Feinberg et al v. Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
HADASSAH FEINBERG, et al., 	: 	CIV. NO. 1:25-CV-768
:
Plaintiffs, 	: 	(Judge Saporito)
:
v. 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
DAUPHIN COUNTY CHILDREN 	:
AND YOUTH, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Factual Background and Procedural History
The plaintiff in this case, Hadassah Feinberg, is a prolific, and prodigiously
unsuccessful, litigant who, for years, has been pursuing claims of wide-sweeping
conspiracies 	involving 	county, 	township, 	law 	enforcement, 	and 	individual
defendants in federal and state court.1 Feinberg’s cases follow a characteristic pattern
involving voluminous filings against a slew of defendants attempting to implicate
them in conspiratorial pursuits, some of which involve Feinberg and some which do
not. Indeed, some of her past legal forays have alleged grandiose scenarios that
appear 	more 	imagined 	than 	real, 	accusing 	high-ranking 	officials, 	including
1 See Feinberg v. Smith, et al., 1:23-cv-02165; Feinberg v. Chardo, et al., 1:24-cv-
00706; Feinberg v. Cintron, et al., 1:24-cv-01377.
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Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner and the Governor of Pennsylvania, of
participating in an organized crime ring.2 Feinberg v. Cintron, 1:24-cv-1377.
There is a second troubling aspect to Finberg’s idiosyncratic approach to
litigation. After Feinberg lodges facially deficient complaints she often files notices
of voluntary dismissal of those claims when her meritless pleadings are challenged.
Indeed, Feinberg has engaged in this expedient behavior on at least three occasions
during the past year. See Feinberg v. Smith, 1:23-CV-2165 (Docs. 150, 151);
Feinberg v. Schwab, 4:25-CV-591 (Docs. 6,7); Feinberg v. Dauphin County Social
Services, 1:25-CV-768 (Doc. 81).
This characteristic and feckless style of litigation bleeds into the instant case.
Recently, Feinberg has repeatedly pursued claims against dozens of defendants
relating to the brief removal of her children from her home in 2023 by Dauphin
County Children and Youth Services (CYS). In pursuing these claims against a
number of CYS and Department of Human Services (DHS) employees, school
district, law enforcement, and medical personnel, Feinberg has patently attempted to
avoid the Court’s judgment on her meritless and frivolous claims by voluntarily
dismissing her case, which the Court had already recommended be dismissed, then
2Feinberg also purportedly filed a private criminal complaint alleging Governor
Shapiro was somehow implicated in the assassination attempt of President Donald
Trump in Butler, PA. (Doc. 74, ⁋ 22)
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refiling the same claims in a new case. 3 Indeed, as argued by the defendants in their
motion for costs, Feinberg has now filed seven lawsuits against the CYS defendants
in state and federal court.4
This has not gone unnoticed by the Court.
Thus, at the outset, Feinberg’s pattern of vexatious litigation, including
reasserting claims here that had previously been recommended dismissed by this
Court, casts grave doubt upon the meritoriousness of these claims. Nonetheless, very
generally stated, Feinberg alleges the thirty-one defendants in this case engaged in a
conspiracy to retaliate against her5 by removing her children from her home for eight
days in 2023 and engaged in a wide-spread coverup of child abuse. Her over fifty-
3 As we have noted, this is not the first time she has engaged in this type of conduct.
In the 2023 iteration of this case that was referred to Magistrate Judge Schwab,
Feinberg filed a parallel 105-page complaint alleging RICO violations by a number
of the same defendants which was later consolidated with her other claims. Feinberg
v. 	Chardo, 	1:24-CV-706 	(M.D. 	Pa. 	2024). 	Moreover, 	after 	Judge 	Schwab
recommended her claims in the previous case citing these same factual allegations,
Feinberg sued the Judge, but later voluntarily dismissed her those claims as well.
See Feinberg v. Schwab et. al., 4:25-cv-00591.
4 See Doc. 48, at 9 (collecting cases).
5 As discussed below, one of the many ambiguities of Feinberg’s complaint is that,
while she clearly alleges whatever conduct for which the defendants were retaliating
was protected, the precise protected activity, and the retaliatory motive of many of
the defendants, is somewhat unclear. But, broadly construed, she alleges that, at least
some of the defendants retaliated against her for reporting CYS to various state
authorities for their failure to investigate the alleged abuse of the Smith children.
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page complaint alleges that, in October 2023, she took temporary custody of the four
children of an acquaintance, the Smith children, who were located in deplorable
conditions and in need of medical attention. (Doc. 1, at 2). According to Feinberg,
she discovered evidence that the children were being physically abused and reported
the abuse to several officials at CYS and had the children evaluated at the hospital.
(Id., ⁋⁋ 70-79). The plaintiff alleges it took her numerous calls to get CYS to respond,
including a call to Dauphin County Commissioner Defendant George Hartwick, but
that they sent Defendant Scott Smith to her home the day after she took custody of
the children, on October 13, 2023. (Id., 80-82). Defendant Smith took pictures of the
bruising and marking on the Smith children and told the plaintiff he would
investigate. (Id., ⁋ 83). While at her home, Defendant Smith pointed out a “safety
sleeper-bed” prescribed for one of her children, A.F., who suffers from several
mental and physical disabilities. (Id., ⁋ 84).
