1:25-cv-01614•Pearsall v. UPMC et al
Testo completo
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA TERRENCE PEARSALL, Plaintiff, v. UPMC, et al., Defendants. CIVIL NO. 1:25-CV-1614 (JUDGE NEARY) (Magistrate Judge Latella) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Pro se Plaintiff Terrance Pearsall originated this action by filing what was styled as a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 29, 2025, alleging that he was subjected to a sexual assault during a medical appointment. (Doc. 1). While he claimed various constitutional violations, he also alleged sexual harassment and sexual assault, which, liberally construed, constitute pendent claims under Pennsylvania state law. He failed to allege, however, that the Defendants were acting under the color of state law when he was sexually assaulted and therefore could not state a claim under section 1983. Accordingly, a screening order was issued advising Plaintiff of the elements necessary to plead a section 1983 claim, and the critical element that the defendant’s actions must have been committed under Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 1 of 21
2 color of state law. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint but again failed to allege that any of the defendants were state actors. (Doc. 1). A second Order, giving even more extensive pleading guidance was issued. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, again alleging a sexual assault, and requesting that the matter be moved to the Court of Common Pleas for Dauphin County. For the reasons that follow, it will be recommended that any section 1983 claims raised in the Second Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that any state claims be dismissed without prejudice. I. Background On August 29, 2025, the Plaintiff, Terrence Pearsall, initiated this action by filing a pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff averred that at the time of filing he was an inmate confined at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Rockview. (Doc. 1, ¶ 3). Named as Defendants were the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC); Eric Tater, an employee of UPMC; and Dr. Khem Adhilari, a physician at UPMC. (Doc. 1). On that same date, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (IFP), (Doc. 2), and a Motion to Amend Complaint. (Doc. 3). Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 2 of 21
3 By Order dated October 10, 2025, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP was granted, but service of the Complaint was held in abeyance pending the Court’s screening obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). (Doc. 5). By separate Order also dated October 10, 2025, the Plaintiff was advised of several deficiencies in the Complaint which rendered it subject to dismissal. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff was advised of the general rules of pleading provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and advised of potential deficiencies with Plaintiff’s Complaint, including that it appeared to fall short of the minimal pleading requirements established by Rule 8. (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff was informed that his Complaint may be subject to dismissal pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because “[a] § 1983 plaintiff ‘must establish that she was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor,’” and Plaintiff “does not indicate that UPMC, a non-profit corporation, is a state actor. Nor does [he] allege facts permitting such an inference. Thus, [Plaintiff’s] constitutional claims against UPMC are [subject to be] dismissed.” (Id.) (quoting Gunsallus v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr, No. 4:21-CV-00368, 2022 WL 36368, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2022)). Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 3 of 21
4 Further, and significantly, Plaintiff was advised that if he sought to redress federally protected rights under § 1983, while “seemingly private behavior may be [] fairly treated as that of the State itself” he must allege state action. (Id.) (quoting Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d at 646). Plaintiff was advised that the Third Circuit has explained: [T]he principal question at stake is whether there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. To answer that question, we have outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine whether state action exists: (1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity. (Doc 6, p. 5) (quoting Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d at 646). Because the original Complaint that Plaintiff filed completely failed to allege state action sufficient to maintain a § 1983 action, he was granted twenty-one (21) days in which to file an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff filed a request for an extension of time to file an Amended Complaint, and that request was granted by Order dated November 9, 2025. (Doc. 9). Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 4 of 21
5 An Amended Complaint was filed on December 9, 2025. (Doc. 10). The Amended Complaint again named Eric Tater and Dr. Khen Adhikari as Defendants; however, the Amended Complaint named Penn State Health, not UPMC, as a Defendant. Additionally, it alleged that Tater and Adhikari are employees of Penn State Health, not UPMC. However, the Amended Complaint again failed to allege any action on the part of the state or that the Defendants were state actors. Plaintiff alleged that on August 29, 2023, he attended a medical appointment at Penn State Health and that he was sexually assaulted during the examination by Defendant Tater. Although he indicated that he was currently confined at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Rockview, Plaintiff did not indicate in the Amended Complaint whether he was an inmate at the time of his medical appointment nor did he allege any relationship between the named Defendants and any state institution. Accordingly, Plaintiff was given another opportunity to amend his complaint. In assisting in the filing of a Second Amended Complaint, the Court provided the following additional guidance. First, Plaintiff is again reminded that “to establish a successful claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law and deprived Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 5 of 21
6 the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Mollett v. Leclerc, No. 3:25-CV-185, 2025 WL 817601, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2025). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations of state actions. “[W]here—as here—a defendant is not alleged to be a public entity, the allegations must plausibly show that the private defendant should be considered a state actor for purposes of section 1983. Although there is no simple line between state and private actors, the principal question at stake is whether there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Langston v. Hershey Med. Ctr., No. 1:15-CV-2027, 2016 WL 6780702, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2016). (Doc. 11). Plaintiff was granted twenty-one days to file a Second Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies outlined above. On January 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, (Doc. 14), again alleging a sexual assault committed by Defendant Tater but again failing to allege state action. For relief, the Plaintiff requested that the case “be moved” to the Court of Common Please for Dauphin County. (Doc. 14, p. 2). II. Discussion A. Applicable Standards i. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 6 of 21
