Rivera v. Dempsey et al

1:22-cv-00233Pamd1 dic 2025

Testo completo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANGEL RIVERA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ARIANNA DEMPSEY,
et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-cv-00233
(SAPORITO, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Angel Rivera alleges that four defendants1 affiliated with
SCI-Frackville were deliberately indifferent to his risk of self-injury,
leading to an incident in which he swallowed pills and a razor in May
2021. The defendants have moved for summary judgment. (Docs. 74, 78).
Because 	the 	record 	plainly 	contradicts 	Rivera’s 	claims 	that 	the
defendants ignored his threats of self-harm and denied him medical care,
the defendants’ motions will be granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In brief, the operative complaint (Doc. 13) alleges as follows: Rivera
was an inmate at SCI-Frackville who suffered from “serious mental
1 A fifth defendant, Nathan Wynder, was voluntarily dismissed.
See
(Doc. 56).
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illness.” Between July 29, 2020, and March 8, 2021, he engaged in “over
a dozen incidents of self-harm,” including a 56-day hunger strike, self-
mutilation, and suicide attempts. On March 8, after spending 17 days in
a Psychiatric Observation Cell (“POC”) following a suicide attempt, he
was considered for potential discharge to the Restricted Housing Unit
(“RHU”) by nurses Arianna Dempsey and Stephen Donahue. Dempsey
allegedly “informed [Rivera] that she was aware of his vulnerabilities to
suicide, and self-harm. However, she needed his cell for other inmates.”
Although Rivera allegedly told Dempsey and Donahue that he “needed
serious help” and would “most definitely find a way to kill himself” if
released from the POC, Rivera was released to the RHU on March 8,
“without any form of official protection from self-harm.”
In the following weeks, Rivera filed prison grievances and made a
variety of informal complaints to prison staff about his release from the
POC and his vulnerability to suicide. These included oral complaints to
Shawn Kephart, who allegedly told Rivera that there was “no need for
psychiatric observation of any kind,” and Robert Boyce, who allegedly
told Rivera that he “could not do anything unless [Rivera] actually
attempted 	to 	kill 	himself.” 	On 	May 	7, 	2021, 	Rivera 	“ingested 	an
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[aluminum] razor[] and over two dozen psychotropic pills in an attempt
to kill himself.”
On April 20, 2023, the Court denied defendant Dempsey’s motion to
dismiss the claims against her pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and it denied
her 	request 	for 	summary 	judgment 	for 	Rivera’s 	failure 	to 	exhaust
administrative remedies.
See (Docs. 34, 35). The case thus proceeds on
Rivera’s Eighth Amendment claims of deliberate indifference to a serious
medical 	need 	and 	“failure 	to 	prevent 	self-harm” 	against 	Dempsey,
Donahue, Boyce, and Kephart. The defendants’ motions for summary
judgment are ripe for adjudication.2
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a
2 Rivera has also filed a “Motion to Strike/Rebuttal and/or Reply
Brief” (Doc. 97), which is in substance an untimely sur-reply filed without
leave of court.
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reasonable 	jury 	could 	return 	a 	verdict 	for 	the 	non-moving 	party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all
inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the
movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.”
Pastore v. Bell
Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking
summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence
of a genuine dispute of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant
must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that
“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
the jury.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first
determine if the moving party has made a
prima facie showing that it is
entitled to summary judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the
burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477
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U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the
record, 	including 	depositions, 	documents, 	electronically 	stored
information, 	affidavits 	or 	declarations, 	stipulations 	(including 	those
made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
III. 	MATERIAL FACTS
Rivera’s response to Dempsey’s statement of material facts is styled
as an affidavit,
	see (Doc. 89), and cites only sparingly to supporting
evidence. 	Where 	Rivera 	has 	not 	presented 	competent 	evidence 	to
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the factual assertions in
Rivera’s 	affidavit 	are 	disregarded3, 	and 	defendants’ 	contrary 	fact
statements are deemed admitted.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); M.D. Pa.
L.R. 56.1. Specifically, Rivera disputes much of the content of his medical
records, attesting that the records were “fabricated” and that he “does not
recall” the events described therein, or that the events never occurred. As
further described below, these unsupported attestations are contradicted
3 For example, Rivera’s repeated attestations that defendants acted
with an “agenda of depriving [him] of treatment” (
see,
e.g., (Doc. 89 at 8))
are disregarded, because he presents no basis to establish his personal
knowledge of the defendants’ motivations.
