Sirmons, Jr. v. SCI-Camp Hill Prison Dentist's Administration

1:25-cv-01040Pamd23 mar 2026

Testo completo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHRISTOPHER SIRMONS, JR., 	:
Plaintiff 	: 	No. 1:25-cv-01040
:
v. 	: 	(Judge Kane)
:
SCI CAMP HILL PRISON DENTIST’S 	:
ADMINISTRATION, 	:
Defendant 	:
MEMORANDUM
Currently before the Court are pro se Plaintiff Christopher Sirmons, Jr. (“Sirmons”)
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”) and complaint. For the
reasons stated below, the Court will grant the IFP Application and dismiss the complaint without
prejudice to Sirmons filing an amended complaint.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Sirmons, a convicted, sentenced, and incarcerated state prisoner,1 commenced this action
by filing a complaint and an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, both of which the
Clerk of Court docketed on June 10, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 1–2.) When Sirmons filed his in forma
pauperis application, he did not use the Court’s standard form; as such, two Administrative
Orders issued requiring him to either refile an in forma pauperis application or remit the filing
fee. (Doc. Nos. 5, 8.) Additionally, because Sirmons did not file a certified prisoner account
statement as required by the in forma pauperis statute when he applied for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) (“A prisoner seeking to bring a civil action . . .
without prepayment of fees[,] . . . shall submit a certified copy of the trust fund account
1 Sirmons is currently incarcerated at Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution Camp Hill
(“SCI Camp Hill”).
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statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period immediately
preceding the filing of the complaint . . ., obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at
which the prisoner is or was confined.”), a third Administrative Order issued requiring the
superintendent at Sirmons’s place of confinement to submit Sirmons’s certified account
statement with the Clerk of Court. (Doc. No. 6.) The Clerk of Court docketed Sirmons’s
certified account statement and IFP Application on June 30, 2025, and July 31, 2025,
respectively. (Doc. Nos. 7, 10).
In the complaint, Sirmons names SCI Camp Hill’s “Dentist’s [sic] Administration” as the
only Defendant. See (Doc. No. 1 at 1, 2). Sirmons alleges that in the afternoon of May 30,
2025, he arrived at SCI Camp Hill’s “Dentist Department” for dental work. See (id. ¶ 6).
Sirmons informed the unidentified dentist that “the only dental work to be done to his mouth is
to [r]emove the feelens [sic] that has [sic] been in his teeth longer than twenty year’s [sic] and
replace them with a feelen [sic] that do [sic] not have silver or aluminum metal into [sic] them.”
See (id. ¶ 7). He claims that replacement of his fillings was necessary because he “found out
over the last [f]ew years that he has been dealing with an [a]llergic [r]e[a]ction[] from the silver
[sic] aluminum [sic] metal feelens [sic],” which has “been causeing [sic] [d]ismal [f]unction with
[h]eart, [d]iscolor raction [sic] with skin, and weakening the Emusystem [sic] over the last 11
years” as well as causing him to “look sick . . . around the mouth, lips [sic].” See (id. ¶ 8).
The dentist reviewed Sirmons’s “[d]ocuments, [r]ecords[,] and x-[r]ays” to gain a “better
under standing [sic] for what he was assigned to do.” See (id. ¶ 9). The dentist then told
Sirmons that he was going to perform dental work on a tooth with a cavity located on the upper
left side of Sirmons’s mouth. See (id.).
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Sirmons asserts that the dentist’s statement about his cavity “couldn’t have been true”
because he “got his teeth worked on in SCI[]Somerset [b]etween year 2022 and year 2023, [a]nd
got [a]the teeth that was [sic] a cavity [r]emoved.” See (id. ¶ 10). Sirmons also had his teeth that
were “treatable” cleaned and “[f]eelen.” See (id.). His tooth that supposedly had a cavity
“showed (no) [sic] signs of [e]xposure of a cavity or [r]ottenness, [w]eak [e]namel, or appcess
[sic].” See (id.).
At this point, “things heated up [b]etween the [d]entist and Sirmons,” and the dentist and
another “dentist employee” exchanged words with Sirmons. See (id. ¶ 11). During this
exchange, the dentist and dental employee called Sirmons a racist and threatened to kill him, see
(id.), which led to Sirmons “[sitting] back wounding [sic] why [b]oth [d]entists called him
[r]acist and threat[ened] to kill him” even though Sirmons never said anything racist to the
dentists or threatened to harm them. See (id.).
