Franklin v. Wetzel et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VINCENT FRANKLIN,
Plaintiff
v.
L. HICKS,
Defendant
CIV. ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-1091
(JUDGE MANNION)
MEMORANDUM
Presently 	before 	the 	court 	in 	this 	prisoner 	civil 	rights 	case 	is
defendant's motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below,
the motion will be granted.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Vincent Franklin, filed this case on June 29, 2023, asserting
generally that he was wrongfully deprived of his prison job at the Huntingdon
State 	Correctional 	Institution 	("SCI -Huntingdon") and 	the 	corresponding
compensation during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Doc. 1).
The case was initially assigned to United States District Judge Christopher
C. Conner. On July 5, 2023, Judge Conner dismissed all defendants other
than 	defendant 	Hicks. 	(Doc. 	7) . The 	case 	is 	presently 	proceeding 	on
plaintiff's second amended complaint, which was filed on April 5, 2024. (Doc.
38). Hicks answered the second amended complaint on May 28 , 2024. (Doc.
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45). The case was reassigned to the undersigned on January 21 , 2025,
following Judge Conner's retirement from the court.
On January 30 , 2025, Hicks moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 48).
In response, Franklin argued that additional discovery was needed before
the summary judgment motion could be adjudicated. (Doc. 56). The court
granted Franklin's motion for additional discovery on July 8, 2025, reopened
discovery until August 31 , 2025, and denied Hicks's motion for summary
judgment without prejudice to her right to refile the motion after the close of
discovery. (Doc. 57). After the renewed discovery deadline passed, the court
set a dispositive motions deadline of October 31 , 2025. (Doc. 59). Hicks filed
the instant motion for summary judgment on October 7, 2025, along with a
supporting brief and a statement of material facts . (Docs. 60-62). Franklin
filed an opposition brief and a response to the statement of material facts on
October 31 , 2025. (Docs. 65-66). Hicks has not filed a reply brief, and the
deadline for doi ng so has expi red under the Local Rules. The motion for
summary judgment is accordingly ri pe for review.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment 	is 	appropriate "if the 	pleadings, the discovery
[including , depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file]
and disclosure materials on file , and any affidavits show that there is no
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genuine issue as to 	any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed . R. Civ. P. 56(c); see a/so Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); 	Turner v. 	Schering-Plough Corp.,
901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable
jury could find for the non-_	moving party, and is material if it will affect the
outcome of the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v. 	Liberty
Lobby, Inc ., 	477 U.S. 242, 	248, 	254 	(1986); 	Aetna 	Gas . & Sur. 	Co . v.
Ericksen, 903 F. Supp. 836, 838 (M.D. Pa . 1995). At the summary judgment
stage, "the 	judge's 	function 	is 	not 	himself to 	weigh 	the 	evidence 	and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see a/so Marino v. Indus. Crating
Co. , 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (a court may not weigh the evidence
or make credibility determinations). Rather, 	the 	court 	must consider 	all
evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641 , 647 (3d Cir. 2007).
To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must affirmatively
identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The moving party
can discharge that burden by showing that "on all the essential elements of
its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could
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find for the non-moving party." In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir.
2003); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets this initial
burden , the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to material facts, " but must show sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Boyle v. County of Allegheny,
139 F .3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Matsushita Elec. 	Indus. Co . v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). However, if the non-moving
party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant]
will bear the burden of proof at trial, " Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary
judgment 	because 	such 	a 	failure 	"necessarily 	renders 	all 	other 	facts
immaterial. " Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche,
Inc ., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).
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Ill. 	MATERIAL FACTS 1
Franklin was incarcerated 	in 	SCI-Huntingdon at 	all 	relevant times,
beginning on December 5, 2020. (Doc. 61 ,I5; Doc. 65 ,I5). Franklin asserts
that after 	he was transferred to SCI-Huntingdon, 	Hicks deprived 	him 	of
employment compensation that John Wetzel , the then-secretary of the DOC,
had purportedly authorized for all inmates during the COVID-19 pandemic.
(Doc. 61 	,I,I6-7; Doc. 65 ,I,I6-7). 	Franklin asserts that inmates who were
transferred 	to 	SCI-Huntingdon 	from 	SCI-Smithfield 	shortly 	after 	he 	was
transferred 	to 	SCI-Huntingdon 	were 	given 	the 	promised 	employment
compensation , while he was not. (Doc. 61 ,I8; Doc. 65 ,I8). Franklin's transfer
to SCI-Huntingdon was an administrative transfer from SCI-Dallas for the
purpose of reducing the population of SCI-Dallas. (Doc. 61 ,I,I16-20; Doc. 65
,I,I16-20).
