Filali v. Harrisburg AL Operations LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SAMI EL FILALI,
Plaintiff,
v.
HARRISBURG AL OPERATIONS
LLC,
Defendant.
CIVIL NO. 1:23-cv-00133
(KANE, J.)
(LATELLA, M.J.)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Sami El Filali filed two motions for sanctions
relating to his claim that Defendant failed to turn over and destroyed
video surveillance footage capturing an incident where he claims he was
the victim of workplace discrimination. For the reasons set forth
herein, the motions will be denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint on January 24,
2023. (Doc. 1). At the time the Complaint was filed, Plaintiff was
represented by counsel. (Id.). Defendant answered the Complaint on
April 17, 2023. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel on October 11, 2023, indicating that Plaintiff had terminated
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him. (Doc. 18). The court granted that motion on October 17, 2023 and
provided Plaintiff with thirty (30) days to find new counsel or advise the
Court of his intention to proceed pro se. (Doc. 21). On November 21,
2023, the Court issued another Order indicating that Plaintiff failed to
comply with its October 17, 2023 Order and directing Plaintiff to notify
the Court by December 1, 2023 as to whether he retained new counsel
or intended to proceed pro se. (Doc. 23). On November 30, 2023,
Plaintiff filed a letter to the docket stating that “[T]he Counsel [sic] of
American Islamic Relation is my new counsel in this case.” (Doc. 24).
However, the following day, December 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed another
letter to the docket indicating that he would be proceeding pro se. (Doc.
25).
The matter was referred to Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom for
pretrial management on December 20, 2023. Defendant filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment and supporting brief on May 14, 2025. (Doc.
66). On June 10, 2025, the matter was reassigned to the undersigned
magistrate judge for pretrial management. Plaintiff filed a brief in
opposition to summary judgment on August 19, 2025 and then filed a
request for a copy of a deposition on August 21, 2025. (Docs. 70, 71).
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Defendant filed a reply brief in further support of summary judgment
on September 2, 2025. (Doc. 72).
Plaintiff then filed a “Request to appoint a representative” on
September 8, 2025. (Doc. 74). On that same date, he filed a “Motion to
compel the defendant to release the security camera recording tapes”
(hereinafter “Motion to Compel”). (Doc. 75). On September 16, 2025, he
filed a “Memorandum and Brief Summary Defendant’s False
Allegatio[n]s and Misleading Facts.” (Doc. 76).
We issued a Memorandum (Doc. 78) and Order (Doc. 79) on
October 30, 2025, directing Plaintiff to provide to the Court for in
camera review any (1) documentation from a public agency or court of
record that he has been adjudicated incompetent, or (2) documentation
from a medical provider that the type of mental illness he is being
treated for renders him legally incompetent, to the extent such
documentation exists. On November 20, 2025, having received no
response from Plaintiff, we filed an additional Order again directing
Plaintiff to provide the specified documentation on or before December
4, 2025. (Doc. 80).
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On December 1, 2025, the Court received documents from Plaintiff
for in camera review. After reviewing those submissions, we issued a
Memorandum Opinion (Doc. 82) and Order (Doc. 83) denying Plaintiff’s
Request to Appoint a Representative (74). On December 22, 2025,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of that Order (Doc. 89),
which we denied. (Doc. 91).
With respect to his Motion to Compel, we issued an Order and
Memorandum on December 9, 2025 denying the motion. (Doc. Nos. 84,
85). Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 29, 2025.
(Doc. 92). In order to fully address Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration, we issued an Order on December 30, 2025 directing
Defendant to submit a “verified response indicating (1) the efforts it
took to identify the requested video footage; and (2) the results of those
efforts.” (Doc. 93). In compliance with that Order, Defendant filed
submitted an affidavit on January 7, 2026. (Doc. 94). On February 2,
2026 we denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.
On November 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sanctions.
