of his federal sentence. As a
result, his petition will be dismissed as moot.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Petitioner’s Section 2241
petition will be dismissed as moot. An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: February 2, 2026
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