ANTHONY v. NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 2:22-cv-03382-KNS Document56- Filed 10/08/26 Page1of4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL ANTHONY,
Plaintiff,
v. : CIVIL NO. 22-3382

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE,

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
Scott, J. October 8, 2026

Pending before the Court is Defendant National Republican Congressional Committee’s
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Michael Anthony’s sole remaining claim in his
Amended Complaint, a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. For the reasons discussed herein, the
Court grants the Motion and dismisses the claim with prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiff alleges that he received at least 58 unsolicited text messages from Defendant over
a 16-day period. The messages were sent at various times, including late at night. Plaintiff
contends that the manner and amount of text messages constitute an intrusion upon seclusion
(“IUS”). Plaintiff previously claimed that Defendant violated the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act (“TCPA”), which was dismissed by this Court. That dismissal was affirmed by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Plaintiff also previously pled an intrusion upon seclusion claim
which this Court dismissed without prejudice, granting Plaintiff leave to amend. Plaintiff

proceeded to amend his complaint and Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss in response.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

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I. Legal Standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Plausibility
means ‘more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’” Tatis v. Allied
Interstate, LLC, 882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). A claim is
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Jd. In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and interpreted in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor. See
McTernan vy. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Schrob v. Catterson, 948
F.2d 1402, 1408 (Gd Cir. 1991)).

Ul. Discussion

Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on three separate grounds:
because (1) the text messages in question were not “highly offensive to a reasonable person’; (2)
Plaintiff failing to state his TCPA claims necessitates the dismissal of his remaining IUS claim
because the TCPA claim is easier to plead; and (3) Plaintiff's [US claim would violate the First
Amendment by regulating protected core political speech. See ECF No. 53-1. Plaintiff counters
each of Defendant’s contentions accordingly. See ECF No. 54.

The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's IUS claim is insufficiently pled. An

intrusion upon seclusion claim provides that “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or

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otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (Am. Law Inst. 1977); Vogel v. W. T.
Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 129-30, 327 A.2d 133 (1974). Plaintiff pleads that the text messages were
highly offensive, but the Court finds Plaintiff's Amended Complaint lacking in necessary detail
regarding precisely how the text messages were highly offensive. In other words, Plaintiffs
conclusory allegations do not suffice. The Court previously dismissed this Count due to
insufficient detail and does so again today. See Anthony v. Nat'l Republican Cong. Comm., No.
22-3382, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62212, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2026).

Although in the Amended Complaint Plaintiff includes a timeframe during which he
received the text messages, the Court remains unconvinced that receipt of such messages amounts
to the “substantial” and “highly offensive” intrusion necessary to attach liability. Borse v. Piece
Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 622 (3d Cir. 1992); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt.
d (“It is only when the telephone calls are repeated with such persistence and frequency as to
amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff, that becomes a substantial burden to his existence,
that his privacy is invaded.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs allegations do not plausibly amount to
a “substantial burden to his existence [such] that his privacy is invaded” because Plaintiff could
have opted out of receiving the text messages at any point by replying ‘STOP’ to the short code.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. D.

Similarly, Plaintiff's argument that he did not opt out due to FCC guidance not to respond
to “suspicious texts, even if the message requests that you ‘text STOP’ to end messages” is
unavailing based on his own allegations. ECF No. 54 at 5. Plaintiff alleges that he “made

exhaustive and numerous attempts to get the unsolicited texting to stop” by “promptly attempt[ing]

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to identify the party responsible for sending them to request that the text messaging stop.” Am.
Compl. § 23. Thus, instead of replying ‘STOP’ due to his concern that the text messages were
suspicious, Plaintiff proceeded to contact several parties behind the transmission of the messages.
But the entire time, Plaintiff also had the option to delete the text messages, use the appropriate
text blocking tools, and forward the unwanted texts to SPAM, all of which is advised by the exact
same FCC guidance on which Plaintiff relies and has attached to his Amended Complaint. See
Am. Compl. Ex. A. The Amended Complaint fails to mention whether Plaintiff took such steps
or, if not, why he chose not to do so.

The Court’s conclusion is not that Plaintiff was required to “ask the intruder to stop and
only then is the violation triggered if the intruder does it again.” ECF No. 54 at 8 (emphasis in
original). Instead, the Court’s conclusion is that because Plaintiff had various means that a
reasonable person would have used, but nothing indicates that he did in fact use them, he
necessarily cannot state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. Nothing in Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint rises to the level necessary for Plaintiff to proceed here. As Defendant argues and with
which the Court agrees, “Anthony himself did not find these text messages ‘offensive’ enough to
block or opt out of them—as any ‘reasonable’ person would do. Thus, it is implausible these text
messages were ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person.’” ECF No. 53-1 at 10.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's IUS claim is dismissed with prejudice. It is so ordered.