The plaintiff then alleges that Defendant Smith initiated a child abuse
investigation against her, alleging that Feinberg was restraining A.F. in a zipped tent-
bed. (Id., ⁋ 114). She asserts that Smith appeared at various times at her home and
at her children’s schools and interviewed them without supervision or her consent,
causing them distress. (Id., ⁋⁋ 114-118; 177-82). Feinberg called Dauphin County
and Susquehanna Township Police to report that she was the victim of retaliation
and that her family was in danger, but she alleges that Defendant A.J. Young of the
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Susquehanna 	Township 	Police 	also 	threatened 	to 	charge 	her 	with 	child
endangerment. (Id., ⁋⁋ 121-22). She also reported the alleged retaliation to the
Baltimore Police Department and Defendant Kenneth Keller of the FBI, who she
alleges indicated he would make an official report. (Id., ⁋⁋ 123-25). Feinberg then
moved her family to Cumberland County and filed a petition in the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania for retaliation and abuse. (Id., ⁋⁋ 127-28).
On November 2, 2023, a Dauphin County judge issued a verbal order
approving the removal of Feinberg’s children from her home and, on November 3,
2023, CYS took custody of Feinberg’s children. (Id., ⁋⁋ 129-30). CYS’s petition was
dismissed as unfounded on November 16, 2023, by the Cumberland County Court
of Common Pleas and her children were returned to her the next day. (Id., ⁋ 132).
Broadly construed, Feinberg alleges that the child abuse investigation initiated
against her, which resulted in the removal of her children from her home for thirteen
days, was initiated because she contacted public officials regarding CYS’s failure to
respond to her and investigate the alleged abuse of the Smith children.
Feinberg also includes a number of other side plots in her narrative. For
example, she alleges that CYS caseworkers insisted she use their preferred adoption
services provider, Families United, despite her preference of using another provider,
because of a financial kickback and threatened to withhold funding if she did not
comply. (Doc. 1, ⁋⁋ 88-97).
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Feinberg is also suing the medical defendants Penn State Hershey Medical
Center and Doctor Kathryn Crowell, alleging that, when she took the Smith children
for a follow-up visit regarding the alleged child abuse, Crowell snatched the
documentation of the alleged abuse from her hand and was dismissive of their
injuries and that an unknown physician’s assistant blocked her from leaving when
she tried to leave one of the Smith children at the hospital to pick up her own
children. (Id., ⁋⁋ 155-67). Feinberg then left the three Smith children at Hershey
Medical Center and they were later placed back with their mother. (Id., ⁋⁋ 168-70).
Her allegations against the third medical defendant, Doctor Ryan Spotts, seemingly
amount only to his failure to intervene in the alleged ongoing retaliation campaign
against her, despite a duty to A.F. as his primary care provider. (Id., ⁋⁋ 278-79).
She also alleges that Officer Young of the Susquehanna Township police
department, repeatedly stalked, harassed, and threatened her, and even placed his
hands on her and made threats against her life. (Id., ⁋⁋ 122, 175-76, 199-201, 212-
15), that her attorney, Defendant Marc Scaringi, was part of the coordinated effort
against her and communicated with CYS about matters in the case, (Id., ⁋⁋ 189-92),
and various other discrete incidents against the myriad defendants which she alleges
demonstrate a calculated effort to retaliate against her.
The plaintiff first filed a complaint concerning these factual allegations,
naming many of the same defendants, on December 29, 2023. See Feinberg v. Smith,
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1:23-cv-02165. On March 18, 2025, the Court, Schwab, M.J., recommended her
complaint be dismissed in its entirety without leave to amend. Id. (Doc. 146).
Presented 	with 	this 	Report 	and 	Recommendation, 	Feinberg 	then 	voluntarily
dismissed her complaint on April 10, 2025. Id. (Docs. 150, 151).
However, having abandoned these claims on April 10, 2025, less than one
month later Feinberg filed the instant complaint, alleging the same essential series
of events against many of the same defendants, on May 2, 2025. (Doc. 1). 6 The
defendants responded to this latest effort by Feinberg to repackage the claims which
6 Her complaint names thirty-one defendants who have filed six different motions to
dismiss. For clarity purposes, we address the groups of defendants as they have filed
their motions to dismiss. The “Dauphin County Defendants,” include Dauphin
County, Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth, Dauphin County
CYS 	caseworkers 	Scott 	Smith, 	Marisa 	McClellan, 	Allison 	Vajdic, 	Amanda
Ozenbaugh, Lisa Wheeler, Shapree Random, Noelle Barrett, and Kim Deiber,
Director 	of 	Dauphin 	County 	CYS 	Randi 	Yeager, 	and 	Dauphin 	County
Commissioner George Hartwick. The “Medical Defendants” include Penn State
Milton Hershey Medical Center, Dr. Kathryn Crowell, and Dr. Ryan Spotts. The
“Susquehanna Township School District (STSD) Defendants” include Susquehanna
Township 	School 	District, 	Superintendent 	of 	Susquehanna 	Township 	School
District Tamara Willis, and Principal of Sara Lindemuth Elementary Andrea Martin.
