Wallace v. Centre County Correctional Facility et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

AUTHENTI.

Case 1:24-cv-00010-JFS-SA Document 72 Filed 03/19/26 Page 1 of 19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHNATHAN WALLACE,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-cev-00010
V. (SAPORITO, J.)

LIEUTENANT GEMMATI, e¢ aZ,

Defendants,
MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Johnathan Wallace proceeds on claims of excessive force,
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and denial of medical care
against five defendants affiliated with the Centre County Correctional
Facility (‘CCCF’). All parties have moved for summary judgment. (Docs.
61, 66). Because the evidence does not support a reasonable inference
that the conditions in Wallace’s cell constituted punishment, or that he
received inadequate medical care, summary judgment will be granted to
the defendants on those claims. However, because the record does not
clearly resolve whether defendant C.O. Shearer subjected Wallace to
objectively unreasonable force after he had stopped resisting, summary

judgment will be denied on his excessive force claim against Shearer.

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I, BACKGROUND

Wallace filed his original complaint on January 3, 2024, (Doe. 1),
and was permitted to amend the complaint after his case was screened.
(Docs. 8, 9). After the close of discovery, Wallace granted leave to file a
second amended complaint, which is now the operative complaint. See
(Doc. 46).

As relevant here, the unverified complaint alleges that on
September 15, 2022, Wallace informed correctional officers “that his cell
was dirty and lreekled of urine,” and contained hair on the bed, “blood-
like stains’ on the floor and wall, and “a spider web and spider.” An officer
“swept and mopped” the cell, but Wallace was not satisfied. He refused to
go back into the cell, but defendants Lt. Gemmati, Lt. Beals, C.0. Garver,
C.O. Shearer, and C.O. Richner! “forced him there.” He alleges that these
defendants pushed him, tackled him to the ground, and hit his head
against a wall,

Wallace sought medical attention, but Gemmati allegedly

instructed a nurse “not to assess” Wallace. At “some time during the

1 The latter two officers were named as “Shears” and “Ritner’ in the
amended complaint, but defendants’ briefing identifies them as C.O.
Shearer and C.O. Richner. See (Doc. 62).

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morning,’ Wallace allegedly suffered a seizure and “notified medical.” He
had been prescribed Keppra for seizures, but the medication was
allegedly discontinued after this incident.

Wallace seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.2 He was
ultimately permitted to proceed on claims of excessive force,
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and denial of medical care
against Gemmati, Ritner, Shearer, “C.O. Strunk,” and “C.O. Quigley.”?
(Doc. 52). Because the complaint did not clearly indicate whether Wallace
was a convicted prisoner or a pretrial detainee, it was unclear whether
his claims should be evaluated under the Highth Amendment or the
Fourteenth Amendment, but he was explicitly permitted “to pursue the
claims regardless of the ultimate legal basis.” (Doc. 52 at 5, n. 2). The
parties have now moved for summary judgment.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

2 Because Wallace is now incarcerated at SCI-Forest, and there is
no indication that he will be returned to the CCCF, his claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief will be dismissed as moot. See, e.g.,
Griffin v. Beard, 401 F. App’x 715, 716-17 (3d Cir. 2010).

3 Defendants now indicate that these two defendants are the same
person; Quigley was formerly known as Shrunk. (Doc. 62 at 1).

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judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 4717 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all
inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the
movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Pastore v, Bell
Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (8d Civ. 1994). The party seeking
summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence
of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, AT7 US.
317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant
must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that
“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
the jury.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first

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determine if the moving party has made a prima facie showing that it is
entitled to summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the
burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex, 477
U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

Til. MATERIAL Facts?

On September 8, 2022, Wallace was booked into the CCCF pending

4 Wallace did not directly respond to defendants’ summary
judgment motion, although it appears that he intended his own motion
to serve as a response. His filings cite only sporadically to supporting
evidence. See (Docs. 66, 67). Any factual allegations in these filings are
not competent evidence at the summary judgment stage, and they are
ignored unless supported by evidence in the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1). Nonetheless, the Court has reviewed and considered all the
evidence the parties have submitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) Gn
addition to properly cited materials, the court “may consider other
materials in the record”). Where Wallace has not presented competent
evidence to show a genuine dispute of material fact, defendants’ fact
statements are deemed admitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); M.D. Pa.

