T.D.H. v. Middletown Borough Police Department et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
T.D.H.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MIDDLETOWN BOROUGH
POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-cv-01459
(SAPORITO, J.)
MEMORANDUM
In this federal civil rights action, the plaintiff, Tyler Henderson,
claims that a police officer, defendant Juan J. Castro, used excessive force
in effecting an arrest of the plaintiff, and that other police officers
present, 	defendants 	Scott 	Tantlinger 	and 	Derek Weinoldt, 	failed to
intervene to protect Henderson from that use of excessive force, all in
violation of Henderson’s Fourth Amendment rights. Henderson further
claims 	that 	this 	use 	of 	excessive 	force 	violated 	his 	Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights, and he also asserts state-law claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and battery against all
defendants. In addition to these individual police officers, Henderson
seeks to hold the Middletown Borough Police Department liable as the
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employer of two of these three police officers.1
The defendants have filed two separate but substantially similar
motions for summary judgment. Officer Weinoldt has filed a motion for
summary judgment, Doc. 66, together with a brief in support of his
motion, Doc. 67, and a statement of undisputed material facts, Doc. 68.
The 	Middletown 	Defendants—Officers 	Castro, 	Tantlinger, 	and 	their
municipal employer—have filed a motion for summary judgment, Doc.
69, together with a brief in support of their motion, Doc. 70, and a
statement of undisputed material facts, Doc. 69-1. The plaintiff has failed
to file any substantive response whatsoever to either motion.2
1 Officers Castro and Tantlinger are police officers employed with
the Middletown Borough Police Department. Officer Weinoldt is a police
officer employed with the Lower Swatara Township Police Department,
and he had responded to assist the Middletown officers with the arrest.
The 	complaint 	named 	two 	additional 	Middletown 	police 	officers 	as
defendants, both of whom were voluntarily dismissed in December 2023.
See Doc. 30.
2 We note that, although he was represented by counsel at the time
when he filed his complaint, Henderson’s attorney was permitted to
withdraw 	from 	representing 	him 	in 	October 	2024.
	See 	Doc. 	48.
Henderson was unable to secure substitute counsel, and he has been
appearing pro se in this matter since then. His only response to the
summary judgment motions is a handwritten pro se submission which
states: “Tyler D[.] Henderson ask that the courts move into judgement
[sic] the pleadings on defendants Juan J[.] Castro, Derek Wein[]oldt,
Scott Tantlinger and Middletown Borough Police Department[.] Today’s
Date is 11-4-25[.] Thank you[.]” Doc. 79.
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I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a
reasonable 	jury 	could 	return 	a 	verdict 	for 	the 	non-moving 	party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all
inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the
movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.”
Pastore v. Bell
Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).
The 	party 	seeking 	summary 	judgment 	“bears 	the 	initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,”
and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes
such a showing, the non-movant must set forth specific facts, supported
by the record, demonstrating that “the evidence presents a sufficient
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disagreement to require submission to the jury.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at
251–52.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first
determine if the moving party has made a
prima facie showing that it is
entitled to summary judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 331. Only once that
prima facie showing has been made does the
burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477
U.S. at 331.
Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the record,
including 	depositions, 	documents, 	electronically 	stored 	information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for the
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers or other
materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “An affidavit or declaration used to
support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out
facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or
declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(4). “Although evidence may be considered in a
	form which is
inadmissible at trial, the
content of the evidence must be capable of
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admission at trial.”
Bender v. Norfolk S. Corp., 994 F. Supp. 2d 593, 599
(M.D. Pa. 2014);
see also Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., 192 F.3d
378, 387 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that it is not proper, on summary
judgment, to consider evidence that is not admissible at trial).
Here, the defendants have moved for summary judgment, but the
plaintiff has failed to submit a brief in opposition or any other papers
contesting the defendants’ motions. The plaintiff ’s failure to actively
oppose the defendants’ motions for summary judgment implicates two
local rules, which provide that a party who fails to file a brief in
opposition to a motion “shall be deemed not to oppose such motion,” M.D.
Pa. LR 7.6, and that all material facts set forth in the movant’s statement
of material facts “will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted” by
a counter-statement of material facts by the non-movant, M.D. Pa. LR
56.1.