(Doc. 81). Plaintiff filed an additional Motion for Spoliation Sanctions
on January 22, 2026. (Doc. 97). In compliance with our Order to file a
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response, Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Spoliation Sanctions on January 28, 2026. (Doc. 101). We now consider
Plaintiffs’ two motions for sanctions.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence,
or the failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence in
pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.” 	Paramount Pictures
Corp. v. Davis, 234 F.R.D. 102, 110 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (quoting Mosaid
Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335
(D.N.J. 2004)). When a district court finds that spoliation has occurred,
it has the authority to fashion an appropriate sanction to remedy the
damage to other parties. 	Mosaid, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
District courts in the Third Circuit previously relied on both the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the inherent authority of the court
in imposing sanctions for spoliation of any kind of evidence. 	Bistrian v.
Levi, 448 F. Supp. 3d 454, 464 (E.D. Pa. 2020). In 2015, however,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 was amended to provide a uniform
standard governing spoliation sanctions for the loss of electronically
stored information. 	Id. The Supreme Court promulgated amended
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Rule 37(e) in recognition of “the serious problems resulting from the
continued exponential growth in the volume of [electronically stored]
information.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015
amendment. Where the amended rule applies, it provides the exclusive
remedy for spoliation of electronically stored information (“ESI”),
foreclosing reliance on the court's inherent authority. 	Id.
Rule 37(e) provides the standard for determining whether
spoliation of ESI has occurred. Amended Rule 37(e) provides that
spoliation occurs where ESI “that should have been preserved in the
anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to take
reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or replaced
through additional discovery.” The advisory committee's notes to the
2015 amendment detail the elements of spoliation of ESI. First, the
spoliating party was under a duty to preserve when the loss occurred.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
Second, the lost ESI was within the scope of the duty to preserve.
Id. (“The new rule applies only if the lost information should have been
preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation....” (emphasis
added)). Third, “the information was lost because the party failed to
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take reasonable steps to preserve” it. 	Id. 	Fourth and finally, because
ESI “often exists in multiple locations,” spoliation occurs only where the
information is truly lost and not recoverable elsewhere. 	Id.
The Third Circuit has provided three factors that courts must
consider when contemplating Rule 37 sanctions:
(1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or
destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice
suffered by the opposing party; and (3) whether
there is a lesser sanction that will avoid
substantial unfairness to the opposing party and,
where the offending party is seriously at fault,
will serve to deter such conduct by others in the
future.
GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., 930 F.3d 76, 82 (3d Cir. 2019)
(citing Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir.
1994)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
In Plaintiff’s initial Motion for Sanctions, he stated that on
December 23, 2024, he “filed a subpoena with this honorable court
addressed to the defendant t[h]rough his counsel to release the security
camera footage.” (Doc. 81 at 1). He claimed that the subpoena went
unanswered. (Id.). Further, he asserted that on November 25, 2025, he
filed a “safe harbor motion and sent it via certified mail to the
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defendant’[s] attorney.” (Id. at 2). Plaintiff requested that the Court
“take the appropriate severe sanction against the defendant.” (Id.).
In his second motion for “Spoliation Sanctions,” Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendant refused to release evidence that is “relevant and
very important for the above case.” (Doc. 97 at 1). Plaintiff argues that
the “HR vice president confirmed that the building had security camera
before,” but she also confirmed that Defendant had a new surveillance
system installed in January 2023 and that the footage was not saved.
(Id. at 2). Plaintiff alleges that “when the defendant realized that
charges were under way against him (it) he rushed to destroy evidence
first . . .” (Id.). Plaintiff claims that when he first filed his “2 written
complaints” in March 2022 with Defendant, “Antonia [B]ultron said she
had access to records and information relevant to the inquiry regarding
the surveillance footage maintained by the facility.” (Id. at 3). He
further claims that his complaint contained specific information about
the area, date and time where the incident occurred. (Id.) Plaintiff
asserts that the evidence was “destroyed, deleted, withheld, overwritten
or simply was not saved” notwithstanding that Defendant had a “duty
to . . . preserve the evidence while charges are pending against him (it),”
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which constitutes spoliation. (Id. at 5). Accordingly, he seeks sanctions
including evidence preclusion, witness preclusion, monetary sanctions,
adverse inference, issues sanctions, dismissal or default judgment,
dismissal of the defendant’s claim,1 limitation on damage, evidence
rulings, prejudice to the opposing parties and any penalties the court
sees appropriate. (Id. at 5).
Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s request for spoliation sanctions
by arguing that by the time it was arguably under a duty to preserve
evidence relating to the incident at issue in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the
surveillance footage would have been overwritten as a matter of course.