(continued on next page)

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trial on criminal charges. See (Doc. 61-1 at 2, 9). On September 15, 2022,
the date of the incident at issue, Wallace was in segregated custody on
suicide watch in Unit Al. (Doe. 61-1 at 25, 61-4 at 6).

Defendants have presented surveillance footage of Wallace’s cell
and body camera footage from four prison officers. See (Docs. 61-2, 64).
The video shows Wallace outside of his cell, handcuffed, arguing with
officers. Wallace told the officers that he had been bitten by a spider in
his cell and there were blood stains on the wall and “webs” under the bed.
He refused to return to the cell until it was cleaned. An officer, identified
in defendants’ briefing as defendant Shearer, entered the cell to
investigate. What Shearer saw is not clear from the video, but he
concluded: “Well, you still got to come in here.” Multiple officers ordered
Wallace into the cell, and Wallace entered while continuing to argue. As
an officer was about to close the door, Wallace walked back into the
doorway as if trying to exit the cell. Two officers converged on him and
pinned him against a wall inside of the cell.

When he was first pinned against the wall, Wallace was pushed into

L.R. 56.1.

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a crouching position, with an officer’s weight on his back. It is unclear
from the video whether Wallace was physically resisting the officers from
the crouching position.5 (Cell Camera’, 6:52-6:58). Wallace was then
brought to a standing position, still pinned against the wall. His palms
were open, and Shearer held onto his arms.

From this standing position, Shearer dragged Wallace to the
opposite wall of the cell. Wallace raised his handcuffed hands toward the
wall in an apparent attempt to brace himself. Wallace yelled: “’m in
cuffs, what are you doing?” Shearer then pushed Wallace into the far
corner of his cell, and Wallace collided forcefully with the wall. Wallace
continued to yell: “I?m in cuffs!” While Wallace was pinned in the corner,

Shearer appears to press Wallace’s head into the wall with his elbow or

5 Defendants, citing to the surveillance video, describe Wallace as
“struggling with the staff” during this period. (Doc. 62, J 22). However,
only Wallace’s legs are visible while he was pinned into a crouch, because
Shearer’s body obstructs the view from the surveillance camera. (Cell
Camera, 6:52-6:57). While it is possible that the officers were trying to
bring Wallace to the floor and Wallace resisted, that is not apparent from
the video, and the video does not show that Wallace received an order to

lie down.

6 Citations to timestamps refer to the surveillance video from the
camera mounted in Wallace’s cell. However, the summary of material
facts also incorporates evidence from the body camera footage.

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forearm. The video does not show that Wallace physically resisted the
officers during this time. Ud, 6:59-7:06).

Ultimately, other officers assisted by grabbing Wallace’s legs and
holding him horizontally on a table.’ One officer yelled: “Relax!” Wallace
replied: “I am relaxed, get my f***ing face off the wall!” Lt. Gemmati said:
“Do not move. This glove’ is activated: I will use it.” Wallace continued to
verbally protest about the incident and the condition of the cell. After
approximately 45 seconds in this position, Wallace’s handcuffs were
removed, and the officers left the cell.

After the officers left, Wallace can be heard yelling for medical
attention for his injuries. A group of officers and medical staff returned
to the cell, and a nurse examined Wallace through his cell window.
Wallace reported injuries to his wrists, face, neck, and back. Less than

two hours after the incident, officers and medical staff entered Wallace’s

7 Defendants describe Wallace as “wrestling” with the staff at this
point. (Doc. 62, § 23). At most, the video shows that his left leg briefly
bent while the officers were holding it. However, it is unclear whether he
was attempting to evade their grasp, or whether his leg bent because of
the way in which the officers grabbed it. See (Cell Camera, 7:08-7:09).