However, the plaintiff ’s failure to respond to the motion does not
mean 	that 	the 	defendants 	are 	automatically 	entitled 	to 	summary
judgment.
See Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Review, 922
F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990). These local rules must be construed and
applied in a manner consistent with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
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Procedure.
See id. at 174. Thus, in the context of a motion for summary
judgment, a non-movant’s failure to file an opposition brief and counter-
statement of material facts is “construed as effecting a waiver of [the non-
movant’s] right to controvert the facts asserted by the moving party in
the 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	or 	the 	supporting 	material
accompanying it.”
Id. at 175–76. The moving party must nevertheless
establish that, based on the facts set forth in support of its motion, it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See id.;
see also Lorenzo v.
Griffith, 12 F.3d 23, 28 (3d Cir. 1993);
Miller v. Ashcroft, 76 Fed. App’x
457, 462 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Even though the applicable [Middle District of
Pennsylvania] local rules provide that a summary judgment motion is to
be considered unopposed and its statement of material facts admitted
where a responsive brief is not timely filed, the Magistrate Judge was
still required to find that the undisputed facts warranted judgment as a
matter of law.” (citations omitted)).
In other words, in the absence of active opposition by the non-
movant, the two-step, burden-shifting analysis that normally applies on
summary judgment is abbreviated to just the first step, requiring the
moving party to make a
	prima facie showing that it is entitled to
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summary judgment, based on the undisputed facts of record.
See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331.
II. 	UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, the following facts are undisputed:3
This lawsuit arises from an encounter between Henderson and the
defendants that occurred on October 11, 2020. At the time of this
encounter, the plaintiff identified as a transgender female and went by
the name of Tiffany Henderson.4 His legal name, however, is Tyler Deonte
Henderson.
On October 11, 2020, at approximately 7:30 p.m., the Middletown
Police Department received an anonymous 9-1-1 call reporting screaming
and 	yelling 	and 	objects 	being 	smashed 	at 	110 	Woodland 	Avenue,
Apartment 203, Middletown, Pennsylvania (the “Premises”). Officers
Castro and Tantlinger were dispatched to the Premises in response to the
active disturbance report by 7:31 p.m.
After Castro and Tantlinger were dispatched, the complainant
3 This recitation of undisputed material facts is derived from the
defendants’ statements of material facts, the substance of which is
deemed admitted because Henderson has failed to respond to them.
4 We note that, during the course of this litigation, Henderson has
advised the court that he now prefers to be addressed by male pronouns.
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called back and informed the dispatcher that she had observed an
individual, later determined to be Henderson, leaving Apartment 203 on
foot, making threats. The caller described the subject of this person as a
“black female adult, wearing hot pink and leopard print.” Dispatch
informed Castro and Tantlinger of this updated information.
While en route to the Premises, Castro instructed Tantlinger, who
was in a separate car, to conduct a traffic stop on a vehicle which was
observed speeding in the area of the Premises on the suspicion that the
driver might have been involved in the disturbance to which they were
responding. Officer Weinoldt arrived and assisted in the traffic stop.
Ultimately, it was determined that the vehicle was not involved in the
disturbance.
Meanwhile, Castro continued on to the apartment complex, parked
his 	vehicle, 	and 	attempted 	to 	locate 	the 	female 	described 	by 	the
dispatcher. Castro did not observe the female outside, so he proceeded
inside the building and up the stairs to Apartment 203. He knocked on
the door several times and announced his presence as “Middletown
Police.” No one answered the door.
Castro contacted dispatch and prepared to contact witnesses. He
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then heard the front door of the apartment complex open and observed a
woman wearing a pink shirt and leopard print pants coming up the
stairs. The woman was later identified as the plaintiff, Henderson. The
plaintiff was alone, on the phone, and yelling at someone. Officer Castro
heard Henderson yell “I’m not fucking around, get the fuck out of here.”
He then observed that Henderson matched the description provided by
dispatch, and that Henderson appeared to Castro to be agitated. Castro
attempted to make contact with Henderson, asking if he was okay and
advising that he needed to talk to him, but Henderson brushed past
Castro, proceeded to Apartment 203, and entered the Premises.