The “Law Enforcement Defendants” include Susquehanna Township Chief of Police
Robert Martin, and Susquehanna Township Police Officers Lee Ann Tarasi and
Adam “A.J.” Young. The “Commonwealth Defendants” include Pennsylvania
Department of Human Services (PA DHS), Secretary of PA DHS Valerie Arkoosh,
Regional Director for Central Region of the Office of Children and Youth (OCYF)
Gabi Williams, and OCYF investigators Carrie Self and Sally Lupini. Feinberg’s
former attorney, Mark Scarigni, has filed his own separate motion to dismiss.
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she had previously abandoned by once again moving to dismiss this this redundant
complaint. (Docs. 35, 40, 41, 42, 45, 58).
Presented with these legal challenges to her latest complaint, Feinberg’s case
has now followed an increasingly familiar pattern—it has imploded. This implosion
had particularly bizarre aspects and began on November 19, 2025, when local
counsel for the plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw his appearance. (Doc. 74). The
motion was supported by an extraordinary and detailed factual recital including
averments that “Ms. Feinberg had procured [co-counsel’s] imprisonment for eight
days in a Florida jail,” and the revelation that local counsel recently “discovered that
Ms. Feinberg has made accusations that Governor Josh Shapiro had engaged in a
conspiracy to engineer the assassination attempt directed at then-former President
Trump in Butler, PA in July, 2024.” (Doc. 74, ¶¶ 21, 22). On November 20, 2025,
we granted this motion, finding that “it is difficult to imagine an event which would
more thoroughly undermine the trust relationship that must exist between attorneys
and a client than the imprisonment of a lawyer, allegedly instigated by the client.”
(Doc. 75).
At 1:52 a.m. on Sunday, November 23, 2025, a pro se submission was then
emailed by the plaintiff to our chambers email account. In this submission the
plaintiff identified herself as Hadassah Harris, and averred that she was now the
spouse of lead counsel in this case. Ms. Feinberg-Harris also confirmed that she had
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instituted legal proceedings against her attorney-husband, including an injunction
which forbids her spouse, and lead counsel, from communicating with her and her
family, a circumstance which seems to make lead counsel’s continued representation
of the plaintiffs in this case impossible. (Doc. 77).
Ms. Feinberg-Harris then sought appointment of counsel for the remaining
plaintiffs in this case. She made this request, however, at a time when, as discussed
in the attached addendum to this Report and Recommendation, the viability of these
legal claims was in grave doubt, and we were considering multiple motions to
dismiss this case. (Doc. 77). We denied this request without prejudice, finding that
appointment of counsel would be premature since we have not had the opportunity
to fully consider the threshold factor we must examine: the arguable merits of the
plaintiffs’ claims which are the subject of pending motions to dismiss. (Doc. 78).
At 8:44 p.m. on November 25, 2025, Feinberg-Harris emailed the court, all
counsel, and numerous third parties expressing the intention to voluntarily dismiss
this case in its entirety. We instructed Feinberg to file a motion confirming that she
had fired her estranged spouse as her counsel and requesting a voluntary dismissal
of this lawsuit. (Doc. 80). Feinberg complied with this request on November 26,
2025, by filing a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, (Doc. 81), and we
permitted all parties the opportunity to address her notice. (Doc. 83). Accordingly,
this case is now ripe for resolution.
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II. Discussion
A. Since No Answer or Summary Judgment Motion Has Been Filed in this
Case, Feinberg May File a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal. But Since “the
plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on
or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an
adjudication on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). Further, the
Court Still Retains Jurisdiction to Address Pending Sanctions Requests.
This is the second occasion on which Feinberg has filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal of the same essential claims pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which provides that: “the plaintiff may dismiss an action without
a court order by filing: (i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves
either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i):
“affixes a bright-line test to limit the right of dismissal to the early
stages of litigation,” Manze, 817 F.2d at 1065, which “simplifies the
court's task by telling it whether a suit has reached the point of no
return. If the defendant has served either an answer or a summary
judgment motion it has; if the defendant has served neither, it has not.”
Id. (quoting Winterland Concessions Co. v. Smith, 706 F.2d 793, 795
(7th Cir.1983)). Up to the “point of no return,” dismissal is automatic
and immediate—the right of a plaintiff is “unfettered,” Carter v.
United States, 547 F.2d 258, 259 (5th Cir.1977).
In re Bath & Kitchen Fixtures Antitrust Litig., 535 F.3d 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2008).
In the instant case, the procedural prerequisites for the filing of a Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice are satisfied since it appears from the docket that neither an
answer nor a summary judgment motion—the two events which curtail a plaintiff’s
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untrammeled right to voluntarily dismiss a frivolous claim—has been filed by any
defendant. Instead, the defendants have simply filed multiple motions to dismiss this
complaint. However, “[b]ecause a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is
neither an answer nor a motion for summary judgment, its filing generally does not
cut off a plaintiff's right to dismiss by notice.” Id. at 166. Therefore, Feinberg may
rely upon Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) to dismiss this case.