8 It is undisputed that this glove was a “taser glove.”

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cell, took photographs of his injuries®, and performed a “full medical
assessment.” (Doc. 61-4 at 7-8). The medical records do not clearly
document any diagnoses, but Wallace was prescribed Tylenol and an
antibiotic ointment. Medical staff also found no evidence of a spider bite
on Wallace. Wallace claimed that when he saw a spider in his cell, he
“fyeaked out” because he has arachnophobia, which caused him to be
“uncooperative” with security. Ud).

The record lacks any evidence that Wallace suffered a seizure,
complained of a seizure, or was prescribed seizure medication at the
CCCE. On September 8, 2022, at his initial intake in the prison, he
reported a history of seizures, but that he was not taking any medication
for them. (Doc. 61-4 at 2-3). On December 13, 2022, after he had been
released and then re-admitted to the prison, he claimed that he “had a
seizure in 2019” and “does not require medications.” (/d. at 4).

IV. DISCUSSION

Although the operative complaint frames Wallace’s claims as

Eighth Amendment claims, the record indicates that Wallace was a

9 The record includes two photographs of Wallace (Doc. 61-1 at 21-
22), but it is not clear if those were the only photographs taken.

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pretrial detainee, not a convicted prisoner, when these events occurred.
No party disputes that fact. See (Doc. 61-1 at 2, 13-16; Doc. 63 at 10-11;
Doc. 67 at 2). Therefore, Wallace’s claims will be evaluated under the
Fourteenth Amendment standards applicable to pretrial detainees
(which broadly prohibit conditions that “amount to punishment”), rather
than the Eighth Amendment standards (which prohibit “cruel and
unusual punishment”). See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 5385-87 (1979).

A. Conditions of Confinement

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Wallace’s
conditions of confinement claim. As noted, the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits conditions that “amount to punishment” of a pretrial detainee.
See Hubbard vy. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bel/ 441
U.S. at 535). To meet this standard, prison conditions must either be
imposed for the “express purpose” of punishment or “rationally connected
to a legitimate purpose but excessive in relation to [that] purpose.” Hope
v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 328 (8d Cir. 2020) (citing Bell,
441 USS. at 538-39).

Although Wallace has alleged that his cell contained dirt and hair

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and “reeked” of urine, he has not presented evidence of these conditions,"
At most, he has presented evidence that there was a single spider in his
cell that may have bitten him, and that officers forced him to return to
the cell while the spider may still have been in it. Although Wallace may
have reacted strongly because of arachnophobia, he has not presented
evidence that the defendants were aware of this fear, so that fact cannot
support an inference of deliberate punishment. Prison officials are
permitted to dictate where and how prisoners are housed, and they enjoy
“wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order
and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” See Beli 441 U.S.

at 547. No reasonable jury could find that the conditions amounted to

10 Wallace refers to a written report from the day before his cell
extraction. (Doc. 67 at 1). The report indicates that during a walkthrough
of various units, an officer “spoke with [another inmate] about cleaning
Al.” The report notes that “[a] block of time has been set aside every day”
for cleaning, and a “new bottle of covid cleaner” was delivered to the unit.
See (Doc. 65-1). Al refers to a unit, not a particular cell, see (Doc. 61-1 at
25), so there is no evidence that this report refers to Wallace’s cell.
Regardless, the fact that someone “spoke ... about cleaning” would not
reasonably suggest that a cell had hair or urine in it. Contrary to
Wallace’s argument, defendants are not required to produce video
evidence of cleaning to obtain summary judgment.

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“excessive” hardship in relation to that purpose, because Wallace suffered
no more than a minor, temporary inconvenience and a superficial injury."

B. Medical Care

Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on Wallace’s
medical care claims. To sustain a claim, Wallace would have to show that
a defendant was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. See
Thomas v. City of Harrisburg, 88 F.Ath 275, 281 (8d Cir. 2023). He has
presented no evidence that he suffered a seizure, complained of a seizure,
or required seizure medication at the CCCF. To the extent his claim was
premised on the staff’s response to his injuries after the cell extraction,
he has not explained how their response — evaluation through a window