Officer Castro knocked on the door to the Premises and Henderson
opened the door. Henderson immediately started screaming at Castro,
accusing the police officer of harassing him. Castro advised Henderson
that he was called to the Premises for a report of a fight and asked
Henderson to calm down and tell him what was happening. Castro spoke
to Henderson in a calm tone of voice and attempted to deescalate the
situation. But Henderson continued to yell, scream, and curse at Officer
Castro.
After completing their traffic stop, Officers Tantlinger and Weinoldt
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arrived on scene at the Premises at approximately 7:44 p.m. In his
incident report, Weinoldt reported that, upon arriving, he could hear
Henderson yelling at Castro, and Castro responding calmly. Tantlinger
and Weinoldt initially stood near the stairs while Castro continued to
speak with Henderson.
Officer Castro attempted to explain the nature of their presence,
but Henderson repeatedly cut him off. At his deposition, Tantlinger
characterized Henderson’s tone as combative and aggressive. Castro
repeatedly advised Henderson to calm down.
Officer Castro asked for the plaintiff ’s name and advised that the
officers needed to check the apartment. Henderson flung his ID card at
Castro’s chest. Castro caught it and observed that it bore the name “Tyler
Deonte Henderson.” Castro repeated the name off the ID card and asked
if that was what the plaintiff wanted to be called. Henderson said “get
the fuck out of my face.”
Castro asked Henderson who he was fighting with inside the
apartment, and Henderson immediately began to scream: “no fucking
body . . . none of your fucking business . . . this is my fucking house you
pussy . . . I pay for this shit so what the fuck do you need now pussy?”
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Castro warned Henderson to lower his voice and control his cursing, as
they 	were 	in 	an 	apartment 	building 	with 	other 	residents 	nearby.
Henderson replied by continuing to scream: “Fuck that I pay for this
shit . . . . this is my fucking home . . . do what you have to do then . . .
fucking 	harassing 	me 	in 	my 	fucking 	home.” 	Castro 	again 	warned
Henderson to calm down or the officer would be compelled to charge him
for his behavior.
Castro 	then 	asked 	who 	Henderson 	was 	fighting 	with 	and
Henderson again screamed: “no fucking body is in my fucking home . . .
fucking check and then get the fuck out of my face with this harassment!”
Castro again warned Henderson to calm down, and he asked if the
officers 	could 	check 	the 	apartment. 	Henderson 	stepped 	aside 	and
screamed: “Go the fuck ahead . . . I’m tired of fucking repeating myself
with you fucking assholes . . . go check damn it.”
Officers 	Tantlinger 	and 	Weinoldt 	entered 	the 	apartment 	and
performed a safety sweep of the interior. While they did that, Officer
Castro continued to try to talk to Henderson, explaining that there was
a 	call 	for 	an 	active 	disturbance 	that 	could 	be 	a 	fight 	or 	domestic
disturbance in progress, and he asked what had gotten Henderson so
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upset. In response, Henderson screamed and cursed at Castro, who
warned Henderson that he would be charged with disorderly conduct if
he continued to scream and curse. Henderson continued to scream,
yelling: “I pay $1,500 a month for this shit I can yell in my house fuck
you!” While screaming, Henderson would clap his hands and loudly
stomp his feet. Castro again warned Henderson to stop screaming and
cursing.
At that point, Henderson’s phone rang and he answered it and
immediately began screaming at the caller. Henderson then threw his
phone down and stomped his feet while continuing to scream. Officer
Castro then advised Henderson that he would be receiving a citation for
disorderly conduct. Henderson responded by continuing to curse and
scream at Castro, yelling “fuck you boo boo . . . you fucking pussies,”
while clapping his hands within a foot of Castro’s face.
Based on Henderson’s ongoing behavior, despite multiple warnings
to stop, Officer Castro advised Henderson that he was now being charged
with misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Henderson continued to scream at
Castro 	and 	clap 	his 	hands 	in 	Castro’s 	face. 	At 	that 	point, 	Castro
determined that an in-custody arrest was necessary because the incident
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was escalating. Officer Castro advised Henderson that he was under
arrest 	and 	motioned 	for 	Officers 	Tantlinger 	and 	Weinoldt 	to 	take
Henderson into custody.