1 Local 	Rule 	56 .1 requires a motion for summary judgment to "be
accompanied by a separate, short and concise statement of the material
facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there
is no genuine issue to be tried" and requires that the party opposing a motion
for 	summary 	judgment 	file 	a 	statement 	responding 	to 	the 	numbered
paragraphs in the movant's statement of material facts, which "shall include
references 	to 	the 	parts 	of 	the 	record" 	that 	support 	the 	nonmovant's
opposition to the motion . M.D. Pa. L.R . 56.1. The facts in this section are
derived from the parties' Rule 56.1 statements. (See Docs. 61, 65).
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Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, Wetzel issued several COVID-
19 update emails to DOC staff. (Doc. 61 	,i21; Doc. 65 ,i21 ). 	In one such
email, sent on March 13, 2020, Wetzel provided guidance to DOC staff on
inmate compensation during the pandemic. (Doc. 61 ,T24; Doc. 65 ,T24 ). The
email authorized continued compensation for inmates at their regular rate of
pay, for 	their 	normal 	work 	hours, 	if their 	employment 	positions 	were
temporarily 	suspended 	due 	to 	COVID-19 	precautions, 	if 	they 	were
quarantined as a COVID-19 precaution , or if they were students who were
not permitted to attend classes due COVID-19 precautions. (Doc. 61 ,T25;
Doc. 65 	,T25) . 	Inmates who 	were 	administratively 	transferred 	were 	not
included on the list of inmates who would continue to receive employment
compensation. (Doc. 61 ,T26 ; Doc. 65 ,T26; Doc. 61-5 at 2). 2
In the absence of contrary guidance from the secretary, employment
compensation for transferred inmates is ordinarily governed 	by DC-ADM
2 Franklin disputes this contention and cites a December 20, 	2020,
email from Wetzel to all DOC inmates that states "If you have employment,
but are unable to participate due to COVID precautions, you will continue to
be compensated. (Doc. 65 ,T26 ; 65-1 at 2). This does not create a dispute of
fact as to the contents of Wetzel 's March 13 , 2020, email. Whether it creates
an issue of fact on the ultimate issue of whether Franklin was entitled to
compensation is addressed in the discussion section below.
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816. (Doc. 61 ,I,127-28; Doc. 65 ,I,127-28). 3 DC-ADM 816 states that when
an inmate is transferred, he is processed for a job at the new facility and is
compensated in accordance with the new job, with no guarantee that he will
be given the same compensation he was given at his previous institution.
(Doc. 61 ,I,129-30; Doc. 65 ,I,129-30).
When Franklin arrived at SCI-Huntingdon on December 5, 2020, he
was 	placed 	in 	the general 	labor pool 	and 	given the compensation that
corresponded to that position of $0.72 per day. (Doc. 61 ,131; Doc. 65,131).
He remained in the general labor pool until June 8, 2022, when he was given
a food work service assignment. Doc. 61 ,132; Doc. 65 ,132). Franklin and
other inmates arriving at SCI-Huntingdon were classified as administrative
transfers and placed in the general labor pool. (Doc. 61 ,I,133-34; Doc. 65
,I,133-34 ). 4
At the end of December 2020, SCI-Smithfield was classified as the
single point of entry for all parole violators and new intakes across the DOC
system, 	which 	resulted 	in 	nearly 	all 	inmates 	in 	SCI-Smithfield 	being
3 The 	parties 	dispute 	whether 	DC-ADM 	816 	governed 	Franklin's
compensation in this specific case in light of Wetzel's emails, but there is no
dispute that DC-ADM 816 is the relevant policy.
4 Franklin notes that he does not have knowledge of how other inmates
were classified , but does not otherwise dispute the factual basis for Hicks's
contention. (Doc. 65 ,I,133-34 ).
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transferred to other institutions. (Doc. 61 ,I35; Doc. 65 ,I35). On February 4,
2021, 	Wetzel 	sent 	an 	email 	to 	DOC 	staff 	providing 	guidance 	for
compensation for inmates transferred from SCI-Smithfield. 	(Doc. 	61 	,I37;
Doc. 	65 ,I37). 	The email 	stated that the 	inmates transferred from 	SCI-
Smithfield were to maintain their previous rate of pay at their new institutions.