Sirmons then asked the dentist if he could begin with Sirmons’s dental work. See (id. ¶
12). While the dentist was preparing, Sirmons was “shaking his head lightly.” See (id.). The
dentist noticed Sirmons shaking his head and “flaired [sic] up with [r]age” and was “[r]eady to
take his [g]loves off.” See (id.). The dentist told Sirmons if he was shaking his head because he
did not “want this [d]one,” he could leave. See (id.). Sirmons responded by informing the
dentist that he was only supposed to “[r]emove the [f]eelens [sic] and [r]eplace [them] with new
ones.” See (id.). He then again asked the dentist to begin the dental work. See (id. ¶ 13).
After approximately forty minutes of dental work, the dentist told Sirmons that he was
“about done” and had “just one more thing” to do. See (id.). The dentist then pushed his chair
near Sirmons, left, and returned with “a [d]ental [m]achine that had a (saw head) [sic] placed on
to it.” See (id.). The dentist placed this device onto Sirmons’s tooth on the upper left side of his
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mouth and “used [ b]rut [sic] [f]orce[,] cuting [sic] the one whole tooth into two.” See (id.).
Sirmons asserts that the tooth “showed no signs or exposure of [sic] a cavity or [r]ottenness,
weak enamel[,] or [a]ppcess [sic].” See (id. ¶ 14).
The dentist’s procedure caused Sirmons to suffer severe and sharp pain through his jaw,
temple, and left side of his neck and face. See (id.). The location of the tooth was a “[b]lood
clog and swollen.” See (id.). The dentist also “nearly nocked [sic] Sirmons[’s f]ront teeth out”
while cutting the tooth. See (id.).
Sirmons alleges that his tooth is still split in two and, as such, it “has 100% [e]xposure to
become [a c]avity or [r]ottenness[,] weak [e]namel[,] or a[n] appcess [sic].” See (id. ¶ 15). He
claims that an “appcess [sic] is life threaten[ing].” See (id.). He also claims that the “more [he]
eat [sic] and drink [sic][,] the worst [sic] the pain will get.” See (id. ¶ 17).
Based on these allegations, Sirmons asserts that the dentist was deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs—his allergic reaction to the fillings in his teeth—in violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See (id. ¶ 17). He also appears to assert
that (1) the dentist inflicted cruel and unusual punishment by cutting his tooth in half and leaving
it in place and (2) he has been retaliated against because he has a pending civil rights action
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and SCI Camp Hill. See
(id. ¶¶ 16–17). For relief, Sirmons requests a declaratory judgment stating that Defendant
violated his constitutional rights, $18 million in compensatory damages, and punitive damages.
See (id. at 7). Sirmons indicates that he seeks these forms of relief against Defendant “[i]n [a]ll
of their [sic] capacities.” See (id. ¶ 5).
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Applications for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may allow a plaintiff to commence a civil case
“without prepayment of fees or security therefor,” if the plaintiff “submits an affidavit that
includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such
fees or give security therefor.” See id. This statute
“is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal
courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338
(1989). 	Specifically, Congress enacted the statute to ensure that administrative
court costs and filing fees, both of which must be paid by everyone else who files
a lawsuit, would not prevent indigent persons from pursuing meaningful litigation.
[Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995)]. Toward this end, §
1915(a) allows a litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court in
forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit stating, [inter alia], that [they are]
unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827.
See Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App’x 130, 131–32 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished)
(footnote omitted).
B. 	The Court’s Screening of Complaints Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this Court must “review . . . a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). If a complaint is frivolous or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must dismiss the complaint. See id. §
1915A(b)(1). The Court has a similar screening obligation with respect to actions filed by
prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis. See id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“[T]he [C]ourt shall dismiss
the case at any time if the [C]ourt determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is frivolous . . . [or]
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .”).
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A complaint is frivolous under Sections 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it “lacks an
arguable basis either in law or fact.” See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. In addition, when reviewing
whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Sections
1915A(b) or 1915(e)(2), the Court applies the standard governing motions to dismiss filed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Smithson v. Koons,
No. 15-cv-01757, 2017 WL 3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 26, 2017) (“The legal standard for
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1) [and] § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
. . . is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3008559 (M.D. Pa. July 14,
2017); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (explaining that when
reviewing a complaint for possible dismissal pursuant to § 1915A, “a court employs the motion
to dismiss standard set forth under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). To avoid
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must set out “sufficient factual matter” in the complaint
to show that their claims are facially plausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
This plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility that the defendant is liable for the
alleged misconduct. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). When
evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those allegations, viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. See id.; In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir.