Officer Tantlinger instructed Henderson to put his hands behind
his back, and he attempted to place Henderson in handcuffs, placing his
hand on Henderson’s arm. Henderson pulled away from Tantlinger and
Weinoldt and moved toward Castro in the hallway, hitting Castro in the
neck or collarbone area. Henderson attempted to tackle Castro, who stiff-
armed Henderson so he could not knock Castro down. Tantlinger took
ahold of Henderson’s arms and ordered Henderson to stop resisting.
Henderson ripped away from Tantlinger’s grasp again and spun around,
flailing his arms and striking Weinoldt in the face.
Officers Tantlinger and Weinoldt continued to attempt to gain
control of Henderson, and Henderson continued to struggle, flail, and
resist arrest. Henderson was kicking, driving his body into Weinoldt and
the wall, and thrashing around, contorting his body in an effort to escape
Tantlinger’s grasp and refusing to put his hands behind his back.
Officers Tantlinger and Castro were concerned that Henderson
would get out of their control and someone would get hurt. Tantlinger
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attempted to reach for his Taser, but was unable to do so. Tantlinger
continued to issue verbal commands for Henderson to calm down and
place his hands behind his back, but Henderson continued to resist,
struggle, and kick. Tantlinger began to lose his grip on Henderson.
Officer Castro had independently concluded that it was necessary to
deploy his Taser to halt Henderson’s resistance, but Tantlinger also
yelled for Castro to tase Henderson to stop his resistance.
Officer 	Castro 	deployed 	his 	Taser 	in 	“dart” 	mode, 	striking
Henderson’s right flank, and Henderson went to the ground. Officers
Tantlinger and Weinoldt attempted to place Henderson in handcuffs, but
Henderson continued to resist. Castro pulled the Taser trigger again to
obtain 	neuromuscular 	incapacitation, 	but 	it 	failed, 	and 	Henderson
continued to resist. Castro then used the Taser to deliver a “drive stun”
to Henderson’s lower extremity, allowing Tantlinger and Weinoldt to
secure Henderson in handcuffs.
Henderson claims to have sustained an injury as a result of his
being handcuffed, but he did not recall making any complaints of pain or
otherwise communicating to the officers that the handcuffs were too
tight. In fact, the first time Henderson recalled being aware of any injury
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was after he had been placed in jail, and he did not recall making any
complaint to jail staff regarding such an injury. Henderson has failed to
produce any medical evidence of any assessment of the nature or cause
of 	any 	injury. 	Indeed, 	the 	only 	documented 	medical 	complaint 	by
Henderson upon his arrival at the jail was a complaint of
neck pain.
Henderson also presented to the Lancaster General Hospital Emergency
Department approximately one week after his arrest, and following his
discharge from jail, at which time his only complaint was of an assault
by
prison guards. In 697 pages of relevant medical records produced by
the hospital in this case, there is no reference to any injury sustained by
Henderson as a result of his October 11, 2020, arrest. At his deposition,
Henderson testified that he filed suit to recover damages for the prison
assault, and that case ended in a settlement.
After his October 11, 2020, arrest, Henderson was charged with
multiple 	crimes, 	including 	felony 	aggravated 	assault, 	misdemeanor
resisting 	arrest, 	and 	misdemeanor 	disorderly 	conduct. 	Ultimately,
Henderson pleaded guilty to misdemeanor disorderly conduct pursuant
to a plea agreement, and he was sentenced to serve a 12-month term of
probation. He does not contest the lawfulness of his arrest.
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At his deposition, Henderson admitted that he had been “very
agitated and moving around.” He did not recall voluntarily putting his
hands behind his back or otherwise willingly facilitating his arrest, as
opposed to resisting it. Henderson was also unable to identify any
individuals who were treated differently than him based on their race or
gender identification.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Henderson’s complaint is comprised of five counts. In Count I,
Henderson asserts a § 1983 federal civil rights claim against Officer
Castro for the excessive use of force in effecting his arrest, in violation of
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In
Count II, Henderson asserts a § 1983 federal civil rights claim against
Officers Weinoldt and Tantlinger for their failure to intervene to protect
Henderson from Castro’s allegedly excessive use of force, in violation of
Henderson’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizure. In Count III, Henderson asserts a § 1983 federal civil rights
claim 	against 	all 	defendants 	for 	treating 	Henderson, 	an 	African-
American transgender female at the time of this incident, differently
than similarly situated Caucasian transgender women, in violation of his
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Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law. In Counts
IV and V, Henderson asserts state-law claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and battery against all defendants. Although named
as a defendant to the action, none of these claims is expressly brought
against Middletown Borough Police Department. The defendants have
moved for summary judgment on all claims.