immediately after the incident, and full evaluation less than two hours

1 See, eg. Echevarria v. Cnty. of Bergen, No. CV 23-3002 (ES)
(CLW), 2025 WL 517955, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 18, 2025) (a single interaction
with vermin “does not amount to a sufficiently serious deprivation” for a
Fourteenth Amendment claim); Chapolini v. City of Philadelphia, No. 22-
CV-284, 2022 WL 815444, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2022) (“certain
unsanitary conditions, while uncomfortable or unpleasant,’ are not
sufficiently serious or punitive); Thomas v. SCI-Graterford, No. CIV.A.
11-6799, 2014 WL 550555, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2014); see also Sever
v. Perrin, No. 3:11-CV-29-KRG-KAP, 2013 WL 4855338, at *5 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 11, 2013) (a spider bite “that resolves quickly, with minimal care,
and without residual effects is not under any definition of the term a
serious medical need”).

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later — was inadequate to address his medical needs. Wallace’s argument
that this response was “against [defendants] own policy” is unsupported
by evidence, and regardless, that fact would not sustain a constitutional
claim. See Washington v. Salamon, 2022 WL 4096877, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 7, 2022) (‘a violation of prison policy is not equivalent to a
constitutional violation”) (citations omitted).

C. Excessive Force

However, Wallace’s excessive force claim will proceed against
defendant Shearer. Unlike a convicted prisoner’s Eighth Amendment
claim, a pretrial detainee need not establish that a defendant used force
“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”
Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty., 8 FAth 187, 193 (3d Cir, 2021) (citation
omitted). Rather, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force
purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.”
Td, at 194 (emphasis in original) (quoting Avngsley v. Hendrickson, 576
U.S. 389, 400 (2015)). Although there is no “mechanical” application of
this standard, courts can consider factors such as “the relationship
between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the

extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or

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to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue:
the threat reasonably perceived by the officer} and whether the plaintiff
was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. Because prison officers
“are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” the court must assess the
officer’s actions based on “what the officer knew at the time, not with the
20/20 vision of hindsight.” Jad. at 397, 399.

In this case, it is undisputed that Wallace’s attempt to walk out of
his cell in violation of multiple verbal orders justified the use of force to
enforce these legitimate orders. See, e.g., Giddings v. Rogers, No. 1:22-
CV-00097, 2024 WL 4186926, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2024). However,
a reasonable jury could find that once the officers pinned Wallace against
the wall of his cell, Wallace was no longer resisting them and was in no
position to do so. Nonetheless, Shearer dragged Wallace to the other
corner of his cell, caused him to collide forcefully with the wall, and
pushed Wallace’s head into the wall with his elbow or forearm, during

which time the video does not suggest any resistance from Wallace.!?

12 See, e.g., Riley v. Clark, No. 4:20-CV-00325, 2025 WL 985228, at
*12 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2025) Geconsidered on other grounds, Riley v.
(continued on next page)

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A review of the other Kings/ey factors demonstrates that summary
judgment is not appropriate on this record. First, the evidence does not
clearly document the extent of Wallace’s injuries. Wallace received what
the prison medical staff described as a “full evaluation,” and they
prescribed him Tylenol, but it is unclear what they diagnosed. Pain
medication could suggest a painful injury, or a superficial one.
Defendants submitted two photographs that appear to depict minor
bruising on Wallace’s face and neck, but the visibility of an injury is not
dispositive. See, eg., Riley, 2025 WL 985228, at *12 (citing Smith v.
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 649 (8d Cir. 2002) “/D/e minimis injuries do
not necessarily establish de minimis force.”)); Ross v. Fiss, No. 1:21-CV-
02080, 2023 WL 2739638, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2023). A reasonable
jury could construe this limited evidence in either side’s favor.

An assessment of the “severity of the security problem at issue”

favors Wallace. The video shows Wallace in “passive resistance”: arguing

Klahr, 2025 WL 2024501 (M.D. Pa. July 18, 2025)); Derrick v. Finnegan,
No. CV 22-4436 (SDW-SDA), 2025 WL 750960, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2025)
(“[al reasonable juror could conclude that Defendants were no longer
facing an active disturbance or other threat to security,” despite the
plaintiff's prior resistance).