2010). However, the Court should not accept legal conclusions as true, and “a formulaic
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recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive a complaint’s screening under
Sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2). See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).
In addition, in the specific context of pro se prisoner litigation, the Court must be mindful
that a document filed by a pro se litigant is “to be liberally construed.” See Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339–40 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining
that “when presented with a pro se litigant, we have a special obligation to construe his
complaint liberally” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, a pro se
complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). This means the court must “remain
flexible, especially ‘when dealing with imprisoned pro se litigants . . . .’” See Vogt v. Wetzel, 8
F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45
(3d Cir. 2013))).
Additionally, when construing a pro se complaint, the court will “apply the relevant legal
principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” See Mala, 704 F.3d at 244. However,
pro se litigants “‘cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules that apply to
all other litigants.’” See Vogt, 8 F.4th at 185 (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245).
C. 	Section 1983
Section 1983 is the statutory vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress for
violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This statute states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
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Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
See id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means through which
“to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.” See Pappas v. City of
Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S.
273, 284–85 (2002)). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	The IFP Application
After reviewing the IFP Application and Sirmons’s certified prisoner trust fund account
statement, it appears that he is unable to pre-pay the costs of this civil action. However, because
Sirmons is an incarcerated person, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to his IFP
Application. The PLRA provides for a three-strikes rule, which “supplies a powerful incentive
not to file frivolous lawsuits . . . .” See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 311 (3d Cir.
2001) (en banc). This three-strikes rule, which is contained within the in forma pauperis statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1915, provides as follows:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action
or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions,
while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court
of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is
under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
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A strike under this section will accrue:
only if the entire action or appeal is (1) dismissed explicitly because it is ‘frivolous,’
‘malicious,’ or ‘fails to state a claim’ or (2) dismissed pursuant to a statutory
provision or rule that is limited solely to dismissals for such reasons, including (but
not 	necessarily 	limited 	to) 	28 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1915A(b)(1), 	1915(e)(2)(B)(i),
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 2013). Additionally, “[t]he text of Section
1915(g)’s three-strikes provision refers to any dismissal for failure to state a claim, whether with
prejudice or without.” See Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020).
After reviewing Sirmons’s history of filing federal civil, non-habeas actions, the Court
concludes that he had accrued at least three strikes for purposes of Section 1915(g) prior to the
date he filed his complaint in this case. In this regard, Sirmons filed the following actions which
qualify as strikes under Section 1915(g):
1. 	Sirmons, Jr. v. Berks County Pa. Police Dep’t Admin., et al., No. 24-cv-06871
(E.D. Pa. filed Dec. 23, 2024): On April 3, 2025, the Honorable John F. Murphy
dismissed without prejudice and with prejudice in part Sirmons’s complaint for
failure to state a claim for relief under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), did not grant
Sirmons leave to amend, and directed the Clerk of Court to close the case. See
id., ECF Nos. 5, 6. Despite Judge Murphy not granting Sirmons leave to amend,
Sirmons filed a motion to file an amended complaint, see id., ECF No. 18, which
Judge Murphy denied. See id., ECF No. 19. Sirmons appealed from this decision
to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, see id., ECF No. 21, which denied his
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal after determining that he
has three strikes for purposes of Section 1915(g). See id., ECF No. 26.
2. 	Sirmons, Jr. v. Dep’t of Corr. Admin, SCI Camp Hill, et al., No. 25-cv-00510
(M.D. Pa. filed Mar. 20, 2025): On June 4, 2025, the undersigned dismissed with
prejudice in part and without prejudice in part Sirmons’s complaint for failure to
state a claim for relief under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), did not grant him leave to
amend, and directed the Clerk of Court to close the case. See id., ECF Nos. 8, 9.
3. 	Sirmons, Jr. v. SCI Camp Hill, et al., No. 25-cv-00804 (M.D. Pa. filed May 6,
2025): On June 4, 2025, the undersigned dismissed with prejudice in part and
without prejudice in part Sirmons’s complaint for failure to state a claim for relief
under 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), did not grant him leave to amend, and directed the Clerk
of Court to close the case. See id., ECF Nos. 5, 6.