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by the record and do not create a genuine issue of material fact. Thus,
Rivera’s relevant medical records from February 1 through May 7, 2021,
are summarized herein.
See (Doc. 76-5).
A. Background to POC Discharge (February 1-March 1, 2021)
On February 1, Rivera was being housed in a POC because he had
flooded his own cell and “endorsed suicidal ideation.” He reported cutting
himself daily with plastic spoons due to “stress,” and the attending nurse
ordered that he not receive cutlery. The nurse found “no clear symptoms
that would warrant medication intervention and the risk of medications
continues 	to 	outweigh 	any 	benefit 	as 	he 	has 	repeatedly 	hoarded
medications and overdosed despite safety measures like crush orders.”
(Doc. 76-5 at 8).
On February 3, Rivera presented broken pieces of a plastic spoon,
which he had used to cut himself, and reported having “rubbed feces into
the lacerations on his arm.” Nurse Megan Walsh reviewed his medical
history, including detailed descriptions of his behavior during the prior
five days, and spoke to him at length. Rivera made “multiple comments
to staff about ending his life if placed back in the RHU.” The psychology
department offered him non-medical interventions, but Rivera demanded
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medication, which the staff refused based on his prior incidents of
hoarding and overdosing. Walsh concluded that Rivera “continues to be
self-harming and so will need to remain in POC with no change orders.”
However, later that day, Rivera requested to see a psychology provider.
The provider noted that Rivera wanted to “start [a] step-down plan today,
so he can return to [the RHU] on Friday.” The following day, Rivera was
laughing and joking with staff, reported no “mental health symptoms,”
and requested reading material. The plan was to “start to try to progress
him safely,” removing him from “constant” watch to “close” watch, and
granting his request for reading material. (
Id. at 14-21).
On February 5, Rivera’s attitude had changed. He told Walsh that
he would “never stop” harming himself, and he produced a broken spoon4
with blood on it. He would remain in the POC, but he would not be
prescribed 	medication 	because 	“his 	behaviors 	and 	self-harming 	are
considered 	part 	of 	ASPD 	diagnosis5 	which 	does 	not 	respond 	to
4 Walsh noted that, although security had been notified, it was
“unclear how [Rivera] continues to access plastic utensils.”
5 The parties dispute Rivera’s mental health diagnoses. The prison
staff listed his diagnoses as including antisocial personality disorder
(“ASPD”) and “unspecified insomnia disorder,” but that these did not
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medication,” 	and 	because 	of 	his 	history 	of 	hoarding 	medication,
overdosing, and self-harm. (
Id. at 24-26).
On 	February 	8, 	Rivera 	was 	seen 	by 	psychiatrist 	Dr. 	Andrew
Newton, 	who 	described 	Rivera’s 	case 	as 	“challenging 	from 	the
management point of view.” Newton examined Rivera, noting that he
presented “no objective clinical signs of psychotic illness,” and had been
“tried on pharmacotherapy severally in the past with no therapeutic
benefit.” Ultimately, Newton directed that he should be discharged to a
camera cell in the RHU, with a referral to a Behavioral Management
Unit. On admission to the RHU, Rivera “presented as respectful, calm,
and cooperative,” and denied any significant mental health symptoms.
(
Id. at 29-37).
On February 12, Rivera presented without psychological distress,
and he was noted to be harassing and mocking staff. Walsh noted that
Rivera had not shown any self-harm or psychiatric symptoms since
February 8. On February 16, he was still in no apparent distress and
constitute a “serious mental illness.” Rivera claims that in addition to the
listed diagnoses, he “suffered from a serious case of Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder,” and that his condition should have been classified as
serious.
See (Doc. 89, ¶ 43; Docs. 90-3, 90-4).
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reported 	no 	symptoms, 	but 	continued to 	“demonstrate[] 	controlling,
immature 	behavior.” 	However, 	on 	February 	18, 	Rivera 	was 	again
reported to have flooded his cell and “reported to [a lieutenant] that he’s
going 	to 	kill 	himself.” 	Psychiatry 	provider 	Maribeth 	Bucher 	wrote:
“Inmate is a frequent flyer to the POC and uses it as a coping skill. He
has also been known to hoard his medication to overdose so he can be
sent out to the hospital for a brief respite from prison.” (
Id. at 52-75).