A. Excessive Force Claim
Henderson claims that Officer Castro’s use of a Taser against him—
once in “dart” mode and once in “drive stun” mode—constituted the
excessive use of force.5
“The use of excessive force during an arrest is a cognizable violation
under the Fourth Amendment.”
Geist v. Ammary, 40 F. Supp. 3d 467, 475
(E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 n.16 (1979)). “[A]
plaintiff may prevail on an excessive force claim if he can show that a
seizure occurred and that the seizure ‘was unreasonable under the
circumstances.’”
Brown v. Cwynar, 484 Fed. App’x 676, 679 (3d Cir. 2012)
5 The complaint also appears to attempt to attribute force used by
the other officers in the course of subduing Henderson—handcuffing him,
kneeling on his back, pulling his hair, and beating him—to Officer Castro,
but there is no evidence in the record that Castro used any force against
Henderson other than deployment of the officer’s Taser.
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(quoting
Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011)).
“A seizure occurs when a suspect ‘submits to the police’s show of
authority or the police subject him to some degree of physical force.’”
Id.
at 680 (quoting
Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 1999)). Thus,
it is undisputed that Henderson was “seized” by Officer Castro.
As for whether that seizure was reasonable, “we examine the
objective reasonableness of the officer[’s] conduct.”
Santil v. Borough of
Carteret, No. 22-2898, 2024 WL 3565308, at *8 (3d Cir. July 29, 2024)
(citing
	Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 417 (3d Cir. 2015)). “This
requires 	that 	we 	consider 	whether 	under 	the 	totality 	of 	the
circumstances, the officer[’s] actions are objectively reasonable in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivations.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting
Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2004)).
The 	following 	factors 	guide 	our 	analysis: 	(1) 	the
severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect
poses an imminent threat to the safety of the police or
others in the vicinity, (3) whether the suspect attempts
to resist arrest or flee the scene, (4) the possibility that
the persons subject to the police action are themselves
violent or dangerous, (5) the duration of the action,
(6) whether the action takes place in the context of
effecting an arrest, (7) the possibility that the suspect
may be armed, and (8) the number of persons with
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whom the police officers must contend at one time.
Id. at *8 n.16 (citation modified) (first quoting
Santini, 795 F.3d at 417
(citing
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (identifying the first
three factors)); and then quoting
Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d
Cir. 1997) (identifying the last five factors),
abrogated on other grounds
by Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 209–11 (3d Cir. 2007));
see also Geist, 40
F. Supp. 3d at 476. Moreover,
[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must
be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight. . . . 	The 	calculus 	of 	reasonableness 	must
embody allowance for the fact that police officers are
often 	forced 	to 	make 	split-second 	judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary
in a particular situation.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.
Although the gratuitous use of a Taser on an individual who is
“nonviolent, compliant, and poses no threat of danger” is objectively
unreasonable and thus unconstitutional, courts have “held that the use
of a taser on an individual who disobeys an officer or actively resists an
officer’s commands is constitutionally reasonable.”
See Randolph-Ali v.
Minium, 793 Fed. App’x 146, 150 (3d Cir. 2019) (collecting cases);
see also
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Geist, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 476 & n.27 (collecting cases).
Applying the relevant factors, and viewing the undisputed material
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving plaintiff, we conclude
that no reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Castro’s use of a Taser
to subdue Henderson during his arrest was objectively unreasonable.
Although there was nothing to suggest to the officers that Henderson
might be armed, and the officers were contending with only a single
arrestee 	at 	the 	time, 	the 	other 	factors 	identified 	above 	weigh
overwhelmingly in favor of an objectively reasonable use of force. The
crime at issue at the time when Castro deployed his Taser—aggravated
assault involving bodily injury to an officer in the performance of his
duty—is serious. Until he was finally subdued, Henderson was actively
and violently resisting arrest, and in doing so, he clearly posed an
imminent threat to the safety of the arresting officers, struggling with
the officers, striking Weinoldt in the face, and attempting to tackle
Castro. The use of force—one successful deployment of the Taser in dart
mode and a second in drive stun mode—was brief in duration and clearly
took place in the context of an arrest.