(Doc. 	61 	,I38; 	Doc. 	65 ,I38). 	Staff at other prisons were also directed to
attempt to place those inmates in their previous employment positions, but
there was no guarantee this would occur. (Doc. 61 ,I39; Doc. 65 ,I39).
No inmates who were administratively transferred to SCI-Huntingdon
during the COVID-19 pandemic was given their previous rate of pay. (Doc.
61 ,I40; Doc. 65 ,I40). 5 Institutional staff are required to follow DOC policies
and guidance from the secretary and are not authorized to circumvent those
policies and guidance. (Doc. 61 ,I,I41-42; Doc. 65 ,I,I41-42). 6
5 Franklin disputes this contention , but only on the basis that he does
not have personal knowledge of what other inmates were paid. (Doc. 65
,I40). He does not offer any contrary evidence to dispute the contention. (Id.)
6 Franklin asserts that Hicks circumvented the relevant guidance from
Wetzel in this case, but he does not dispute the contention that as a matter
of policy she does not have the authority to do so. ( See Doc. 65 ,I,I41-42).
Whether there is a question of fact on 	Hicks's compliance with Wetzel's
guidance is addressed in the discussion section below.
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IV. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's claims are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Section 1983
authorizes 	redress for violations of constitutional 	rights 	and 	provides 	in
relevant part:
Every 	person 	who, 	under 	color 	of 	any 	statute, 	ordinance,
regulation, 	custom, 	or usage, 	of any State 	or Territory 	...
subjects, or causes to be subjected , any citizen of the United
States 	or 	other 	person 	within 	the jurisdiction 	thereof to 	the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action 	at 	law, suit 	in 	equity, 	or other proper proceeding 	for
redress . . ..
42 U.S.C. §1983. Thus, to establish a successful claim under Section 1983,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged conduct was committed by
a person acting under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. 	Lake 	v. 	Arnold, 112 F.3d 	682, 689 	(3d 	Cir. 	1997). 	By its terms,
Section 1983 does not create a substantive right, but merely provides a
method 	for 	vindicating 	federal 	rights 	conferred 	by 	the 	United 	States
Constitution and the federal statutes that it describes. Baker v. 	McCollan,
443 U.S. 137 (1979).
In this case, Franklin alleges that Hicks violated his right to equal
protection under a "class-of-one" theory. (Doc. 38). To succeed on such a
claim , he must show that 	he was treated differently from 	other similarly
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situated individuals and that there was 	no rational basis for the different
treatment. Village of Willowbrook v. O/ech , 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
Franklin 	asserts that the 	inmates who were transferred from 	SCI-
Smithfield to SCI-Huntingdon during the pandemic were similarly situated to
him and that Hicks treated him differently from those inmates for no rational
reason. (Doc. 38 at 2-3).
Hicks 	argues 	that 	she 	is 	entitled 	to 	summary judgment 	because
Franklin was 	not similarly situated to the inmates transferred from 	SCI-
Smithfield . (Doc. 62 at 5-6). Hicks notes that Franklin was administratively
transferred to SCI-Huntingdon while the inmates from SCI-Smithfield were
transferred to SCI-Huntingdon after the prison was reclassified as the single
point of entry for all parole violators and new intakes during the pandemic,
and that gu idance from Wetzel indicated that the SCI-Smithfield inmates
were to receive the same rate of pay at their new institution. (Doc. 62 at 6).
Franklin argues that he was similarly situated to the SCI-Smithfield inmates
because they were all administratively transferred to SCI-Huntingdon and
that he should therefore have been given his same rate of pay in the same
manner that the SCI-Smithfield inmates were. (Doc. 66 at 6).
The 	court 	concludes 	that 	Hicks 	is 	entitled 	to 	summary judgment.
Franklin's argument 	is 	based 	on 	the assertion that 	he and the inmates
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transferred 	from 	SCI-Smithfield 	were 	similarly 	situated, 	but 	the 	record
demonstrates that this 	is 	not true. 	Franklin was 	subject to 	an 	ordinary
administrative transfer to 	SCI-Huntingdon , while the 	inmates from 	SCI-
Smithfield were transferred as part of a depopulation of that prison to permit
it to act as the single entry point for all parole violators and new intakes. (See
Doc. 61 ,T,T33-37; Doc. 65 ,T,T33-37). Email guidance from Wetzel specifically
directed institutional staff to give the inmates transferred from SCI-Smithfield
the same rate of pay they had been given prior to the transfer. (Doc. 61- 7).