The following day, Rivera reported to staff in the POC that he had
swallowed “a 1/4 inch razor blade,” but he “refused” an x-ray. He reported
that he had wanted to come to the POC for “quiet,” because the RHU was
too stressful. Despite his report of swallowing the razor blade, he denied
any psychiatric symptoms and did not appear to be in any distress. On
February 22, he again denied any psychiatric symptoms, but on February
23, he reported having cut himself and refused treatment from any
medical or psychiatric provider. On February 24, he presented in no
psychiatric distress. He “report[ed] that he wants certain things (blanket,
mattress, water, etc) and essentially that he is behaving badly until he
can get them.” The providers concluded that his actions were intended to
“manipulate and control [his] environment,” and not consistent with
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psychiatric pathology. On February 25-26, he was verbally abusive to
staff and refused evaluation and assessment. (
Id. at 79-115).
With respect to the medical notes from this period, Rivera attests
that he “never spoke to these parties about any of this stuff” or “does not
recall 	any 	of 	this.” 	He 	attests 	that 	during 	this 	period, 	he 	“recalls
informing institutional staff on a daily basis that he was suicidal and
having suicidal thoughts [non]-stop, and that if discharged to the RHU
that he had plans to find a way to kill himself,” but “institutional staff
refused to document this and report this.”
B. Refusal of Treatment and POC Discharge (March 1-March 8,
2021)
The medical notes document that on March 1, 2021, Rivera was
seen 	by 	defendant 	Arianna 	Dempsey, 	a 	psychiatric 	nurse. 	Rivera
appeared in no psychiatric distress, and he claimed that he “never said I
was going to kill myself.” He demanded a mattress and blanket that had
been refused due to his prior incidents of self-harm: “You have to give me
what I ask for. I haven’t threatened to hurt myself or engage in self-
injury. I know the policy.” Aside from these and other demands, he “did
not want to engage in any therapeutic conversation”: “I don’t want
programming now. I don’t need it. I am cool.” Between March 2 and
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March 4, he refused a series of attempts by mental health staff to interact
with him. On March 4, Walsh noted that he had “expressed to nursing
staff that his intention was to remain in the POC until he was transferred
to a BMU.” Walsh concluded that Rivera was “grossly abusing the POC
by refusing assessments in order to extend his POC stay indefinitely.”
Walsh contacted a “regional medical director to assess for whether Mr.
Rivera can be discharged from the POC despite refusing assessment,”
given that he had four consecutive days without self-harm. Between
March 5 and 7, Rivera again refused assessment by the medical staff, and
providers were “working on a behavioral plan on how to successfully
discharge him from the POC.” (
Id. at 117-141).
On March 8, after a final discussion with Dempsey, Rivera was
discharged from the POC to an RHU camera cell for monitoring, with
follow-up interactions scheduled to address his “maladaptive behaviors”
and anti-social personality disorder. In Rivera’s discharge summary,
Dempsey recounted Rivera’s last 14 days in the POC, including his recent
“lack of engaging in any and all offered treatment” and attempts to
manipulate staff, and noted that the regional medical chief had approved
the discharge. (
Id. at 154).
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Rivera 	generally 	disputes 	these 	events 	on 	the 	same 	grounds
described above,
i.e., that he “does not recall” the events, “never spoke”
to the relevant individuals about these topics, and complained daily
about his suicidal thoughts to staff who refused to report them.
C. Treatment After Discharge (March 8-May 6, 2021)
Medical notes indicate that within hours after being discharged,
Rivera agreed to be assessed by a psychiatric provider “for the first time
since [March 1] when he spoke with [Dempsey].” He indicated that he
was “not going back to the RHU,” and made “veiled threats” of self-harm:
“I already notified my family. Make sure you document this. I told you
that I am having these thoughts non-stop.” (
Id. at 157).