However, it is also clear that Rule 41(a) does not provide a license for
vexatious litigants to repeatedly file and then dismiss frivolous lawsuits. Quite the
contrary, Rule 41 specifically prohibits such legal gamesmanship stating that: “if the
plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or including
the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). This:
two-dismissal rule creates an exception: “[I]f the plaintiff previously
dismissed any federal -or state-court action based on or including the
same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the
merits.” Id. There are four requirements that must be met to trigger the
two-dismissal rule: (1) the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed an action in
either state or federal court, (2) thereafter the plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed a second action pending in 	federal 	court, (3) the two
dismissals concerned the same claim, and (4) the plaintiff seeks to raise
the twice-dismissed claim again in federal court. Id.; see Com. Space
Mgmt. Co. v. Boeing Co., 193 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“[W]hether the second voluntary dismissal is subject to the two
dismissal rule ... is an issue that becomes ripe (and can be determined)
only in a third action, if and when one is filed.”). The two-dismissal
rule was adopted to “limit a plaintiff's ability to dismiss an action” and
“curb abuses” of “liberal state and federal procedural rules [that] often
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allowed dismissals or nonsuits as a matter of right until the entry of the
verdict.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397, 110
S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990).
Rose Ct., LLC v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 119 F.4th 679, 685–86 (9th Cir.
2024). On this score:
Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has addressed what “the same
claim” means for purposes of the two-dismissal rule. Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1)(B). However, some . . . circuits have interpreted this phrase
and concluded that claims are the same for relevant purposes if they
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. See, e.g., Jian Yang Lin
v. Shanghai City Corp, 950 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2020) (analogizing the
two-dismissal rule to the doctrine of res judicata and holding that a
subsequent claim is the same if “it arises from the same transaction or
occurrence as the first action”); Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. #
1, 926 F.2d 959, 961 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the two-
dismissal rule was inapplicable where the first two dismissals involved
claims of discrimination occurring in 1979 and the present action
alleged 	discrimination 	occurring 	between 	1984 	and 	1986).
Id. at 686. Thus, a determination regarding whether the two-dismissal rule applies
typically entails examining the degree to which the two dismissed cases involve: an
overlap of defendants; a common nucleus of operative facts; and a commonality of
legal claims.
Judged by these legal guideposts, Feinberg’s second voluntary dismissal in
this case clearly triggers Rule 41’s two dismissal rule. Indeed, a review of the two
complaints which Feinberg has filed, and then abandoned, reveals that they share
identical plaintiffs and many common defendants. Further, both complaints purport
to arise out of the same common nucleus of operative facts. In addition, the two
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complaints advance virtually identical constitutional claims under the First, Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Moreover, while we need not ultimately reach the merits of her latest
complaint given Feinberg’s decision to abandon this case, the two complaints share
one other common quality which strongly favors invocation of the two dismissal
rule—they both appear to be legally frivolous. Indeed, Judge Schwab’s Report and
Recommendation in Feinberg v. Smith, 1:23-CV-2165 (Doc. 146), which found
Feinberg’s complaint to be deeply flawed, clearly served as the legal catalyst for the
abandonment of Feinberg’s first complaint, and the addendum to this Report and
Recommendation reveals that Feinberg’s current complaint still suffers from the
same profound legal defects.
Accordingly, with one exception, Rule 41’s two dismissal rule applies here
since “the plaintiff previously dismissed a[] federal- or state-court action based on
or including the same claim.” Therefore, this “notice of dismissal [should] operate[]
as an adjudication on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). That sole exception to
the two-dismissal rule relates to the claims that Feinberg purported to bring on behalf
of her children. It is well established that the plaintiff, acting pro se, may not
represent these children or compromise their legal claims. See Osei-Afriyie by Osei-
Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 878 (3d Cir. 1991). Therefore,
while the children’s claims may lack merit, their rights should not be restricted or
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denied by Feinberg’s conduct. Therefore, the children’s claims should be dismissed
without prejudice.
Finally, we note that there are also several pending motions which seek
imposition of sanctions against the plaintiff or her lead counsel, 7 along with requests
that the Court impose a narrowly tailored injunction requiring Feinberg to obtain
leave of court prior to filing any additional lawsuits. (Docs. 36, 58, 79, 84, 85). With
respect to these requests for collateral relief, it is clear that Feinberg and her lead
counsel cannot avoid the potential legal consequences of their actions through the
simple expedient of filing a voluntary dismissal of this case. Quite the contrary, the
Court plainly retains the ability to address post-judgment sanctions litigation even
after there has been a voluntary dismissal of a lawsuit.
This authority stems from several sources. At the outset, Rule 41 expressly
permits imposition of sanctions, and provides that:
(d) Costs of a Previously Dismissed Action. 	If a plaintiff who
previously dismissed an action in any court files an action based on or
including the same claim against the same defendant, the court:
(1) may order the plaintiff to pay all or part of the costs of that previous
action.
7 While the defendants may clarify any misunderstanding on our part, we do not
construe these sanctions requests as implicating local counsel, whose ethically sound
decision to withdraw from this case seems to have been the event which triggered
the implosion of this litigation.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(d).
Further, 	it 	is 	well-settled 	that, 	after 	a 	voluntary 	dismissal 	under 	Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(i), a court may still impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11. Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Cooter
& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395-96, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359
(1990)). Therefore, “[e]ven though the Rule 41(a)(1)(A) dismissal has the effect of
making it as if the action never existed, this Court has the authority and jurisdiction
to enter contempt or Rule 11 sanctions or attorneys' fees despite the Rule 41(a)(1)(A)
dismissal.” ecoNugenics, Inc. v. Bioenergy Life Sci., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 3d 1082,
1089 (D. Minn. 2019), aff'd, No. 19-CV-351 (JNE/DTS), 2019 WL 10982132 (D.