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Because the Court concludes that Sirmons has accrued three or more strikes, he cannot
proceed in forma pauperis in this action unless he specifically and credibly alleges that he “is
under imminent damager of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Ball v. Famiglio,
726 F.3d 448, 470 (3d Cir. 2013) (indicating that “a prisoner claiming that [they are] in imminent
danger of serious physical harm must ‘make specific [and] credible allegations to that effect’”
(last alteration in original) (quoting Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2013))),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 537–38 (2015). This
means that Sirmons must allege that he is “seek[ing] relief from a danger which is ‘imminent’ at
the time” he filed his complaint. See Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 312. If his alleged danger has
passed, he is not in imminent danger. See id. at 313 (“[Section 1915(g)] contemplates that the
‘imminent danger’ will exist contemporaneously with the bringing of the action. Someone
whose danger has passed cannot reasonably be described as someone who ‘is’ in danger, nor can
that past danger reasonably be described as ‘imminent.’”).
Here, although the Court is concerned about the credibility of Sirmons’s allegation that a
dentist intentionally split his tooth and then allowed Sirmons to leave the dental office with the
split tooth, this allegation is sufficient to satisfy his high burden under Section 1915(g) to show
that he was in imminent danger of serious physical harm due to the possibility of his split tooth
leading to a severe infection (such as an abscess). See, e.g., McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709,
711 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the plaintiff’s allegation of a spreading mouth infection, caused
by two delayed tooth extractions, was sufficient to show imminent serious danger); Stine v.
Oliver, 644 F. App’x 857, 859–60 (10th Cir. 2016) (concluding that appellant’s allegations that
“his teeth are infected and abscessed” and “authorities are failing to provide dental care” were
sufficient to satisfy Section 1915(g)); Bradshaw v. Phillip, No. 21-cv-00776, 2022 WL 504976,
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at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2022) (explaining that the court previously concluded that the plaintiff
“faced a risk of serious physical harm from tooth decay”); but see Williams v. Gibson, No. 22-
cv-01258, 2023 WL 2401776, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 8, 2023) (determining that the plaintiff’s
“allegation that he has not yet received treatment for his unspecified tooth pain does not meet the
high burden to show imminent serious physical harm” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, because
Sirmons’s IFP Application and certified account statement show that he cannot prepay the filing
fee in this case, the Court will grant the IFP Application and allow Sirmons to proceed in forma
pauperis in this case.2
B. 	Screening of the Complaint
As indicated above, the only named Defendant in this case is SCI Camp Hill’s Dentist’s
Association. See (Doc. No. 1 at 1). Section 1983 permits claims only against a “person” who
violates the plaintiff’s constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. §
1983. A prison medical department or “Dentist’s Association,” is not a proper defendant to a
Section 1983 claim. See Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (concluding that the
plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the New Jersey Prison Medical Department could not
proceed because the Department was not a “person” for purposes of the statute (citation
omitted)). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Sirmons’s complaint for failure to state a
plausible claim for relief under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) because he fails to
name a proper defendant under Section 1983.
2 However, because Sirmons is a prisoner, he is advised that he will be obligated to pay the filing
fees for this case in installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),
regardless of the outcome. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
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C. 	Leave to Amend
Having determined that Sirmons’s Section 1983 claim against Defendant is subject to
dismissal, the Court must determine whether to grant him leave to file an amended complaint.
Courts should generally give leave to amend but may dismiss a complaint with prejudice where
leave to amend would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete
Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n civil rights cases district courts must
offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a case for failure to
state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.”); see also Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (“When a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend a
deficient complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, the court must inform the plaintiff that
[they have] leave to amend within a set period of time, unless amendment would be inequitable
or futile.”). “In determining whether [amendment] would be futile, the district court applies the
same standard of legal sufficiency as [it] applies under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997).
Here, although Sirmons has not named a proper defendant for Section 1983 purposes, the
Court cannot determine at this time that an amendment would be futile. As such, the Court will
grant Sirmons leave to file an amended complaint to the extent that he can name a proper
defendant for his Section 1983 claim.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant the IFP Application and dismiss the
complaint without prejudice to Sirmons filing an amended complaint to the extent he can name a
proper defendant for his Section 1983 claim. An appropriate Order follows.3
s/ Yvette Kane
Yvette Kane, District Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania
3 The Order will provide additional information to Sirmons about the filing of an amended
complaint.
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