Brown v. PA Department of Corrections et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KAMIL T. BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAISON,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-cv-00445
(SAPORITO, J.)
ORDER
Kamil T. Brown, formerly incarcerated at SCI-Camp Hill, proceeds
on retaliation and excessive force claims against Samuel Caison, a
correctional 	officer 	at 	the 	prison. 	Caison 	has 	moved 	for 	summary
judgment (Doc. 24), and Brown has not responded despite multiple
extensions of the deadline to do so. Because Brown has not properly
exhausted administrative remedies as to his claims for money damages,
and the record forecloses any reasonable inference that Caison violated
his constitutional rights, the Court grants summary judgment to Caison.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The 	Court 	received 	Brown’s 	verified 	complaint 	against 	four
defendants affiliated with SCI-Camp Hill on May 7, 2024. (Doc. 1). As
relevant here, the complaint alleges that Caison engaged in a campaign
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of 	abuse 	and 	harassment 	against 	Brown 	in 	retaliation 	for 	Brown
submitting prison grievances and other complaints against Caison. The
complaint 	requests 	“pun[i]tive 	and 	compensatory 	damages 	to 	be
determined by a jury,” and no other relief.
See (Doc. 1 at 5). Following a
motion to dismiss, Brown was permitted to proceed on two claims against
Caison: an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim based on a June 14,
2022, incident in which Caison allegedly “grabb[ed Brown] around the
neck,” 	and a First 	Amendment retaliation 	claim based on Caison’s
purportedly illegitimate search of Brown’s cell on September 30, 2022.
See (Doc. 12).
Caison moved for summary judgment on July 11, 2025, and his brief
in support was filed on September 23, 2025. Brown failed to respond to
the motion within the time allotted, and the Court issued two orders
extending the deadline and warning that the motion would be deemed
unopposed if Brown did not respond. (Docs. 33, 35). The Court then
granted a final, limited extension to February 19, 2026, after Brown filed
a motion claiming he was unable to meet the last deadline due to
unspecified 	“personal 	reasons.”
	See 	(Docs. 	36, 	37). 	Brown 	has 	not
responded to the motion, and the time to do so has passed.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a
reasonable 	jury 	could 	return 	a 	verdict 	for 	the 	non-moving 	party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all
inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the
movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.”
Pastore v. Bell
Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking
summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence
of a genuine dispute of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant
must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that
“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
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the jury.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first
determine if the moving party has made a
prima facie showing that it is
entitled to summary judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the
burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477
U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the
record, 	including 	depositions, 	documents, 	electronically 	stored
information, 	affidavits 	or 	declarations, 	stipulations 	(including 	those
made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
Because Brown has not responded to the motion, Caison’s properly
supported statements of fact are deemed unopposed.
See M.D. Pa. L.R.
56-1. Regardless, the Court must review the record to establish “that the
facts specified in or in connection with the motion entitle the moving
party to judgment as a matter of law.”
Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands
Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990).
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III. 	MATERIAL FACTS
The summary judgment record describes three incidents at SCI-
Camp Hill involving Brown and Caison, and documents the prison
grievances 	Brown 	pursued 	after 	each 	incident. 	The 	Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) provides a three-part procedure for
grievances: initial review by a Grievance Officer, appeal to the Facility
Manager, and final appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances
and Appeals (“SOIGA”). To begin the grievance process, the prisoner
must 	provide 	a 	factual 	summary of 	the 	claim 	and state 	the 	relief
requested.
See DC-ADM 804 (“Inmate Grievance System”), § 1.A.1 As
relevant here, “[i]f the inmate desires compensation or other legal relief
normally available from a court, the inmate must request the specific
relief sought in his/her initial grievance.”
Id., § 1.A.11.d.
In the first incident, on June 14, 2022, Caison issued a misconduct
report against Brown for “Presence in [an] Unauthorized Area.” In brief,
the report alleged that Caison witnessed Brown on the “B side” of the
1 Although not included among the summary judgment papers, the
Court takes judicial notice of the current version of DC-ADM 804, a
publicly available policy that has been in effect since May 1, 2015.
See,
e.g.,
Williamson v. Rivello, No. 1:23-CV-1781, 2026 WL 286179, at *2 n.2
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2026).
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prison, in an area where he was not permitted. Caison repeatedly ordered
Brown to return to the “A side” where he was housed. Brown “became
irate” before ultimately complying “at his leisure.” During this dispute,
Brown 	threatened 	to 	file 	a 	falsified 	grievance 	against 	Caison. 	The
misconduct report was referred to “informal resolution,” meaning that
Brown suffered no loss of privileges.
See (Doc. 31-1).
On the same date, Brown filed a grievance that told his own version
of this incident, in which he accused Caison of “grabb[ing Brown] by [the]
neck,” drafting a falsified report, and using “[intimidation] tactics to
silence [Brown] from writing this grievance.” The grievance did not
clearly state the relief requested, but Brown wrote that he “would like to
press charge[s]” against Caison.
See (Doc. 31-3 at 5).
Six days later, on June 20, Brown attended a sick call in which he
told a physician assistant that he “had an altercation on 6/14/22 and
desires something for neck stiffness and pain.” He did not otherwise
describe the injury and had no apparent limitation to his range of motion,
but “want[ed] it documented that he has neck pain.” The provider
initially 	recommended 	Motrin, 	but 	it 	is 	unclear 	if 	this 	was 	ever
prescribed, because he was already taking Naproxen for an unrelated
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issue.
See (Doc. 31-4). On June 23, Brown had a “mental health contact”
in which he told a provider that he had “a verbal altercation with a Sgt.
and [was] worried about how that [would] play out.”
See (Doc. 31-5).