Minn. June 21, 2019).
Likewise:
[W]e have an affirmative responsibility to ensure that the courts do not
become encumbered with repeated, random, meritless matters filed
litigants who are unable or unwilling to comply with the requirements
prescribed by the law. In such instances, provided that the litigant is
given prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, it is well settled that
the court possesses the inherent authority to limit a frivolous filer's
opportunities to burden the legal system with meritless filings, by
requiring a frivolous filer to obtain the prior approval of the court before
lodging any new complaints relating to the same subject matter of past
frivolous litigation. See e.g., Chipps v. U.S.D.C. for the M.D. of Pa.,
882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989); Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81
(3d Cir. 1987); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1982).
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Walsh v. U.S. House of Representatives, No. 3:17-CV-486, 2017 WL 9532989, at
*3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:17-
0486, 2017 WL 2544834 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2017).
Since this Court is permitted, and often obliged, to consider post-judgment
sanctions litigation following the voluntary dismissal of a meritless lawsuit, should
the district court dismiss this case, we recommend that these sanctions issues be
referred to the undersigned for further litigation.
III. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:
First, Feinberg should be GRANTED leave to voluntarily dismiss this case.
Second, except for the claims of the Feinberg children, which should be
dismissed without prejudice, since “the plaintiff previously dismissed a[] federal- or
state-court action based on or including the same claim,” this “notice of dismissal
[should] operate[] as an adjudication on the merits” of all her individual claims. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B).
Third, the defendants’ motions to dismiss, (Docs. 35, 40, 41, 42, 45, 58),
should be deemed moot.
Fourth, upon the dismissal of this case, the defendants’ motions and requests
for sanctions, (Docs. 36, 58, 79, 84, 85), should be referred to the undersigned for
resolution.
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The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing
requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or 	recommendations 	made 	by 	the 	magistrate 	judge. 	The 	judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or
where required by law, and may consider the record developed before
the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis
of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses 	or 	recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Submitted this 9 th day of December 2025.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
HADASSAH FEINBERG, et al., 	: 	CIV. NO. 1:25-CV-768
:
Plaintiffs, 	: 	(Judge Saporito)
:
v. 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
DAUPHIN COUNTY CHILDREN 	:
AND YOUTH, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
ADDENDUM TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This addendum addresses the parallels between the legal claims advanced by
the plaintiff in this case and in Feinberg v. Smith, 1:23-CV-2165 (Doc. 146), noting
that, as Judge Schwab found in Feinberg v. Smith, supra, the instant complaint is
legally flawed in at least the following six ways.
II. 	Discussion
1. Rule 4 Calls for the Dismissal of Defendants Kenneth Keller, Paige
Kulsa, and Marcie Smith.
At the outset, upon review of the docket in this case, it appears three of the
defendants, Kenneth Keller, Paige Kulsa, and Marcie Smith, have not responded to
the plaintiff’s complaint, nor is there evidence that the complaint was properly
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served upon these defendants in the form of a return or waiver of service. Rule 4 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribes the method by which service can be
made and describes how a party must demonstrate proof of service on the record.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)-(l). Rule 4 also sets time limits for service and prescribes
the sanction of dismissal for the failure to make proper and timely service, stating as
follows:
(m) Time Limit for Service. If a defendant is not served within 90
days after the complaint is filed, the court--on motion or on its own
after notice to the plaintiff--must dismiss the action without prejudice
against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified
time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court
must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
The language of Rule 4(m) is both clear and mandatory. Where there is an
unjustified and unexcused failure to timely serve a complaint, the court “must
dismiss the action.” As a general rule, “the party asserting the validity of service
bears the burden of proof on that issue.” Grand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. Star
Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 4A Charles A. Wright
and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1083 (1987)). When the
plaintiff fails to carry this burden of proof on the issue of proper and timely service,
consistent with Rule 4(m)’s mandate that the “court—on motion or on its own after
notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action,” dismissal of the case is entirely
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appropriate. Indeed, when a plaintiff does not show good cause for a failure to serve,
Beckerman v. Susquehanna Township Police, 254 F. App’x 149, 154 (3d Cir. 2007),
or fails to make service, despite warnings and requests by the court to address service
issues, Foster v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n, 157 F. App’x 488, 490
(3d Cir. 2005), the courts have frequently dismissed actions for failure to make
service.
These principles control here and would ordinarily call for dismissal of this
action with respect to Defendants Keller, Kulsa, and Smith for failure to make timely
and proper service. In this case, the plaintiff has provided no proof of proper service
on these defendants nearly seven months after this action commenced. Moreover,
during the intervening months Feinberg has not sought a further extension of time
in which to make service on Defendants Keller, Kulsa, and Smith. Given this
cascading array of failures, dismissal is appropriate here. Beckerman, 254 F. App’x
at 154 (affirming dismissal for failure to serve two days after service deadline
elapsed where no good cause shown). 8
8 In our view, Feinberg’s claims against these defendants—which mirror those
lodged against the other defendants—also fail on their merits for multiple reasons.