The moving defendants have made a
prima facie showing that,
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based 	on 	the 	undisputed 	facts of 	record, 	viewed in 	the 	light 	most
favorable to the nonmoving party, they are entitled to summary judgment
on the plaintiff ’s excessive force claim. The nonmoving plaintiff has failed
to respond to the defendants’ motions or statements of material facts.
Accordingly, 	summary 	judgment 	will 	be 	granted 	in 	favor 	of 	the
defendants with respect to the plaintiff ’s excessive force claim.6
B. Failure to Intervene/Protect Claim
Henderson claims that Officers Weinoldt’s and Tantlinger’s failure
to intervene to protect him from Officer Castro’s use of a Taser against
him constituted a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights as well.
To establish liability under a failure to intervene theory, a plaintiff
must 	demonstrate 	that 	his 	underlying 	constitutional 	rights 	were
violated, that the officer had a duty to intervene, and that the officer had
a 	realistic 	and 	reasonable 	opportunity 	to 	intervene.
	See 	Smith 	v.
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650–51 (3d Cir. 2002). Generally, an officer who
6 We note that the defendants have also raised a qualified immunity
defense with respect to this claim. But the matter of qualified immunity
need 	not 	be 	addressed 	if 	the 	court 	determines 	that 	no 	underlying
constitutional violation occurred.
See Schieber v. City of Phila., 320 F.3d
409, 423 (3d Cir. 2003);
Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 174–75 (3d
Cir. 1998).
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is 	in 	the 	vicinity 	when 	a 	constitutional 	violation 	occurs 	has 	the
opportunity to intervene, at least for summary judgment purposes.
See
id. at 650 (“[A]ll of the named officers were in the vicinity at some point
when [the plaintiff] alleges he was beaten.”).
Because, as addressed in the preceding section of this opinion,
Henderson has failed to demonstrate that his underlying constitutional
rights 	were 	violated, 	he 	cannot 	maintain 	his 	claim 	for 	failure 	to
intervene.
See Chapolini v. Capodanno, No. 21-2954, 2023 WL 179843, at
*2 (3d Cir. Jan. 13, 2023) (per curiam) (“A failure-to-intervene claim
requires showing an underlying constitutional violation occurred, and
[the plaintiff has made no such showing.” (citation omitted));
Adams v.
Selhorst, 449 Fed. App’x 198, 204 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[Plaintiff]
failed to demonstrate that her underlying constitutional rights were
violated. 	Therefore, 	she 	cannot 	maintain 	a 	claim 	for 	failure 	to
intervene.”).
The moving defendants have made a
prima facie showing that,
based 	on 	the 	undisputed 	facts of 	record, 	viewed in 	the 	light 	most
favorable to the nonmoving party, they are entitled to summary judgment
on 	the 	plaintiff ’s 	failure-to-intervene/protect 	claim. 	The 	nonmoving
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plaintiff has failed to respond to the defendants’ motions or statements of
material facts. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor
of 	the 	defendants 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	plaintiff ’s 	failure-to-
intervene/protect claim.7
C. Equal Protection Claim
Henderson claims that the defendants treated him, an African-
American transgender female at the time of this incident, differently
than similarly situated Caucasian transgender women, in violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights.
To establish an equal protection claim, a plaintiff “must point to an
existing and relevant comparator.”
Smith v. City of Atl. City, 138 F.4th
759, 778 (3d Cir. 2025). This is because “the Fourteenth Amendment
proscribes unequal treatment only among persons similarly situated
according to a relevant standard of comparison.”
Stradford v. Sec’y Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2022). “Other factors explaining
disparate treatment will usually preclude persons from being similarly
situated.”
Id.
Henderson 	has 	failed 	to 	produce 	any 	evidence 	whatsoever 	of
7
See supra note 6.
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similarly 	situated 	Caucasian 	transgender 	women—or 	any 	other
combination of race and gender identity—who were treated differently
from him when they violently resisted a lawful arrest. Absent such
comparator 	evidence, 	Henderson’s 	equal 	protection 	claim 	fails 	as 	a
matter of law.
