1:25-cv-00202•Khalid v. Ali
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Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti0- Filed 01/15/26 Page 1 of 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA IRAM KHALID, : No. 1:25-CV-202 Plaintiff : (Neary, J.) v. : (Caraballo, M.J.) DAWAR ALT, : Defendant REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION The undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff Iram Khalid’s complaint. Doc. 1. The gravamen of that pleading instrument rests on abuses presumably committed by Defendant Dawar Ali’s family. Id. at 2-5. As the complaint is based on domestic conflict issues involving Khalid’s spouse! and in-laws, it neither establishes federal jurisdiction nor otherwise presents cognizable federal claims. As Khalid has not availed herself of the opportunity to cure those deficiencies, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice for futility. 1 Though the complaint fails to specify the relationship between the parties, the undersigned construes the pleading as alleging that Ali is Khalid’s husband. See Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 914 (3d Cir. 2022) (pro se complaints are construed liberally); see also Doc. 1-1 at 1 (stating that the first name of Khalid’s spouse is “Dawar’). Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti0- Filed 01/15/26 Page 2 of 12 IL. Background On February 3, 2025, Khalid, proceeding pro se, commenced this action against Ali. Doc. 1. The complaint presents a narrative listing Khalid’s grievances involving mostly unidentified entities (repeatedly referred to as “they,” presumably “husbands relatives”), including: “taking money on [Khalid’s] name”; “using [her] social security” and other personal information; “keep[ing] busy [her] in kitchen and home cleaning stuff’; preventing her from “tak[ing] care of [her] kids” and driving; threatening to “buried [her] in this house” and “harm [her] family in Pakistan”; “punish[ing] [her] daughter and tell[ing] her I will through [the daughter] in the creek backside of our house”; and “demanding money ... from [her] and [her] parents” and “shout[ing] on [her] and [her] kids and beat [them]” if Khalid or her family refuses. Id. at 2-5. Khalid also states that her situation involves fraud, and that she reported her circumstances to the police. Id. at 3-4. Khalid simultaneously applied for and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, with the complaint’s service held in abeyance pending the Court’s screening obligations. Docs. 2; 4; see Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti0- Filed 01/15/26 Page 3 of 12 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring sua sponte dismissal when an action “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted... .”). On July 15, 2025, the undersigned, after a preliminary review of the complaint, issued a screening order. Doc. 5. There, the undersigned explained that the complaint: (1) does not appear to establish federal jurisdiction, as federal courts lack jurisdiction over domestic violence matters; (2) falls short of the plausibility standard established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as Khalid fails to identify the laws under which she brings this action and merely presents her grievances without legal authorities or supporting allegations; and (8) fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b), which requires that a pleading be presented in numbered paragraphs. Id. The undersigned, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), afforded Khalid 21 days to file an amended complaint, or to file a notice of her intent to stand on the initial complaint. Jd. at 3-4. Khalid has done neither to date. The undersigned construes Khalid’s inaction as her intent to stand on the initial complaint, and accordingly proceeds with screening that instrument. Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 4 of 12 II. Discussion The undersigned recommends that the complaint be dismissed for two reasons: (1) the lack of federal jurisdiction over this action; and (2) Khalid’s failure to meet the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard. The undersigned also recommends that the dismissal be with prejudice for futility. A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction The complaint, which appears to rely on allegations concerning domestic abuse and fraud committed by Ali’s family, fails to establish federal jurisdiction over this action, and thus warrants dismissal. Article ITI of the Constitution of the United States confines federal jurisdiction to certain “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Thus, federal courts have “limited jurisdiction,” wielding “only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). That is, “subject matter jurisdiction is non-waivable.” Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 77 (8d Cir. 2008) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977). Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 5 of 12 “lT]he court can raise sua sponte subject| |matter jurisdiction concerns,” id., because “courts have an independent obligation to satisfy themselves of jurisdiction if it is in doubt.” Jd. at 76-77 (citing Healthy City, 429 U.S. at 278). In addressing subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the Court “must take care not to reach the merits of acase....” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 348 (8d Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted) (quoting CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 144 (8d Cir. 2008)). A dismissal is mandatory “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject| ]matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(8). Here, neither of Khalid’s premises establish federal jurisdiction over this action. Regarding domestic matters, it is axiomatic that “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (quotation omitted) (quoting In re Burrus, 186 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)). Thus, a county court is a more appropriate forum to entertain Khalid’s domestic disputes. See id. Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 6 of 12 As for potential fraud and identity theft crimes, Khalid, a private individual, lacks the authority to enforce a federal criminal statute—in a civil action, no less. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986) (collecting cases establishing that civil parties cannot “compel the State to enforce [a criminal statute] ... because a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” (quotation omitted)). Moreover, Khalid has reportedly brought these matters to the attention of law enforcement officials. Doc. 1 at 3 (“I go to the police station because they are taking money on my name on (May or June) that was time I was in Pakistan.”). Thus, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction alone warrants this action’s dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(8); Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703; Diamond, 476 U.S. at 64. B. Failure to Meet Plausibility Standard In addition to its jurisdictional defects, the complaint fails to state a federal cognizable claim from both legal and factual perspectives. This pleading failure constitutes another reason for dismissal. The Court has a statutory duty to conduct a preliminary review of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Among the statutory Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 7 of 12 erounds for an action’s dismissal is its “fail[ure] to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” Jd. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(Gii). That language mirrors the provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permit dismissal of a complaint on motion of a party, and thus is subject to a similar analysis. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (8d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (8d Cir. 2000)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (8d Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”). The Court of Appeals employs a three-step inquiry when determining a complaint’s sufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6). Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (8d Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Lutz v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 49 F.4th 328, 328 (8d Cir. 2022); Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787. First, the reviewing court “tak[es] note of the Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 8 of 12 elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787 (second alteration in original) (quotation omitted) (quoting [gbal, 556 U.S. at 675). The second phase is to “identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Jd. (first quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; and then citing Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.8d 212, 224 (8d Cir. 2011)). Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Jd. (alterations in original) (quotation omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This last step is done “in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 434 (8d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228, 230 (8d Cir. 2008)). “If, after completing this process, the complaint alleges ‘enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements of a claim, then it plausibly pleads a claim.” Lutz, 49 F.4th at 328 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2009)). Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti0- Filed 01/15/26 Page 9 of 12 Here, Khalid’s complaint does not pass muster under that Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. The pleading instrument details Khalid’s grievances without discernible legal theories or plausible allegations, leaving the Court unable to determine whether she asserts cognizable federal claims against Ali. See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786. At no point in the complaint does Khalid reference what laws serve as the bases for her complaint. Relatedly, though Khalid alleges, somewhat vaguely, that her “husbands relatives” have verbally abused her, she fails to explain her relationships to those third-party relatives, the operative time periods, and the precise nature of their actions that led her to seek federal aid. Absent that factual content, Khalid does not meet the mandates of Rule 12. See Duran v. Welfare Reform Act Cong., 2016 WL 1135517, at *1 (D.N.J. 2016) (discussing Rule 8(a) requirement and “who, what, when, where|,] and how’ of the events at issue” (citation omitted)). While “[c]omplaints filed by pro se litigants, . . . are liberally construed,” such pleadings “must still ‘allege sufficient facts ... to support a claim.” Rivera, 37 F.4th at 914 (first citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); and then quoting Mala v. Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 10 of 12 Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (8d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted)). That is, mere “[c]onclusory allegations of liability are insufficient.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (8d Cir. 2019) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); see also Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 499 n.1 (8d Cir. 1997) “Although a complaint’s allegations are to be construed favorably to the pleader, . . . [the Court] will not read causes of action into a complaint ... .” (citation omitted)). Therefore, as the complaint stands now, this action cannot proceed beyond the screening review stage. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The undersigned thus must recommend that this action be dismissed. See Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6); Rivera, 37 F.4th at 914; Garrett, 938 F.3d at 92: Duran, 2016 WL 1135517, at *1. C. No Further Amendment Should Be Granted Finally, the undersigned recommends that Khalid’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice, as providing any further leave to amend would be futile. By the Order of July 15, 2025, the undersigned prophylactically afforded Khalid leave to amend and remedy the same, specifically delineated deficiencies in her complaint summarized here. Khalid did not avail herself of that opportunity. 10 Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 11 of 12 Thus, Khalid has “provided no basis for the district court to proceed with hfer] case[,]” and “then failed to comply with an explicit order to ... fil[e] an amended complaint,” even though she was afforded that opportunity, pursuant to Rule 15. See Azubuko v. Bell Natl Org., 243 F. App’x 728, 729 (8d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). “When a litigant’s conduct makes adjudication of the case impossible,” “[a] district court has the authority to dismiss a suit” with prejudice and without the analysis set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (8d Cir. 1984). Azuwbuko, 243 F. App’x at 729 (citations omitted). As Khalid failed to file an amended pleading that corrected any of the critical flaws in her complaint identified by the undersigned, offering her future leave to amend would be futile. The undersigned thus concludes that dismissal with prejudice is warranted. See id. III. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that: 1. The complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and 2. The Clerk’s Office be DIRECTED to TERMINATE Dawar Ali as the defendant and CLOSE this case. 11 Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 12 of 12 Khalid is also placed on notice that, pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 686 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. M.D. Pa. L. R. 72.8. Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (8d Cir. 2007). Date: January 15, 2026 s/ Phillip J. Caraballo Phillip J. Caraballo United States Magistrate Judge 12
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