7 The statute governing proceedings in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 directs that “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “The United States Supreme Court has held that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)’s term ‘frivolous’ when applied to a complaint, ‘embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation,’ such that a claim is frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it ‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact’” Romeo v. State of Delaware, No. CIV.A. 04-153-SLR, 2004 WL 1043196, at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 27, 2004) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)). This statutory text of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Therefore, Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 7 of 21
8 “[w]hen reviewing complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must apply the standard of review set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Romeo, 2004 WL 1043196, at *1. While both 12(b)(6) and § 1915(e)(2)(B) warrant dismissal, § 1915 allows for a claim to be dismissed prior to the service of the complaint, while courts should not rely on 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint sua sponte prior to service of process. Green v. LG Elecs. USA, No. 23-1062, 2023 WL 3915102, at *2 (3d Cir. June 9, 2023), cert. dismissed, 144 S. Ct. 874, 218 L. Ed. 2d 59 (2024), reconsideration denied, 144 S. Ct. 2516, 219 L. Ed. 2d 1198 (2024). However, the standard for dismissal for failure to state a claim is the same for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 12(b)(6). See Treadway v. DOC Pennsylvania, No. 25-CV-2800, 2025 WL 1888208, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2025) (“Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Bush v. Doe (I), 858 F. App’x 520, 522 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)). Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 8 of 21
9 ii. The 12(b)(6) Standard Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a claim must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This requires the Plaintiff to put forth evidence that, “when taken as true, suggest[s] the required elements of a particular legal theory.” McNeilly v. City of Pittsburgh, 40 F. Supp. 3d 643, 650 (W.D. Pa. 2014). The Plaintiff must state “sufficient factual allegations which ‘nudge’ its claims ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). The purpose is to ensure “fair notice of the factual basis of a claim while raising a ‘reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.’” Id. at 651. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This means that a complaint may be dismissed if it does not present sufficient facts to support a plausible claim: “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 9 of 21
10 complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)). The court must accept both the Plaintiff’s allegations and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). However, it need not accept “‘unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Reciting the elements that make up a cause of action and supporting them with “mere conclusory statements” is insufficient to give those statements the presumption of truth. McNeilly, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 650 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937). When faced with a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), a court should conduct a two-part analysis: 1) separate the factual and legal elements of a claim; and 2) “determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 10 of 21
11 for relief.” Id. (internal citation removed). The court may consider facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellab, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). This analysis requires the court to look at the claims on a case-by-case basis and rely both “on its judicial experience and common sense.” McNeilly, 40 F.Supp.3d at 650. The court will not be reaching legal conclusions, but instead is merely determining “whether the plaintiff should be permitted to offer evidence in support of the allegations.” Id. (citing Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000)). iii. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiff’s three Complaints bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The basis of federal jurisdiction asserted is federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In all three Complaints, Plaintiff failed to allege that any of the Defendants were state actors or any of their actions were taken under color of state law. As noted above, Plaintiff was twice advised that to properly plead a section 1983 claim, he would have to allege that the defendants acted under color of Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 11 of 21
12 state law. Plaintiff alleged that on August 29, 2023, he attended a medical appointment at Penn State Health, Harrisburg. (Doc. 14, p. 2). He alleged that Defendant Eric Tater sexually assaulted and abused him during the visit. (Id.). He asserts that Defendant Dr. Adhikari was aware of Tater’s conduct and failed to protect Plaintiff. (Id.). According to its website, “Penn State Health is an integrated academic health system serving patients and communities across 15 counties in central Pennsylvania.” https://www.pennstatehealth.org/about-us. Penn State Health is listed on the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) public website as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/details/. “Penn State Health is a non-profit corporation incorporated and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” United States ex rel. Shannon v. Penn State Health St. Joseph Reg'l Health Network, No. CV 21-2351, 2025 WL 984353, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2025). All three of Plaintiff’s complaints are completely devoid of any allegations that Penn State Health or either of the Defendants, employees of Penn State Health at the time of the alleged incident, were state actors or working in connection the State or any of its agencies. “[T]o establish a Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 12 of 21
13 successful claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Mollett v. Leclerc, No. 3:25-CV-185, 2025 WL 817601, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2025) (citing Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997)). See also Fata v. Delgado, No. 25-1888, 2026 WL 36123, at *1 (3d Cir. Jan. 6, 2026) ([Plaintiff’s] attempt to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails because defendants, who are private citizens, are not state actors and were not acting under color of law.”). As outlined above, Plaintiff was advised that in some instances private parties may become state actors for purposed of section 1983 and that: [T]he principal question at stake is whether there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. To answer that question, we have outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine whether state action exists: (1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 13 of 21