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with officers, disregarding their verbal orders, walking out of his cell, and
at most, briefly attempting to evade the officers’ grasp. See Ailey, 2025
WL 985228, at *11; Atkinson v. Apodaca, No. 1:23-CV-00142-CBB, 2025
WL 712871, at *7-8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2025) (“Given that Atkinson claims
he was restrained and passively resisting, a jury could conclude that the
level of force used to compel him to enter his cell was unjustified.”). The
video does not show Wallace attacking or attempting to harm anyone.
Defendants offer no evidence that any officer subjectively perceived a risk
of such harm, nor evidence supporting their argument that this
apparently isolated incident posed a “security risk to the entire facility.”!8

There is evidence that defendants tried to limit the amount of force
they used, particularly at the start of the dispute. They repeatedly sought

to achieve Wallace’s compliance through verbal orders, and they

18 Defendants assert that “Lilf more inmates joined in the disruptive
and belligerent behavior of Wallace, the entire facility could have been at
risk.” (Doc. 63 at 14). But the video does not appear to show any other
inmates out of their cells, and there is no evidence “to suggest that
[Wallace] was in danger of escaping [his celll or that Defendants were
acting to prevent a disturbance from spreading.” Kwing v. Cumberland
Cnty, 152 F. Supp. 3d 269, 291 (D.N.J. 2015) (There is a significant
distinction between using force to quell a prison riot or to stop violence
from spreading, and using force when there is no real emergency.”).

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attempted to investigate his claim that the cell was dirty. Toward the end
of the incident, Gemmati announced that he had a taser glove, apparently
to head off any resistance by Wallace while he was being held on the
table. This evidence precludes summary judgment for Wallace", but does
not resolve the question of whether Shearer used objectively
unreasonable force against Wallace while he was already subdued.
Because the record does not plausibly indicate that any other officer used
unreasonable force, summary judgment will be granted to all defendants

except Shearer.

D. Qualified Immunity

Alternatively, defendants argue that Shearer is entitled to qualified
immunity. Qualified immunity applies to government officials
performing discretionary functions unless (1) the “facts, taken in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate a constitutional violation,”
and (2) the alleged right was clearly established at the time of the
violation. See Thomas, 88 F.4th at 281 (citation omitted). A clearly

established right is one so apparent that “every reasonable official would

14 Because Wallace’s motion will be denied on the merits, the Court
does not address the argument that it should be denied as untimely.

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understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” James v. N.eJ, State Police,
957 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583
U.S. 48, 63 (2018)). “Thus, so long as an official reasonably believes that
his conduct complies with the law, qualified immunity will shield that
official from liability.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (8d Cir, 2012).

It is defendants’ burden to establish their entitlement to qualified
immunity, see Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014), and
their argument is largely premised on the idea that the evidence does not
show a constitutional violation.!5 For the reasons described above, that
argument fails as to the excessive force claim against Shearer. Further,
it is clearly established that prison officers may not “use gratuitous force
against an inmate who has been subdued.” See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d
318, 326 (8d Cir. 2009); Jacobs, 8 F4th at 197 (striking a physically
restrained and nonthreatening inmate . .. [is] clearly unlawful”). Given

this clearly established right, and the evidence that Wallace was subdued

15 Defendants also contend that they were not “on notice” of any
constitutional violation because “[tlhe evidence does not meet the
standard necessary to establish the possibility of a constitutional
violation... as at most the actions/inactions are negligent or mistakes.”
(Doc. 63 at 24). However, they have not presented any argument or
evidence for the proposition that their “actions/inactions” amounted to
“negligenice] or mistakes.”

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as Shearer continued to apply force, Shearer is not entitled to qualified
immunity at this stage. See, e.g., Noel v. Miksich, No. 3:22-CV-23, 2026
WL 494027, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2026) (“[a] jury could conclude that,
at some point during this course of events, Noel ceased resisting, but
Defendants continued to use a degree of force that qualified as excessive,”
precluding qualified immunity).

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted on all claims
except for Wallace’s excessive force claim against Shearer. This case will
be referred to the Court’s Prison Litigation Settlement Program for
potential mediation, unless a party objects within 14 days of this

memorandum and order.

Dated: March 19, 2026 s/Joseph F' Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge

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