Between March 9 and March 22, Rivera vacillated between verbally
abusing staff, refusing to interact with staff, and accusing staff of denying
him 	medical 	treatment. 	He 	generally 	presented 	without 	apparent
psychological distress. At a contact on March 16, Rivera was “smirking
as he asked [Boyce] questions about his stepdown plan . . . [H]is questions
were 	answered 	previously 	by 	other 	staff. 	He 	is 	well 	aware 	of 	his
restrictions, and the treatment rationale.” (
Id. at 159-196).
On March 23 Rivera complained to Boyce about the fact that he was
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on a 6-month razor restriction. Boyce responded that he was “not aware
of the 6 months, but if he is on one I presume it is due to his extensive
history of self-harm,” including his previous claim that he had swallowed
a razor. Rivera explained that he “hurts himself to make staff angry, or
because he is pissed off . . . or to make staff work.” Boyce described the
following interaction with Rivera:
I asked him if he ever thought about what he does to his
body on a spiritual level. He asked what I meant. I asked
him to consider the prospect that he has a moral and
ethical obligation to himself, to take care of himself
medically, to treat himself with kindness, respect, and
dignity . . .
I told him that despite what he may think or feel
sometimes, staff are trying to [help] him and we really
do want what is best for him. He asked me if he felt he
needed to go to the POC, even though he did not harm
himself, could he go. I told him that if he felt like he was
a danger to himself or others, or thought he might harm
himself, I would want him to ask for POC . . .
(
Id. at 197).
Over the following days, Rivera continued to complain about his
razor restriction. At a meeting on March 30, 2021, Rivera reiterated prior
complaints about lack of medication, and made a veiled threat of self-
harm to Boyce: “If nursing isn’t going to do their jobs . . . I am going to
show their incompetence.” Rivera “remarked with a smile, that he can’t
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predict how he will act, what he will say, and what he will do.” Boyce
pointed out the “contradictions” of that statement, “
i.e., [his] deliberate,
measured and calculated” attempts to influence staff and affect his cell
transfer, to which Rivera “appeared pleased that his efforts were being
acknowledged.” Boyce’s conclusion was that Rivera’s “agenda [was] to
expedite his transfer and litigate . . . He doesn’t appear motivated in
treatment.” This pattern of accusations, abuse of staff, and demands for
various accommodations generally continued through April. (
Id. at 214-
245).
On April 30, Rivera was provisionally accepted into the Behavioral
Management Unit as he had requested, and “expressed his thanks for the
help that was offered to him,” telling one staff member: “I’m done gang
warring with you all.” On May 3, while on the waiting list for the BMU,
he “presented as calm, making jokes, and appeared satisfied that he was
leaving.” Between May 4 and May 6, he was still awaiting transfer, but
was laughing and joking with staff, and denied thoughts of suicide or self-
harm. (
Id. at 246-271).
In response to these records, Rivera attests that he “specifically
recalls informing Institutional Staff (All Defendants) on a regular or
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when available” of his ongoing suicidal thoughts, and to the extent the
medical records document facts to the contrary, he “does not recall these
allegations in the slightest.”
D. Self-Harm Incident (May 7, 2021)
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on May 7, 2021, Boyce was summoned
to the RHU, where Rivera was reported to be “making statements about
possibly getting cell extracted.” When Boyce arrived, Rivera complained
about staff actions related to yard time, alleged tampering with his mail,
and delays in his transfer to the BMU. Rivera told Boyce that he had
warned staff “about what would happen if he was sent to the RHU after
his last POC discharge, that at some point he can harm himself when and
if he chooses to do so.” Rivera stated: “You can’t stop it . . . [m]y mind was
already made up.” Rivera then produced a razor blade which was hidden
in a sugar packet, “20 or more” pills in his hand, and another four pills
on the wicket6. Boyce knocked away the four pills, and asked for the
remaining contraband, but did not try to reach through the wicket out of
concern that Rivera would injure him. Rivera “swallowed the pills and
6 A wicket is a slot in a prison cell door.
See Taylor v. Reinard, No.
3:CV-12-0891, 2013 WL 4647421, at *1 n.2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2013).
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the razor blade,” and told Boyce that he had already swallowed another
10 pills. He was taken to an emergency room for treatment. (
Id. at 274).
The record does not describe the medical consequences for Rivera, but he
attests that he “had to undergo surgery.”
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. Administrative Remedies
The defendants have requested summary judgment on the basis
that Rivera failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a);
Downey v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020). The Court previously
addressed this issue and found that Rivera had raised a genuine issue of
material fact “as to whether his attempts to exhaust his administrative
remedies were thwarted by prison officials.”