See Hargrave v. Ramsey, 688 Fed. App’x 124, 127 (3d Cir.
2017);
see also Heath v. City of Phila., No. 16-5302, 2021 WL 2661520, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2021) (“Plaintiff has not identified any similarly-
situated comparators, crippling her Equal Protection claim.”).
The moving defendants have made a
prima facie showing that,
based 	on 	the 	undisputed 	facts of 	record, 	viewed in 	the 	light 	most
favorable to the nonmoving party, they are entitled to summary judgment
on the plaintiff ’s equal protection claim. The nonmoving plaintiff has
failed to respond to the defendants’ motions or statements of material
facts. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of the
defendants with respect to the plaintiff ’s equal protection claim.8
D. Municipal Liability Claims
The 	complaint 	does 	not 	articulate 	any 	specific 	claims 	against
Middletown Borough Police Department, but it has included it as a party,
8
See supra note 6.
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presumably as the employer of Officers Castro and Tantlinger.
“On 	its 	face, 	§ 1983 	makes 	liable 	‘every 	person’ who 	deprives
another of civil rights under color of state law.”
Burns v. Reid, 500 U.S.
478, 497 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
Monell 	v. 	Department 	of 	Social 	Services, 	436 	U.S. 	658 	(1978), 	the
Supreme Court of the United States established that municipalities and
other local governmental units are included among those “persons”
subject 	to 	liability 	under 	§ 1983.
	Id. 	at 	690. 	A borough 	is 	such 	a
municipality subject to liability as a “person” under § 1983.
Chizmar v.
Borough of Trafford, 454 Fed. App’x 100, 106 (3d Cir. 2011);
Cannarozzo
v. Borough of W. Hazleton, 575 F. Supp. 3d 510, 528 (M.D. Pa. 2021).
But “[u]nder
Monell, a municipality cannot be subjected to liability
solely because injuries were inflicted by its agents or employees.”
Jiminez
v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007). Rather,
a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only if the conduct alleged to
be unconstitutional either “implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
that body’s officers” or is “visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even
though such a custom has not received formal approval through the
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body’s official decision-making channels.”
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91.
“[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made
by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983.”
Jiminez, 503 F.3d at 249. “A plaintiff
must identify the challenged policy, attribute it to the [municipality or
corporation] itself, and show a causal link between execution of the policy
and the injury suffered.”
Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903,
910 (3d Cir. 1984).
Here, the plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence whatsoever
regarding any policies, practices, or customs of the municipal defendant,
apparently relying solely on a
respondeat superior theory of liability with
respect to the Middletown Borough Police Department, and thus his
claims against the municipality—such as they are—fail as a matter of
law.
	See Jimenez, 503 F.3d at 249. Moreover, in the absence of any
underlying 	constitutional 	violations, 	Middletown 	Borough 	Police
Department is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on any § 1983
Monell derivative liability claims against it.
See Los Angeles v. Heller,
475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986);
Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, 706 F.3d
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227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013).
The moving defendants have made a
prima facie showing that,
based 	on 	the 	undisputed 	facts of 	record, 	viewed in 	the 	light 	most
favorable to the nonmoving party, they are entitled to summary judgment
on the plaintiff ’s
	Monell municipal liability claims. The nonmoving
plaintiff has failed to respond to the defendants’ motions or statements of
material facts. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor
of the defendants with respect to the plaintiff ’s
Monell municipal liability
claims.
E. State-Law Claims
Where a district court has dismissed all claims over which it had
original jurisdiction, the court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Whether the
court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within its discretion.
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009). That decision should be
based on “the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity.”
	Carnegie-Mellon 	Univ. 	v. Cohill, 	484 U.S. 343, 	350 	(1988);
Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995). “[I]n
the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial,
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the 	balance 	of 	factors . . . 	will 	point 	toward 	declining 	to 	exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”
Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350
n.7. Upon consideration of these factors and the record before us, we find
nothing to distinguish this from the usual case. Therefore, the remaining
state-law claims will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment will be granted. The clerk will be directed to enter judgment in
favor of the defendants on the plaintiff ’s § 1983 federal civil rights claims
set forth in Counts I, II, and III of the complaint, and the plaintiff ’s state-
law tort claims set forth in Counts IV and V will be dismissed without
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: March 6, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
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