(Doc. 101 at 7). Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show
that Defendant acted in bad faith, and therefore, he is not entitled to an
adverse inference. (Id. at 8). Finally, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff
has never explained what his hypothetical footage would depict or how
it would advance any viable claim . . . . Plaintiff asserts that a coworker
cursed at him, asked his name, and asked him if he had taken out the
trash . . . . Even if that were true – and even if such an exchange had
1 We note that Defendant has not filed a counterclaim in this
matter. 	(See Doc. 5). 	Accordingly, there is no claim of Defendant’s that
would be subject to dismissal.
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somehow been captured on silent surveillance footage – it would not
support Plaintiff’s claims of a hostile work environment based on his
race, religion, or national origin.” (Id. at 10).
Against that backdrop, we now consider whether spoliation of
evidence occurred and if so, whether sanctions are warranted.
A. Defendant Was Not Under a Duty To Preserve When the Loss
Occurred.
Rule 37(e) applies to “electronically stored information that should
have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(e). The Rule does not apply to information that was lost or
destroyed before a duty to preserve arose. Fed R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory
committee’s note to 2015 amendment. The Rule incorporates the
common-law “duty to preserve relevant information when litigation is
reasonably foreseeable.” 	Id.
The common-law standard is an objective one, asking not whether
a party actually anticipated litigation, but “whether a reasonable party
in the same factual circumstances would have reasonably foreseen
litigation.” 	Bistrian, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 468 (citing Micron Tech., Inc. v.
Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). There is no single
bright line that definitively marks when litigation reasonably should be
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anticipated. 	Id. Instead, courts consider a variety of factors, including
the type and seriousness of the injury; how often similar kinds of
incidents lead to litigation; the “course of conduct between the parties,
including past litigation or threatened litigation”; and what steps both
parties took after the incident and before the loss of the evidence,
including whether the defendant initiated an investigation into the
incident.” 	Id.
When a party argues that spoliation occurred before the complaint
was filed, the court must conduct a fact-sensitive inquiry to determine
at what point the spoliating party reasonably should have anticipated
the litigation. 	Id. In the employment context, courts have observed
that the duty to preserve evidence arose when the employer was served
with a copy of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Committee (PHRC)
complaint or EEOC Notice of Charge. 	See Thompson v. Bridgeton Bd. of
Educ., 9. F. Supp. 3d 446, 453 (D.N.J. 2014); Tabon v. University of
Pennsylvania Health System, No. 10–2781, 2012 WL 2953216, at *2
(E.D.Pa. July 20, 2012) (“In employment discrimination cases, a duty to
preserve arises when the defendant receives notice of an EEOC
charge.”).
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Here, we note that Plaintiff emailed Defendant on March 13,
2022, alleging “[r]acial harassment, discrimination.” (See Doc. 101 at
13). However, notwithstanding the title of Plaintiff’s email, the
somewhat incoherent narrative set forth in that email did not include
facts that would put an employer on notice of a potential discrimination
claim. (See id.). Rather, at best, it describes a dispute with a co-worker
where the co-worker asked him questions, including whether he took
the trash out, and cursed at him. (Id.). There is nothing in that email
to suggest that Plaintiff was subject to any type of discrimination based
upon his race, religion, or national origin. (Id.).
Defendant states that it received a copy of “Plaintiff’s filing with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”)” on October 5,
2022. (Doc. 101 at 7). Accordingly, we find that Defendant should have
anticipated litigation at that point and so, its duty to preserve was
triggered on October 5, 2022. 	See, e.g., Thompson, 9. F. Supp. 3d at 453.
To the extent video surveillance footage was within the scope of the
duty to preserve, Defendant indicated that any such footage that “may
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have existed would have been overridden in the normal course” by that
date. (Doc. 101) (emphasis in original).
Because Defendant was not under a duty to preserve evidence at
the time any video surveillance footage was overwritten in the normal
course, there was no spoliation pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(e). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motions for Sanctions (Docs. 81
and 97) will be denied.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Motions for Sanctions
(Docs. 81 and 97) will be denied. An order follows.
Dated: February 2, 2026 	s/ Leo A. Latella
LEO A. LATELLA
United States Magistrate Judge
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