	See (Doc. 34 at 22-23).
Because exhaustion under the PLRA is “non-jurisdictional,” and the
record forecloses any relief to Rivera on the merits, the Court need not
further address these arguments.
See,
e.g.,
Martinez v. Berfield, No. 1:20-
CV-1759, 2024 WL 4311474, at *3 n.6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2024) (citing
Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 265 (2018)).
B. Rivera’s Affidavits
Rivera’s opposition to summary judgment is largely premised on his
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own affidavits.
See (Docs. 89, 90-2, 102-1). Therefore, the Court must
consider whether this is competent evidence at the summary judgment
stage. It is well-established that “conclusory, self-serving” testimony, via
affidavit or deposition, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
See
Irving v. Chester Water Auth., 439 F. App’x 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2011);
Kirleis
v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted). However, “the testimony of a litigant will almost
always be 	self serving since 	few litigants will 	knowingly volunteer
statements that are prejudicial to their case . . . [T]hat has never meant
that a litigant’s evidence must be categorically rejected by the fact finder.”
Lupyan v. Corinthian Colleges Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 321 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2014).
When a non-movant attempts to defeat summary judgment through their
own testimony, courts consider whether that testimony, “juxtaposed with
the other evidence, is sufficient for a rational factfinder to credit [it]
despite its self-serving nature.”
See Hricenak v. Mickey Truck Bodies, No.
4:21-CV-00694, 	2024 	WL 	1604650, 	at 	*2 	(M.D. 	Pa. 	Apr. 	12, 	2024)
(citations 	omitted);
	Whitnum 	v. 	Meadows 	at 	Stroud 	for 	Nursing 	&
Rehab.,
LLC, No. 3:18-CV-02137, 2020 WL 7773906, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec.
30, 2020);
see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When
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opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a
court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on
a motion for summary judgment.”).
Essentially, Rivera claims in his affidavits that he threatened self-
harm or suicide every day, to “all defendants,” and that voluminous,
detailed records of his actions or statements to the contrary are all
“fabricated.” Rivera’s repeated, vague explanations that he “never spoke
to these parties about any of this stuff” in his medical records, or “does
not recall” the documented incidents, are unsupported by any other
evidence.7 His claim of daily, unreported threats of self-harm is similarly
unsubstantiated, 	even 	in 	his 	contemporaneous 	grievances.8 	To 	the
7
See Kirleis, 560 F.3d at 162 (citing
Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305
F.3d 728, 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2002) (affiant’s bare assertion that she “did
not recall” seeing a document did not create a triable issue as to whether
she received it)).
8 Two of Rivera’s grievances state, in broad terms, that he told
various medical staff he would “find a way to kill [him]self” if released to
the 	RHU.
	See 	(Doc. 	90-8, 	Doc. 	95-1 	at 	15). 	Contrary 	to 	Rivera’s
accusations, Dempsey and other staff did acknowledge threats of self-
harm in the medical notes, but they concluded that these threats were
essentially manipulative.
See,
e.g., (Doc. 76-5 at 13-15, 154, 157). Thus,
the statements in Rivera’s grievances do not support his claims that
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contrary, at the time he claims the medical staff was ignoring his threats,
Rivera was in fact complaining that he had been “placed in the POC for
nearly a month without justification” (Doc. 90-8) and that staff ’s refusal
to give him a razor amounted to unjustified “retaliation.” (Doc. 90-5).
In sum, Rivera’s affidavits do not establish a genuine dispute of fact
as to the symptoms he presented to medical staff or the treatment that
he was offered. Therefore, the Court’s remaining analysis is directed to
whether this treatment, as documented in the record, reflects deliberate
indifference by any defendant.
C. Eighth Amendment
A plaintiff can establish an Eighth Amendment claim by showing
that (1) he had a serious medical need; (2) the defendant was deliberately
indifferent to that need; and (3) the deliberate indifference caused harm
to the plaintiff.
	Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 229 (3d Cir. 2023).
Deliberate indifference requires “obduracy and wantonness,” which may
be shown by recklessness or conscious disregard of a serious risk.