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2. Dauphin County, Dauphin County Children and Youth Services,
and the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services Are Immune
From These Claims.
The plaintiff advances claims against several government municipalities and
agencies, Dauphin County, Dauphin County Children and Youth Services, the
Pennsylvania Department of Human Services. These claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides that, “[t]he
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const.,
amend. XI. Although the text of the Amendment seems only to restrict the Article
III diversity jurisdiction of federal courts, the United States Supreme Court has
explained that it has “understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for
what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.” Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ). What that “presupposition” means is two-fold:
“first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that [i]t
is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amendable to the suit of an
individual without its consent.” Id. (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13
(1890)) (internal quotations omitted).
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Pennsylvania has not consented to be sued in federal court. See 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 8521(b) (“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to
waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed
by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”); see also 1
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2310 (under Pennsylvania law, the Commonwealth enjoys
sovereign immunity unless the General Assembly “specifically waives sovereign
immunity.”); Pa. Const. art. I, § 11 (providing that the Commonwealth may be sued
only “in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by
law direct.”). Although the Commonwealth has expressly waived its sovereign
immunity from suit in state court in nine specific areas, it has not waived its
immunity from being sued in federal court for any reason. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 8521(b); Chittister v. Dep't of Community and Economic Development, 226
F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that the Commonwealth “has waived immunity
only for certain specified tort claims in suits for damages in state court,” while at the
same time has emphasized that nothing in the waiver statute shall be construed to
waive immunity from suit in Federal courts). Accordingly, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals has long made clear that Pennsylvania has not consented to be sued in
federal court. See id.; Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 141 F.3d
88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998); Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981).
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In this case, Dauphin County, through its agency Dauphin County CYS, is an
arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
has held that “Pennsylvania's domestic relations agencies, such as Children and
Youth Services, are defined by statute as arms of the state courts and institutions of
state government,” and thus subject to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Wattie-Bey v. Attorney General's Office, 424 F. App'x 95, 98 and n.2 (3d Cir. 2011);
see also Walters v. Washington County, No. 06-1355, 2009 WL 7936639 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 22, 2009); Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestic Relations Section, No.
09-266, 2009 WL 3052411 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2009). Moreover, as a state agency,
the DHS is also subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Buckner v. Child. in
Youth Servs., No. CV 3:24-1094, 2025 WL 565831, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2025).
3. Defendants Milton Hershey Medical Center, Kathryn Crowell,
Ryan Spotts, and Marcie Smith, and Mark Scarigni Are Not
Proper Parties Under § 1983.
In addition, Feinberg attempts to sue a number of private entities, including
the medical defendants, her former attorney, and the mother of the Smith children,
Marcie Smith, under a federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, as to
these putative defendants, Feinberg’s complaint fails as a matter of law because the
plaintiff has fundamentally misunderstood the reach of this civil rights statute.
Simply put, Feinberg may not bring claims against private entities as civil rights
violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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In this regard, it is well established that § 1983 does not by its own force create
new and independent legal rights to damages in civil rights actions. Rather, § 1983
simply serves as a vehicle for private parties to bring civil actions to vindicate
violations of separate, and pre-existing, legal rights otherwise guaranteed under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989). Therefore, any analysis of
the legal sufficiency of a cause of action under § 1983 must begin with an assessment
of the validity of the underlying constitutional and statutory claims advanced by the
plaintiff.
On this score, it is also well settled that:
Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federally protected
rights caused by persons acting under color of state law. The two
essential elements of a § 1983 action are: (1) whether the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state
law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of a federally
protected right. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68
L.Ed.2d 420 (1981).
Boykin v. Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, 893 F.Supp. 409, 416 (M.D. Pa.
1995), aff'd, 91 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
Thus, it is essential to any civil rights claim brought under § 1983 that the
plaintiff allege and prove that the defendant was acting under color of law when that
defendant allegedly violated the plaintiff's rights.
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To the extent that a complaint seeks to hold private parties liable for alleged
civil rights violations, it fails to state a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
since the statute typically requires a showing that the defendants are state actors.
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50, (1999). In this regard, it
has been held that private individuals, hospitals, medical professionals, and attorneys
are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.9 See Cassell v. City of Philadelphia, 350
F. App'x 611, 613–14 (3d Cir. 2009); Carver v. Plyer, 115 F. App'x 532, 537 (3d
Cir. 2004).
This basic principle applies here and ordinarily would compel dismissal of
Feinberg’s § 1983 claims against the private entities named in this complaint since
their actions are simply beyond the reach of this particular federal civil rights statute.
4. The Child Welfare and Law Enforcement Defendants Are Entitled
To Immunity.
9 Moreover, any claim the plaintiff may have that the non-state actors joint
participation in the alleged constitutional violations converts them into state actors
for the purposes of this action, she simply has not alleged with sufficient particularity
any 	facts 	which 	demonstrate 	the 	medical 	professionals, 	attorney, 	or 	private
individual in this case had any contact with any CYS official with regard to her
complaints. On the contrary, as to these defendants, the plaintiff alleges only her
belief that they were in contact with CYS about her case, conclusory allegations
which are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. See also,
McCain v. Episcopal Hosp., 350 F. App'x 602, 605 (3d Cir. 2009) (Other than [the
plaintiff’s] bare assertion, there is nothing in the complaint to suggest that either
defendant was acting under color of state law).