Franklin asserts that a December 10 , 2020, email from Wetzel to all
inmates 	required 	institutional 	staff to 	maintain 	Franklin's 	compensation.
(Doc. 66 at 3). In the email, Wetzel stated, "If you have employment, but are
unable to participate due to COVID precautions, you will continue to 	be
compensated. " (Doc. 66-4 at 1). Franklin also provides several declarations
from other inmates stating that Wetzel made a similar promise that "if you
are currently employed, 	and 	are unable to work, you will continue to be
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compensated until further notice" during a "fireside chat video" produced in
2020.7 (Se Doc. 66-3).
Franklin's reliance 	on 	Wetzel's assurance 	is 	misplaced 	because 	it
presupposes that Franklin "ha[d] employment" or was "currently employed"
at the time of his transfer to SCI-Huntingdon. Nothing in Wetzel's guidance,
however, indicated that it was superseding the DOC's ordinary policies on
administrative transfers set out in DC -ADM 816. (See id.) Similarly, Wetzel's
March 	13 , 2020, 	email 	authorized 	continued 	compensation 	for 	inmates
whose 	positions 	were 	temporarily 	suspended , 	inmates 	who 	were
quarantined , 	or 	inmates 	unable 	to 	attend 	classes 	due 	to 	COVID-19
precautions , but did not include any language indicating that it was changing
the policies governing compensation for inmates who were administratively
transferred. (Doc. 61 ,T25 ; Doc. 65 ,T25) .
Given 	the 	silence 	from 	Wetzel 's 	emails 	regarding 	administrative
transfers, 	job 	placement 	and 	compensation 	for 	inmates 	who 	were
administratively transferred continued to be governed by DC-ADM 816. That
7 The parties appear to agree that no original copies of the video exist
after additional discovery was conducted on this basis. The court assumes
that the declarations from other inmates accurately represent what was said
in 	the video for the 	purpose of viewing 	the 	evidence 	in 	the 	light most
favorable to Franklin as the non-moving party.
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policy specifically provides that an administratively transferred inmate will be
processed for a job at his new institution and is not guaranteed the same
rate of pay at his new institution. (Doc. 61 111129-30; Doc. 65 111129-30 ; Doc.
61-6 at 3). Thus, at the time of his transfer, Franklin was not employed such
that he would be covered by Wetzel's COVID-19 guidance; rather, he was
waiting to be processed for a new job at his new institution. Hicks therefore
had 	a rational 	basis for denying 	Franklin the same rate of pay at SCI-
Huntingdon while giving the same rate of pay to SCI-Smithfield inmates
because DOC policy specifically required such differential treatment. 8
Franklin also argues that he should have been given the same pay rate
because he was temporarily suspended from his job at SCI-Dallas prior to
his transfer to SCI-Huntingdon 	as 	a COVID-19 precaution 	and 	Wetzel 's
guidance stipulated that inmates in that situation would be paid the same
rate. (Doc. 66 at 1-2). This argument is unavailing. First, the exhibit Franklin
attaches to his brief to show that he was suspended does not actually state
that fact in any manner. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Doc. 66-2). Second, even
8 The 	court does 	not consider whether the 	DOC 	policies treating
inmates transferred from SCI-Smithfield differently from inmates transferred
from all other institutions could give rise to an equal protection claim because
Franklin does not advance such a claim . Frankin only asserts that Hicks's
application of the relevant DOC policies and COVID-19 guidance violated his
right to equal protection. (See Doc. 38).
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if Franklin's job was temporarily suspended as he asserts, this does not alter
the fact that he was subsequently transferred to SCI-Huntingdon . As noted
above, his employment status after the transfer was governed by DC-ADM
816 rather than Wetzel 's COVID-19 guidance and under DC-ADM 816 he
was 	to 	be 	processed 	for 	a 	new job 	at 	SCI -Huntingdon 	and 	was 	not
guaranteed the rate of pay he had been receiving while at SCI-Dallas. Thus,
the 	court 	concludes that 	Hicks 	did 	not violate 	Franklin's right to 	equal
protection because the undisputed factual record establishes that she was
required to treat inmates transferred from 	SCI -Smithfield differently from
Franklin 	and 	all 	other transferred 	inmates 	under the 	DOC 's COVID-19
guidance.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Fo r the foregoing reasons, the court will grant defendant's motion for
summary judgment an d close this case. An appropriate order shall issue.
ala 	y E. Mannion
United States District Judge
Dated: 	t/(21t
23-1091-0 1
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