Ultimately, DOC investigators found that Brown’s allegations of physical
abuse were “unsubstantiated,” because there were no witnesses and no
video footage of the incident.
See (Docs. 31-2, 31-3).
On August 29, 2022, Brown was involved in another dispute with
Caison. In a grievance, Brown claimed that Caison had “refused to let
[him] out on time” for a scheduled telephone call at 6:10 p.m. Brown
claimed that Caison did not let him out until 6:20 p.m., which in turn
“cause[d Brown] to lose out on 6:30 p.m. yard time.” The grievance officer
reviewed camera footage and found that Brown had been released to use
the phone at 6:12 p.m., and used the phone from 6:13 p.m. to 6:36 p.m.,
in excess of his allotted 15 minutes, and thus Caison was not responsible
for Brown missing yard time.
See (Doc. 31-6).
Finally, Brown filed a grievance in which he alleged that Caison
conducted an improper search of his cell on September 30, 2022. Brown
alleged that Caison “took it upon himself to conduct a full[-]fledge[d]
security investigative search” without Brown present. Brown allegedly
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returned to his cell and found it “ransack[ed]” and in “disarray,” with
various items strewn about the floor, and with “one brown t-shirt [and] a
car magazine” missing. As relief, he requested Caison’s “removal from
any [and] all further interaction with general population.” Upon review
of 	surveillance 	video, 	the 	grievance 	officer 	found 	that 	Caison 	had
removed “an extra mattress and a large amount of excessive linens,”
which did not require a confiscation slip because they were state property,
and that “[n]o evidence exists”2 to corroborate Brown’s allegations that
his cell was left in disarray.
See (Doc. 31-7 at 6-7).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Caison is entitled to summary judgment because Brown did not
properly exhaust administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners3 complaining about the conditions of
their 	confinement 	must 	exhaust 	available 	administrative 	remedies
2 In appealing the denial of this grievance, Brown claimed to have
“witnesses that saw [Caison] leave the cell in disarray,” but did not
identify the witnesses.
See (Doc. 31-7 at 5).
3 Although Brown has now been released from custody, these rules
still apply to this case because he filed the operative complaint from
prison.
See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 88 (3d Cir. 2019).
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before they may file suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA
requires proper exhaustion, meaning plaintiffs must administratively
grieve their claims in accordance with the procedural rules of the prison
in which they are incarcerated.
Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d
299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)).
Because the DOC’s rules require that “the inmate must request the
specific relief sought in his/her initial grievance,” a prisoner who has not
requested money damages during the grievance process cannot seek
money damages in federal court.
See,
e.g.,
Wright v. Sauers, 729 F. App’x
225, 227 (3d Cir. 2018);
Mills v. Rogers, No. 1:20-CV-00266, 2024 WL
3034099, at *17-18 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 2024) (addressing claims for
compensatory and punitive damages);
Cramer v. Bohinski, No. 1:22-CV-
583, 2024 WL 1557377, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2024).
Here, the undisputed evidence shows that Brown did not request
monetary relief in his grievances about the June 14 altercation with
Caison 	or 	the 	September 	30 	cell 	search.4 	Because 	he 	only 	seeks
4 	Brown also did not make any such request in his grievance
appeals.
See (Docs. 31-3, 31-7);
cf. Bailey v. Yoder, No. 20-CV-01836, 2023
WL 7329526, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2023) (finding that plaintiff ’s claim
for money damages was exhausted when he sought money damages in
his grievance appeal and the request was considered on its merits).
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compensatory 	and 	punitive 	damages 	in 	this 	case, 	and 	he 	has 	not
exhausted those claims for money damages in accordance with the DOC’s
rules, the Court must grant summary judgment to Caison.
See Mills,
2024 WL 3034099, at *17-18.
Moreover, 	Brown 	has 	not 	presented 	evidence 	that 	could 	have
sustained his claims on their merits. Even assuming a genuine dispute
of fact as to whether Caison “grabbed” Brown’s neck or throat, this alone
would not defeat summary judgment on his excessive force claim; he
would have to show that the officer used more than
de minimis force.
See
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (not every “malevolent touch
by a prison guard” violates the Eighth Amendment);
Fears v. Beard, 532
F. App’x 78, 82 (3d Cir. 2013) (summary judgment appropriate where
officer used
de minimis force, despite plaintiff ’s allegations of pain). The
record shows that Caison would have been justified in using some force,
given 	that 	Brown 	was 	in 	an 	unauthorized 	area 	of 	the 	prison 	and
disobeyed verbal orders to leave.
See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641,
649 (3d Cir. 2002) (force applied “in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline” does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
Brown’s retaliation claim would also fail on its merits. He alleges
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that the September 30 cell search was “in retaliation for” his August 29
grievance about the denial of yard time. However, he has not disputed
the evidence that this was a frivolous grievance based on allegations he
knew to be false, which is not protected conduct that can sustain a
retaliation claim.
	See McKee v. Rowe, No. 4:23-CV-00015, 2024 WL
265867, at *3 n. 43 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2024) (citing
United States v.
Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2018) (the First Amendment does
not protect “false statements of fact”)). Nor could a jury reasonably find
a 	“pattern 	of 	antagonism” 	by 	Caison 	supporting 	an 	inference 	of
retaliation for prior grievances. To the contrary, the record shows that
Brown’s repeated allegations of abuse by Caison were investigated and
consistently found to be unsupported or contradicted by video, written
records, and/or interviews with staff.
See also (Doc. 1-1 (documenting
responses to seven grievances Brown filed against Caison)).
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Defendant’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	(Doc. 	24) 	is
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter JUDGMENT in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff.
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2. 	The Clerk is directed to mark this case as CLOSED.
Dated: March 12, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
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