Rouse
v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting
Whitley v. Albers,
medical 	notes 	were 	“fabricated” 	or 	that 	the 	defendants 	refused 	to
document his threats.
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475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). In the context of suicide or self-harm, a plaintiff
can state an Eighth Amendment claim by establishing (1) a “particular
vulnerability” to suicide or self-harm; (2) that “the prison official knew or
should have known” of that vulnerability; and (3) “the official acted with
reckless or deliberate indifference.”
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209,
223-24 (3d Cir. 2017).
The essence of Rivera’s claim is that his March 8 placement in the
RHU constituted deliberate indifference to his risk of suicide or self-
harm. However, even accepting Rivera’s point that the RHU was “less
safe” than the POC, the record forecloses any inference of deliberate
indifference. Prior to the March 8 transfer, the staff attempted to treat
his mental illness in the POC, but he repeatedly refused or undermined
the offers of treatment, and staff were essentially unable to identify a
medical cause for his behavior.9 Based on ample evidence, including
9 The record documents Rivera’s treatment for roughly five weeks
preceding the transfer, but Rivera further concedes that in the “months
leading up to” this incident, he had been placed in POCs “approximately
15 times,” and seen “by Psychology staff approximately 35 times, and
Psychiatry staff nearly 100 plus times.” (Doc. 90 at 4);
	see Bucek v.
Allegheny Cnty., No. 2:22-CV-940-NR, 2025 WL 1826134, at *7 (W.D. Pa.
July 2, 2025) (“This extensive and frequent medical treatment—even if
wrong—undercuts any showing of deliberate indifference.”).
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Rivera’s own admissions, the staff concluded that he was “grossly abusing
the POC by refusing assessments in order to extend his POC stay
indefinitely.” Thus, Rivera was transferred from the POC to the RHU,
having spent the prior week essentially refusing all evaluation and
treatment, and not engaging in self-harm. Rivera was released to a cell
with a camera where he would be monitored by staff. Even if this decision
was erroneous or negligent, a medical professional’s reasoned decisions
premised 	on 	the 	belief 	that 	a 	patient 	is 	malingering 	do 	not 	show
deliberate indifference.
See,
e.g.,
Todd v. Walters, 166 F. App’x 590, 592
(3d Cir. 2006);
Grant v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:20-CV-00338,
2021 WL 4312451, at *9 n.7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2021). The fact that medical
staff10 documented and submitted this plan for review by the regional
medical director, who approved the plan, further belies any inference of
recklessness or “wantonness.”
See,
e.g.,
Blaise v. Ebbert, No. 3:12-CV-
2298, 2015 WL 1400878, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2015);
	Dixon v.
10 	The record does not indicate that any defendant aside from
Dempsey 	was 	directly 	involved 	in 	the 	March 	8 	transfer. 	Rivera’s
attestations to the contrary are disregarded, because he does not provide
a basis for his personal knowledge of any other defendant’s “authority” to
dictate his transfer.
See (Doc. 102-1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
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Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:17-CV-1827, 2022 WL 3330142, at *12
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2022).
Nor does the record indicate any defendant’s deliberate indifference
between the March 8 transfer and the May 7 incident of self-harm.
Contrary to Rivera’s unsupported claims that he threatened self-harm at
every 	available 	opportunity, 	he 	had 	been 	refusing 	treatment 	and
complaining about the restrictions imposed because of his prior self-
harm. Nonetheless, he was accepted to a Behavioral Management Unit,
as he had requested, and was on the waiting list to be transferred.
Boyce’s11 many documented interactions with Rivera indicate patient and
exhaustive attempts to help him. When he tried to stop Rivera from self-
harm on the day in question, Rivera said: “You can’t stop it . . . [m]y mind
was already made up.” In sum, while the record vividly attests to Rivera’s
pain and distress, it equally shows that the medical staff consistently
tried to help him based on reasoned medical judgments. The events of
May 	7, 	2021, 	although 	tragic, 	did 	not 	result 	from 	any 	defendant’s
violation of Rivera’s constitutional rights.
11 While the record shows occasional contacts with Dempsey and
Donahue during this period, most of Rivera’s documented interactions
involved Boyce.
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V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted to the defendants.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: December 1, 2025
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
Case 1:22-cv-00233-JFS-SA Document 107 Filed 12/01/25 Page 23 of 23

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