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Moreover, to the extent that Feinberg wishes to hold individual CYS, OCYF,
and law enforcement officials liable for their part in the emergency removal of her
children from her custody, these officials are entitled to broad immunity in such
proceedings. At the outset, with regard to the child welfare defendants from Dauphin
County CYS and Pennsylvania OCYF, federal and Pennsylvania state law provide
broad protection and immunities to child welfare workers, particularly in child abuse
investigations and dependency proceedings. In fact, the Third Circuit has joined a
cascade of other circuits in holding that the duties performed by child welfare
workers in dependency proceedings are so closely analogous to those performed by
prosecutors that they too are entitled to absolute immunity from liability. As the
Third Circuit explained:
CYS defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions on
behalf 	of 	the 	state 	in 	preparing 	for, 	initiating, 	and 	prosecuting
dependency proceedings. Their immunity is broad enough to include
the formulation and presentation of recommendations to the court in the
course of such proceedings. We reach this conclusion because (1) the
functions performed by the CYS defendants in dependency proceedings
are closely analogous to the functions performed by prosecutors in
criminal 	proceedings; 	(2) 	the 	public 	policy 	considerations 	that
countenance immunity for prosecutors are applicable to child welfare
workers performing these functions; and (3) dependency proceedings
incorporate 	important 	safeguards 	that 	protect 	citizens 	from
unconstitutional actions by child welfare workers.
Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 495 (3d Cir. 1997)
(citing Milspaugh v. County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Wabash County, 937 F.2d
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1172, 1176 (7 th Cir. 1991); Vosburg v. Department of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 135
(4 th Cir. 1989); Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F. 2d 374, 378 (6 th Cir. 1989); Meyers v. Contra
Costa County Dept’ of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9 th Cir. 1987)). This broad
immunity applies equally to officials from Pennsylvania OCYF. See Peterson v.
Allegheny County, No. 2:21-CV-00078-CCW, 2022 WL 280948, at * 16 (W.D. Pa.
Jan 31, 2022) (citing B.S. v. Somerset Cnty., 704 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2013)).
Further, although the Third Circuit has applied absolute immunity to child
welfare workers only so far as their involvement in dependency proceedings, state
actors in their official capacity are also entitled to qualified immunity in certain
circumstances. Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields these individual
defendants to the extent Feinberg argues the allegedly unconstitutional acts of the
individual CYS and OCYF defendants were committed outside the confines of their
dependency proceedings duties and tries to hold the individual law enforcement
defendants liable for their part in the custody determination.
On this score, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields governmental
officials from civil liability so long as their conduct “does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015). The qualified immunity
inquiry has two parts. The first asks whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts
to “make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
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223, 232 (2009). The second question is “whether the right at issue was clearly
established at the time of [the] defendant's alleged misconduct.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). A court may “exercise [its] sound discretion in deciding
which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis” to address first “in light
of the circumstances of the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129
S.Ct. 808.
Here, the plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to make out a violation of
any constitutional right. In fact, Feinberg’s claims that the defendants violated her
constitutional rights are belied by the official state court records confirming that a
verbal order for emergency protective custody authorized the removal of her
children from her home. (Doc. 35-1). The written confirmation of the verbal order
confirms that the court concluded that for the children “to remain in the home of the
mother would be contrary to [their] welfare, health and safety and best interests.”
(Id.) On this factual finding, the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas issued a
verbal order on November 2nd, 2023, granting an order of protective custody and
authorizing CYS and/or any duly authorized law enforcement officer to take the
children into custody. (Id.)
Given this factual backdrop, in Fourth Amendment cases involving the
removal of a child from a parent’s custody, courts in this circuit have “analogized
the situation of a childcare worker who seeks, obtains and executes a temporary
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custody order to a police officer seeking, obtaining and executing an arrest warrant.”
Studli v. Child. & Youth And Fams. Cent. Reg'l Off., 346 F. App'x 804, 809–10 (3d
Cir. 2009) (quoting Callahan v. Lancaster–Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13, 880
F.Supp. 319, 334 (E.D.Pa.1994)) (internal quotations removed). Thus, the Third
Circuit has confirmed:
“[It] is well-settled that probable cause to arrest generally exists when
a police officer makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant that meets the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” The only exception is where
“the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence unreasonable.” It is only when this
exception applies that the “shield of immunity” would be lifted.
Id. (quoting Callahan, 880 F.Supp. at 334). Here, the written confirmation of the
verbal order indicates the CYS officials were acting on a verbal order of the court.
Thus, absent any claims of fraud or false statements on the part of those seeking the
protective order, which the plaintiff does not allege, CYS cannot be liable for
conduct ordered by the court. See Studli, 346 F. App'x at 810.
Her First Amendment retaliation claims falter of the same legal obstacle.