14 with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). Here, “there are no allegations that [Penn State] Health or the Defendant doctors ‘acted with the help of or in concert with state officials,’ for example, or met any of the other two tests for state action. Absent such facts, nothing in the Complaint suggests a legal basis for concluding that Defendants are state actors for the purposes of § 1983.” Downes v. St. Luke's Univ. Health Network, No. 5:25-CV-5104, 2025 WL 3299242, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2025) (quoting Pinnock v. Univ. of Pa. Hosp., No. 25-5276, 2025 WL 2901060, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2025) and collecting cases). Because none of the Defendants are alleged to have acted under color of state law and there have been no allegations that would, even given the most strained reading, support an inference of state action, the section 1983 claims should be dismissed. iv. The State Law Claims In all three of his Complaints, Plaintiff references sexual assault and or sexual abuse. Liberally construing these pro se pleadings, as we must, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 14 of 21
15 pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (cleaned up), it appears that Plaintiff has attempted to bring supplemental state claims arising out of Pennsylvania law. Where a district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Whether the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within its discretion. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009). “That decision should be based on the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. In the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” KL by & through Locker v. Dunmore Sch. Dist., No. 3:24-CV-01461, 2025 WL 2723547, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2025) (cleaned up); see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (holding that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”); Brown v. Patel, No. 3:18-CV-01242, 2019 WL Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 15 of 21
16 2502337, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:18-CV-1242, 2019 WL 3562656 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2019) (recommending that federal claims be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and that remaining state law claims be dismissed without prejudice). Therefore, it is recommended that any state law claims Plaintiff attempts to assert be dismissed without prejudice to his right to raise them in state court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). v. Plaintiff’s Request to Move the Case to State Court This matter was originated in federal court. Accordingly, there is no authority to remand it to state court. However, the Pennsylvania legislature has envisioned situations where claims erroneously filed in federal court that were dismissed on jurisdictional bases could be brought in state court and the statute of limitations preserved pursuant to Section 5103(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(b). “Once the federal court dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction, it is then incumbent upon the litigant to take further action under the statute to move the case to state court. To preserve the timeliness of an action under this statute, a litigant, upon having [a] case dismissed in federal Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 16 of 21
17 court for lack of jurisdiction, must promptly file a certified transcript of the final judgment of the federal court and, at the same time, a certified transcript of the pleadings from the federal action. The litigant shall not file new pleadings in state court.” Bradley v. W. Chester Univ., 273 A.3d 106, 112 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2022), aff'd, 291 A.3d 349 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up). Accordingly, it is incumbent on plaintiff to transfer this matter to state court in accordance with Pennsylvania state law.1 C. Leave to Amend The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be 1 It will be recommended that the Clerk of Court be directed to provide the Plaintiff with a certified copy of the docket in this matter to assist in transferring it to state court. Additionally, it should be noted that Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually assaulted by “Eric Tater” during a medical visit at Penn State Health Harrisburg. Media reports abound about that facility having terminated Eric Alphonso Tarter Jr. for the type of conduct alleged by Plaintiff here. Eric Alphonso Tarter Jr. is currently pending trial in Dauphin County on multiple counts of indecent assault in CP-22-CR-0000323-2024. Plaintiff might have another avenue of relief through the Dauphin County District Attorney’s Office. Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 17 of 21
18 inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). In Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 153 (3d Cir. 2025), the Court instructed: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) directs courts to grant motions for leave to amend “when justice so requires.” So leave to amend should be liberally given unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 400 (3d Cir. 2004); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. And because courts have a special obligation to be “more forgiving of pro se litigants,” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019), this Circuit has a “longstanding policy of allowing pro se plaintiffs to amend their complaints before the court rules upon defendants' motions to dismiss,” Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 196 n.8 (3d Cir. 1990) (collecting cases). Leave to amend in this case, however, would be futile. The only basis for federal jurisdiction is Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim. He was fully instructed on the requirements necessary to plead a section 1983 claim on two separate occasions yet was unable to so. The failure to properly plead a section 1983 claim was for good reason; Penn State Health, a private nonprofit healthcare provider, and its employees are not state actors. Plaintiff’s sexual assault claims should have been brought in state court and no amendment would vest this Court with jurisdiction to hear those claims. Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 18 of 21
19 III. Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that: 1. Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be DISMISSED with prejudice; 2. The sexual assault claims be DISMISSED without prejudice; 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case; 4. The Clerk of Court be directed to provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of the Docket in the matter. Dated: January 28, 2026 /s/ Leo A. Latella Leo A. Latella United States Magistrate Judge Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 19 of 21
20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA TERRENCE PEARSALL, Plaintiff, v. UPMC, et al., Defendants. CIVIL NO. 1:25-CV-1614 (JUDGE NEARY) (Magistrate Judge Latella) NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated January 28, 2026. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides: Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 20 of 21
21 to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Dated: January 28, 2026 s/ Leo A. Latella LEO A. LATELLA United States Magistrate Judge Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 21 of 21
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