Broadly 	construed, 	Feinberg 	alleges 	that 	the 	defendants 	violated 	her 	First
Amendment rights by retaliating against her for attempting to report CYS to public
officials for their failure to intervene in the alleged abuse of the Smith children. But,
as the Supreme Court has confirmed, absent a showing on behalf of the plaintiff that
no probable cause existed, a retaliation claim necessarily fails. Nieves v. Bartlett,
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587 U.S. 391, 404, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1725, 204 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2019). Thus, since the
defendants were acting on a verbal order from the court, which was later confirmed
by a written order and adjudicated by the court, Feinberg’s constitutional claims fail,
and the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.10
5. The 	Plaintiff 	Has 	Not 	Alleged 	a 	Conspiracy 	with 	Sufficient
Particularity to State a Claim.
Finally, Feinberg’s federal claims against all defendants11 hinge upon her
allegations that each of the thirty-one defendants named in this case engaged in a
conspiracy to retaliate against her for reporting child abuse in violation of her First
Amendment rights. But, while we do not doubt the plaintiff’s belief that these
separate and widespread entities including local government officials, healthcare
workers, and even her own personal attorney were working in concert to violate her
10 The court order and accompanying process afforded to the plaintiff also defeats
any underlying substantive due process claim, since, in cases involving the violation
of the familial right to privacy, courts again focus on a similar standard to probable
cause. Thus, “[o]ur focus . . . is whether the information available to the defendants
at the time would have created an objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse
justifying the degree of interference with the [plaintiff’s] rights as [a] parent.” Croft
v. Westmoreland Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997).
Based on the petition presented by CYS, the court concluded that removal of the
children was in the best interest of the children. This is enough to satisfy the
reasonable suspicion benchmark, especially when coupled with the fact that
Feinberg did receive the procedures due to her in the child abuse investigation.
11 The plaintiff seemingly only alleges wrongdoing on the STSD defendants as
parties to this ongoing conspiracy. Since these claims fail, these parties should be
dismissed.
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rights, she has not stated any tangible facts which tie these defendants together.
Instead, her complaint alleges only conclusory statements supporting her own beliefs
with regard the alleged conspiracy. This falls far short of the standard to plead a civil
conspiracy claim.
On this score, “[t]o prevail on a § 1983 conspiracy claim, Plaintiff must allege
that Defendants, acting under color of state law, conspired to deprive her of a
federally protected right. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must allege both an
underlying civil rights violation and a conspiracy involving state action.” Sershen v.
Cholish, 2007 WL 3146357, at *16, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79627, at *49-50 (M.D.
Pa. 2007) (citing Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 254
(3d. Cir. 1999)).
In addition:
[T]o maintain a civil conspiracy claim, “[b]are conclusory allegations
of ‘conspiracy’ or ‘concerted action’ will not suffice to allege a
conspiracy. The plaintiff must expressly allege an agreement or make
averments of communication, consultation, cooperation, or command
from which such an agreement can be inferred.” Flanagan v. Shively,
783 F. Supp. 922, 928 (M.D. Pa. 1992). The plaintiff's allegations “must
be supported by facts bearing out the existence of the conspiracy and
indicating its broad objectives and the role each Defendant allegedly
played in carrying out those objectives.” Id. A plaintiff cannot rely on
subjective suspicions and unsupported speculation. Young v. Kann,
926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991). Moreover, “to successfully
counter a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must provide
specific 	evidence 	establishing 	that 	defendants 	agreed 	among
themselves to act against him either unlawfully or for an unlawful
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purpose.” Payne v. Gordon, 3:17-cv-1230, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
129427, 2018 WL 3649026, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2018).
Abreu v. Ferguson, 2020 WL 1271637, at *8, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45714, at *21-
22 (M.D. Pa. 2020). Thus, the standards to maintain a conspiracy claim under state
or federal law are exacting.
Feinberg simply has not met these exacting standards required to set forth a
successful civil conspiracy claim. At the outset her constitutional claims appear to
be without merit and more fundamentally:
[T]o 	the 	extent 	Plaintiffs’ 	conspiracy 	claims 	are 	premised 	on
coordination between certain groups of Defendants—i.e., OCYF, AFA,
and TRAC—to present biased or prejudicial recommendations to the
Family Court in the course of the dependency proceeding, such claims
fail because the alleged deprivations (e.g., interference in the family
unit) were ultimately the result of orders issued by the Family Court, and
Plaintiffs do not anywhere claim that the Family Court participated in
any alleged conspiracy against them. See Khalil, 594 F. App'x at 90–91.
Peterson v. Allegheny Cnty., No. 2:21-CV-00078-CCW, 2022 WL 280948, at *15
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2022) (citing Khalil v. New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. &
Permanency, 594 F. App’x 88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 2015)). Indeed, Feinberg’s broad
conclusory allegations that the thirty-one defendants spanning different agencies and
industries conspired in the removal of her children from her custody, removal which
was ordered by the state court which she has not alleged was involved in the
conspiracy, simply fall short of the exacting standards which govern conspiracy
claims.
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6. This Court Should Decline Jurisdiction Over Any Remaining State
Law Tort Claims.
Finally, the plaintiff has also pursued a number of pendant state law tort
claims against the defendants. However, in a case such as this, where the jurisdiction
of the federal court was premised on an alleged federal claim which fails as a matter
of 	law, 	the 	proper 	course 	generally 	is 	for 	the 	court 	to 	decline 	to 	exercise
supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	plaintiff’s 	state 	law 	claims. 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim under subsection (a) if-... the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) (holding that when federal causes of
action are dismissed, federal courts should not separately entertain pendent state
claims).
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